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**JIMS - JOURNAL OF IDENTITY AND MIGRATION STUDIES**  
Research Centre on Identity and Migration Issues - RCIMI  
Department of Political Science and Communication Science  
University of Oradea  
Address:  
Str. Traian Blajovici nr. 2  
Oradea, 410238  
Romania  
Tel./Fax: +40 259 408 167  
E-mail: jims@e-migration.ro; contact@e-migration.ro  
Website: www.jims.e-migration.ro

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Abstract. This exploratory research seeks to investigate the risk perception of Turkish citizen’s vis-à-vis Syrian refugees, utilising cultural cognition as a theoretical sounding board. Delimited to the city of Izmir, the aims of this research were to ascertain what perceived risks Syrian refugees pose onto Turkish society, how these perceptions relate to worldview adherences amongst Turkish citizens, and what psychological processes may explain the development of such perceptions. Employing a mixed-methods approach, triangulation of both news article and focus group content analyses identified five commonly perceived risks relating to Syrian refugee entry into Turkey: employment, inflow, social, political and security. This information informed the design of a survey instrument, of which was used to compare worldview adherences to perceptions of said risks and demographic characteristics. For two of the five risks, results showed that egalitarians perceived the refugees as a higher risk than those with hierarchist identities. It was also found that individuals with higher levels of education and employment were more likely to perceive Syrian refugees as a risk to Turkish society. As a starting point to explore the development of such perceptions of risk, the processes of identity-protective cognition, reactive devaluation, self-censorship, and optimism bias were used to tentatively explicate the data.

Keywords: risk perception, refugees, identity, cultural cognition, psychology, Turkey

Introduction

Since the spring of 2011, Syria has been undergoing a brutal civil war. As of March 2018, the inter-agency Syria Regional Refugee Response (2018) estimates that over 3.5 million Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey. As has been identified by Pürel Ercoban (2016), Director of the Izmir-based Association for Solidarity with Refugees...
(Mülteci-Der), this has caused a growth in xenophobic sentiments. This is not unusual, as similar trends have been identified in many refugee-hosting countries, notably in South Africa (Crush and Ramachandran 2010; McKnight 2008; De Jager 2011), Lebanon (El-Malak 2002; Hanafi 2014; Ibrahim 2008) and Kenya (Kibreab 2014; Reini 2013; Pavanello et al. 2010). As Kibreab (2007, 31) identifies, refugees are often “(...) invariably blamed for being the cause of economic crisis, shortage of housing, transportation, water, electricity, employment, (...) theft, crime, prostitution and other forms of anti-social behaviour”. Thus, there is a significant need to understand host country perceptions of risk towards forced migrants.

The following research has the objective to examine Syrian refugee inflow and associated risk perceptions held by Turkish citizens in the Aegean city of Izmir. It does so through the theoretical lens of cultural cognition, understood as an approach that combines both cultural theory and the psychometric paradigm. Cultural theory, largely credited to the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas (1970; 1978), asserts that there are “(...) two dimensions of sociality (....), ideal typical social positions (...) able to account for cultural diversity in the most parsimonious way possible” (Mamadouh 1999, 396). These two dimensions, leading to a defined worldview, are known as ‘grid’ and ‘group’. Grid is understood as the “(...) social distinctions and delegations of authority that they use to limit how people behave to one another” (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, 138). Therefore, “the higher the grid dimension, the less life is open to individual negotiation” (Wouters and Maesschalck 2014, 225). Group represents “(...) the outside boundary that people have erected between themselves and the outside world” (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, 138). Therefore, “the higher the group dimension, the more individual choice is subjected to group determination” (Wouters and Maesschalck 2014, 225). Cultural theory undertakes what is known as ‘grid-group analysis’, placing individuals as either hierarchists (high grid, high group), egalitarians (low grid, high group), individualists (low grid, low group) or communitarians (high grid, low group). Claiming that “(...) risk perception can be predicted by cultural adherence and social learning” (Oltedal and Rundmo 2007, 254), cultural theory has been a fruitful theoretical lens in understanding perceptions of risk (see Cerroni and Simonella 2014; Hood 1995; Wouters and Maesschalck 2014). The psychometric paradigm, conversely, has the primary interest of determining various psychological processes at play in the development of risk perception. Predominantly attributed to the work of Slovic (1987), the psychometric paradigm uses “(...) psychological scaling and multivariate analysis
techniques to produce quantitative representations or ‘cognitive maps’ of risk attitudes and perceptions” (Slovic 1987, 281). Through its use, the psychometric paradigm has “(...) identified factors that influence the perception of different hazards” (Siegrist et al. 2005, 211), such as affect, overconfidence, dread and desire for certainty (see Slovic and Peters 2006; Slovic et al. 1980; Chauvin et al. 2008). Cultural cognition seeks to collate both cultural theory and the psychometric paradigm by adopting grid-group analysis all the while taking into account the various individual and group psychological processes that may be involved in the development of cultural worldview ascriptions. For instance, cognitive-dissonance avoidance, affect, naïve realism and reactive devaluation (Kahan et al. 2007) have been used in conjunction to explain cultural worldview adherences and how group and individual characteristics harmoniously sustain perceptions of risk.

The goal of this mixed-methods research was to determine which risks are typically attributed to forced migrants, and how cultural cognition plays into the development of Turkish risk perceptions of Syrian refugees in Izmir, Turkey. The aims were as follows: (1) to examine the Syrian refugee inflow and associated risk perceptions held by Turkish citizens, (2) to ascertain whether there is causality between cultural worldviews and risk perception and (3) to explore possible group and individual psychological processes that could contribute or sustain risk perception in respects to Syrian inflow. Relevant to each aim, three research questions were established:

1. What perceived risks do Syrian refugees pose onto Turkish society?
2. How do cultural worldviews affect the perception that Syrians pose a risk to Turkey?
3. What psychological processes (group and individual) can explain the perception of risk that Syrian refugees pose a threat to Turkish society?

As cultural cognition has never been used in the context of forced migration, this research was fundamentally exploratory. Thus, no hypotheses were established prior to the research, as is typical with exploratory research. Research ethics approval was granted by the University of Leicester Ethics Sub-Committee for Media and Communication and School of Management on 16.09.2015.

Methods

Research design

Due to the limited number of empirical studies on host country risk perception of forced migrants within the Middle Eastern context, a mixed-methods
approach was deemed most suitable as it provides “(...) multiple ways of seeing and hearing, multiple ways of making sense of the social world (...)” (Greene 2008, 20), supported by an understanding that “(...) the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone” (Cresswell and Plano Clark 2007, 5).

In order to determine dominant public interest risk themes relating to Syrian refugees, two instruments were developed. The first involved a content analysis of news articles of two newspapers, Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News, selected based on results by Efe and Yeşiltaş (2012) of which determined both had vastly different representation of events. The content analysis included articles from June 1st to October 1st 2015, a period selected based on the media outpour resulting from the 2015 European migration crisis, along with its convenience in relation to other parts of the research schedule. In total, 167 articles were selected by means of rigid exclusion criteria’s and coded according to risk themes. A focus group was then organized in 2016 to verify the findings of the news article content analysis, enrich its content, authenticate the data within the relevant study area, and determine any perceptual gaps of refugee inflow risks that were not identified. Using quadrat sampling in Izmir’s most densely populated and economically diverse district (Konak), five individuals took part in the focus group discussion. The discussion was recorded, then transcribed, and coded using the same coding frame used during the newspaper content analysis. Results of both newspaper and focus group content analyses were compared using chi-square analysis, determining five risk themes – employment, inflow, legal deviance (security), political, and relations between Turks and Syrians (social) – of which were drafted into survey questions. The survey instrument, including the Likert-style risk perception questions, also included demographic questions, and incorporated a survey instrument developed by Kahan et al. (2007) of which has been used to determine grid-group adherences. Given that census data in Turkey is not collected systematically, data sets are not comprehensive and census records for individuals are not available (at least publicly) for consultation. Thus, the hope of reaching a survey sample representative of Izmir’s population had to be abandoned early in the research. This was one of the most relevant factors leading to this research remaining exploratory rather than explanatory or action-based. As a result, snowball sampling was used for the survey component of this research. This type of sampling is usually used when there are “(...) less than optimal research conditions where other methodologies are not
applicable” (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 424), and is understood as a “(...) nonprobability sampling in which subjects initially selected recruit other subjects, who in turn recruit other subjects, and so on” (Powers and Knapp 2011, 172). In total, 130 surveys were returned and completed in good form, which is sufficient for studies which are exploratory in nature (Shevels 2015).

Data analysis

Data collected by the survey instrument was analysed using SPSS. Multiple analyses were undertaken, including analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine interactions between worldview profiles and risk items, and both linear and ordinal regression to increase the reliability of results. Forward stepwise regression, using models which incrementally added independent variables, was used in both cases of regression analysis.

Results

Descriptive statistics

| Table 1: Descriptive statistics for independent variables |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Category                          | Frequency | Percent |
| EMPLOYMENT LEVEL                  |            |        |
| Unskilled                         | 32        | 24.6   |
| Semi-skilled                      | 47        | 36.2   |
| Skilled manual                    | 32        | 24.6   |
| Skilled non-manual                | 8         | 6.2    |
| Intermediate                      | 4         | 3.1    |
| Professional                      | 7         | 5.4    |
| EDUCATION LEVEL                   |            |        |
| Elementary                        | 10        | 7.7    |
| High school                       | 40        | 30.8   |
| Bachelor’s                        | 59        | 45.4   |
| Master’s                          | 16        | 12.3   |
| Doctorate                         | 5         | 3.8    |
| GENDER                            |            |        |
| Female                            | 72        | 55.4   |
| Male                              | 58        | 44.6   |
| ETHNICITY                         |            |        |
| Minority                          | 23        | 17.7   |
| Turkish                           | 107       | 82.3   |
| WORLDVIEW1                        |            |        |
| Egalitarian                       | 57        | 43.8   |
| Hierarch                          | 73        | 56.2   |
| WORLDVIEW2                        |            |        |
| Communitarian                     | 57        | 43.8   |
| Individualist                     | 73        | 56.2   |

For independent variables, the majority of participants worked in semi-skilled employment (36%); 45.4% had a Bachelor’s level of education; 55.4% were
women; 82.3% self-identified as ‘Turkish’; 56.2% scored as hierarchists; and 56.2% scored as individualists. Socio-demographic and worldview characteristics of the survey sample are reported in Table 1.

Descriptive statistics relating to answers vis-à-vis risk item questions (dependent variables) are reported in Table 2. As reported, the bulk of respondents believed all risks to be either “high” or “very high”, compared to “low” or “very low” response rates. This is particularly evident for both employment and social risk. Security and political risk exhibited the most variability in answers. Across all risk categories, participants believed inflow risk to be the highest (“very high” = 32.3%) and political risk to be the lowest (“very low” = 7.7%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q32: EMPLOYMENT RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q33: INFLOW RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q34: SECURITY RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q35: POLITICAL RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q36: SOCIAL RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of variance (ANOVA)

Given the nature of this research and what it sought to explore, single-factor ANOVA tests were undertaken between risk question dependent variables and cultural worldview independent variables. Three of the five risk theme questions – specifically employment ($p = 0.020$), inflow ($p = 0.0002$) and social ($p = 0.004$) – showed significant variance. On each of these three questions, a Bonferonni-corrected t-test was conducted on all six worldview combinations in order to assess answer variance between worldview interactions. Data showed significance for certain worldview interactions (see Table 3). The employment risk question responses exhibited significance between hierarchist-individualists and egalitarian-communitarians. The inflow risk question showed the richest results in terms of response variance, three worldview interactions in total. The most variance was between hierarchist-communitarians and egalitarian-communitarians ($p = 0.0000$). The social risk question responses showed two significant cases of variance, the first between hierarchist-communitarians and egalitarian-individualists, and the second between hierarchist-communitarians and egalitarian-communitarians.

Table 3: Bonferonni corrected post-ANOVA t-test between worldview profiles and question answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worldview interactions</th>
<th>p(T&lt;=t) two-tail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q32: Employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Hier_Comm</td>
<td>0.1751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Egal_Indi</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.8637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Comm x Egal_Indi</td>
<td>0.0942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Comm x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.4488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egal_Indi x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.0614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q33: Inflow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Hier_Comm</td>
<td>0.1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Egal_Indi</td>
<td>0.0885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Comm x Egal_Indi</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Comm x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egal_Indi x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.1116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q36: Social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Hier_Comm</td>
<td>0.5631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Egal_Indi</td>
<td>0.0234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Indi x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Comm x Egal_Indi</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hier_Comm x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.0062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egal_Indi x Egal_Comm</td>
<td>0.7580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bold indicates significance according to Bonferonni corrected critical value of 0.008.
Regression analysis

As the debate rages on about how to treat Likert-style dependent variables (see Norman 2010), the decision to implement both linear and ordinal regression was taken in the early stages of the research design. Both regression tests were implemented using forward stepwise regression, whereby models – distinct sets of independent variables – are incrementally added into the regression. Model 1 introduced gender, age, employment and education variables. Model 2 introduced ethnicity. Model 3 introduced worldview affiliation variables. Results from both linear and ordinal regression tests were interpreted simultaneously. As the goal of this research was to evaluate the impact of worldview adherences to perceptions of risk, and in an attempt to stay within a reasonable word count, only the two of five risk items which returned statistically significant results (i.e. social and inflow) are presented below. Employment risk also demonstrated significant results, but with other non-worldview independent variables. Thus, along with security and political risks, statistical data for employment has been omitted but is nevertheless included in the 'Discussion' section of this paper.

Table 4: Linear forward stepwise regression, where DV is Q36 (social risk), responses based on a 5-point agreement-disagreement (reverse coded) Likert scale, answering the question "The relationship between Syrian refugees and Turks is quite good"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>0.204 (0.179)</td>
<td>0.182 (0.182)</td>
<td>0.075 (0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-0.025 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.024 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.024 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT LEVEL</td>
<td>-0.098 (0.085)</td>
<td>-0.095 (0.085)</td>
<td>-0.112 (0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION LEVEL</td>
<td>-0.248 (0.123)</td>
<td>-0.244 (0.123)</td>
<td>-0.162 (0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKISH</td>
<td>-0.186 (0.236)</td>
<td>-0.239 (0.229)</td>
<td>-0.239 (0.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIER vs EGAL</td>
<td>0.066 (0.184)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDI vs COMM</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.176)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2.668</td>
<td>2.252</td>
<td>3.297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: IV’s were added incrementally into three models. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at \( p \leq .05 \). N = 130.

The first multiple linear regression results are shown in Table 4, where question 36 (“The relationship between Syrian refugees and Turks is quite good”) is the dependent variable. In response to the social risk posed by Syrian refugees, the hierarchist-individualist value expressed significance in both linear (see Table 4) and
ordinal models (see Table 5). In model 3 of the linear regression (r-squared 0.159; significant F-value of 3.297), a positive coefficient indicated that egalitarians had a tendency to consider social risk as higher than hierarchists. The well-fitted ordinal regression (-2 Log likelihood 0.006; 0.125 Pearson chi-square; r-squared 0.229) showed a similar trend, where the significant egalitarian coefficient of -1.374 marked a higher risk perception than the hierarchist baseline variable.

Table 5: Ordinal forward stepwise regression, where DV is Q36 (social risk), responses based on a 5-point agreement-disagreement (reverse coded) Likert scale, answering the question "The relationship between Syrian refugees and Turks is quite good"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.049 (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSKILLED</td>
<td>2.396 (1.223)</td>
<td>2.427 (1.225)</td>
<td>2.416 (1.263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI-SKILLED</td>
<td>1.925 (1.128)</td>
<td>1.922 (1.126)</td>
<td>2.117 (1.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKILLED MANUAL</td>
<td>1.56 (1.116)</td>
<td>1.589 (1.119)</td>
<td>1.574 (1.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKILLED NON-MANUAL</td>
<td>1.873 (1.328)</td>
<td>1.873 (1.326)</td>
<td>1.963 (1.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERMEDIATE</td>
<td>2.042 (1.367)</td>
<td>2.087 (1.375)</td>
<td>1.843 (1.425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESSIONAL</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEMENTARY</td>
<td>1.982 (1.36)</td>
<td>1.982 (1.358)</td>
<td>1.212 (1.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH SCHOOL</td>
<td>1.455 (1.068)</td>
<td>1.443 (1.07)</td>
<td>1.069 (1.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACHELOR’S</td>
<td>0.121 (0.999)</td>
<td>0.107 (0.999)</td>
<td>-0.041 (1.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTERS</td>
<td>0.313 (1.038)</td>
<td>0.305 (1.039)</td>
<td>0.154 (1.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCTORATE</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.375)</td>
<td>-0.091 (0.383)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNICITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINORITY</td>
<td>0.155 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.235 (0.473)</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKISH</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLDVIEW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGALITARIAN</td>
<td>-1.374 (0.407)</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERARCHIST</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITARIAN</td>
<td>-0.685 (0.364)</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUALIST</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ .05. N = 130. Logit link function. Data points 0a are baseline variable classes.

Regarding regression significance, education took more importance in responses concerning inflow risk (question 33). Across all three linear regression models (see Table 6), education showed negative significance, meaning that those with lower education were more likely to perceive the risk of allowing large numbers of refugees into Turkey as lower than the remaining respondents. The education coefficient did, however, decline (-0.406 to -0.293) when worldview variables were added within model 3. The hierarchist-egalitarian scale worldviews expressed significance (0.838), with a positive coefficient indicating a tendency for hierarchists
to perceive inflow as a lower risk than egalitarians. Ordinal regression (see Table 7) confirmed the difference between hierarchist and egalitarian perception of risk, with a significant egalitarian worldview coefficient of -1.492 below the hierarchist baseline class (thus, perceiving risk as higher). Keeping with the ordinal regression, the significance of education determined through linear regression was pared down, showing in all three models that a maximum educational attainment at the high school level was the most influential educational category.

Table 6: Linear forward stepwise regression, where DV is Q33 (inflow risk), responses based on a 5-point agreement-disagreement (reverse coded) Likert scale, answering the question "The number of Syrian refugees that were accepted into Turkey was appropriate".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>0.25 (0.221)</td>
<td>0.188 (0.222)</td>
<td>0.044 (0.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-0.022 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT LEVEL</td>
<td>-0.175 (0.105)</td>
<td>-0.169 (0.104)</td>
<td>-0.192 (0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION LEVEL</td>
<td>-0.417 (0.152)</td>
<td>-0.406 (0.151)</td>
<td>-0.293 (0.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKISH</td>
<td>-0.529 (0.288)</td>
<td>-0.605 (0.276)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIER vs EGAL</td>
<td>0.838 (0.222)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDI vs COMM</td>
<td>0.034 (0.212)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>3.194</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>4.629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: IV’s were added incrementally into three models. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ .05. N = 130.

