

The Politics of Presence: Immigrant Representation in the Swedish Parliament

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Abstract. The current study explores how immigrants are represented within the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party in the Swedish parliament. Apart from exploring the descriptive representation of immigrants in the two parties in question in the Swedish parliament we explore whether immigrant representation in the aforementioned parties, results in visible diversity in views on migration and gender politics. We are particularly interested in exploring whether immigrant parliamentarians, who might have identities and experiences differing from the majority of the parliamentarians, represent views departing from the general party lines. Our theoretical underpinnings are based historical and feminist institutionalism. Our first findings, which are reached through a qualitative comparative analysis of survey material, are mixed. The number of Social Democratic and Moderate immigrant parliamentarians does not reach the level of foreign-born citizens in Sweden. Nevertheless, both parties appear to allow for diverse views on migration and gender that depart from the general party lines.

Keywords: *Immigration, political representation, intersectionality, institutionalism*

Introduction

Sweden had until recently one of the most generous immigration policy in Europe and in the recent refugee crisis it aimed to act as an example-setter for other European states to follow. Furthermore, the majority of Swedish citizens support a common European migration policy and are positive towards migration both from other EU states as well as non-EU states. (Eurobarometer 87 2017, Eurobarometers 82-86:2012-2016, see also Aylott and Bolin 2015). Sweden has, however also been confronted with several challenges following the recent refugee crisis¹ in Europe and an atmosphere of increased polarization in society.

¹ Sweden and Germany were the main host countries for asylum seekers in Europe in 2015 (The European Commission's Asylum Statistics 2017).

The current study investigates how immigrants², both women and men, are represented within the two largest political parties in the Swedish parliament, the Social Democratic party and the Moderate party. Apart from exploring how ethnicity, gender and cultural diversity are made known in Swedish politics, we explore whether the views of immigrant parliamentarians about immigration and gender politics depart from the general party lines. Based on our previous research on the link between equal descriptive gender representation and substantive gender representation, we are aware that a critical mass or descriptive representation can be a blunt instrument not automatically resulting in critical acts or substantive representation (Magnusdottir and Kronsell 2015 and 2016). Accordingly, the primary intention of this study is not to explore a possible causal relationship between descriptive representation of immigrant parliamentarians and a possible substantive representation of their views. We are rather interested in exploring how immigrants, both women and men, are represented within the two parties in question and whether their views depart from the general party lines and if so if these views are acknowledged or visible within the parties in question.

We start by mapping the descriptive representation of immigrants² in the aforementioned parliamentary parties in 2010 and 2014. Then we move on to exploring the views of immigrant parliamentarians by scrutinizing survey material from the largest election compass³ in Sweden, The Swedish national parliamentary elections 2014, including the current Social Democratic and Moderate parliamentarians, answered 45 questions in writing on different policy areas, such as; gender politics, migration, health care and education. The answers of the immigrant parliamentarians to the questions on gender and migration politics are then primarily compared to the answers of non-immigrant parliamentarians of these parties in order to explore whether the immigrant parliamentarians represent different views and prioritizations within their parties. We also make a comparison between male and female parliamentarians, both immigrants and non-immigrants in order to explore possible gender differences in the views on immigration and gender politics.

² Immigrants are here defined as foreign born individuals or individuals with foreign born parents (second generation immigrants).

³ The Election Compass 2014 was developed by The Swedish National Election Studies at the University of Gothenburg for the Swedish National Television (SVT).

The End of Bipolarity

Swedish politics have in recent years followed similar paths as many other European states, including decreased party loyalties and increased support for radical right wing movements. The long era of Social Democratic governments in Sweden had been broken in 2006⁴ when the centre-right government of the Moderate leader Fredrik Reinfeldt came into office. Reinfeldt and his government of 4 centre-right parties, The Moderates, The Centre Party, the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, was also the first majority government, in Sweden for over a quarter of a century (Aylott and Bolin 2015). In 2010 the traditional bipolarity of Swedish politics also changed. Swedish voters have generally had relatively clear choices between two blocks, one on the centre right with the Moderates and the Center Party in the forefront and the other on the left, led by the Social democrats. The populist party, the Sweden Democrats, (SD), won its first parliamentary elections in 2010, which had various effects on Swedish politics.

First, Reinfeldt's centre-right government lost its majority it had gained in the elections 2006, although the government slightly increased its vote share in 2010 and the Moderate Prime Minister became the first centre-right Prime Minister to retain office after parliamentary elections. The centre-right government could have maintained its majority in 2010 by including SD in its government but all four parties of the government alliance along with the opposition parties had announced at that point in time that they would not form a government with SD due to SD's restrictive migration policy. Secondly the entrance of SD into the Swedish parliament, Riksdagen, was startling to those mainstream voters who had perceived Sweden as a humanitarian norm-entrepreneur and advocate of an all-inclusive welfare system (Hellström 2013, Aylott and Bolin 2015, Erlingsson et al. 2012). Mainstream voters and media also raised concerns about whether Swedish politics were moving away from the policy of multiculturalism, closer to the neighbouring Nordic states with more stringent policies of assimilation (Allern and Karlsen 2013; Erlingsson, Loxbo and Öhrvall 2012). The reactions of both the government and the opposition parties to SD's entrance into Riksdagen were first characterized by attempts to isolate the Sweden Democrats but also by limited co-

⁴ Approximately 1/3 of the voters that voted for SD in 2014 had voted for the Moderate Party in 2010 (The Swedish Election Authority 2014, SVT's election compass 2014).


operation with SD in the parliament. Swedish media also exercised a similar isolation strategy against the Sweden Democrats. Mainstream media had generally not published campaign material from the Sweden Democrats during their election campaign in 2010. This isolation strategy of media and other parties did however not have the intended effects but rather strengthened the identity of the Sweden Democrats and their voters as outsiders and rebels against an ineffective establishment disconnected from the people. In the parliamentary elections in September 2014 the support for the Swedish Democrats increased from 5,7% (parliamentary elections 2010) to 12,9%, making SD then the third largest party in Sweden (The Swedish election authority 2014). Four years in parliament had established SD as parliamentary party and significant changes in attitudes towards the SD had also occurred in the months before the 2014 elections. Mainstream media now granted SD both advertisement space/time and published SD campaign articles, which had been nearly impossible for SD to obtain in 2010 (Sannerstedt 2014, Eriksson 2016, SVT 2014a).

The results of the European Parliament elections in May 2014 where populist right wing parties, including SD, increased their vote share considerably gave strong indications about the strength of SD at the national level. In 2014 SD also gained increased support from other social groups than in 2010, e.g. from urban voters with medium or high income and education, female voters, elderly voters and European immigrants (Sanderstedt 2014, SVT 2014a). Immigration was however not one of the top priorities of the median voter in 2014 who rather prioritized reforms in the health care and educational system (SVT2014a).

The responses of other parties between the EP elections in May and the Swedish parliamentary elections in September were unfocused and they; "...edged nervously around where they believed the median voter might be lurking..." (Aylott and Bolin 2015:3). In this period, the Moderates continued to lose support, mostly to the Sweden Democrats as the Sweden Democrats are to be situated on the centre-right political spectrum, close to the Moderates, in several policy areas such as fiscal politics and welfare state expansions (See e.g. Novus 2014). However, less than a month before election day Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt shifted the focus to immigration after a prognosis from Swedish migration authorities, stating that as many as 80000 refugees were expected to seek asylum in Sweden in 2014 (The Swedish Migration Authority, July 2014, Dagens Nyheter August 16, 2014). Reinfeldt both stated that the high cost

associated with this amount of asylum seekers would; “...create tensions in Swedish society...” but Reinfeldt, being a firm advocate of multiculturalism and liberal immigration politics, also stated that he was; “...asking the Swedish people to open their hearts for those vulnerable people who we see around the world” [author’s own translation] (Rosén 2014). These statements were criticized both for emphasizing the financial cost of saving refugees but some also claimed that Reinfeldt had unintentionally strengthened the Sweden Democrats by placing their prime topic higher on the agenda and by highlighting economic burdens.

It is difficult to say how much Reinfeldt’s statements affected the final outcome of the elections. Still, migration politics did not gain a permanent place at the top of the agenda in 2014 as mainstream voters continued to focus on their prior prioritizations, thus health care, education and employment, in surveys conducted in the last weeks before the elections (see e.g. SVT 2014a, Novus 2014). The results of the elections were however not only disappointing for the defeated centre-right alliance that had governed for eight years, but also for those that opposed the Sweden Democrats. Furthermore, the new minority government of Social Democrats and Greens had (and still has) a narrow parliamentary base, even with the support of the Left party (The Swedish Election Authority 2014).