Discussion

In total, the survey research instrument explored the perception of five risks. From the analysis of survey data, at least two of the five risk items (inflow and social risks) provided some answers to the aforementioned research questions stated in the introduction. The data obtained within the context of the three remaining risk items (employment, security and political risks) were much more inconclusive in regards to how worldviews play in the perception of risk. This next section expands on the results obtained through this research, bridging obtained results with research questions, and exploring possible reasons for these findings.
Table 7: Ordinal forward stepwise regression, where DV is Q33 (inflow risk), responses based on a 5-point agreement-disagreement (reverse coded) Likert scale, answering the question "The number of Syrian refugees that were accepted into Turkey was appropriate".

| Model | AGE | UNSKILLED | SEMI-SKILLED | SKILLED MANUAL | SKILLED NON-MANUAL | INTERMEDIATE | PROFESSIONAL | EDUCATION | ELEMENTARY | HIGH SCHOOL | BACHELOR'S | MASTER'S | DOCTORAT | GENDER | FEMALE | MALE | ETHNICITY | MINORITY | TURKISH | WORLDVIEW | EGALITARIAN | HIERARCHIST | COMMUNITARIAN | INDIVIDUALIST |
|-------|-----|-----------|-------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|----------|----------|--------|-----------|-----------|----------|-------------|--------------|
| 1     | -0.022 (0.027) | 2.15 (1.189) | 1.968 (1.108) | 1.243 (1.093) | 1.945 (1.298) | 1.255 (1.33) | 0a         |           | 2.665 (1.368) | 2.493 (1.089) | 1.34 (1.024) | 1.133 (1.059) | 0a       | -0.152 (0.36) | -0.04 (0.368) | 0a       | 0.807 (0.458) | 0.743 | 0.134 | 0.464 |
| 2     | -0.017 (0.027) | 2.279 (1.185) | 1.942 (1.097) | 1.399 (1.09)  | 1.934 (1.29)  | 1.474 (1.335) | 0a          |           | 2.651 (1.367) | 2.462 (1.091) | 1.261 (1.025) | 1.079 (1.06)  | 0a       | -0.04 (0.368) | -0.04 (0.368) | 0a       | 0.847 (0.468) | 0.675 | 0.157 | 0.852 |
| 3     | -0.016 (0.028) | 2.21 (1.213) | 2.189 (1.126) | 1.361 (1.11)  | 1.871 (1.333) | 1.139 (1.361) | 0a          |           | 1.959 (1.428) | 2.285 (1.148) | 1.248 (1.085) | 1.021 (1.119) | 0a       | 0.083 (0.379) | 0.083 (0.379) | 0a       | 0.847 (0.468) | 0.675 | 0.157 | 0.852 |

Note: IV’s were added incrementally into three models. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bolded coefficients are significant at $p \leq .05$. N = 130. Logit link function. Data points 0a are baseline variable classes.

**Inflow and social risk**

As the intention of this research was to evaluate risk perception through the use of cultural cognition, significant variance ($p \leq .05$) between cultural worldviews was of particular interest. Data analysis revealed that such variance, specifically in regards to the hierarchist-egalitarian worldview scale, was most apparent in responses relating to inflow and social risk. In both cases, the egalitarian worldview perceived the risk as higher than those holding hierarchist worldviews.

Understanding the identities of hierarchists and egalitarians in Turkey is imperative to develop a thoughtful frame of potential explanatory factors fuelling their division on the refugee issue. A relevant way to do so is to look at one of the most polarising event in Turkey’s recent history, the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Although the historical green space in Istanbul was indeed the focal point of civil unrest, the Gezi Movement was far from geographically centralised, where protests...
spanned across dozens of cities, rallying an estimated 3.5 million individuals (De Ballaigue 2013). The importance of this period in regards to this research lies within the prevalent use of egalitarian narratives used by the crowds of protesters. Egalitarianism was a pivotal part of the emergence of the protest movement, where it was the “(...) result of the cumulative authoritarian governmental actions that people revolted against the regime in pursuit of egalitarian ideals (...)” (Ayindli 2015: 4). Alonso (2015) illustrates the magnitude of the Gezi Movement:

“What had initially started as a small sit-in to protect the last piece of green space in central Istanbul went on to develop as a nationwide uprising of sorts. Turkey had rarely seen this level of inter-group camaraderie in contemporary history. It seemed that, at last, something was happening that would start to seriously question the policies that had destroyed (and continue to do so) large chunks of the social fabric, environment, the tangible and intangible heritages of Istanbul, alongside the possibilities of more egalitarian and truly heterogeneous urban spaces.” (Alonso 2015: 231)

Aside from the participants’ strong focus on egalitarianism, another “(...) overarching theme was that of culture, especially the presumed fragmentation of secular political culture at the behest of a pro-Islamic authoritarian nationalist conservative party” [emphasis in original text] (Abbas and Yiğit 2015, 73). Similarly, Moudouros (2014) claims that “(...) the mass mobilization of the protests was attacking the central vein of the ideological and economic aspirations of political Islam regarding the transformation of urban space” (Moudouros 2014, 191) and that the movements’ strong opposition to the ruling AK Parti (AKP) developed “(...) another major pole which came to dispute all the previous ones: it disputes the ideological autocracy of the Islamic world, it requires the overthrow of the Islamic paternalism and at the same time it distances itself from and denounces the older version of the Kemalist authoritarianism” (Moudouros 2014, 193). The movement also presented a stance vis-à-vis Turkey’s economic future, as was expressed in Gürcan and Peker’s (2015) book Challenging Neoliberalism at Turkey’s Gezi Park: “we hope that our enterprise will contribute to the understanding of the prospects and limitations of the emerging popular-egalitarian alternatives to neoliberalism” (Gürcan and Peker’s 2015, 6).

Although a brief outline of the Gezi affair, it is clear that environmental, social, cultural, political and economic spheres factored into this nationwide crisis. Arguably, it is indeed one mean by which the identities of egalitarians and hierarchists in Turkey can be carved out. Furthermore, a look at the demographic
makeup of Gezi protesters provides interesting parallels with this research’ findings. A study undertaken by Konda Research and Consulting (2014) showed that of sampled Gezi park protesters, 34.5% had a high school education, 42.8% had completed college (equivalent to a Bachelor’s degree) and 12.9% had a Master’s degree (Konda Research and Consulting 2014, 11). This is consistent with the egalitarian educational profile determined in this research, where instances in which egalitarians perceived risk significantly higher than hierarchists (inflow and social risk) were paired to higher levels of education. Cluster analysis also revealed the correlation between egalitarians and higher levels of education, where one of five egalitarian-individualist clusters was combined with Master’s level education, another with the Doctorate level, two with the Bachelor’s level and another with high school level education. In contrast, both hierarchist-individualist clusters had elementary education as cluster members.

Although this research has no intention to seek answers in the wrong places, the objective of a discussion is indeed to explore and propose reasoning for research findings according to the best explanatory sources. The Gezi crisis is fresh in Turkey’s history and its magnitude should not be undermined. The events explicitly demarcated a line between two very distinct camps, those who support AKP’s vision of “New Turkey” (Yavuz 2006) as a strong state built on the pillars of neoliberalism and Islam (Moudouros 2014), and those dissidents who disagreed with this outlook. It is not unlikely that this strong polarisation transpires to the refugee inflow question. In fact, this trend was identified in a study by the Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre, where it was determined that Turks supporting AKP were more likely to have positive feelings towards refugees (Erdoğan 2014).

It has been well documented that the decision to allow such a great number of refugees into Turkey was AKP’s making (Bozkurt 2012). Thus, if a parallel is drawn between anti-AKP Gezi protesters and the egalitarian profile of this research, it is possible that egalitarians consider the risk greater than hierarchists because they do not have as strong an allegiance or trust in the current apparatus governing Turkey. If this is true, identity protective cognition may be at work. Kahan et al. (2007) outline the circumstance in which identity protective cognition may take place:

“Individual well-being, this account recognizes, is intricately bound up with group membership, which supplies individuals not only with material benefits but a range of critical nonmaterial ones, including opportunities to acquire status and self-esteem. Challenges to commonly held group beliefs can undermine a person’s well-
being either by threatening to drive a wedge between that person and other group members, by interfering with important practices within the group, or by impugning the social competence (and thus the esteem-conferring capacity) of a group generally.” [emphasis in original text] (Kahan et al. 2007, 470)

In Cohen et al.’s (2000) work on the play of biases and self-affirmation within the perception of abortion, results showed a “tendency to rate the attitude-confirming advocate more favorably than the attitude-disconfirming one” (Cohen et al. 2000, 1160), supporting a theory that “(…) people resist evidence that challenges the validity of strongly held beliefs (…)” (Cohen et al. 2000, 1161). Knowing that the AKP-led government proposed Turkey’s open-door policy for Syrian refugees, and assuming that egalitarians are potentially comprised of individuals with alternate party affiliations (or none at all), their higher perception of risk may be a form of motivated cognition by which AKP initiatives are perceived as inherently anti-social, destructive and unadvisable. To further illustrate this point, what is suggested here is that if egalitarians saw the relationship between Turks and Syrian refugees as good or low risk (social risk), or the number of allowed refugees to enter Turkey to be acceptable (inflow risk), then their affinity to governmental wariness would be threatened to a certain extent. This has strong ties to the process of reactive devaluation, “(…) the tendency of individuals who belong to a group to dismiss the persuasiveness of evidence proffered by their adversaries in settings of intergroup conflict” (Kahan and Braman 2006, 166), where even if there was evidence of social cohesion between Syrian refugees and Turks, egalitarians would potentially reject these facts. Alternatively, as McCright and Dunlap (2011) explain that “the parallel dynamics of identity-protective cognition and system-justifying attitudes also suggest that heightened emotional and psychic investment in defending in-group claims may translate into misperceived understanding about problems (…)” (McCright and Dunlap 2011, 1165), it is possible that hierarchists perceive social and inflow risks as lower than egalitarians in order to justify the arguably rigid and hierarchical AKP system, and would therefore validate news reports showing successful relations between Syrian refugees and Turks.

As religion and its place in national identity configured into the Gezi movement, it may have had influence on egalitarian and hierarchist perceptions of risk. Moudouros (2014) explains that:

“(…) the AKP managed to restore the doctrine of an ‘original Turkey’ as the central characteristic of the identity that seeks to impose itself in public. The basic components of this identity are the local characteristics unique to the nation and
Islamic religion, as interpreted by the current political power” (Moudouros 2014, 184)

Demographic data concerning Turkey’s June 2015 election shows that 44% of AKP’s electorate was composed religious conservatives (16% above the national average), 47% were traditional conservatives and 9% identified as “modern” (Konda Research and Consulting 2015, 75). In contrast, AKP’s main contender, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), had an electorate profile made up of 8% religious conservatives, 38% traditional conservatives and 54% identifying as “modern” (29% above the national average)(Konda Research and Consulting, 2015: 75). Both cultural theory and cultural cognition consider culture as the anchor dividing hierarchists and egalitarians. However, as these theoretical frameworks have been applied in Western societies, where cultural diversity is much more prevalent due to colonisation, globalisation and global migration flows, culture in Turkey is much more homogenous and its divisions are rather anchored in the debate of modernisation versus traditionalism. Historically speaking, Turks have mostly identified as non-Arabs (Salbi 2015; Uzer 2016), largely fuelled by their penchant for secularism and modernisation. However, although “(...) Turkish historiography has been dominated by secularization theory that takes as axiomatic the ‘decline of religion’ both among individuals and in society as a whole as a result of modernization” (Brockett 2011, 222), “(...) Turks today who do not consciously identify as Muslims have a very real fear that their own freedoms are now at risk with an Islamic political power” (Brockett 2011, 226). As Syrian refugees flow through the border, originating from the Arab world with higher national rates of religiosity, egalitarians’ plausible affinity to modernisation and secularism is now threatened, potentially explaining a higher perception of refugee inflow and social risk.

The authentic truth explaining the division between hierarchists and egalitarians on the inflow and social risks relating to Syrian refugee inflow is unattainable within the scope of this research. However, as this section carved out potential variables contributing to hierarchist and egalitarian identities, future research opportunities have become visible.

**Security and political risk**

Responses regarding both security and political risk were largely inconclusive when analysed against independent variables. Significant variability was only
identified in responses relating to security risks, where ordinal regression identified that individuals working in lower employment levels considered the risk to be lower than those working in higher employment levels. Linear regression, however, did not recognise this variability as significant.

Descriptive statistics regarding risk level responses for both political and security risks evidently demonstrate a larger spectrum of responses when compared to the other risk factors. For instance, where risk level is primarily considered as “high” or “very high” for employment and social risks, responses for political and social risk seemingly hover between “high” and “low”. Various factors, other than those demographic characteristics collected in this study, can potentially explain the larger spectrum of risk perceptions for political and security risks.

As briefly identified in the last section, AKP has greatly changed Turkey’s political landscape since its success as the ruling party since 2002. One of the early events foreshadowing the current state of Turkey’s political landscape were the 2008 Ergenekon court trials. Led by AKP, 275 individuals, including army generals, lawyers and journalists, were accused of being part of a coup-plotting terrorist organisation named “Ergenekon”. After five years, “(…) the court acquitted only 21 out of some 275 defendants and handed down harsh sentences to the rest” (Taş 2014, 163). This was, however, a controversial case, as some journalists and academics claimed that the Ergenekon court trials were potentially an attempt by AKP to silence political opponents (Hürriyet 2008; Taş 2014; Esayan 2013). When the same State prosecutors working on the Ergenekon case went after then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (now President) for corruption charges in 2014, Erdoğan attempted to discredit the prosecutor’ authenticity, “(…) acknowledging what many legal and forensics experts have long said: that, in a word, the [Ergenekon] trials were a sham” (Arango 2014). However, at this point, constitutional changes (Aydınlı 2011) were already put in place and the once politicised and traditionally parallel military forces (Haynes 2010) were now seemingly under AKP rule (The Economist 2013). This was an extensive change, as “(…) Turkey’s political culture and the legitimacy of successive regimes have been strongly moulded by the heavily politicised armed forces” (Haynes 2010, 315). It is from this understanding that both political and security risks have been grouped together in this discussion.

Although well within the lines of ethical protocol, asking questions about the political and security risks brought about by Syrian refugees may be wrought with limitations in a socio-political climate such as Turkey. Beck (1998) explains that...
manufactured uncertainty “(...) means that risk has become an inescapable part of our lives and everyone is facing unknown and barely calculable risks” (Beck 1998, 12). In Turkey, this unknown is exacerbated by a widely-recognised systematic control of information by the ruling party. In the 2016 Prison Census by the Committee to Protect Journalists, Turkey ranked 1st globally for journalist imprisonment (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2016a). Alternatively, Reporters with Borders’ 2017 World Press Freedom Index ranked Turkey 155th highest out of 180 countries (Reporters Without Borders, 2017). In one event, where photograph-supported reports surfaced that Turkey’s Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı intelligence agency (MIT) was transferring weapons into Syria, the state resorted to pressing terrorism and treason charges against the two journalists who had reported on this evidence (Committee to Protect Journalists 2016b). Judges and lawyers have also faced the brunt of censorship, Human Rights Watch calling it “(...) government control of the judiciary” (Sinclair-Webb 2015). Academics have not escaped ideological control either, where following a recently drafted petition signed by 90 Turkish academics demanding a ceasefire in the predominantly Kurdish southeast region, government security forces detained 27 of them under a charge of spreading terrorist propaganda (Weaver 2016).

As Coote (1998) asserts that planning for uncertainty involves “(...) a continuing dialogue between the public and the policy-makers”, and that it is indeed “(...) a two-way process in which those who are responsible give account and are held to account by those who have vested that responsibility in them”, it is apparent that by means of censorship, the current Turkish State does not want a dialogic relationship with its citizens, or at least those who do not endorse all of AKP’s endeavors. This lack of dialogue can lead to a misunderstanding of risks, potentially explaining the large spread in political and security risk perceptions. Other studies on public perception of risk, particularly in the context of climate change, have drawn similar conclusions (see Corbett and Durfee 2004; Poortinga et al. 2011; Corner et al. 2012). Fear may also be at play in the make up of responses, where some respondents may have downplayed political risk (by means of self-censorship) in the event that somehow their identity would be revealed to Turkish authorities. Some may have answered according to their understanding that the current government’ shear strenght will tame security risks, as has been the case with its recent military campaign in Kurdish areas in southeastern Turkey, along with widespread arrests following the 2016 coup attempt allegedly plotted by the Gülen movement (Lowen
2017). In view of the 2015 Ankara bombing attacks claiming the lives of nearly one hundred protesters, and where Cagay Duru of the Association of Turkish Psychologists stated that “such man-made attacks not only kill or injure people, but also cause severe harm on the psychology of individuals and society” (Girit 2015), others may have responded according to a view that security gaps do exist. Lastly, although not claiming that this is the last of possible explanation for the response divide on (particularly) security risk, is the notion of optimism bias. Where optimism bias is “(...) the tendency to rate our own risk as significantly lower than that of our peers (...)” (Cameron 2008, 573), some may have answered thinking that while a security risk may in fact exist, the slim chances that it affects them directly may have lead them to a lower perception of actual risk.

**Employment risk**

Descriptive statistics (see Table 2) indicated that, generally, the risk of Syrian refugee inflow was perceived as “high” (51.5%) or “very high” (26.2%). As was briefly outlined in the introduction, this is a common fear amongst host country citizens. By means of regression analysis, employment, education and ethnicity independent variables were shown to express significant variance in responses ($p \leq .05$). Those having a higher level of education, working in a high employment category and identifying as Turkish seemingly perceived employment risk as higher than the remainder of respondents.

Media reports concerning both Syrian refugees and the theme of employment show two very different realities. On the one hand, the Syrian refugees’ inability to secure work permits has forced many into informal or low-paying jobs, causing hostility amongst locals competing for the little work that is available (Ozdemir 2014; Today’s Zaman 2014). In this scenario, the results from this research are surprising, as those in higher-level employment perceive refugees as a higher risk to Turkish employment than those working in unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled-manual jobs. The second refugee employment reality is portrayed as successful, where Syrian’s were the most prominent group of foreigners starting new businesses in Turkey in 2014 (Hürriyet Daily News 2014) and that 2015 saw “(...) more than 1,000 companies (...) established in Turkey with at least one Syrian partner (...), compared with 30 in 2010” (Hürriyet Daily News 2015). This equates to about one out of forty new businesses in Turkey, indicates a report by the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (Zalewski 2015). This second scenario, where Syrian refugees
are seemingly gaining an increasingly strong foothold in business on Turkish soil, may be one of a plurality of factors explaining why those in higher-level jobs (e.g. those working in business or finance) have a significantly higher employment risk perception than those working in lower-income employment sectors.

Coupled with results for risk perception and educational attainment, higher risk perception amongst those working in higher-level employment sectors may also have been the result of increased access to information. According to the 2015 Turkish Statistical Institute (2015) survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) usage, 94.1% of individuals with a university degree had logged onto the Internet within a three month period, in contrast to 31.2% of individuals with a primary level education (Turkish Statistical Institute 2015). Similarly, a report on Internet and social media usage in Turkey found that those with higher incomes (thus likely in higher employment levels) were significantly more likely to use the Internet for news information than those in lower income ranges (Konda Research and Consulting 2011). Although no studies specific to Turkey have been undertaken comparing the representation of Syrian refugees in print, television and online news platforms, studies such as Yang and Grabe’ (2011) confirm that a knowledge gap exists between those individuals who gather news information from print and those who consult online sources. Bek (2004) asserts that tabloidization permeates throughout the whole of Turkey’s television networks (and has also been extended to print media), resulting in televised and print news that is condensed and politically superficial: “the reporting adopted in this news is not the investigative type; it does not attempt to investigate why and how an event happened or what the social context or solutions are” [emphasis in original text] (Bek 2004, 381). Online news sources, on the other hand, are much more fluid and dynamic, as content is added at multiple times of the day, articles are connected via hyperlinks and users can participate through discussion boards and comment threads. This, undeniably, creates an environment with richer content and greater learning opportunities rather than television or print news sources that restrict or dumb down (in the case of tabloidization) information. As Akser and Baybars-Hawks (2012) outline that since AKP’s political success in 2002 was followed by the mass conglomeration of television and print news, creating what they call a “(…) media autocracy (…)” (Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012, 315), it is not unlikely that news coverage pertaining to refugee livelihoods and well-being has been wrought with distortions. If this is the case, it would potentially explain why both highly educated and those working in
high-level employment jobs (i.e. those individuals more likely to access online news sources) would have a wider understanding and pulse on the refugee issue, their livelihoods and their potential impact on Turkey’s employment structure.