Source: The Election Authority/Valmyndigheten 2014

The strong position of the Sweden Democrats resulted in a government crisis in December 2014 when the government was unable to get its budget approved in the parliament. The budget proposal of the centre-right opposition got more votes since SD decided to support the centre-right budget⁵. SD had actually announced that the party would vote against every government's budget unless SD's demands regarding a more stringent migration policy would be met. The Social Democratic Prime Minister, Stefan Löven, announced that extra elections would be held in March 2015 since the budget was not approved. The political climate was tense and the government and the centre-right alliance accused each other of limited co-operation spirit. Polls in December indicated that the voters of the largest parliamentary parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderates, would vote in a similar manner in the extra elections but SD seemed to be slightly increasing their vote share (SVT 2014b, DI 2014, Novus 2014). Accordingly, despite harsh accusations, the government and the centre-right alliance reached an agreement on the 29th of December and the extra elections were cancelled (Aftonbladet 29.12 2014). Apparently both sides deemed it necessary *at that point in time* to co-operate in order to secure a functioning minority government that was not dependent on the Sweden Democrats.

The Politics of Presence

The current study seeks inspiration from own previous work on the link between equal gender representation and substantive representation in Scandinavian politics. The previous research revealed that a balanced descriptive representation was to be considered a blunt instrument not automatically leading to substantive representation, where diverse experiences and views are recognized (Magnusdottir and Kronsell 2015, 2016). The current study builds on this knowledge and expands relevant feminist scholarship to employ in the context of immigrant representation. Representation in politics, or the lack of representation, has been an important topic in gender studies and the women's movement since suffrage debates (Lovenduski 2005: 1) but it is

⁵ Traditionally the opposition parties present their own budget proposals and vote for their own proposals but the Sweden Democrats decided to vote for the centre-right budget. Social Democratic Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven, had stated that his government would not continue to govern if its budget would not be approved.

also central to debates on democracy because concerns for representation, usually signal a lack, and means making something present when in some sense it is not. If for example representation of different social groups or minorities is lacking or low in democratic institutions or the representation is not balanced then it is a sign of ill- functioning democracy.

There has been a considerable debate over the years about the meaning of the concept of representation. Political theorists are inclined to use several different categories of representation (Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967). In our context, it is most relevant to distinguish between descriptive and substantive representation. Anne Phillips (1995) writes on representation; that to rely only on the representation of political ideas and views, for example through political parties, is not at all sufficient. She argues for politics of *presence* and is weary of the notion that there can be a representation of ideas and views for example on gender that would be detached from the person who is representing. The politics of presence mean that certain social factors, such as gender need to be included in the analysis of the representatives as they are a part of their identity and others cannot represent those factors.

Taking a starting point in Anne Phillips (1995) politics of presence, two main approaches have been developed (Lovenduski and Norris 2003). The first looks at descriptive representation in elected bodies and concerns the number of women and men (or social groups) and the relationship and balance between different representatives in political institutions. The share of seats in government, parliament and on the nomination lists of political parties are commonly used as a way to indicate inclusion of different social groups (Wängnerud 2009: 53). Most empirical research in Western Europe on *descriptive representation* has focused on gender representation without proper inclusion of other intersecting factors such as ethnicity, origin or education. The starting point for feminist research on descriptive gender representation is in the 'critical mass' argument, originally formulated within the business sector by Moss Kander, (1977) who argued that certain number of women needs be present for their presence to be felt (Dahlerup 2006). Dahlerup (1988) further developed the critical mass concept for politics, suggesting that the number of women represented, matters for representation to have substantive effects. Concepts like a critical mass and quotas have been useful and important to establish a female presence as well as the presence of

minority groups in politics. They can however be problematic when the focal point is on the numbers as other intersecting factors, such as age, education and income make known the diverse interests of immigrants as distinct individuals rather than a homogenous group. Linked to this is the question of whether minorities *will* make a difference or not, once they have been included in the polity (Dahlerup 2006:517) and the trickier question of what would be the indications of a substantive representation of immigrants.