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Victims or Intruders? Framing the Migrant Crisis in Greece and Macedonia

Ivo BOSILKOV and Dimitra DRAKAKI

Abstract. Representations of immigrants in media are considered a major factor in shaping immigration attitudes. In the context of the migrant crisis in Europe, we analyze how news content about the migrant crisis is framed by media in Greece and Macedonia, two neighboring countries on the Balkan migrant route. By using framing theory as analytical framework, this study applies Benson’s (2013) paradigmatic “security/threat” and “humanitarian/victim” frame dichotomy in migration coverage to the concept of issue framing. The content analysis of six print media outlets in both countries (N = 660) investigates the variety of subframes and framing devices within the scope of the two overarching frames, finding dominant portrayals of refugees as illegal trespassers, potential terrorists and social burdens in both countries. However, positive depictions of migrants are more common in Greece, which we attribute to the absence of ideological consensus and differences between the countries’ political and media systems.

Keywords: media, framing, migration, Greece, Macedonia

Introduction

Immigration in Europe has been a heated topic in both public and academic debate in the last decades, due to the major implications it has for the political system and the social fabric of European countries. Yet, if during this period immigration has been considered concerning, in the past two years, with the eruption of conflicts in several regions near to the European continent, especially in the Middle East, the issue has transformed into an existential one, becoming a priority in the mind of many European citizens.

A relatively unscrutinized factor in shaping public opinion on immigration are the media. Information relayed via the press has been shown to have an important role in determining how people think about the issue (Boomgaarden and
Vliegenthart 2009; Schemer 2012; Van Klingeret al. 2014). In the context of the current so-called “European migration crisis”, with fears about terrorist attacks rising rapidly, and the ever-growing debate about multiculturalism versus assimilation (see Borooah and Mangan 2009, also Triadafilopulous 2011), the media have an even greater significance regarding the issue. Parallel to the media debate on immigration, there is a metadebate on whether the media’s approach manages to reflect the complexity of migration, sometimes resulting with criticism for reinforcing discourses of prejudice and exclusion (Thorsbjornsrud 2015; Cecchi 2011).

The first step towards investigating media effects is identification of the news content. Thus, the aim of this study is more narrow both in terms of analytical framework and societal context, focusing on the coverage of migration in an environment strongly affected by it. Media influence public opinion in a variety of ways such as agenda setting and priming (Zaller 1992; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), but one particular mechanism that is especially utilized in migration coverage is news framing. We add to the literature by analyzing how migration is framed in Macedonia and Greece, comparing the news coverage on the crisis in the two neighboring countries which have been directly affected by the mass movement of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants on the Balkans route. What makes this research question even more pertinent is the fact that the two countries have a very different experience with migrants, distinct social and media traditions, as well as complicated bilateral relations, making comparative media research a suitable approach. Thus we also provide an extensive case contextualization, aimed to explain the rationales of migration framing in the two countries.

Framing migration

We define framing as the way in which reality is organized by journalists and news organizations through their working routines, in order to provide the meaning of the story and capture the essence of the issue (Scheufele 1999). From this perspective, the information packages that constitute media frames are effective as discursive devices because they are made intelligible by individual frames, as “information processing schemata” (Entman 1991), or “internal structures of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990). Lecheler and De Vreese (2012) encapsulate this relationship by conceiving frames as patterns of interpretation that are used to classify information sensibly and process it efficiently. Therefore, there is a
fundamental distinction between framing as a microconstruct, represented by the existing cognitive schemas of audiences that make issues accessible, and as macroconstruct, referring to modes of presentation of information by journalists that reduce the complexity of issues (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

The focus of this study is on the latter, or more accurately, on the “frame building” part of Scheufele’s (1999) process model of framing, conducted by journalists (p. 115). Journalistic frames on migration are issue-specific, as they are intrinsically related to certain topics and as such differ from generic frames which can be applied on a wide range of topics (De Vreese et al. 2011). As framing has famously been described by Entman (1993) as “the selection of certain aspects of perceived reality and making them salient, in such way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation” (52), framing migration requires the use of specific techniques to reduce the issue’s complexity, by shedding light on selected aspects of it. Journalists draw such techniques from a repertoire of existing frames based in and bound by culture, and as such, frames result not only from media practices, but also from the specific historical, political and social context in which they occur (Van Gorp 2005: 488). Accordingly, the approach to covering migration is the outcome of the sociopolitical circumstances, reflecting the economic, cultural, and (especially since September 11th) security threat seen in the arrival of newcomers. At the same time, Western democratic values and the political system in Europe assume equal rights for minorities, tolerance of different cultures and protection from persecution through asylum.

It is in this setting that media frames on migration are constructed. Some scholars argue that the focus on irregular immigration in Europe is unbalanced and disproportionate considering its complexity (Benson 2013; Horsti, 2007; Suro 2011; Thorsbjornrud 2015) and media representations of immigration tend to be selective and negative, resulting with “demonisation” of migrants that tends to erode social cohesion and lead to marginalization and exploitation of migrants (Milonio et al. 2015). According to them, issue of immigration is securitized through the discourse of existential fear and othering, which becomes embedded into the constitution of political community and practice (Huysmans 2006), and perpetuated by media through use of terminology such as “illegals”, “clandestines”, “overstayers”, “economic freeriders” with reference to migrants. However, at the same time the tradition of quality journalism in Europe institutes distinct normative commitments
such as diversity of content in political, social and cultural terms, and trustworthy and balanced news (Van Cuijlenberg and McQuail 2003). Applied to the issue of migration, this “social responsibility” paradigm has materialized through a strive for serious, in-depth coverage, often utilizing a generic frame of human interest to bring a human face or emotional angle to the presentation of migration, countering stereotypical narratives (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). In the context-specific extension of this framing strategy, media present asylum seekers as vulnerable victims forced to leave their countries due to a fear of persecution because of race, religion, ethnicity or political opinion, and therefore, under international humanitarian laws have the right to protection in another country (Van Gorp 2005).

According to Van Gorp (2005) it is these two conceptualizations which establish a parsimonious dichotomy of migration framing in media; the “intruder” frame; a cultural manifestation of ‘the other’ as a threat to one’s own cultural and economic achievements, and the “victim” frame; a common dramaturgic technique used to portray those find themselves helpless in a situation. The preponderance of the typology in the news is also corroborated by Beyer and Matthes (2015) specifically for illegal migration, and by Benson (2013) in his analysis of immigration coverage in the United States and France. Within these two broad generalizations exists a diversity of subframes; Horsti’s (2007) discourse analysis reveals two underlying frames which fit the threat description: the illegality frame, which portrays the undocumented asylum seeker in the context of criminality and human smuggling, and the control frame, which implies the danger of asylum seekers leaving the reception centres, or their border registration. The enforcement frame and immigration reform frame are characteristic for the American media discourse with regards to Latin immigration (Kim et al. 2011), and even public health is included in the variety of threatening aspects of migration. Within the humanitarian frame, prominent representations are those of migrants as being victims of human smugglers, or suffering from racism (Milioni et al. 2015).

This range of subframes that comprise the categories are necessary for the construction of a more exhaustive codebook that would encompass all the ways in which migrants are framed in media. However, on a higher level of abstraction that we consider essential in order to round up this theoretical overview, we believe our contrasting frames correspond with the idea of valenced frames (Schuck and De Vreese 2006), which assess frames as carrying inherently positive or negative meanings. We depart from the premise that the victim frame highlights
considerations of humanism, empathy and solidarity, thus evoking a compassionate outlook and altruistic sentiment vis-a-vis migrants. In turn, the intruder frame unequivocally depicts migrants as a danger to society. Hence, in substantive terms, from the perspective of “native” media’s portrayal of migrants, the threat frame is negative, while the humanitarian is positive. This is, we argue, is an important distinction when it comes to a cross-national comparative evaluation of how the media represents migration. In this study, we compare Greece and Macedonia, the first EU and non-EU country on European soil respectively, along the Balkan migrant route.

**Case contextualization**

Despite being neighbouring states on the Balkans, Greece and Macedonia diverge significantly in terms of government characteristics, political tradition and media environments. This would indicate not only strong differences in the authorities’ management of the recent migrant crisis sparked by the violence in the Middle East (especially the Syrian war) and the general public perception of the crisis, but also the media coverage of the migrants, as endogenous to the other two aspects.

The relationship between the two countries is also difficult and controversial, as they have been locked in a dispute over Macedonia’s name and identity since its declaration of independence from communist Yugoslavia in 1991 (see Floudas 2002; International Crisis Group,2009). The antagonisms stemming from the dispute didn’t help bilateral cooperation regarding the migrants, which added to the lack of coordination, confusion and chaos on the Greek-Macedonian border, as migrants attempting to reach Western Europe were held in the Idomeni camp in tense conditions that frequently turned violent and reached international notoriety (Smith and Tran 2016).

**Macedonia**

Beyond the impact of the dispute, the specific internal political, social and media characteristics of the two countries had a prominent effect on their approach to the crisis. Macedonia is a post-communist state which during the last decade has been governed by a right-wing nationalist-populist party VMRO-DPMNE, in a rule
characterized by authoritarianism (Sisovski and Kolozova 2015). The party’s authoritarian tendencies have been most strongly felt in the media sphere; Freedom House (2016) downgraded the status of the country from “partly free” to “not free”, due to government wiretapping of journalists, corrupt ties between officials and media owners, and an increase of attacks on media workers. The Media Sustainability Index (2015) reports that “traditional media are almost completely dominated by pro-government editorial policies, as a result of the active effort of the ruling parties to exert control over the leading broadcast and print media” (78). To facilitate the domination in the political debate, methods such as bribery (or blackmail) of media owners through awarding government advertising contracts and inciting public hatred against certain media and journalists have been employed (Belicanec and Rizliev 2012).

This deeply pessimistic description of the media situation serves to establish its correspondence with the basic outline of the Mediterranean polarized pluralist model by Hallin and Mancini (2004), although with much more extreme characteristics. This model differs from the North Atlantic liberal and the North European democratic corporatist model by the level of political parallelism, which in the Mediterranean type is high, as well as the high role of the state in the media system through intervention and subsidies, in addition to low journalist professionalization. The media situation in Macedonia resembles even more the post-communist Eastern European countries according to the updated Hallin and Mancini media systems analysis. For example, striking similarities can be found with Poland, where media partisanship, political advocacy and clientelism is omnipresent (see Dobek-Ostrowska 2012); however, the media culture is even more dire in Macedonia, where the polarization is more strongly reflected in every sphere of society.

Finally, Macedonia has not only internalized and upgraded corruptive media practices, but also the general media and public discourse vis-a-vis the migrants that has been characteristic for Eastern Europe, one of intolerance, xenophobia and prejudice, further expressed in Eastern EU members’ rejection of migrant quotas proposed by the EU (Gross 2015). With the number of migrants on the border rapidly increasing, the government overcame the initial confusion and began implementing a more restrictive policy, eventually refusing entrance for migrants altogether (Kroet 2016). Pro-government media were eager to follow the regime’s cues, further solidifying the perception of migrants as a
threat, especially from terrorist attacks. In a situation where most media are controlled by the government, the narrative of danger and emergency quickly became dominant.

**Greece**

Contrary to Macedonia, Greek media had longer time to evolve since the fall of junta in 1974 and the consolidation of democratic governance. The abolition of state monopoly in the early 90s has led to rampant commercialization of radio and television with hundreds of new channels and stations proliferating at national, regional and local levels (Papatheodorou and Machin 2003). However, media legislation did not contain specific checks to prevent high levels of horizontal concentration of ownership (Media Pluralism Monitor 2014) and as a result, six publishers own the biggest nationally circulated newspapers, many magazines, a handful of broadcast media, as well as press distribution agencies. Furthermore, these owners of the biggest media conglomerates, the ‘oligarchs’ as commonly known in Greece, are also active in other sectors of the economy and often receive favourable government deals. In such ambient, media are used as instruments for strengthening of relations with politicians to facilitate acquisition of state contracts, as also reported by a US Embassy cable by Wikileaks (Embassy Athens 2006). In general, the media culture in Greece is traditionally seen as being one of clientelism and instrumentalization (Nevradakis 2014), with media and state being intertwined, a phenomenon broadly witnessed in southern Europe (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002).

The fiscal crisis that broke out in Greece in 2009 inevitably affected all existing societal structures including the media landscape, challenging the status-quo as the vast majority of the population started expressing a tendency of questioning the established media organizations. Traditional narratives were gradually starting to get rejected by a more skeptical Greek public scoring some of the lowest levels of trust for the mainstream media institutions in European Union according to the Eurobarometer 2016 survey. The crisis of the predominant media structures led to a shift towards alternative channels of information (Donadio 2013). Simultaneously, the Greek population also punished traditional political elites, leading to the triumph of the leftist party SYRIZA that came into power in January 2015. As the party pledged to regulate the lawlessness of the media scene and dismantle the link between state and private media, a parliamentary examination
committee started an investigation of the legality of advertising expenditure of Greek banks to media and political parties over a period of the last ten years.

The action towards ending corruption in media has been slow and inconsistent as the government of the ruling left-wing Syriza party struggles also on various other fronts: dealing with the long-standing debt crisis and managing the refugees and migrants influx that saw 857 thousand people entering Europe through Greece in 2015, while the closure of the Balkan route in March 2016 left tens of thousands of migrants stranded within the country’s borders. The unprecedented influx and the makeshift refugee camps on the borders exacerbated the instability of the press, leaving mostly ideological affiliation as orientational device for covering the crisis.

**Data and Methods**

To identify the frames in the two countries we employed a quantitative content analysis. Using a deductive approach, we adapted the work of Milioni et al. (2015) to devise a codebook consisting of twelve categories. Seven categories (“smuggling”, “refugee”, “othered”, “scapegoat”, “helpless”, “journey”, “success story”) represented the subframes of the overarching “victim” frame, while the other five (“illegal”, “alien”, “social intruder”, “civic threat”, “health threat”) made up the dimensions of the overarching “intruder” frame. We complemented the coding scheme of Millioni et al. (2015) with the instructions for identifying ‘framing devices’ of Van Gorp (2005), as well as specific frame properties (prevalence of themes, explanations offered for why people enter the EU, and proposed solutions for the migrant crisis) from a recent UNHCR report on the press coverage of the refugee crisis in the EU (Berry et al. 2015) to increase validity in the particular context.\(^1\) According to coding instructions, for each article frames were coded as present (1) or absent (0). From the subframe variables, we created an additive index for the victim frame (ranging from 0-7) and for the intruder frame (0-5), thus generating the overarching frames by mean calculation.

We selected six newspapers, three from Greece (Ef Syn, To Vima and Kathimerini) and three from Macedonia (Utrinski Vesnik, Vecer and Dnevnik) for our

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\(^1\) A detailed codebook containing the full descriptions, problem definition, problem source, responsibility and possible solutions that make up the subframes, is available upon request to the authors.
comparative analysis. The newspapers are considered quality press, and have among the largest circulations in both countries. We took special care to choose print media that belong to all sides of the ideology spectrum, in order to account for the ideological/partisan affiliation factor; as such, Ef Syn and Utrinski are considered to be generally left-leaning, Dnevnik and Kathimerini are known as neutral or centrist media, while To Vima and Vecer have a right-wing bias.

The period we have chosen for analysis were the whole months of February and March 2016. The reason for this particular time frame was due to the escalation of the migrant crisis on the border between the two states and the ultimate closure of the Balkan migrant route, which also spiked media coverage during this period. We gathered the data through searching for the keyword “migrant(s)” and “refugee(s)” in the newspapers online databases. While the online databases don’t encompass all the articles that are published in the print edition, they do account for most of these articles, and more importantly, reflect editorial policy of the newspapers.

During our preliminary sampling procedure, we identified 927 articles on migration in Macedonian media and 2865 articles in Greek media. A design decision was not to analyze the entire population, rather to aim for approximately hundred articles per outlet, a number that would yield a representative sample. Thus we performed systematic sampling, analyzing every third article from the search results in Macedonian newspaper archives, and every eighth article in Greek media, arriving to a total number of 660 articles. The intercoder reliability was assessed with Krippendorf’s alpha and was found satisfactory for both the Greek ($\alpha = 0.67$) and Macedonian media ($\alpha = 0.62$).²

Results

We start the analysis by an overview of the frames present in Macedonian and Greek media separately, establishing a general picture of how the migrant crisis was reported in the newspapers of both countries. Table 1 shows the presence of frames discovered in the articles of Utrinski, Dnevnik and Vecer, allowing comparison between the coverage in the three outlets. The immediate impression is that positive frames (119 in total) are vastly outnumbered by the

² A subsample of ten randomly chosen articles for each outlet was coded by two research assistants, each for the articles of their own native language.
negative ones (291). Among the victim frames, the most utilized is the one portraying migrants as helpless with 48 occurrences, where the three newspapers exhibit a significant difference ($\chi^2 (2) = 5.649, p = .059$) with Utrinski using it 24 times. The illegal/criminal frame is the most present one from the negative frames (164), and right-wing Vecer is employing it 71 times, significantly more than Utrinski (51) and Dnevnik (42), $\chi^2 (2) = 7.208, p = .027$.

The case with Greek print media is the opposite. The positive frames in total are used 403 times among all newspapers, while the negative frames appear 191 times. Chi-square tests reveal statistically significant differences in five of the seven victim subframes, where left-wing Ef Syn is reporting on the crisis with a strong sympathies towards the migrants. The three outlets also are significantly different in intruder framing in three out of five subframes (illegal, social intruder and civic threat), where Kathimerini scores the highest percentage of negative depictions. The entire distribution is provided in Table 2.

### Table 1. Frames in Macedonian newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Utrinski (N=113)</th>
<th>Dnevnik (N=93)</th>
<th>Vecer (N=117)</th>
<th>Total (N=313)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Othered</td>
<td></td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scapegoat</td>
<td></td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpless</td>
<td></td>
<td>24*</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intruder</td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>51**</td>
<td>42**</td>
<td>71**</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alien</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>8**</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>0**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values represent total number of frames counted. *Row values significantly different from each other at $p < .10$. **Row values significantly different from each other at $p < .05$
Table 2. Frames in Greek newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Ef Syn (N=106)</th>
<th>Kathimerini (N=136)</th>
<th>To Vima (N=95)</th>
<th>Total (N=337)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Othered</td>
<td>31***</td>
<td>7***</td>
<td>6***</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scapegoat</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpless</td>
<td>40***</td>
<td>33***</td>
<td>12***</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey</td>
<td>46***</td>
<td>32***</td>
<td>19***</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>22***</td>
<td>8***</td>
<td>14***</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intruder</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>3***</td>
<td>22***</td>
<td>3***</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alien</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>18***</td>
<td>79***</td>
<td>50***</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health threat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>594</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values represent total number of frames counted. *Row values significantly different from each other at p < .10. **Row values significantly different from each other at p < .05. ***Row values significantly different from each other at p < .001.

Table 3. Country comparison on Victim frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Smuggling</th>
<th>Refugee</th>
<th>Othered</th>
<th>Scapegoat</th>
<th>Helpless</th>
<th>Journey</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.3*</td>
<td>11.0**</td>
<td>13.1***</td>
<td>17.2***</td>
<td>25.2**</td>
<td>28.8***</td>
<td>13.1***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.1*</td>
<td>6.2**</td>
<td>0.6***</td>
<td>4.6***</td>
<td>14.9**</td>
<td>3.1***</td>
<td>0.3***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values represent percentages. *Column values significantly different from each other at p < .10. **Column values significantly different from each other at p < .05. ***Column values significantly different from each other at p < .001

The totals from the previous two tables are presented as percentages in a country comparison in tables 3 and 4. Greek media have within them a distinctively larger percentage of victim frames than Macedonian media. These discrepancies are most highlighted in frames where migrants are portrayed as ‘othered’ by xenophobia or racism with only 0.6 percent of Macedonian reports including this frame, compared to 17.2 percent in Greek media, \( \chi^2 (1) = 39.349, p < 0.001 \). There is a similar significant gap between countries for the “journey” and “success” frames.
On the other hand, framing the migrants as illegals or criminals is much more frequently used in Macedonian media, as more than half the coverage involves this frame, compared to 17.2 percent in Greek media, $\chi^2 (1) = 83.230$, $p < 0.001$. Interestingly, the situation is the opposite with the social intruder or burden frame, which Greek media use significantly more than Macedonian, $\chi^2 (1) = 19.289$, $p < 0.001$. The alien, civic and health threat frames are not heavily utilized.

**Table 4. Country comparison on Intruder frame**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Illegal</th>
<th>Alien</th>
<th>Soc. intruder</th>
<th>Civic threat</th>
<th>Health threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>17.2***</td>
<td>1.5**</td>
<td>43.6***</td>
<td>1.5**</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>50.8***</td>
<td>4.3**</td>
<td>27.2***</td>
<td>4.0**</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values represent percentages. *Column values significantly different from each other at $p < .10$. **Column values significantly different from each other at $p < .05$. ***Column values significantly different from each other at $p < .001$.

**Table 5. Country comparison on dominant frame**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Victim dominant</th>
<th>Intruder dominant</th>
<th>Neither/Equal</th>
<th>No frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>53.0***</td>
<td>33.0***</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>20.5***</td>
<td>62.4***</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>7.7*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values represent percentages. *Column values significantly different from each other at $p < .10$. **Column values significantly different from each other at $p < .05$. ***Column values significantly different from each other at $p < .001$.

In order to have a clearer picture of what is the overall approach in terms of migrant framing in the two countries, we checked for the dominant frame in each article. We define “dominant” frame as in the one that contains more of the specific positive or negative subframes; if victim subframes outnumber the intruder subframes in a particular article, we considered the overall frame victim dominant, and vice versa. We found that in Greek outlets the victim dominant frame was present in more than half of the articles, while in Macedonian outlets, it is barely over 20 percent, $\chi^2 (1) = 74.344$, $p < .001$. Meanwhile, almost two thirds of the articles in Macedonian outlets have intruder dominant framing, significantly different than the 33 percent in Greek outlets, $\chi^2 (1) = 56.950$, $p < .001$. There were
47 articles in Greek media and 55 in Macedonian media that didn’t have a dominant frame (the number of positive and negative subframes was equal), out of which a small percent didn’t have any type of framing (Table 5).

We conducted a one-way ANOVA to find out the differences in framing between the specific outlets for the victim and intruder indices. For the victim frame, there is a significant effect of the individual outlet on the frame utilization, $F(5, 652) = 38.370, p < .001$. Greek newspapers use the victim frame significantly more than Macedonian newspapers. However, there is also a significant difference between Ef Syn on one side, and Kathimerini and To Vima on the other side. The latter two don’t exhibit a difference between their reporting, and neither do the Macedonian newspapers between them. The means are presented in Table 6. In the second row of the same table we see the differences in the use of the intruder index by outlet. A significant effect exists, $F(5, 654) = 17.611, p < .001$, but it is caused singlehandedly by Ef Syn whose mean for intruder framing is significantly lower than all other newspapers, which are largely at the same level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ef Syn</td>
<td>1.81 (1.36)</td>
<td>0.79 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>Kathimerini</td>
<td>0.97 (1.06)$^a$</td>
<td>0.36 (0.54)$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To Vima</td>
<td>0.84 (1.14)$^a$</td>
<td>0.32 (0.51)$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Utinski</td>
<td>0.43 (0.75)$^b$</td>
<td>0.89 (0.60)$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dnevnik</td>
<td>0.36 (0.54)$^b$</td>
<td>0.90 (0.64)$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vecer</td>
<td>0.32 (0.51)$^b$</td>
<td>0.78 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.79 (1.08)</td>
<td>0.78 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intruder</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.21 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.90 (0.64)$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.82 (0.73)$^a$</td>
<td>0.93 (0.82)$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.93 (0.79)$^a$</td>
<td>0.91 (0.79)$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.91 (0.79)$^a$</td>
<td>0.89 (0.61)$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.89 (0.61)$^a$</td>
<td>0.90 (0.64)$^a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Means for ‘Victim’ generated from a 0-7 scale. Means for ‘Intruder’ generated from a 0-5 scale. Values in brackets represent standard deviations. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Tukey. $^{a,b,c,d,e,f,g}$ Row values with different subscripts were significantly different from each other at $p < .05$.

Expectedly, these tendencies spilled over into the findings from analysis exploring specifically the effects of country and ideology on the indices. From the examination by means of multivariate ANOVA, there is a notable main effect of country, $F(1, 652) = 125.888, p < .001$, indicating that average presence of the victim frame was significantly higher in Greek ($M = 1.20, SD = 1.25$) than in Macedonian media ($M = 0.37, SD = 0.61$). The main effect of ideology also yielded a significant difference, $F(2, 652) = 18.474, p < .001$ between left-leaning ($M = 1.10, SD = 1.28$), centrist ($M = 0.72, SD = 0.93$) and right-leaning ($M = 0.55, SD = 0.89$) media (see Table 7). The interaction between country and ideology was also
significant, $F(2, 652) = 11.919$, $p < .001$; the effect of ideology is greater for Greece, than it is for Macedonia. The Greek left-leaning newspaper is significantly different from both centrist and right wing ones at $p < .001$, while Macedonian newspapers are not significantly different from each other based on ideological position.

Table 7. Victim frame means by ideology and country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Greece Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Macedonia Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Total Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left-leaning</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.81 (1.36)</td>
<td>0.43 (0.75)</td>
<td>1.10 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.97 (1.05)</td>
<td>0.36 (0.54)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-leaning</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.84 (1.14)</td>
<td>0.32 (0.51)</td>
<td>0.55 (0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values in brackets represent standard deviations.

For the intruder frame, the main effects of country, $F(1, 654) = 10.179$, $p < .001$, and ideology, $F(2, 654) = 7.738$, $p < .001$, are also significant. The presence of the intruder frame is significantly smaller in Greece than it is in Macedonia, and left-leaning media are significantly different from both centrist and right-wing, although there isn’t a significant difference between centrist and right-wing media ($p = .601$). In this case there is also a significant simple main effects, driven clearly by the difference between utilization of the intruder frame among leftist outlets in both countries ($p < .001$), since there is no significant difference between center ($p = .411$) and right-wing ($p = .762$) outlets. As shown in Table 8, the effect of ideology on employment of the intruder frame disappears in the case of Macedonia.

Table 8. Intruder frame means by ideology and country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Greece Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Macedonia Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Total Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left-leaning</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.21 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.91 (0.79)</td>
<td>0.57 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.82 (0.73)</td>
<td>0.89 (0.61)</td>
<td>0.85 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-leaning</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.93 (0.82)</td>
<td>0.90 (0.64)</td>
<td>0.91 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values in brackets represent standard deviations.

Finally, we demonstrate the effect of the type of article (news report, commentary or feature) on the victim and intruder frames used by the analyzed outlets. There is a main effect of the type of article, but only in the case of victim
frames, $F(3, 640) = 14.181$, $p < .001$, while for intruder frames the main effect of type of article is not significant, $F(3, 640) = 1.462$, $p = .224$. News reports frame migrants as victims significantly less than editorials or features ($p < .001$), while for the intruder frame differences between all article types are non-significant.

The interaction between type and media is not significant for the victim frame $F(8, 640) = 1.309$, $p = .236$, however it is significant for the intruder frame $F(8, 640) = 2.066$, $p < .05$. Further examination of this effect shows that To Vima uses the intruder frame significantly more in editorials ($M = 1.57$, $SD = 0.25$) than in news reports ($M = 0.87$, $SD = 0.07$), at $p < .05$, while Utrinski its the opposite: the intruder frame is less present in editorials ($M = 0.40$, $SD = 0.30$) than in news reports ($M = 0.95$, $SD = 0.06$) at $p < .05$. This is seemingly causing the interaction effect, since the other outlets do not exhibit significant differences between article types.

**Conclusion**

This study employed a framing analysis of online newspaper articles on immigration during February and March 2016, when the refugee crisis became the most reported issue on the media agenda across Europe. The research aimed to compare the way Greek and Macedonian press utilized frames on migration when reporting on the refugee crisis, focusing either on the positive or negative coverage of the phenomenon. Although the press from the two neighboring countries reported heavily on immigration, they did not do so in uniform ways.

In most Macedonian articles mainly negative framing of the refugees is employed, with 62.4 percent of the articles portraying them as clandestines and social intruders of society. The illegal frame appeared in more than half of the examined articles, placing it by far the most commonly used frame in the Macedonian media. However, although the “illegality” rhetoric appeared more in the right leaning newspaper Vecer, the difference between the Macedonian newspapers was not big. This means that political ideology did not seem to play a defining role in the editorial decision when covering immigration. When the Macedonian press utilized the victim frame, it was mainly to portray the refugees as helpless (14.9 percent of the articles) and victims of inadequate assistance in the borders and the refugee camps.

On the other hand, Greek media took a more positive approach with half of the articles framing the refugees as victims and focusing on the perils of their
journey, the insufficiency of aid supply and poor rescue operations and the hard living conditions in the squalid refugee camps. It is even more noticeable that some victim subframes used heavily by the Greek press such as the “journey”, “othered” and “success” sub-frames, barely appeared in the Macedonian news articles. In fact, there were only two articles which addressed the xenophobic attitudes towards refugees in Macedonian media, as this dimension of reporting in the context of the migrant crisis was largely ignored.

While Macedonian press utilized mainly the “illegal” sub-frame by both left and right wing newspapers, in the Greek press the illegal frame was used 17.2 percent of the time, but almost only in the conservative and right leaning press. In general the coverage of the three Greek newspapers reflected their respective political positions. This was also evidenced in the use of the most predominant subframe. While the Greek press deployed more positive frames in total, what is interesting is that, unlike in Macedonia, the most predominant sub-frame was the “social intruder/burden” frame (43.6 percent), with many articles highlighting the impact of the refugee influx upon Greek society, the difficulties of the Greek state to cope with the high demand for humanitarian aid and the “irresponsible” decision of some of the European Union members to close their borders. This sub-frame was heavily used by the conservative Kathimerini (79 out of 136) the right leaning To Vima (50 out of 80), but the left-wing newspapers Ef Syn abstained from the trend and adopted a by far more humanitarian approach towards the crisis with 192 out of 214 sub-frames to be positive, confirming the existence of strong ideological slant in the Greek news arena.

Despite these findings, one possible caveat of this study is that low reliability alphas between the subframes indicate that the deductive scheme doesn’t fully correspond to the theoretical framework of the overarching victim and intruder frames. Cronbach alpha was especially low ($\alpha = 0.17$) for the “intruder” subframes, of which surprisingly none had significant Paerson correlations among them. What’s more, principal component analysis showed that the subframe variables load highly on four factors, instead of two, further blurring the rationale of the particular analytical approach. This indicates the need for a more inductive approach which would identify frames not accounted for by existing literature. Furthermore, the selection of outlets is far from exhaustive: although the selected newspapers are among those with largest readership in the two countries, the validity of the study would undoubtedly be improved with the inclusion of more outlets. In addition to
controlling for the partisan/ideological affiliation, an important dimension which is overlooked here is the distinction between broadsheet daily newspapers and tabloids. Any future work extending on this research would do well to control for this difference, instead of analyzing only quality broadsheets.

That being said, our findings do unequivocally demonstrate the difference between the Macedonian and Greek print media. Macedonian outlets followed a more traditional way of reporting on immigration, focusing on the illegality of the intruders and the perils for society, while Greek media approached the topic in more diverse ways, as political affiliation of the newspapers played a crucial role in the editorial decisions. We argue here that the variation observed in patterns of media coverage between the two examined countries is due to three crucial factors: the difference between their media systems, the policies supported by their respective governments, and the political and social consequences for each of the countries, with regards to the closure of the Balkan route in March 2016. Concerning the first, although characteristics of the media systems in both countries correspond to the polarized pluralist model (Hallin and Mancini 2004), Macedonian media are under much greater direct control of a right-wing ruling party, thus being effectively coerced into following ideological cues supplied by the government’s position on migration, even in the case of left-leaning outlets. The Greek media, albeit far from independent, are only indirectly influenced by political elites through oligarchic interests, and therefore do not universally employ hardline anti-migrant discourse. The comparatively greater diversity of perspectives in Greek media is also facilitated by the emergence of alternative media, and not least the rise to power of a far-left party intent on reforming the media system.

The latter also relates to the other two factors we mentioned. Three days before the EU-Turkey deal, the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was claiming that Greece will press its European counterparts for solidarity with refugees and fair burden-sharing among European Union countries (Georgiopoulos 2016), while Macedonia like the other countries on the Balkan route was erecting fences in an attempt to reduce the influx of migrants. Greece’s position was that it was about to become overwhelmed by about 60 thousand desperate people left in limbo, most of whom live in squalid makeshift camps, while Macedonia was preoccupied with sealing the deal and keeping the refugees out of its territory. In that sense, the actions of the Greek government were confounded by leftist principles, while Macedonia’s elite combined the ethno-nationalist narrative encountered frequently
in Eastern European countries vis-a-vis the migrants (see Edwards 2016), with a pragmatic insulation strategy, citing lack of resources to deal with the crisis. The media in the two countries simply reflected elite consensus (or lack thereof) concerning the issue.

References


Russian Cultural Communities within the Czech Republic: Economics, Perceptions and Integration

Piper QUINN and Šárka PRÁT

Abstract. In today's globalized society, immigration has become an increasingly prevalent issue within Central EU countries, sparking intense debates and discourse across numerous platforms. However, while these issues hold great importance within individual host countries, there is a distinct lack of literature available regarding particular migration flows. The aim of this paper is the quantitative and qualitative study of Russian cultural centers within the Czech Republic. As one of the largest third country national groups within the country, Russian migrants create an important impact on Czech socio-economic spheres. Through an analysis of pre-existing research, statistics, and historic developments, this paper offers an examination of the economic and demographic shifts that have lead to the rise and decline of popular Russian centers within the Czech Republic. The research shows that Russian migrants are primarily wealthy, educated, and intend on staying in the country long term for either education or work. Additionally, the existence of strong cultural communities and negative perceptions by the majority community somewhat delay the process of their integration. By analyzing the growth, demographics, and levels of integration within specific cultural centers, researchers are able to gather a better understanding of Russian migration as a whole.

Keywords: immigration, Czech Republic, Russia, integration

Introduction

As a result of complicated migratory trends emerging from the present political atmospheres, the process of international migration has been the subject of increasingly intense political and social debate. Such debates have been particularly strong within Central Europe, resulting in the increasing popularity of conservative parties throughout the region. These trends are connected not only with the Czech territory and population, but with the increasingly polarized views towards migration within our globalized world.
In the recent decade, the Czech Republic has successfully transitioned from an emigration country to a target destination for migrants. As a result of these increased flows, fervent debates are taking place on the political field regarding the opening of Czech borders, the number of accepted migrants, and ways to best achieve integration into Czech society.

Due to the Czech Republic’s complicated and turbulent past with Russia, the migration of Russian speaking migrants remains a divided social, economic, and political issue well into the present day. However, despite the common negative perception of Eastern migrants, Russian migration has continued to increase dramatically over the past several years. According to the Czech Statistical Office, there are currently around 35,000 Russian foreigners within the Czech Republic, a number which has been steadily increasing from the 1990s onwards. As the third largest third country national community within the Czech Republic (falling behind only Ukrainians and Vietnamese,) the lifestyles, community demographics, and roll within the labor market all create significant impacts on the greater Czech society.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the current understanding of migration from Russia to the Czech Republic through an analysis of the shifting social and economic patterns of popular migration centers within the Czech Republic. By looking at these patterns of migration, as well as the push and pull factors which lead to the development of migration centers, a better understanding of the motives, methods, and levels of integration of Russian migrants can be reached. Additionally, this paper provides an overview of the complex historical trends between the two countries and their effects on the policies, trends, and lifestyles that play a role in the changing demographics.

Methodology

A holistic approach was applied during research which compared a wide basis of previous research, statistics, and collected data. In this process of collecting, sorting, and processing data, a number of domestic and foreign sources were used as well as the relevant documentation on immigration law and process.

The quantitative analysis of secondary data comprised a large portion of this research. Finding accurate sources of data on migration is often complicated, convoluted by the legislation of the countries in question. Due to the
necessity of recent and accurate information in order to analyze these issues within the Czech Republic, the primary source of data comes from online statistical sources - The Czech Statistical Office (CZSO), Eurostat and Eurostat Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. Additionally, previous domestic and international publications were used in order to gather information on particular trends - specifically on the more qualitative aspects of migration, including modern lifestyles, and success of integration.

**Immigration Policy in the Czech Republic**

Since joining the EU in 2004, the Czech Republic’s migration policy has been tied to the common policies of all member states. While specific areas of migration are more regulated by EU policies than others (including asylum, external borders, and matters of return), member states maintain a relatively high degree of independence in determining the migration and integration of third country nationals.

The Czech Ministry of the Interior states seven key principles of focus for the country in their “Strategy on Migration Policy of the Czech Republic” (2015). These include: irregular immigration, asylum, the external dimension of immigration, free movement inside of the Schengen area, legal immigration, coordination with common EU immigration policies, and the integration of foreigners. The focus on integration is particularly relevant to third country nationals, and the goal has been met with varying degrees of success.

In entering the Czech Republic, third country nationals may apply through a number of different avenues in order to gain residence within the Czech Republic. Entry through studying or education is a common method of migration for students and young professionals.

In the processes of applying for work or the creation of a business within the Czech Republic, third country nationals are able to apply for either a Blue Card or an Employee Card. As stated by the Czech Ministry of the Interior, Blue Cards are a residential status for long-term migrants that intend to be involved in highly skilled jobs (requiring either a university degree or vocational training of more than three years). These cards allow holders to both work and reside within the Czech Republic. Following a period of five years of consecutive employment within the EU while holding a Blue Card, as well as two years of residence within the Czech Republic,
residents are able to apply permanent residence within the Czech Republic.

In 2014, Employee Cards replaced the previous Green Card system. These are a new type of permit allowing for employment of longer than three months for any type of work - including low skilled employment. While the card cannot be used for longer than 2 years, holders may apply to extend its validity.

**Push and Pull Factors for Russian Migration**

The key to understanding the current international movement of many Russian migrants lies in the economic and social conditions of Russia itself. Similar to Ukrainian populations, which comprise the largest non-EU migratory group within the Czech Republic (CSO, 2017), Russia’s migratory population is largely driven by the existence of strong push factors. These include unpredictable levels of unemployment, and, according to 2017 OECD report on the country, below average life expectancy, basic sanitation, water quality, and air quality. However, while ‘push’ factors explain the desire to leave Russia, their existence alone does not provide the explanation for their destination of choice.

The Czech Republic provides the pull factors necessary to assuage a number of the domestic difficulties that drive Russian migration. Access to education is a primary reason for Russian migration, with student and educational migration becoming increasingly prevalent over the past decade. According to the Czech Statistical Office, the number of Russian students studying in the Czech Republic has increased by ten times since 2005 (going from 542 students to 5,627). Ludmila Kopecka states in her 2013 report that that the greatest pull factor for educational migration to the Czech Republic is the possibility of studying for for free when the student knows the Czech language.