Own previous studies on gender representation revealed that a gender-balanced descriptive representation was a blunt instrument that did not automatically lead to substantive representation or so-called “critical acts” by the critical mass (Magnusdottir and Kronsell 2015, 2016). It is therefore necessary to shift the focus towards ‘critical acts’ or what the political representatives think, what views they express and whether these activities have implications for policies (Tremblay 2006: 502). While substantive representation centers on the impact or effect of balanced representation, another aspect of this is the assessment of whether immigrant representatives are in any way different from non-immigrant representatives. Accordingly, representation is not merely about equal democratic rights but also about acknowledging that immigrant representatives *may* have different views and experiences that need to be presented and visualized as an important contribution to Swedish politics (Phillips 2000; Rauum 1995). An interesting point to note from the Nordic context is that Nordic gender quotas, (mostly used in Norway and Iceland) are not merely perceived as a matter of democracy and social justice as is the case e.g. in Germany and France (Freidenvall and Krook 2010) but they are viewed as a tool to include women’s experiences and views that *differ* from those of men (Inhetteen 1999, Teigen 2000). This is highly relevant for our study, although the Swedish political parties do not use formal quotas, since the experiences and views of different groups of immigrants may also *differ* from the majority of the Swedish people. Drawing parallels from studies on women’s representation, which have measured the importance of gender in the parliamentary process and demonstrated that female representatives help strengthen the position of women in society, we assume that immigrant representatives in parliament may strengthen immigrants’ position in society. Inspired by feminist and historical institutionalism we however also suspect that we might detect assimilation of

views and what can be called; “homogenic Swedishness” within the two political parties in question despite their strong support for diversity and multiculturalism. Accordingly, we think it is relevant to employ historical and feminist institutionalism in our analysis. Feminist institutionalism, which can be expanded to include other intersecting social factors than gender, argues that institutions are important to study because institutions organize power inequalities through formal as well as informal rules and practices and that constructions of identities are intertwined in the daily life or logic of institutions. Institutions, such as political parties, are arenas where social symbols such as ethnicity and gender are (re)shaped and individual identities can be products of institutions. Power relations built on ethnicity have previously been overlooked in institutional theory but we build on historical institutionalism, using its analytical strengths and concepts while seeking to overcome its blindness. We therefore combine insights from historical institutionalism about ‘path dependency’ and the ‘stickiness’ of institutions with an expanded feminist institutionalism.

Pierson says about power inequalities in institutions that they “can be reinforced over time and often come to be deeply embedded in organizations and dominant modes of political action and understanding, as well as in institutional arrangements” (Pierson 2004: 11). Furthermore, path dependency in institutions, such as the political parties, can be understood as ‘sticky’ because opportunities for innovation and changes are constrained by previous choices (Kenny 2007: 93). In our analysis, we are also inspired by the intersectionality approach although we do not employ it to the same extent as our main analytical tools, thus historical and feminist institutionalism.

The idea that women have special interests and men others has been widely discussed as part of the debate on women’s representation and it is with certain unease that the concept is used. Anna Jónasdóttir (1988: 38) suggests that there is a “minimal common denominator” in the shared interest of acting against the gender order. In later work, Jones and Jónasdóttir (2009:9-10) argue convincingly for the relevance of “the interest concept” as useful for analyzing gender. A problem in thinking in terms of interest not taken up by them is raised by Weldon (2011:441). She says that the problem is not: “...that women never share any interests” but that a focus on interests and a tendency to conceptualize them as common ones, lend privilege to certain women. This can

be expanded to the current study as we suspect that well-educated, high income earning female parliamentarians with and immigrant background might have less in common with low-income working-class immigrant women than their fellow male parliamentarians. Consequently, it may obscure minority views by overriding the differences that exist between women in terms of experiences and social positions (Weldon 2011: 442).

Methods and material


The descriptive and substantive representation of immigration and gender are primarily explored by mapping immigrants in the Social Democratic and Moderate parliamentary parties in 2010 and 2014 and via a qualitative analysis of the survey material from SVT's election compass. We start the analysis by mapping the descriptive representation of immigrants in the parliamentary parties in 2010 and 2014. We compare the descriptive representation of immigrant parliamentarians to the entire proportion of immigrant citizens in Sweden in order to establish how well immigrants are represented within the parliamentary parties in question. We also map the representation, of female and male immigrants and compare it to the general gender division in the parties in question. Furthermore, we make use of relevant data in regards to education and age in order to deepen our understanding of influential intersectional factors, other than gender, ethnicity or origin. Then we move on to exploring the views of immigrant parliamentarians by scrutinizing the aforementioned survey material from the largest election compass in Sweden; The Swedish national television's election compass ("Valkompassen 2014"), where candidates in the parliamentary elections 2014, including the current Social Democratic and Moderate parliamentarians, have answered 45 questions in writing in different policy areas, such as; gender politics, immigration, health care and education. We have selected 8 out of the 45 questions, 6 questions discuss migration politics and all (2) questions about gender politics. The answers of the immigrant parliamentarians to those questions are then primarily compared to the answers of non-immigrant parliamentarians of these parties in order to explore whether the immigrant parliamentarians represent views and prioritizations that differ from the majority views. We also make a comparison between male

and female immigrant parliamentarians in order to explore possible gender differences in the views of the female and male immigrant parliamentarians.

Descriptive representation of immigrants in the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party 2010-2014

Our intention in this section is not to give a complete account of immigrants' involvement in Swedish politics but to map and discuss immigrant representation within two of the largest parties in parliament as they are deemed well-suited to give us sufficient indications about descriptive representation of immigrants in Swedish politics. Definitions of immigrants have been a reoccurring theme in academic debates in recent years since these definitions are somewhat problematic and vague. In the current study, we have defined immigrants as foreign-born individuals or individuals with foreign-born parents (second generation immigrants).

In 2014 approximately 7,5% of eligible voters were foreign-born and around 15,4% of the total population was foreign-born (The Swedish Statistical Authority 2014). These 15,4% foreign born Swedish citizens situate Sweden in the 10th place of the 34 OECD states in terms of the proportion of foreign-born citizens of total population (OECD 2014, The Swedish Statistical Authority 2014, The Swedish Migration Authority 2014). The numbers become considerably higher when second generation immigrants with foreign-born parents are included, well over 20% (The Swedish Statistical Authority 2014). These numbers, especially those of second generation immigrants are estimated, and these numbers are in general problematic as immigrants from the other Nordic states; Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland, are not included in these numbers and Finnish immigrants are for example one of the largest immigrant group in Sweden (The Swedish Migration Authority 2014). We do still consider these numbers to be useful for comparison as they give us indications about the descriptive representation of immigrants in the Swedish parliament.




Source: The Swedish Statistical Authority 2014

We start our mapping within the Social Democratic Party, which is currently the largest party with 113 parliamentarians or 31% of the seats in the parliament. A simple mapping reveals that 11,5% of the Social Democratic parliamentarians in 2014 can be defined as immigrants. Most of them are foreign-born themselves but a small minority are second-generation immigrants with foreign-born parents. The proportion of immigrant parliamentarians does therefore not reach the 15,4% foreign-born population but there is an increase from 2010 when the immigrant parliamentarians were only 8,03%. Women are 43% of the immigrant parliamentarians and men 57% which is to be considered a gender-balanced representation and in line with the general gender division within the Social Democratic parliamentary party with 53% male parliamentarians and 47% female parliamentarians in 2014 (The Swedish Election Authority 2014, SVT 2014a). Approximately 66% of the immigrant parliamentarians are originally from the EU or one of the EU candidate states, including Turkey. The rest are from states with a high number of refugees such as Iran, Syria and Eritrea. Accordingly, European immigrants appear to be slightly overrepresented among Social Democratic parliamentarians as just about half of foreign-born citizens in Sweden are European (The Swedish Statistical Authority 2014, SVT 2014a).

We then move on to the Moderate Party, currently the second largest

party with 83 seats or 23% in the parliament. Nearly 11% of the Moderate parliamentarians in 2014 are immigrants. This is similar to 2010 when the Moderates had 107 seats in the parliament and 11,2% of their parliamentarians had an immigrant background. Women are 56% of the immigrant parliamentarians and men 44%, which is to be considered a gender-balanced representation and in line with the general gender division within the Moderate parliamentary party with 52% male parliamentarians and 48% female parliamentarians in 2014 (The Swedish Election Authority 2014, SVT2014a). The origin of the Moderate immigrant parliamentarians is slightly more balanced than in the Social Democratic party as 56% of the Moderate immigrant parliamentarians come from EU or EU candidate countries, including Turkey, and 44% from states outside of Europe. Accordingly, there appears to be a fairly balanced representation between EU immigrants and non-EU immigrants, although specific states with large refugee groups, such as from Syria, Afghanistan and Eritrea might be underrepresented (The Swedish Statistical Authority 2014, SVT2014a).