While numbers have increased dramatically over the past several years, educational migration has been taking place in the Czech Republic for several decades. The first Czech-Russian grammar school and the first Slavonic grammar schools were established in Prague, enabling young Russians to study in the capital. Post-secondary education can be found at the Prague International University of Russia, where students are able to study law, finance, management, psychology, design, economics, spa services, and advertising. According to estimates, only a third of students return to their native country following the completion of their studies (Sládek, 2010). The majority of Russian students either stay in the Czech Republic
permanently or resettle further to the West (Sládek, 2010).

In addition to educational opportunities, economic pull factors are, unsurprisingly, a large impetus for emigration to the Czech Republic. The disaster of the 1990s in Russia, coupled with the 2014 downturn, proved the Czech Republic to be a far more stable economic option.

The existence of family, social, and cultural networks as an incentive for migration also cannot be ignored, as they form one of the most important incentives for movement. According to studies done by Drbohlav, Luptak, Janska and Bohuslavová (1999), more than 70% of Russians migrate with their families. As Sonja Haug (2009) states, migration networks “provide a foundation for the dissemination of information, as well as for patronage or assistance”. They make migration easier for those involved through the “reducing costs and risks of moving”, and ultimately “pave the way for establishing transnational migration networks”.

**History of Russian Migration**

This history between Russia and the Czech Republic is complex, yet vital to the understanding of the modern migrational trends and surrounding social conditions. The migration of Russians to the Czech Republic has been historically common, though not always consistent. Migrational flows varied between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ depending on decade. In his book “The Russian Diaspora in the Czech Republic” (2010), Sládek discusses these changes in motivations based on the time period.

The first major influx of Russian migration occurred between 1918 and 1948. Due to the political pressure of the war, the vast majority of migrants were forced into the territory - categorizing this wave as one of involuntary migration. The first group of these migrants were Russian military prisoners who were not allowed to return to their homeland following the end of WWI, and thus remained in the Czech territory. The second wave of migrants were primarily refugees of both WWI and the Russian Civil War, while the third group was comprised of the Russian intelligentsia following their expulsion from their home country. The majority of migrants remained in the Czech Republic until after WWII, when forced repatriation and violent deportation to socialist camps took place.

While this period also saw some level of voluntary migration for the purpose of work or gaining greater freedoms, it was much less frequent. Although the Czech
Republic (then Czechoslovakia) sought to increase the number of Russian intelligentsia within the region, the group primarily migrated to the more prosperous regions of France, England, or the United States.

According to Sladek (2010), another wave of Russian migration into Czechoslovakia was recorded between 1948-1989 during the socialist bloc period. The most common type of voluntary migration during this period was for marriage. However, migration for work was primarily ideologically constructed within socialist countries, and thus workers had little choice in their own movement.

Although it is widely assumed that migration following the period of the 1989 Velvet Revolution was solely voluntary, there are many instances in which migration could be considered involuntary. With the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s socio-economic situation was in dire condition. Rising unemployment, unavailability of medical care, worsening of accessibility and quality of education, and the loss of social security all left few alternatives for Russian migrants during this time (Drbohlav, Lupták, Jánská and Bohuslavová 1999).

The first and most common reason for post-1989 involuntary migration following was political. A number of Russian migrants living in the Czechoslovakian territory stated in the survey created by Drbohlav (2010) that they had to leave Russia due to either political disunity or oppression created by the new nation. Another common reason for involuntary migration was the prevalence of ethnic discrimination within the Soviet Union. It wasn’t uncommon for Jewish citizens to be unable to find work, thus forcing them to migrate elsewhere to find jobs.

Like its counterpart, voluntary migration also occurred for a variety of different reasons during the period following the Velvet Revolution. Economic migration was spurred by the economic instability of the 1990s in Russia. Šišková (2001) states that in 1997, 21% of the population of the Russian Federation was below the minimum living standard. As highly educated people lost their positions or became increasingly concerned about the country’s financial situation, they chose to invest their capital in a more secure country and left.

Economic migration can be divided into migrants with funds and without funds. Unsurprisingly, migrants without financial support had a harder start. Although they were typically college graduates, difficulties in documentation or finding employment forced many to spend their first few years at low skilled or unskilled professions.
Modern Trends in Russian Migration

Following the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, migration from Russia has steadily increased. Today, there are over 35 thousand Russian-speaking migrants living within the Czech Republic, while in 2004 this number sat at roughly 14 thousand. This comparatively large increase is partially a result of the economic growth the Czech Republic experienced during this period acting as a major incentive for migration; the GDP grew by approximately 62% between 2004 and 2016 according to World Bank data. Additionally, the new pro-migration policies and political security following EU accession played major factors in the decision to migrate to the country.

The year 2000 was pivotal in migration from Russia, as new visa requirements for citizens of some former soviet states reduced migration flows. However, beginning in 2004, the Czech Republic saw a drastic increase in Russian migrants. This can be viewed as a result of both the Czech Republic joining the EU and the relative economic prosperity of the country at the time. During this period, the surplus of jobs for unskilled employees caused a high annual growth rate and resulted in an influx of economically motivated migration. This growth in migration reached its peak between 2006 and 2007, when Russian migration rose by almost six thousand migrants in just one year. Following this, the growth rate dropped significantly and began to level out between 2009 and 2014 (CSO, 2016). While migration continued to increase during this time, the economic crisis had a noticeable impact on the rate at which Russian migrants entered the country due to both the economic and social insecurity of the time.

Today, rates following the economic crisis are just beginning to pick up to their pre-2009 levels - although they are nowhere near the massive influx seen in the 2007 period (CSO, 2016). Out of the 35 thousand Russian migrants within the Czech Republic, nearly 34 thousand have held a residence permit for over twelve months and 20 thousand have obtained a permanent residence within the country (CSO, 2016). This seems to indicate that as Russian migrants enter the Czech Republic, they intend to stay permanently, rather than partake in seasonal or ‘circular’ migration.

Centers for Russian Migration within the Czech Republic

Today, the majority of Russian speaking migrants are located in either the Prague region, the Central Bohemian Region, or the Northwest region of the Czech Republic.
Republic (CSO, 2016). While an increased number of migrant populations are not surprising in the metropolitan regions of Prague and Brno, the Karlovy Vary district in the Northwest represents an usual cultural pattern and provides some insight into the purposes, demographics, and integration of Russian migrants.

**Karlovy Vary**

Karlovy Vary is a well known spa town located in the Northwest District of the Czech Republic, and is particularly popular among Russian tourists. On almost every street, shop, and restaurant, translations are offered in Cyrillic as Russian acts as one of the most prevalent languages within the area. Russian tourism in the region is so high that the nearby Karlovy Vary International Airport offers flight only to Moscow and St. Petersburg. As a major cultural and economic center for Russians within the Czech Republic, the trends of this region provide insight into larger patterns of Russian movement within the country.

Between 2004 and 2010, the number of Russian migrants in the region increased steadily from 1,198 to 2,571. However, as within the rest of the Czech Republic, the Russian population dwindled following its peak in 2010 during the ensuing financial crisis (CSO, 2016). By 2014, the Russian population had shrunk and in 2016 the numbers dropped to 1,763. Unlike the general Russian population within the Czech Republic, the Karlovy Vary region has continued to see Russians leaving despite the end of the financial crisis and the country’s growth in other sectors. What was once the strongest cultural center for Russian speaking migrants has begun to decline. This is in stark contrast to other popular Russian destinations, such as Prague or the Bohemia regions, which either continued to increase or have experienced a negligible decline.

Some of these changes in migrational patterns, as well as the differences in age composition, can be explained by the weaker economic situation within the Karlovy Vary region as a whole. During the 2015 period, the unemployment rate in the Karlovy Vary region was 8.3%. While this is average at an EU level, the Czech Republic is notorious for its low unemployment; in 2015 the average unemployment in the country was 4.5%. Today, the unemployment in Karlovy Vary is the sixth highest of all fourteen regions within the Czech Republic (CZSO, 2017) and 3.9%, and continues to contribute to the diminishing population of the region. Additionally, the Karlovy Vary region has not only the lowest GDP of any Czech region, but also the lowest growth rate (1.8% in 2015). When compared to regions like Prague, which has a GDP growth of 4.6% and unemployment rate of 2.2%, it is not surprising that the
population has been leaving over the past several years.

The effects of these economic changes, as well as the overall economic and labor situation within the Karlovy Vary region, can be seen in both the age distribution of the Russian minority as well as their educational division when compared to larger, more prosperous regions such as Prague.

**Figure 1: Age composition of the Russian speaking population in the Karlovy Vary Region as of December, 2016**

(source: Own graphic based on data by ČSÚ, 2017)

Figures 1 and 2 show the age composition in the Karlovy Vary Region as of December 31, 2016. The age pyramid of the Russians in the Karlovy Vary Region is characterized by the prevalence of 40-44 year old women and 50-54 year old men.

Prague, however, shows a lower age distribution: the majority of both men and women are between the ages of 35 and 39. This difference between the Prague and the Karlovy Vary regions is due in part to the greater opportunities that the capital offers. These economic opportunities act as pull factors for young professionals seeking to start a career. Additionally, Prague provides options for higher education, which acts as a major incentives for young Russians seeking high skilled professions. Karlovy Vary’s workforce is aging, and without matching (or at least comparable) economic opportunities, it lacks the necessary pull factors to bring in new workers.
In addition to the age composition, the educational division of Karlovy Vary provides an important insight into the economic structure of the diaspora. Within Europe, an agreement between the skill set of a third country national and their placement in the workforce is often perceived as a good indicator of the integration into the labor market (Eurostat 2011). Although some Russians are hired as a cheap labor force, a shockingly large proportion of Russian migrants within the Czech Republic occupy positions requiring higher education. Due to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs’ transition to a new information system, data is only available up to 2011. The 2010-2011 period was the beginning of the economic crisis, as well as the peak of Russian population in Karlovy Vary over the past decade. Thus, the educational composition shown in Figure 3 does not reflect the subsequent decline in population, however it can be assumed that a number of these educated Russians have since moved to either Prague or other regions of the Czech Republic with better employment opportunities.
As shown in the above Figure, the vast majority of Russians have obtained a Bachelor's degree or higher, with the largest share of Russians having a Master's degree (29%). According to official CZSO statistics, approximately 9% of the Russian population has either only completed or is in the process of completing primary education. In the school year 2015/2016, there were 526 Russian children in kindergartens, 1,377 Russian children in elementary schools, 1,016 in secondary schools, 43 in conservatories and 95 in higher vocational schools. As young Russians either migrate to Karlovy Vary or are born into primarily educated Russian migrant families, many will go on to postsecondary education and increase the diaspora’s share of Bachelor’s and Master’s education. Despite the prevalence of Bachelor’s and Master’ holders, Russian migrants have the lowest share of Doctorates among either other migrant groups or the majority group within Karlovy Vary.

As the number of Russian migrants within the Karlovy Vary region has significantly decreased following the collection of data, it can be assumed that these statistics have also changed as educated migrants move elsewhere in the Czech Republic. However, this data does illustrate the predominance of educated Russian migrants seeking skilled labor. These factors play an intrinsic role in their ability to
integrate, type of migration, and sector of employment migrants will be pursuing following their migration.

**Integration into the Czech Workforce**

Russian migrants are able to find employment in a wide variety of sectors within the Czech Republic. As seen in Figure 4, the most prevalent positions according ČSÚ are as scientists or academics. This surprisingly high figure may be due in part to both the high level of education Russian migrants receive before migration, as well as the large prevalence of Russian students studying within the country.

Following academics, the most common professions are as technicians, healthcare providers, and teachers. According to this data from ČSÚ, it seems that educated Russians are migrating to the Czech Republic and subsequently contributing positively to the economic growth within their regions.

**Figure 4: The professions of Russians in the Czech Republic (2016)**

(source: Own graphic based on data by ČSÚ, 2016.)
When entering into the Czech workforce, Russian migrants face a number of barriers to integration. According to a 2016 STEM research poll, nationalism and prejudice continue to be a major barrier to entry into the workforce. The continued difficulties with prejudice are perhaps not surprising when taken into the historical context between the two countries. However, they are far from the only difficulty migrants face; language barriers and difficulty with administration all create significant hurdles for migrants to overcome (Drbohlav, 2015). Migrants take a varied approach in finding solutions to these problems. The tactic of becoming a freelancer has become increasingly popular among Russian migrants. Following the population decline in 2010, the number of Russians with valid trade licenses has grown from approximately 1500 to 2700. As previously discussed, a large number of Russian migrants are wealthy, educated entrepreneurs. Some of these migrants seek to start an ‘alternative life’ within the Czech Republic, while maintaining primary residence in Russia. Others choose to stay, live, and work within the Czech Republic entirely.

Figure 5: Russians with valid trade license in years 2004-2016

(source: Own graphic based on data by ČÚ, 2016.)
Labor in Karlovy Vary

As of December 2016 there were 55,665 entrepreneurs within Karlovy Vary - of whom only 9% were foreigners. Of these foreigners, 3%, or 185, were Russian businessmen (MPO, 2016).

Despite the diminished numbers of entrepreneurs living within the region, it is evident that there is a large Russian economic influence within the region. This phenomenon is explained through the use of the ‘substitute airport’ technique by Russian business owners. Sládek (2010) first came up with the "substitute airport" theory, which explains that while Russians own, work, or hold shares in real estate companies within the Czech Republic, they live and spend the majority of their time in Russia. The creation of this “alternative life” within the Czech Republic is appealing to many wealthy Russians.

After 1989, Karlovy Vary began struggling due to a lack of finances. In response, Russian foreigners began arriving and bought the failing spa town’s spas and residential buildings through Czech companies. Through these investments, wealthy Russians increased their own representation, entered into privatization, provided for their own second homes, and helped to reconstruct the spa zones (Fiedlerova, 2015). Additionally, during this time the Czech Republic entered the Schengen area. According to Šimon Stiburek, a researcher at the Czech University of Agriculture in Prague, the free movement of goods and services provided easier access to Western markets, further incentivizing Russian migration and entrepreneurship.

The majority of Russians living in this region work within the retail, accommodation, or real estate sectors. Due to the fact that the Russian population owns several of the resort spaces within the district, their predominance in these fields is not surprising.

In Karlovy Vary, workers receive the lowest salaries of anywhere within the Czech Republic. However, the real estate and accommodation sectors - which Russians dominate - are some of the highest paid. Despite being the lowest earning region, Russians within Karlovy Vary actually exceeded the average earnings within the Czech Republic between 2012 and 2015 (CSU, 2017).
Integration into Czech Society

In Karlovy Vary there is a certain segregation of Russian migrants in the economy, as Russians employ workers of their "own" ethnicity and thus create an "ethnic economy" (Drbohlav, 2011). Additionally, the majority of Russian residents and Russian-owned businesses are concentrated in one location near the center of the city. However, as Drbohlav points out, in Prague these housing and economic concentrations of a single minority group do not exist. This indicates that these social developments may not be in response to the behavior of the majority group, but instead be based on internal desires of the Russians themselves. The status of many Russian migrants in this region as educated, comparatively wealthy, and business owners greatly effects their levels of integration. While less wealthy or non-entrepreneurial migrants may join a mixed-language job, or go to university which would encourage the use of the Czech language as well as social integration, the status of business owners and workers in Karlovy Vary does not necessitate these steps to integration. This, along with the large influx of Russian tourism, has resulted in the partial isolation and lack of integration within the Karlovy Vary district.

Czech Perception of Russian Migrants

As Drbohlav states in his analysis of the Russian community, it is crucial to recognize the history of Russian-Czech relations when evaluating the position of
Russians in Czech society. Due to the Soviet occupation of the Czech Republic up until the late 1980s, the view of Russian migrants are often still viewed negatively by the general public.

According to a survey carried about STEM, there is still a substantial part of the Czech population - approximately 50% - that would have issues with having a Russian neighbor. However, despite this relatively high number, acceptance of Russians within the Czech Republic is currently at an all time high. When asked to what degree having a Russian neighbor would be an issue, approximately 50% of respondents stated that it would be “no problem”. In contrast, 33% said that it “would be unpleasant”, and 13% stated it “would be difficult”. 4% of respondents said that having a Russian neighbor would be “completely unacceptable”. While substantial progress is being made, it is still far from enough to erase decades of animosity between the two groups.

Conclusion

Despite the lack of integration, the vast majority of Russian migrants are highly educated, skilled workers who intend on remaining in the Czech Republic rather than returning to their home country. In addition to a large percentage of scientists, academics, and healthcare providers, there is a growing prevalence of entrepreneurs - Russians who obtain a trade license and open up their own businesses here in the Czech Republic. Students also constitute a major demographic in Russian migration, with the number of Russians studying in the Czech Republic increasing by over ten times since 2005.

The existence of an established and ever growing Russian ethnic minority in the Czech Republic has helped to facilitate and encourage increased movement through the provision of information, emotional support, cultural recognition, and economic sustainability. For the Russian migrants within the Czech Republic, this community has been incredibly influential to their integration - or lack thereof. Due to the prevalence of the cultural community within some parts of the Czech Republic (specifically Karlovy Vary and some parts of Prague), integration is not seen as strongly as in more ‘diluted’ areas.

The two most common regions for Russians to migrate to - Karlovy Vary and Prague - have experienced large economic and social shifts over the past several decades. Following the 1989 Velvet Revolution, Russian foreigners began importing
money to Karlovy Vary, and financed the failing town’s spas and residential buildings through Czech companies. This helped to increase the community’s economic and social dominance within the region. The majority of Russians living in in the region work within the retail, accommodation, or real estate sectors. Due to the fact that the Russian population owns several of Karlovy Vary’s resort spaces, their prevalence in the real estate, retail and accommodation sectors is significant; although Karlovy Vary is the lowest earning district, Russians within the district exceeded the average Czech earnings between 2012 and 2015.

While this paper offers an overview of the immigration process from Russia to the Czech Republic, it is by no means an exhaustive exploration into the dynamics of this immigration community. Instead, it acts as an examination at the most pertinent trends of Russian migration since 2004, as well as a historical outline of this flow throughout the past several decades. Despite the significance of this community within the Czech economic and social structure as a whole, as well as its relevance to international socio-economic trends, very little research has been done on the subject of the economic and social shifts of common migrational centers; this paper contributes to that small pool. Based on the current patterns and available research, and relevant statistical analysis, it seems that the trend of increasing Russian migration is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. However, in order to achieve a full understanding of the many facets of Russian migration, this work concludes that the analysis (or indeed, the creation) of other sources, as well as the facilitation of new studies of both the majority and minority population are necessary.

References


Russian Cultural Communities within the Czech Republic

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Heritage Language Learning and Ethnic Identity Maintenance among Chinese-Canadian Adolescents

Henry P.H. CHOW

Abstract. Heritage language learning and ethnic identity maintenance are two salient issues for minority adolescents in Canada. Based on a questionnaire survey of 515 Chinese-Canadian adolescents conducted in a western Canadian city, this paper explores respondents’ motivations to learn heritage language and their maintenance of ethnic identity. The findings revealed that respondents considered the learning of heritage language to be important and demonstrated a strong communicative orientation of heritage language acquisition. Multiple ordinary least-squares regression further demonstrated that sex, age, religious affiliation, integrative motivation to learn, ethnic identity, exposure to ethnic media, and parental encouragement were significantly associated with academic performance in heritage language school, whereas age, country of birth, Chinese language proficiency, exposure to ethnic media, intention to further studies in ethnic homeland, and medium of communication with parents were significantly related to ethnic identity maintenance.