Source: The Swedish parliament/Riksdagen 2014

A vast majority of both the female and male immigrant parliamentarians has a university degree, which is in line with the general education level of Swedish parliamentarians and the fact that the general education level of Swedish

immigrants is equal to the education level of ethnic Swedes although there are considerable differences between various ethnic groups (The Swedish Statistical Authority 2014 and The Swedish parliament/Riksdagen 2014)

Concluding discussion

We have now established the descriptive representation of immigrants in the Social Democratic party and the Moderate party in 2010-2014. Our first findings reveal that the percentage of immigrant parliamentarians, including second-generation immigrants, does not reach the same level as foreign-born citizens in Sweden, excluding second-generation immigrants. Nevertheless, the descriptive representation of immigrants has increased in the Social Democratic party, between 2010 and 2014, which might indicate further attempts to inclusion. Now we are interested in scrutinizing the substantive effects or representation of the views of the immigrant parliamentarians. More precisely, critical acts such as diverse views, identities and experiences in party politics rather than political homogeneity. As a first step, we suggest that evidence of diversity acknowledgement is to be found in the answers of the parliamentarians in SVT's election compass 2014⁶. Systematic comparison of the answers⁷ of the immigrant parliamentarians, both women and men and the non-immigrant parliamentarians reveals some diversity worth further exploration.

Starting with a general question on multiculturalism; *all* the immigrant parliamentarians from both parties claim that it is a *very positive* proposal to aim for a multicultural Sweden. This is slightly more positive than the general party line for the Moderate party, where 61% are *very positive* and 29% are *rather positive* and 2% are *negative*. Within the Social Democratic Party 86% are *very positive* and the rest are *rather positive*. In comparison 95% of the Sweden Democrats are *very negative*. The five additional questions in the immigration category give us rather mixed results; Those questions all indicate some sort of a diversity acknowledgement within the political parties in question as the views of the immigrants differ from the views of non-immigrants but gender differences among the immigrant parliamentarians are barely visible. Female and male immigrant parliamentarians in both parties are for example all more negative, than the general party line, to the proposal of making it possible for

⁶ 92% of the Social Democratic immigrant parliamentarians participated in the SVT'S election compass vs. 75% of the Moderate immigrant parliamentarians.

⁷ See questions in appendix.

asylum seekers to apply for an asylum at Swedish embassies abroad and the main argumentation appears to be concerns about that the principle of legal security might be compromised. The immigrant parliamentarians are also *all* more negative (*very negative*) towards the proposal of Sweden accepting fewer immigrants in the future. The differences between the immigrant parliamentarians and the general party lines are however very slim as the majority of both Social Democrats (98%) and the Moderates (86%) perceive this proposal as *negative* or *very negative*. In comparison 91% of the Sweden Democrats are *rather positive* or *very positive* towards this proposal.

Two questions/proposals out of the 6 questions/proposals regarding immigration politics, produce more surprising results, worth further investigation. First is the following proposal:

The police should actively search for asylum seekers whose asylum applications have been rejected and the police should deport them (SVT's Election Compass 2014a) [author's own translation].

All of the Social Democratic immigrant parliamentarians are rather negative towards this proposal, which is in accordance with the party line as 80% of the Social Democrats are rather negative or very negative here. The general party line for the Moderate party here is that 59% are rather positive or very positive but among the immigrant parliamentarians 75% are rather positive or very positive and the rest is negative but gender differences are not detected. A proposal/question for free healthcare for undocumented migrants also produces some interesting results for the Moderate Party. All of the Moderate immigrant parliamentarians are rather negative towards free healthcare for undocumented migrants, which is interesting since 28% of the non-immigrant parliamentarians are rather positive and 12% are very positive. The Social Democratic immigrant parliamentarians' answers are almost identical to the majority line where 55% are rather positive (53% of majority) and the views of the rest of both immigrant parliamentarians and non-immigrant parliamentarians are distributed along similar patterns from very positive to rather negative or indifferent) with no detectable gender differences. In comparison, 97% of the Sweden Democrats are very negative towards providing free healthcare to undocumented migrants.