Keywords: heritage language learning; ethnic identity maintenance; Chinese-Canadian adolescents

Introduction

Canada is one of the most diverse countries in the world. The multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nature of this country is rapidly growing as a result of increased immigration from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, as well as Central and South America. According to the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS), Canada had a foreign-born population of about 6,775,800 people, representing 20.6% of the total population. Among the immigrants whose mother tongue was other than English or French, Chinese languages (i.e., Mandarin, Cantonese, and other Chinese dialects) were the most common mother tongues. A total of about 852,700 individuals reported these languages. In total, Chinese languages were reported by 13% of the foreign-born population with single mother tongue (Statistics Canada 2014). As regards ethnic origin, over 200 different ethnic origins were reported. Approximately 1,487,580 individuals identified themselves as Chinese. The Chinese people made up the
second largest visible minority group, forming 21.1% of the visible minority population and 4% of Canada’s total population (Statistics Canada 2013).

Heritage language learning and ethnic identity maintenance are two salient issues facing ethno-cultural groups in multicultural and multilingual countries such as Canada. Indeed, heritage language is considered an indispensable tool for conveying a sense of the families’ history and heritage to their offspring (Guardado 2010; He 2006; Kouritzin 2006; Suarez 2007), whereas ethnic identity constitutes a crucial part of self-definition that affects the way in which individuals feel about themselves, process information, and present themselves in the social environment (Sue, Mak, and Sue 1998: 305). As well, ethnic identity serves basic psychological needs, such as the sense of belongingness and historical continuity (McGoldrick, Giordano, and Garcia-Preto 2005). Notably, research has demonstrated the positive impact of ethnic identity on minorities’ self-esteem (Cavazos-Rehg and DeLucia-Waack 2009; Xu, Farver, and Pauker 2015; Yuh 2005), psychological well-being (Adams et al. 2016; Chae and Larres 2010; Costigan, Koryzma, Hua, and Chance 2010; Kiang, Gonzales-Backen, Yip, Witkow, and Fuligni 2006; Lee 2003; Seaton, Scottham, and Sellers 2006), and academic success (Adelabu 2008; Autiero 2017; Chang and Le 2010; Hernández et al. 2014; Morales 2010; Ong, Phinney, and Dennis 2006; Supple, Ghazarian, Frabutt, Lungett, and Sands 2006; Umaña-Taylor, Diversi, and Fine 2002; Urdan and Munoz 2012).

A plethora of studies are available on heritage language retention and ethnic identity maintenance of various minority groups in Canada (Abdi 2011; Bosdki 1991; Clarke 1996; Dhruvarajan 1993; Feuerverger 1991, 1986; Guardado 2010; Jurva and Jaya 2008; Karumanchery 1996; Lalonde, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1992; Mitsopoulos 1989; Nakahara 1991; Noro 2009, 1987; Okuno 1993; Sengupta 1987; Subhan 2007; Tan 1992). Comparatively speaking, research on heritage language learning and ethnic identity retention among the Chinese, which have now become one of the largest visible minority groups in Canada, has been surprisingly sparse in view of its complexity and importance.

In fact, previous studies on Chinese language learning have employed an ethnographic approach (Chan 1989; Curdt-Christiansen 2006), investigated the effects of a single variable (e.g., parental influence) on heritage language retention (Shi 2016; Cheung 1981), used a single vignette approach (Han 2012), adopted a quantitative approach using a relatively small sample (Man 1997), and focused on adults (Comanaru and Noels 2009). On the other hand, studies of ethnic identity
among ethnic Chinese have studied children and youth using a qualitative approach (Hiller and Chow 2005; Tsang, Irving, Alaggia, Chau, and Benjamin 2003), a narrative approach with a single participant (Chan 2009), a quantitative approach with a limited sample size (Kester and Marshall 2003; Lay and Verkuyten 1999) and dealt with adults (Kwong 1998). To extend this line of research and to fill a gap in the research literature, this paper examines the orientations to heritage language learning, heritage school performance, and ethnic identity maintenance among Chinese-Canadian adolescents in a western Canadian city.

Method

Sample
The data for the present analyses were based on a questionnaire survey of 515 Chinese-Canadian students enrolled in three different heritage language schools in Calgary, Alberta (Chow 2012, 2004). The sample comprised 255 male (50%) and 255 female (50%) students with a mean age of 14.24 years ($SD = 1.92$). Almost two-thirds ($n = 323, 63.7\%$) were born in Canada and about one-third ($n = 164, 32.3\%$) were born in Hong Kong. The average length of residence in Canada was 11.96 years ($SD = 4.06$). An overwhelming majority of the students were Canadian citizens ($n = 470, 93.8\%$).

Measures of key variables
Motivations to learn heritage language. The motivational orientations to heritage language learning was measured using a 22-item scale on a 5-point scale ($1 = $ very unimportant; $2 = $ unimportant; $3 = $ uncertain; $4 = $ important; $5 = $ very important). A subset of these items was adapted from Feuerverger’s (1986) ethnolinguistic scale which was based on Gardner and Lamberts’ (1972) integrative (i.e., learning a language because of a positive affective disposition towards the language community and the desire to achieve language proficiency in order to participate in and develop a sense of belonging to the language community) and instrumental (i.e., learning the language as a means of achieving practical goals such as improving one’s economic status or getting social recognition) motivational orientations to foreign language learning.

Academic performance in heritage language school. Academic performance was based on respondents’ self-reported grades obtained in heritage language school
using a 5-point scale (1 = Grade E or 48% or below; 2 = Grade D or 50-59%; 3 = Grade C or 60-69%; 4 = Grade B or 70-79%; 5 = Grade A or 80-100%).

**Ethnic self-identification and ethnic identity maintenance.** Ethnic identity (i.e., an individual’s sense of belonging to an ethnic group and the part of one’s thinking, perception, feelings, and behaviour that is due to ethnic group membership) was measured using an 8-item scale adapted from Phinney’s (1992) Multi-group Ethnic Identity Scale. Ethnic self-identification was based on the respondents’ preferred ethnic label to describe themselves (e.g., Canadian, Chinese-Canadian, or Chinese).

**Statistical analysis**

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used to analyze the data. Descriptive and inferential analyses were conducted. Cronbach’s alpha reliability test was employed to explore the internal consistency of all scales used. Factor analysis was employed to explore the factorial structure of the motivational orientations to heritage language learning scale. Two multiple ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression models were constructed to identify the key determinants of respondents’ heritage school performance and ethnic identity maintenance.

**Findings**

**Motivations to attend heritage language school**

Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the twenty-two items measuring motivational orientations to heritage language learning. The top five reasons reported by the respondents for attending Chinese language schools included: (1) To be able to communicate with my parents in Chinese (\(M = 4.05, SD = 1.09\)); (2) Because it is important to my parents (\(M = 3.91, SD = 1.14\)); (3) Because I am interested in traveling to my ethnic homeland (\(M = 3.86, SD = 1.22\)); (4) To be able to speak with other Chinese in their mother tongue (\(M = 3.84, SD = 1.06\)); and (5) To be able to watch Chinese TV programs/videos and to listen to Chinese radio broadcasts (\(M = 3.84, SD = 1.16\)). The results demonstrated that respondents placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of learning their heritage language for practical (i.e., communicative and instrumental) purposes.

A principal component factor analysis using varimax rotation was conducted to explore the underlying dimensions of these items. The analysis revealed three factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1, accounting for a total of 59.10% of the
The three factors were labelled “communicative,” “instrumental,” and “integrative” orientations to heritage language learning. Eleven items (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, m, n, o and r) were loaded on the “communicative orientation” factor, accounting for 26.05% of the variance (Eigen value = 5.73). These items focused principally on learning the Chinese language for communication purposes. Eight items (h, i, p, q, s, t, u, and v) were loaded on the “instrumental orientation,” accounting for 22.88% of the variance (Eigen value = 5.03). These items dealt primarily with practical reasons for learning the Chinese language. Three items (j, k, and l) were loaded on the “integrative orientation,” explaining 10.17% of the variance (Eigen value = 2.24). The main focus of these items was on the significance of gaining respect or acceptance from both ethnic group members and outsiders. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for these three factors were .92, .88, and .73 respectively.

Table 1: Motivations to learn the Chinese language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>5</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. To be able to speak with my parents in Chinese</td>
<td>27 (5.3)</td>
<td>29 (5.7)</td>
<td>44 (8.6)</td>
<td>205 (40.0)</td>
<td>208 (40.5)</td>
<td>4.05 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. As an expression of commitment to my heritage</td>
<td>21 (4.1)</td>
<td>27 (5.3)</td>
<td>100 (19.5)</td>
<td>247 (48.1)</td>
<td>118 (23.0)</td>
<td>3.81 (.98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. To be able to read Chinese newspapers, magazines, and books</td>
<td>48 (9.3)</td>
<td>70 (13.6)</td>
<td>114 (22.2)</td>
<td>175 (34.0)</td>
<td>107 (20.8)</td>
<td>3.43 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. To be able to watch Chinese TV programs/videos and to listen to Chinese radio broadcasts</td>
<td>33 (6.4)</td>
<td>41 (8.0)</td>
<td>68 (13.3)</td>
<td>202 (39.5)</td>
<td>168 (32.8)</td>
<td>3.84 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Because it is important to my parents</td>
<td>27 (5.3)</td>
<td>36 (7.0)</td>
<td>90 (17.5)</td>
<td>163 (31.8)</td>
<td>197 (38.4)</td>
<td>3.91 (1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Because it is important for the future of the Chinese culture in Canada</td>
<td>26 (5.1)</td>
<td>31 (6.0)</td>
<td>124 (24.2)</td>
<td>198 (38.6)</td>
<td>134 (26.1)</td>
<td>3.75 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. To help me better understand my Chinese background</td>
<td>33 (6.4)</td>
<td>35 (6.8)</td>
<td>92 (18.0)</td>
<td>222 (43.4)</td>
<td>130 (25.4)</td>
<td>3.74 (1.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Because I like to learn languages</td>
<td>44 (8.6)</td>
<td>59 (11.5)</td>
<td>151 (29.4)</td>
<td>166 (32.4)</td>
<td>93 (18.1)</td>
<td>3.40 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Because I need it for my future career</td>
<td>30 (5.8)</td>
<td>26 (5.1)</td>
<td>147 (28.7)</td>
<td>152 (29.6)</td>
<td>158 (30.8)</td>
<td>3.74 (1.12)</td>
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<td>j. Because other Chinese will respect me more if I know the Chinese language</td>
<td>42 (8.2)</td>
<td>54 (10.5)</td>
<td>124 (24.2)</td>
<td>197 (38.5)</td>
<td>95 (18.6)</td>
<td>3.49 (1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Because non-Chinese will respect me more if I know my ethnic language</td>
<td>42 (8.2)</td>
<td>63 (12.3)</td>
<td>203 (39.7)</td>
<td>134 (26.2)</td>
<td>69 (13.5)</td>
<td>3.24 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Because most of my friends are also attending Chinese language school</td>
<td>95 (18.4)</td>
<td>126 (24.7)</td>
<td>148 (29.0)</td>
<td>110 (21.6)</td>
<td>32 (6.3)</td>
<td>2.72 (1.18)</td>
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<td>(SD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>m. To be able to speak with other Chinese in their mother tongue <em>(i.e. Chinese)</em></td>
<td>25 (4.9)</td>
<td>31 (6.1)</td>
<td>91 (17.8)</td>
<td>216 (42.4)</td>
<td>147 (28.8)</td>
<td>3.84 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. To allow me to participate more freely in activities within the Chinese community</td>
<td>33 (6.5)</td>
<td>54 (10.6)</td>
<td>126 (24.8)</td>
<td>186 (36.6)</td>
<td>109 (21.5)</td>
<td>3.56 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. To help me increase my understanding of the Chinese culture in Canada.</td>
<td>33 (6.5)</td>
<td>55 (10.8)</td>
<td>114 (22.4)</td>
<td>202 (39.6)</td>
<td>106 (20.8)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Because I would like to get a job where I could use the Chinese language</td>
<td>43 (8.4)</td>
<td>53 (10.4)</td>
<td>165 (32.2)</td>
<td>149 (29.1)</td>
<td>102 (19.9)</td>
<td>3.42 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Because learning the Chinese language will help me to learn other languages</td>
<td>56 (11.0)</td>
<td>72 (14.1)</td>
<td>197 (38.6)</td>
<td>116 (22.7)</td>
<td>70 (13.7)</td>
<td>3.14 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r. Because other Chinese may relate to me better if I have a knowledge of the Chinese language</td>
<td>22 (4.3)</td>
<td>31 (6.1)</td>
<td>117 (22.9)</td>
<td>221 (43.3)</td>
<td>119 (23.3)</td>
<td>3.75 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s. Because I am interested in travelling to my ethnic homeland <em>(e.g., Hong Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan)</em></td>
<td>43 (8.4)</td>
<td>26 (5.1)</td>
<td>84 (16.4)</td>
<td>165 (32.2)</td>
<td>194 (37.9)</td>
<td>3.86 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t. Because I may further my studies in my ethnic homeland <em>(e.g., Hong Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan)</em></td>
<td>60 (11.7)</td>
<td>68 (13.3)</td>
<td>193 (37.8)</td>
<td>115 (22.5)</td>
<td>75 (14.7)</td>
<td>3.15 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u. To help me increase my understanding of the culture in my ethnic homeland <em>(e.g., Hong Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan)</em></td>
<td>33 (6.5)</td>
<td>45 (8.8)</td>
<td>152 (29.7)</td>
<td>181 (35.4)</td>
<td>100 (19.6)</td>
<td>3.53 (1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Because I may want to live in my ethnic homeland <em>(e.g., Hong Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan)</em></td>
<td>79 (15.4)</td>
<td>70 (13.7)</td>
<td>174 (34.0)</td>
<td>103 (20.1)</td>
<td>86 (16.8)</td>
<td>3.09 (1.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Uncertain; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree

**Academic Performance in Heritage Language School**

A majority of the respondents reported having obtained a grade point average of 80-100% (n = 363, 71.5%). Slightly more than one-fifth (n = 109, 21.5%) attained 70-79%. Relatively few respondents obtained 60-69% (n = 27, 5.3%), 50-59% (n = 4, .8%), or a failing grade (i.e., 49% or below) (n = 5, 1.0%).

**Ethnic Self-identification and Ethnic Identity Maintenance**

A majority of the respondents (n = 343, 67.8%) indicated their preference to self-identify themselves as “Chinese-Canadian.” Slightly more than one-fifth (n = 103, 20.4%) preferred the use of the “Chinese” label. Relatively few respondents (n = 55, 10.9%) identified themselves as “Canadian.” With respect to ethnic identity, as
shown in Table 2, the mean scores ranged from 3.43 to 4.16, demonstrating that most respondents displayed a relatively strong ethnic identity. It is noteworthy that a substantial proportion of the sample felt good about their Chinese background ($n = 418, 81.2\%$) and were happy to be a member of their ethnic group ($n = 424, 82.5\%$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Ethnic identity maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel good about my cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chinese) background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel a strong attachment towards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>my own ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a lot of pride in my ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group and its accomplishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have spent time trying to learn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more about Chinese culture, traditions, and customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a good sense of my Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>background and what it means to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am happy that I am a member of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group I belong to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a strong sense of belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to my own ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I participate in cultural practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of own group, such as Chinese food,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>music, or customs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Uncertain; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree

**Multivariate Analysis**

To explore the determinants of respondents’ academic performance in heritage language school and ethnic identity maintenance, two multiple OLS regression models were constructed. The operational definitions of the various predictor variables included in the two regression models are presented in the Appendix.

Concerning academic performance in heritage language school, as shown in Table 3, the multiple OLS regression model was found to be significant ($F(15,498) = 7.137, p < .01$) and 15.2% of the variance in academic performance was accounted for. Sex ($\beta = -.106, p < .05$), age ($\beta = -.119, p < .01$), religious affiliation ($\beta = .088, p <$
integrative motivation to learn ($\beta = .116, p < .05$), ethnic identity ($\beta = .102, p < .05$), exposure to ethnic media ($\beta = .099, p < .05$), and parental encouragement ($\beta = .970, p < .01$) were found to be significantly related to academic performance in Chinese language school. More specifically, females, younger respondents, and those who professed to be Protestant or Catholic, placed greater emphasis on integrative purposes for learning heritage language, displayed a strong ethnic identity, reported more frequent exposure to ethnic media, and received more parental encouragement were found to perform better academically in the Chinese language school.

Table 3: Unstandardized & standardized regression coefficients for effects of socio-demographic & background variables on academic performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-2.378</td>
<td>-1.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-3.152</td>
<td>-1.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>2.027</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>-1.894</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents’ education</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivations to learn heritage language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative motivation</td>
<td>-.056</td>
<td>-.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental motivation</td>
<td>-.178</td>
<td>-.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrative motivation</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward multiculturalism</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese language school experience</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitality of the Chinese language to parents</td>
<td>-1.308</td>
<td>-.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to ethnic media</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental encouragement</td>
<td>.970</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Linear) (Constant) 71.845  
$F$ 7.137***  
$R^2$ .177  
Adjusted $R^2$ .152  
N 513

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

With respect to ethnic identity maintenance, as displayed in Table 4, the overall multiple OLS regression model was found to be significant ($F (11,502) = 19.272, p < .001$) and 28.2% of the variance in ethnic identity maintenance was accounted for. Age ($\beta = .100, p < .01$), country of birth ($\beta = .122, p < .01$), socio-
economic status ($\beta = .077, p < .05$), Chinese language proficiency ($\beta = .256, p < .001$), exposure to ethnic media ($\beta = .219, p < .001$), intention to further studies in ethnic homeland ($\beta = .145, p < .01$), and medium of communication with parents ($\beta = -.115, p < .01$) were found to be significantly related to respondents’ ethnic identity maintenance. More specifically, older respondents and those who were born in Canada or the United States, indicated a higher socio-economic status (SES), assessed their proficiency in the Chinese language to be higher, reported a greater exposure to ethnic media, demonstrated a stronger desire to pursue further studies in ethnic homeland, communicated with parents in Chinese more frequently in Chinese were found to display a stronger ethnic identity.

Table 4: Unstandardized & standardized regression coefficients for effects of socio-demographic and background variables on ethnic identity maintenance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-.111</td>
<td>-.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>.100 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-.499</td>
<td>-.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>1.483</td>
<td>.122 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
<td>.693</td>
<td>.077 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese language proficiency</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td>.256 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to ethnic media</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>.219 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination experience</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to study in ethnic homeland</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.145 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to reside in ethnic homeland</td>
<td>.249</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium of communication with parents</td>
<td>-.779</td>
<td>-.115 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.272 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Discussion and Conclusion

This investigation contributes to the study of heritage language learning and ethnic identity maintenance among Chinese adolescents in a western Canadian city. The findings revealed that most Chinese-Canadian adolescents generally performed well in heritage language school and were strongly identified with their ethnic group.
The various socio-demographic and situational variables that significantly affected Chinese adolescents’ performance in heritage language schools and their maintenance of ethnic identity have been identified.

As regards academic performance in heritage language school, female students were found to perform better than their male counterparts. Earlier studies have consistently shown that females outperformed male students in second language acquisition (Van De Gaer, Pustjens, Van Damme, and De Munter 2007; Van der Slik, Van Hout, and Schepens 2015). Consistent with results from earlier research demonstrating the positive impact of religion on educational outcomes (Dijkstra and Peschar 1996; Loury 2004; Mooney 2010; Park 2001; Regnerus 2000), students who reported a religious affiliation (i.e., Protestant or Catholic) were found to perform better. Additionally, the higher grades obtained by students whose parents provided encouragement underscores the importance of parental involvement in children’s education. In a similar vein, younger students’ higher academic performance may be linked to their closer parental supervision than their older counterparts. Previous studies have shown that Asian parents had a significant influence and placed considerable pressure on their children to achieve academically (Castro and Rice 2003; McBride-Chang and Chang 1998; Cheng and Starks 2002; Crystal et al. 1994; Dandy and Nettelbeck 2002; Goyette and Xie 1999; Wong 1990; Youn 1993). The positive impact of students’ frequent exposure to ethnic media and stronger Chinese identity on performance in Chinese language school are not unexpected (Brown and Chu 2012; Chang and Le 2010; Rust, Jackson, Ponterotto, and Blumberg 2011). As well, students who placed greater emphasis on integrative motivation to learn were found to perform better. Their stronger desire to develop a sense of belonging to their own ethnic group has perhaps provided an incentive to take their heritage language classes more seriously. In fact, the importance of the role of integrative motivation on students’ learning outcomes has been noted in the literature (Hernández 2006; Khodadad and Kaur 2016; Rúa 2006).

Concerning ethnic identity maintenance, it is peculiar to note the positive association between age and ethnic identity. Perhaps older respondents were more cognizant of their “differentness” from members of the mainstream society. There is empirical evidence showing that minority adolescents’ recognition of their cultural separateness is associated with a positive sense of valuing their ethnic origins (Rosenthal and Hrynevich 1985). Country of birth emerged as another significant predictor. Individuals who were born in Canada or the United States displayed a
stronger ethnic identity. Additional research would be needed to ascertain this finding. Besides socio-demographic variables, other contextual factors such as locality and political strength of the ethnic group may have a significant impact on its members’ ethnic identity (Epstein and Heizler Cohen 2015; Noro 2009). With respect to SES, respondents who scored higher on the SES scale were found to be more strongly identified with their ethnic identity. This finding requires further clarification as contradictory result has been reported in the literature (Kaplan, Brown, Huynh, and Huynh 2016). As expected, students who assessed their proficiency in the Chinese language to be higher, reported a greater exposure to ethnic media, expressed a stronger desire to pursue further studies in ethnic homeland, and communicated with parents in Chinese more frequently were found to be associated with a stronger ethnic identity. Indeed, the close association between ethnic identity and heritage language use has been well-documented (Geerlings, Verkuyten, and Thijs 2015; Mu 2015; Oh and Fuligni 2010).

The findings from the present investigation would be beneficial not only to the various heritage language schools and boards of education, but to all other educational institutions where ethnic language courses are offered. The results could be used as basic information for curriculum development and academic counselling. Several limitations of the current study should be noted. Although this study involved students from all the major heritage language schools in a western Canadian city, a non-random sample was used. Moreover, the analysis relies on cross-sectional data. Statements about causality are, therefore, tenuous at best.

In order to account for these limitations, a longitudinal design should be employed to further substantiate the causal relationships among the study variables. Further studies also need to explore the formation process of Chinese-Canadian adolescents’ ethnic identity using qualitative approaches. In-depth interviews would allow them to share their language learning experiences and to reflect on how they have been seeking their ethnic identity while living in a multiethnic country. As the present study involved Chinese students attending heritage language schools, it would be worthwhile to investigate those who do not take Chinese language courses. In light of the growing ethnic and racial diversity in the Canadian school system, comparative studies exploring the experiences of other minority students would also be fruitful.
Acknowledgements

This study was conducted under the auspices of the Department of Canadian Heritage, Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) of the Government of Canada and the Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration. The author is grateful to Liam Conway, Cora Cyr, Sharon Hanley, André Magnan, and Xiashengyou Wang of the University of Regina and Derrick Chan, Chris Chen, Jo Chiang, and Mark Durieux of the University of Calgary for their research assistance. Gratitude is also extended to Chap Wong, Thomson Yu, Sutton Cheung, Stephen Tam, Christie Chow, Christopher Chow, and Angel Chow for their unflagging support. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 3rd Joint Annual Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies and the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association held November 23-24, 2012 at White Oaks Resort and Spa, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, Canada.

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Appendix:

**Definitions of the Predictor Variables Used in Regression Models**

**Model I: Academic Performance in Heritage Language School**

*Communicative motivation* ($M = 41.32$, $SD = 9.12$) was a composite score based on respondents’ degree of agreement or disagreement with the following eleven statements measured using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree: (1) To be able to speak with my parents in Chinese ($M = 4.05$, $SD = 1.09$); (2) As an expression of commitment to my heritage ($M = 3.81$, $SD = .98$); (3) To be able to read Chinese newspapers, magazines, and books ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.22$); (4) To be able to watch Chinese TV programs/videos and to listen to Chinese radio broadcasts ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.16$); (5) Because it is important to my parents ($M = 3.91$, $SD = 1.14$); (6) Because it is important for the future of the Chinese culture in Canada ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.07$); (7) To help me better understand my Chinese background ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.11$); (8) To be able to speak with other Chinese in their mother tongue (i.e., Chinese); (9) ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.06$); (10) To allow me to participate more freely in activities within the Chinese community ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.13$); and (11) Because other Chinese may relate to me better if I have a knowledge of the Chinese language ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.02$). This 11-item scale has a Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .92.

*Instrumental motivation* ($M = 41.32$, $SD = 9.12$) was a composite score based on respondents’ degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements measured using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree: (1) Because I like to learn languages ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.16$); (2) Because I need it for my future career ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.12$); (3) Because I would like to get a job where I could use the Chinese language ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 1.16$); (4) Because learning the Chinese language will help me to learn other languages ($M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.16$); (5) Because I am interested in travelling to my ethnic homeland ($M = 3.86$, $SD = 1.22$); (6) Because I may further my studies in my ethnic homeland ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 1.18$); (7) To help me increase my understanding of the culture in my ethnic
homeland (e.g., Hong Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan) \((M = 3.53, SD = 1.10)\); and (8) Because I may want to live in my ethnic homeland (e.g., Hong Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan) \((M = 3.09, SD = 1.27)\). This 8-item scale has a Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .88.

**Integrative motivation** was a composite score \((M = 12.92, SD = 3.40)\) based on respondents’ degree of agreement or disagreement with the following three statements measured using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree: (1) Because other Chinese will respect me more if I know the Chinese language \((M = 3.49, SD = 1.15)\); (2) Because non-Chinese will respect me more if I know my ethnic language \((M = 3.24, SD = 1.09)\); and (3) Because most of my friends are also attending Chinese language school \((M = 2.72, SD = 1.18)\). This 3-item scale has a Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .72.

**Attitudes toward multiculturalism** \((M = 3.92, SD = .98)\) was based on respondents’ degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement “People in Canada should take advantage of the multicultural policy and learn about their own culture and language” using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).

**Chinese language school experience** \((M = 2.99, SD = 1.10)\) was based on respondents’ degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement “I enjoy my Chinese classes very much” using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).

**Vitality of the Chinese language to parents** \((M = 3.91, SD = 1.14)\) was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = very unimportant to 5 = very important).

**Ethnic identity** \((M = 31.29, SD = 5.89)\) was an 8-item scale based on respondents’ degree of agreement with the following statements using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree): (1) I feel good about my cultural background \((M = 4.16, SD = .87)\); (2) I feel a strong attachment toward my own ethnic group \((M = 3.78, SD = .98)\); (3) I have a lot of pride in my ethnic group and its accomplishment \((M = 3.99, SD = .92)\); (4) I have spent time trying to learn more about Chinese culture, traditions, and customs \((M = 3.43, SD = 1.06)\); (5) I have a good sense of my Chinese background and what it means to me \((M = 3.76, SD = .92)\); (6) I am happy that I am a member of the group I belong to \((M = 4.17, SD = .86)\); (7) I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group \((M = 3.95, SD = .91)\); and (8) I participate in cultural practices of my own group, such as Chinese food, music, or customs \((M = 4.03, SD = .99)\). This 8-item scale was found to be internally consistent, with a Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .89.

**Exposure to ethnic media** \((M = 12.02, SD = 4.05)\) was an additive score based on frequency of reading Chinese magazines or newspapers \((M = 2.18, SD = 1.23)\), watching Chinese television programs or videos \((M = 3.79, SD = 1.28)\), listening to Chinese pop music \((M = 3.17, SD = 1.44)\), and listening to Chinese radio broadcasts \((M = 2.89, SD = 1.34)\) measured on a 5-point scale (1 = never to 5 = very often/daily).

**Parental encouragement** \((M = 3.37, SD = 1.17)\) was based respondents’ degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement “I often receive praise or approval from my parents for speaking Chinese” using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).
With respect to socio-demographic variables, *age at immigration* ($M = 2.26, SD = 3.63$) was measured in years. *Parents’ education* ($M = 7.71, SD = 2.15$) was a composite score based on the educational level attained by both father and mother (1 = no formal education to 5 = university). *Socio-economic status* ($M = 3.39, SD = .68$) was an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). *Sex* (1 = male; 0 = female), *age* (1=16 or above; 0 = other), and *religion* (1 = Christian; 0 = other) were dummy coded.

**Model II: Ethnic Identity Maintenance**

*Chinese language proficiency* ($M = 14.47, SD = 3.42$) was a composite score based on respondents’ self-evaluation of the following four components: (1) understanding Chinese ($M = 4.08, SD = .86$), (2) speaking Chinese ($M = 4.04, SD = .98$), (3) reading Chinese ($M = 3.16, SD = 1.18$), and (4) writing Chinese ($M = 3.19, SD = 1.16$). This 4-item scale was found to be internally consistent, with a Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .82.

*Exposure to ethnic media* ($M = 12.02, SD = 4.05$) was an additive score based on frequency of (1) reading Chinese magazines or newspapers ($M = 2.18, SD = 1.23$); (2) watching Chinese television programs or videos ($M = 3.79, SD = 1.28$); (3) listening to Chinese pop music ($M = 3.17, SD = 1.44$); and (4) listening to Chinese radio broadcasts ($M = 2.89, SD = 1.34$) measured on a 5-point scale (1 = never to 5 = very often/daily).

*Discrimination experience* was based on whether or not the respondents had experienced discrimination because of their Chinese background within the past twelve months (1 = yes; 0 = no).

*Intention to study in ethnic homeland* ($M = 3.15, SD = 1.18$) and *intention to reside in ethnic homeland* ($M = 3.09, SD = 1.27$) were assessed on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = very unimportant to 5 = very important.

*Medium of communication with parents* ($M = 1.98, SD = .86$) was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = Chinese only to 5 = English only).

Regarding socio-demographic variables, *sex* (1 = male; 0 = female), *country of birth* (1 = Canada or the U.S.; 0 = other), and *religion* (1 = Christian; 0 = other) were dummy coded. *Age* ($M = 14.24, SD = 1.92$) and *age at immigration* ($M = 2.26, SD = 3.63$) were measured in years. *Socio-economic status* ($M = 3.39, SD = .68$) was an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high).
Who Wants to Leave? Migration Motivations in Moldova

Ludmila BOGDAN

Abstract. Migration motivations have been studied in the context of economic deprivation, focusing mainly on poor people seeking economic advantage abroad. This case study relies on quantitative data and finds that there is a positive correlation between economic wealth and a desire to migrate, meaning that wealthier people are more willing to move and settle abroad permanently compared to poorer people.

Keywords: migration motivations, economic deprivation, poverty, migration policy, Moldova

Introduction and Literature Review

The phenomenon of migration has been of major importance in sending and receiving countries, due to social, economic, and political factors. Moldova has provoked an interest amongst researchers of migration because of its enormous proportions of population flows (Pinger 2010). High migration flows make Moldova an interesting case study (Milan Cuc 2005, Trebesch 2008). Moldovan emigrants represent almost a third of the total labor force of the entire country (Lawrence Bouton 2011). In 2004, migrants accounted for about 40% of the economically active population (Milan Cuc 2005). From 2005-2010 Moldova had a consistently high migration outflow, with one quarter to one third of the total working age population made up by migrants (Maria Vremis 2012). In 2004, from an active economic population of 1.6 million, 600,000 workers were working abroad (Trebesch 2008). Moldova is mainly a country of origin of migrants and to a lesser extent a country of transit of irregular migrants (Maria Vremis 2012).

Countries with high migration rates were subjects of the study of the migration motivations. In 2000, about 26% of surveyed Moldovans said they would leave the country permanently and about 30% said that they would leave Moldova for at least a period of time (Gaugas 2004). About 37% of young Moldovans between
the ages of 18-29 stated they would be more willing to move and settle abroad permanently, whilst 50% would move temporarily (IPP.MD 2003). Goerlich and Trebesch looked at what factors might influence Moldovans’ decisions to migrate and they found that the choice of migrating seasonally or permanently is influenced by the size of the network abroad. This was an important factor in particular for urban households (Trebesch 2008).

On the one hand, migration brings significant opportunities to Moldova, mainly remittances and exposure to new culture and lifestyles (Robila 2014, Taylor 1999). Migration can fuel technology and knowledge spillovers by Moldovan migrants who use their new skills at home (Kirchkamp 2002, Winters 2004). According to the World Bank study, migration has very positive outcomes for the Moldovan economy in general, especially on national wages\(^1\) (Lawrence Bouton 2011). Parents’ migration has a positive impact on access to higher education for their children at home (Maria Vremis 2012).

Moldova is a country with a great number of migrants, so remittances are one of the most substantial sources of income. Moldova is a country with one of the highest shares of remittances to its GDP (in the world) (Chindea 2008). In 2004, Moldova was ranked the second country worldwide to receive the highest remittances share, compared to GDP (Dilip Ratha 2005). The National Bank of Moldova combines the migrant remittances with other foreign currency transfers made by individuals in their data base. According to the National Bank of Moldova and the World Bank, remittances have remained consistently above 20% of the GDP after the global economic downturn. In 2007, the remittances constituted 27% of the GDP and in 2007, remittances reached a peak at 36% of Moldova’s GDP (Maria Vremis 2012). About 40% of households in Moldova receive remittances from relatives abroad and 60% of these households finance more than half of their entire expenditures using these remittances (CBS-AXA 2007). Remittances are a tool to alleviate poverty in Moldova (CBS-AXA 2007).

“Transfers from migrants, who accounted for about 40 % of the economically active population at the end of 2004, were primarily used to satisfy basic consumption needs and finance housing and education, with smaller amounts being invested in business activities. Remittances are, moreover, likely to remain a stable and countercyclical source of foreign exchange in the short run. However, as more

\(^1\) Consistent with the literature, the World Bank study finds a positive impact of emigration labor shock on national wages in Moldova.
migrants settle permanently abroad, portfolio choice may become more important.” (Milan Cuc 2005).

On the other hand, migration brings challenges to Moldova, ranging from brain-drain to human trafficking (Pinger 2010). An IOM report warns about the negative effects of migration on the social protection system due to a lack of migrant participation and contribution to the social system mechanisms (Maria Vremis 2012). Migrants are less likely to seek health care abroad, which can be a detriment to their health (Maria Vremis 2012). Emigration from Moldova has high social and emotional costs (Trebesch 2008). In addition to this, the authors highlight the high social and emotional costs of migration and neglect of children (Trebesch 2008). Migration brings challenges at a family level, impacts parental behavior, and influences children’s well-being (Robila, The Impact of Migration on Children’s Psychological and Academic Functioning in the Republic of Moldova. 2014). Several studies found that parental migration has a negative impact on children’s social, psychological, and academic well-being and functioning (Robila 2011, Robila, 2014, Vollebergh 2008). Children with migrant parents are vulnerable and are subject to an increased risk of behavioral and psychological problems due to a lack of supervision and support (Robila, 2014).

Moldova is a sending country of migrants which understands that creating a fertile environment for migration can contribute to the country’s income growth and promote economic development (Chindea 2008, Lawrence Bouton 2011, Taylor 1999). The most beneficial migration is temporary migration (see Abella 2006, Mattoo 2005, Mesnard 2004) because it translates to higher remittances, technology and skills spillovers for the sending countries (Taylor 1999) and cheap imported short-term labor for receiving countries (Pinger 2010, Trebesch 2008).

Research on the remittances focusing on migrant sending countries ignores the causes of migration, which is problematic, considering that the factors of migration motivations also influence the migration and remittances outcomes (Taylor 1999). Motivations can be seen as a push factor for migration, so the distinction between motivations and factors of migration is not clear. The motivations influence people’s decisions to take one action over another. This paper relies on original, empirical data to uncover some of the determinants of migration of Moldovans. The findings show that wealthier people are more willing to migrate permanently (abroad) as opposed to poorer people. On an academic level, these findings enrich the body of literature on migration motivations in one of the
countries with some of the highest rates of migration in the region. On a policy level, these findings might even help policy-makers tailor their migration policies more efficiently.

**Hypotheses and Research Questions**

As well as enriching the existing literature on migration motivations by adding the sub-layers of migration motivations, this paper tries to test two hypotheses that arise from the pull-push theory of migration, stating that some of the main push factors of migration are poverty and unemployment.

Economic deprivation is conceptualized as inadequate resources to cover minimum living expenses or lack of basic material benefits that are a necessity in society. In this paper, economic deprivation has been measured based on monthly salary and ability to cover minimum living expenses with the salary (earned at the moment of the data collection). In order to answer the questions: ‘Who is more willing to migrate and settle abroad?’ and ‘what are the factors predicting someone’s willingness to migrate abroad permanently?’, the following hypotheses will be tested:

**Hypothesis 1:** There will be a negative correlation between monthly salary and desire to move and settle abroad.

**Hypothesis 2:** There will be a negative correlation between salary to cover minimum expenses and desire to move and settle abroad.

**Hypothesis 3:** There will be a negative correlation between social class and desire to move and settle abroad.

**Hypothesis 4:** People from rural areas will be more willing to migrate and people from capital cities will be less likely to migrate.

**Methods**

This study is based on quantitative data. The quantitative method generates data that can be statistically analyzed and consequently, enables one to draw conclusions based on a representative sample of the Moldovan population. The data was collected through face-to-face interviews of a national sample of people aged 14 and above, living in Moldova between June 2013 and September 2014. The sample size includes 250 respondents. To get a
representative sample of the Moldovan population, the multistage randomization was applied considering groups of regions, households and respondents. To avoid response bias, respondents were told that they would be asked personal opinion-type questions, emphasizing that there were no wrong or right answers, but that the researcher was interested in their views on some social issues. The first step in sampling was combining some of the regions in groups, then the randomization of units was done within each group.

Table 1: Socio-demographic composition of the sample (N=250)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residency</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>50.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>27.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city</td>
<td>21.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>00.4 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>54.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of the country</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>22.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>15.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>62.6 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>25.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>67.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>07.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 300 USD/month</td>
<td>57.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 – 600 USD/month</td>
<td>25.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 600 USD/month</td>
<td>17.4 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>15.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>47.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor or equivalent</td>
<td>34.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master or higher</td>
<td>02.5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are descriptive statistics (frequencies).
Survey Variables

Age (1%, >15 years; 32%, 16-25; 17%, 26-35; 17%, 36-45; 14%, 46-55; 16%, 56-65; 4%, <66 years), gender (55%, female; 45%, male), residential area (51%, rural; 27%, urban; 22%, capital city), regions of Moldova (63%, Center; 22%, North; 15%, South), social class (67%, middle class; 26%, lower class; 7%, upper class).

Operationalization of Variables

Motivation to migrate. Respondents were asked if they would be willing to move and settle abroad, should they be given the opportunity. Their responses ranged from “not willing”, “do not know”, “maybe”, to “willing” to move and settle abroad. Participants in qualitative interviews were asked to reason why they wanted to, did not want to, or were hesitant to move and settle abroad.