The results for the last two proposals/answers discussed are interesting, as the Moderate immigrant parliamentarians appear to be more negative than their non-immigrant colleagues. Feminist and historical institutionalism might provide us with partial answers about this stringent position of the Moderate immigrant

parliamentarians. They might be experiencing some sort of a 'hegemonic Swedishness' within the Moderate party, where there is certain stickiness within the party as an institution and where ethnicity only refers to the immigrants. The immigrant parliamentarians might therefore feel pressured to assimilate. This affects their potential role as possible protectors and advocates of undocumented migrants as well as other immigrants. The intersectionality approach might also apply here, as the immigrant parliamentarians might not have much in common with e.g. undocumented migrants. The parliamentarians are well-educated high-income earners. In addition, the immigrant parliamentarians that originally came as refugees were granted asylum and have most likely never lived in Sweden as undocumented migrants for a long period of time. We detect a similar pattern when exploring standpoints on gender quotas in the private sector in SVT's election compass. Immigrant female parliamentarians in the Moderate party appear to be slightly more negative towards using gender quotas than their male colleagues (both male immigrants and male non-immigrants). Feminist institutionalism and an understanding of how the political parties produce and include/exclude knowledge is important here; female immigrant parliamentarians might be experiencing a 'double pressure', not only by a potential institutionalization of 'Swedishness' within the political parties but also by a hegemonic masculinity within political institutions, where there is a certain historical path dependency or structural stickiness, which treats masculinity as the norm and gender only refers to women. Two points need to be emphasized here; first of all, from an intersectionality perspective and the debate about politics of presence, it is challenging to perceive immigrants as a homogeneous group with common interests. Secondly, it is also problematic to perceive immigrant parliamentarians as automatic protectors of other immigrants instead of individuals with various ideological standpoints. This might deepen our understanding of the immigrant parliamentarians and their (potential) representative roles within their parties as well as how multiculturalism and ethnic diversity is made known and conceptualized within the two parties in question.

Accordingly, our first findings reveal that the number of immigrants in both parties does not reach the level of foreign-born Swedish citizens but their representation has increased in the Social Democratic party, between 2010 and 2014, which might indicate further attempts to inclusion. The results from SVT's election compass 2014 indicate that immigrant parliamentarians are not silenced, they do make their voices known and in some areas their opinions differ from the views of non-immigrant parliamentarians. We can cautiously claim that diversity appears to be

acknowledged in both parties, which is in line with the general ideology of both parties. The diversity might however be somewhat limited due to the fact that intersecting social factors, other than ethnicity, such as education and income probably emphasize the commonalities between the immigrant parliamentarians and their non-immigrant colleagues rather than various immigrant groups in Swedish society that do not share these intersecting factors with the immigrant parliamentarians. Furthermore, the fact that there were barely any gender differences in the views of the immigrant parliamentarians might indicate that the political parties in question are path-dependent institutions, reproducing hegemonic masculinity, where gender only refers to women and the women adapt to an oppressive institutional environment. Further research is warranted in order to increase our understanding on how political parties produce and include/exclude knowledge and norms and might organize power inequalities through formal as well as informal rules and practices.

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Appendix

Questions/proposals from The Election Compass of the Swedish national television 2014/ SVT: *S Vallokalsundersökning Riksdagsvalet 2014*, available at www.svt.se/pejl/det-har-ar-valu. Possible answers in the election compass: a) *Very positive*, b) *rather positive*, c) *rather negative*, d) *very negative*, e) *no opinion/indifferent*.



Question/proposal 1: "Sweden should aim for a multicultural society".

Question/proposal 2: "Asylum seekers should be able to seek asylum in Swedish embassies abroad".

Question/proposal 3: "Sweden should aim for accepting fewer immigrants in the future".

Question/proposal 4: "The police should actively search for asylum seekers whose asylum applications have been rejected and the police should deport them".

Question/proposal 5: "Undocumented refugees should have access to free healthcare".

Question/proposal 6: "All municipalities should be obliged to accept refugees".

Question/proposal 7: "Gender quotas should be used in order to include more women as board members in companies".

Question/proposal 8: "Sweden should aim to redistribute power from men to women".