Area of residence. Respondents were asked if they would be willing to move and settle abroad, should they be given the opportunity controlling for area of residence. The results showed that 50% of rural, 41% of capital city and 27% of urban respondents wanted to move and live abroad (p<0.000).

Social class. Respondents were asked with which social class they identified themselves. Responses were coded as “lower social class”, “middle social class”, and “upper social class”.

Monthly Salary. Respondents were asked about their monthly salary. Responses were coded 1 for a salary lower than 300 USD per what? – lower salary, 2 for a salary ranging from 300 USD to 600 USD – average salary, and 3 for a salary higher than 600 USD – high salary. About 58% of respondents have a lower salary, 25% have an average salary, and 17% have a high salary.

Salary to cover min expenses. Respondents were asked if their monthly salary covered minimum living expenses. Responses were coded as “yes” or “no”. About 56% of respondents said that they could not cover their living expenses using salary alone.

Analysis

Hypotheses were tested using descriptive statistics. The dependent variable was the will to move and live abroad tested by four independent variables; social class, monthly salary, ability to cover minimum living expenses with salary and residence.
Results and Discussion

Table 2: Moldovans’ experience and attitudes towards labor migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you worked abroad?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>56 %</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long have you worked abroad?²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1yr</td>
<td>48 %</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1yr</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonally (3 months)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When was the last time you worked abroad?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recently (&lt;1 yr)</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few years ago (&gt;1yr)</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 yrs ago</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have any relatives abroad?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you receive any financial Help from relatives abroad?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>63 %</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to move and live abroad, given the opportunity?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>53 %</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample size =196. Cell entries are results of descriptive statistics (frequencies)

Descriptive statistics show that almost half of the respondents have previous work experience abroad (44%) and from these, about 48% worked abroad for a long period of time (one year or longer). This indicates that Moldovans are heavily

² This question was asked people who said that they have worked abroad previously or currently work abroad.
exposed to labor migration and have extensive experience working abroad. The fact that such a large percentage has worked abroad for a long period of time indicates that people have created connections and thus, familiarized themselves with the working environment abroad. This also points to the fact that the economic situation is not improving and still fails to attract labor migrants back home. Wage discrepancies play a crucial role in this. The wages abroad are much higher compared to those in Moldova, which may be a reason for people working abroad for lengthy periods of time. In addition to this, another factor which might explain why migrants spend longer periods abroad, is the investment already made in their training and integration; an issue which has been widely researched.

Amongst those who have worked abroad, roughly 38% returned home recently, which suggests that many of them are so-called “permanent labor migrants” as opposed to “seasonal migrants”. Most seasonal migrants seek employment abroad during the summer, while permanent migrants, who spend more than one year working abroad, usually come home once a year or less, usually during the summer. People working in the European Union (EU) usually come home to Moldova during the summer, while people working in the Common Wealth Independent States (CIS) usually work abroad (In CIS countries, summer is the most popular season for temporary workers).

About 95% of Moldovans said that they have relatives or close friends abroad. From this number, about 37% of respondents received financial help from their relatives abroad. This is not surprising, considering that remittances make up more than 22% of the national Moldovan GDP. In addition to this, about 40% of people said that they would be willing to move and settle abroad, given the opportunity.

This information shows that most Moldovans have extensive experience working abroad and many have relatives or close friends working abroad. The fact that many people have worked abroad recently, but were home during the public opinion surveying suggests that many people continue to work abroad and return to Moldova seasonally or for a short period of time. About 37% of respondents said that they received some financial help from their relatives abroad, which shows that one of the main reasons Moldovans seek job opportunities abroad, is not only to cover living expenses for themselves, but also their relatives at home. It has become very common for Moldovan households to send a family member abroad to support their entire family. In many cases, this is the only solution to cover living expenses and
costs for higher education (Robila, The Impact of Migration on Children's Psychological and Academic Functioning in the Republic of Moldova. 2014).

Moldovan migrants usually take up jobs that citizens of EU countries would never take due to the low pay. Usually, migrants are paid substantially lower than the minimum salary in (the) destination countries. In addition to this, the working conditions are very often poor. While the salary is lower than the required national minimum, it is still greater compared to salaries in Moldova (Milan Cuc 2005).

Table 3: Factors predicting Moldovan’s motivations to migrate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Respondents who want to migrate abroad permanently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Salary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>31 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>55 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you cover minimum expenses with your monthly salary?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital City</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample size = 219. Cell entries are results of descriptive statistics (crosstabs).

This paper found a positive correlation between salary and the willingness to migrate permanently abroad, which means that people with higher salaries are more willing to move abroad and people with lower salaries are more willing to stay in Moldova. Surprisingly, these findings are the exact opposite of what has been originally hypothesized. Richer people are more motivated to move abroad because they tend to think that their financial situation might deteriorate with Moldova’s lack
of prosperity. They also have more savings to facilitate the transition abroad, which can be very costly. Poorer people, on the other hand, are more risk-averse and less willing to risk the little they have, to move abroad.

The second hypothesis finds that people who are satisfied with their monthly salaries and those who are dissatisfied with their salaries are equally willing to migrate abroad. The salary satisfaction was measured by asking if the monthly salary is enough to cover minimum living expenses. Respondents who said that the salary is adequate to cover minimum expenses were considered satisfied, while respondents who said that the monthly salary is not adequate to cover minimum living expenses were considered dissatisfied with their salaries. Those who do not want to migrate while not being able to cover minimum living expenses does not mean they do not go abroad. In fact, many of them do. Working abroad helps them not only to cover their own living expenses, but also to support their whole family back at home. The working conditions are also very poor compared to safety and working regulations in the country of destination, but again these conditions are still much better compared to the working conditions Moldovans get back home. I think you mean that the working conditions in the destination country are much better than those of Moldova?

Residence is an important factor when predicting whether people are less or more willing to migrate abroad permanently. About 50% of rural people, 40% of capital city residents, and only 27% of urban residents said that they would be willing to migrate abroad. While it is not surprising that the rural residents were more willing to migrate abroad compared to the other two groups, it is surprising that the capital city residents were significantly more willing to move abroad compared to the residents of other urban areas. This might be due to the fact that people in the capital city are more dissatisfied with their lives, but this paper does not provide enough evidence for the reason of such a big difference between the capital city and other urban areas.

There is limited support for the original hypothesis of correlation between the social class and the desire to migrate abroad. Findings show that people from the lower and middle class are equally willing to move and settle abroad and people from higher social class are less willing to do so. However, there is one limitation when it comes to the variable of social class and this is because the respondents self-identified their own social class. Hence, social class was assigned to the respondent in the way s/he perceived it to be.
Conclusion

There are several reasons why people are motivated or even forced to migrate. Some seek better living opportunities and others want to escape poverty and starvation. It is well known that economic deprivation and high unemployment rate are some of the main reasons people seek job opportunities abroad. This paper analyzed the migration motivations of people residing in Moldova by posing several questions: (1) who is more willing to migrate and settle abroad? and (2) what are the factors predicting someone’s willingness to migrate abroad? Moldova is an interesting case study because it is a country with one of the highest rates of migration in the world.

This paper found several important predictors of the Moldovans’ desire to move and settle abroad permanently. Firstly, higher salary is a predictor of a strong will to migrate; people with higher salaries are more willing to move abroad compared to those with lower salaries. Secondly, there was no correlation between salary satisfaction and the will to migrate; in fact, both those satisfied and dissatisfied with their salaries were equally willing to migrate. Thirdly, residence is a strong predictor whether someone is more or less willing to migrate. Rural residents were the most willing to migrate, followed by the capital city residents, and the urban residents were the least willing to migrate. Finally, social class is not a reliable indicator of someone’s motivations to migrate; people from lower and middle classes were equally motivated to migrate, while people from a higher social class were the least motivated. While this paper is limited in its conclusions by the quantitative data, it still states that poorer people are less willing to migrate. This suggests that people who are less willing to migrate are at risk of not informing themselves properly on the aspects of safe migration.

References


Marginal Multilingualism as the Roma People Identity

Lia POP

Abstract. The present paper is trying to introduce the concept of marginal multilingualism as a form of multilingualism different from the elites’ multilingualism. The concept fits for the Roma and for the immigrants’ multilingualism. The Roma marginal multilingualism describes the current Roma linguistic abilities. In the EU after 2000, it is largely developed, also its roots are in their way of living as migrants in continuous interactions with people speaking different languages, in their history. It focused on the component languages and on the categories of speakers with marginal multilingualism’ abilities. The paper assumes, that in the age of global communication, the Roma marginal multilingualism is to be minutely researched as a treasure of informal ways to easy pick up new languages and as a practical resource of multilingualism so needed in the global process eager for multilingual resources. Well-known the marginal multilingualism could be valorized as an European resource in the inclusion process, because the main role of the marginal multilingualism is to facilitate the linguistic interactions between new neighbors and to prevent the social misunderstandings.

Keywords: marginal multilingualism, Roma marginal multilingualism, linguistic insertion

1. Introduction: Why to ignore the Roma multilingualism?

The multilingualism - defined in the more simplest terms – is a feature of an individual or a group to speak more than one language. The multilingual is an umbrella term for the persons that prove to speak two or more languages. The experts in the field distinct between bi-lingualism, tri-lingualism, four languages and multilingualism for more than four. Those individuals that spoke more than seven languages are polyglots; and those that mastered over the 11 languages are the hyper – polyglots. The mentioned experts also elaborated academic tools to score

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1 The research was done in the framework of the collaborative project MIME Project, Mobility and Inclusion in multilingual Europe, CE – Culture and Education - Grant Agreement No. 613 344, in the thematic area: The multilingualism and the Roma people: challenges and opportunities. http://www.mime-project.
the linguistic abilities of each person\(^2\). The individuals’ multilingualism is silently and traditionally associated with the cultural or social elites. It is a matter of the aristocratic prestige, and, in the same time, a matter of the contemporary social utility, of social progress. A multilingual individual is automatically better valorized in his group and in those living around it. It gets more respect and prestige.

In the public imagery, traditionally, the groups’ multilingualism is associated with a great area, with a glorious past\(^3\) which provided to its citizens the intercultural experience and a correspondent education, internalized in the formal or informal ways. (Reversely, the monolingual groups are di-associate from a glorious past\(^4\), from an intercultural experience and a correspondent education. The monolingualism is not valorized as an asset, except by the extra-nationalistic ideologies.)

The contemporary EU – confronted with large linguistic diversity, internalized in the formal or informal ways.

In the shadows of the EU’ multilingualism (elites’ multilingualism) and unmanageable linguistics diversity, there is a third category: the marginal multilingualism.

The present paper is an attempt with a double face. Firstly, it is trying to introduce the concept of the marginal multilingualism, and secondly, to prove the existence of the marginal multilingualism’, at least as the Roma\(^5\) multilingualism.


\(^3\) It is the case with multilingualism of the Great Empires’ centers. Let’s think to the center/s of Babylonians, of ancient Persians, of the Alexander the Great ones, of Bactria – today Balkh province in Afghanistan, other times the center of a great religious cultures as the Zoroastrian, Buddhist-Shamballa and Moslim, the center of the civilizations as Ariana, Greater Khorasan; of the Romans Centers, city of Rome, of Konya (Anatolya), Constantinople and many others. In the modernity there are to be considered, at least, the multilingual centers of the Venetians, Amsterdam, London, Paris, the emblematic multicultural Vienna. Contemporary, all the European metropolis are multilingual. In Oslo, according with the Pakistan sources - live the world most large diasporas speaking Pashto.

The great areas multilingualism is seen politically and culturally as an asset as a key to attract creative people there and to spin-over the quality of life there. (In the margins there are also large linguistically hyper-diverse groups, that compose the New-Babylonia.)

\(^4\) For the concept of multilingualism in Europe see [http://www.mime-project](http://www.mime-project).

\(^5\) The word Roma -pl, from Rom is taken as an umbrella term for ethnic groups as Roma, Sinti, Travellers, Gens du Voyage, Kallé … populations of Europe. It was adopted as a politically
The final goal of analyzing the marginal multilingualism is to provide a fertile soil to identify its role in transforming the EU unmanageable linguistic diversity into a way of self-managed linguistic and social insertion of the marginals. Using the educational ways, a marginal multilingualism is more open to be transformed into a multilingualism appropriate for social inclusion.

2. Marginal multilingualism as a concept

The notion of marginal multilingualism is a response to the linguistic reality of our times. There are varieties of multilingualism not included in the European traditional concept of multilingualism.6

The Roma people in move all around Europe and the new dis-advantaged7 “migrants” arrived in the EU countries speaking among them in multiple languages are the most obvious cases of people that practice a special form of multilingualism: the marginal multilingualism.

This multilingualism admits the adjective marginal for three reasons: a) it is common among the social groups living in the marginal areas, as the marginalized groups (Roma and the poor and uneducated migrants); b) it presents features and roles distinctive from the common multilingualism (the elites’ multilingualism); c) it is scholarly not described yet and publicly ignored and politically un-valorized.

The presences in Europe of such a multilingualism is simply to be noticed. All the Roma – indifferently where they live – they speak their own language, some others dialects of Romani – sometimes not mutually inter-comprehensible – and the local language. They are at least, bi-lingual. De facto, they are regularly multilingual.

correct one at the first congress of International Romani Union, 1971, Orpington with the large contribution of the Gypsologists as Kendrick, Acton and Puxon. The term is used in conformity with the EU documents, post 2010, the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 and other EU documents, as [COM(2011)173 final], even there are academics with different views as Horvath, I. and Năstasă-Kovacs, L. eds (2014). Analytically seen, the term Roma is considered as an umbrella term for speakers of Romani (Romanes) and for the speakers of the Romani pogdialects, (mixed languages); for the speakers of languages non-comprehensible for Roman as the Gabors’ language, (the speakers of Shataroshi – Interv. No. 2.) or the Kashtale people that lost their mother tongue. It is comparable with the British umbrella term GRT.

For the same people – living outside of Europe, in the Near East or US, the term is Gypsies.

7 Poor, un-educated, and, frequently, out of co-ethnic and linguistic networks.
The poor and uneducated migrants – as a special segment of the migrants’ groups toward Europe in the recent years – were or became effective multilingual in a very short time due to the multilingual contexts of the camps, where they live. (Professor Vittoria Guillen Nieto – from University of Alicante, Language department, studied the case of the Romanians migrants’ manual workers in Spain before 2007. She noticed, that in the linguistic context, they need short time to acquire the Spanish: one to two months.)

It is the MIME project that introduced it, in the theory and far beyond it, in the political culture oriented to support the European public policies of multilingualism promotion for inclusive purposes.

As the common type of multilingualism, the marginal one characterizes individuals and groups.

A person is a marginal multilingual when its linguistic competences are appropriated to fulfill the group’s needs. The degree of its abilities in a certain language is not to be evaluated according to the academic requirements - at least at the level B in the Barcelona scale -! To meet the present group’s needs – surviving and figuring ways out of the today marginal condition - are to be considered as the workable criteria in assessing a marginal multilingual speaker’ linguistic abilities.

*We can consider a group as multilingual – partly - when at least 20% of its members are multilingual. (A group is totally multilingual when at least 80% of its members are multilingual.)*

The components of the marginal multilingualism are: the mother tongue, languages of the contexts with obvious social utility – as the English, by the way - and the associations of languages and dialects. As association of languages, the marginal multilingualism includes mainly varieties of languages spoken by tiny minority; spoken in private; and charged with emotional functions; with endangered

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8 The Roma – that could not read and write in their own language – according to those requirements are out of any linguistic competence. They neither fulfil the conditions to be considered as monolingual.

9 The theoretical framework of MIME project with its main concepts – the multilingualism, inclusion, and mobility as challenges and opportunities for the today Europe [as defined initially by the project leaders and enriched after by Grin (2014); (2015); Marácz (2016) and others] – are definitional concepts. Complimentarily with these, the UOR-RCIMI introduced the marginal multilingualism concept. For more http://www.mime-project.

10 There are emotional functions of a language those that facilitate: a) the expressions of the group’s and individual sensibility – from the intimate emotions, feelings towards the self and others, to the religiosity, artistic and cultural feelings; b) the easy and immediate receiving of
identities conservation; with creative roles\(^{11}\); aside a language/s spoken for the wider communicative actions. As associations of languages plus dialects, it keeps all the mentioned features: languages spoken in tiny groups, privately, and by adding, as components, the dialects (not mutually comprehensible\(^{12}\)).

The association of language and dialects transforms such a multilingualism in a most unconsidered one, according to the contemporary stereotypes. Being unconsidered, the marginal multilingualism is also pushed out of the inventory of the society resources. It is un valorized by the society at large, even it is intensively used by the group.

Trying a functional definition of the marginal multilingualism, it is to accept that the marginal multilingualism is functioning as a group’ tool in exploring the other communities offer of opportunities or to insert in those that seem to be more offering.

*The main roots of the marginal multilingualism* are the “social” bilingualism – composed by the mother tongue and the language used as official /or only as dominant in a certain area - and the tendency to acquire new languages needed in mobilities.

There are three added roots of the marginal multilingualism: a) trans-generational transmission of the old traditional languages for the group only, (languages without a current political status\(^{13}\)); b) the mobilities and with them, the acquisitions of new language/s\(^{14}\) in each new context, needed in the interactions with the locals; and c) the invention of new languages or alteration of old languages to meet the new needs in new contexts.

There are traditional languages those languages that result from the “lost” vernacular languages pushed out by the political, religious and cultural programs or simply by the promotion as official language of one single out of many vernacular languages spoken in an area. (Regularly, the official is the language of the politically, religiously and culturally dominant group at the moment of the linguistic paradigm

11 There are identity’s conservative and creative roles those that insure: a)
12 Sometimes such dialects could be bridges to comprehend others languages, the languages practiced in the past by the group, or practiced in other geographical areas.
13 Not international, not national, not politically recognized minorities language, but languages privately used in tiny groups with the same origins.
14 The new acquired languages signify languages or/and dialects spoken as the variety generally practiced in the region.
changing.\textsuperscript{15}) In the case of Roma, the obsolete languages – accepted as traditional in the group cultures – are the languages of the civilizations that the group crossed through, in their history.

The new acquired languages and dialects are those needed in a new linguistic context \textsuperscript{16}, where the group arrived due to its mobilities, firstly the local language and secondly, the official one - or the equivalent to the official. (Regularly, the conquerors language\textsuperscript{17}, a language arrived at our homes - does not reach the marginal multilingualism. (There are the elites’ multilingualism that assimilates such languages, maybe in a two ways process of assimilation.)

*The marginal multilingualism’s functions* are: a) to insert the outsider in the new linguistic and social environment; b) to open ways to the social inclusion.

*The marginal multilingualism is flexible; easy acquirable, changeable with any new context.* It is intimately related with the group or individuals’ geographic mobility. It is totally dependent by their interactions with groups speaking different languages or dialects.

It is hazardous, being composed by languages and dialects aleatory picked up. The components sometimes belong to the same linguistic family, sometimes not at all.

It is informally acquired, through methods discovered in situ or traditionally used in the group. The most innovative of the methods – that we noticed, among the mobile Roma - are the traditional methods: learning all from all and the learning by doing.

It is valuable for the group’s surviving and internally valorized as such. For the societies at large, it is unconsidered and un-valorized, it is out of political projects yet.

The marginal multilingualism, in nowadays Europe, considered on the

\textsuperscript{15} The changing of the medieval linguistic paradigm in Europe means the transfer of the political, religious and cultural functions from the Latin to the dialects spoken in Tuscany, Castilla, Catalunya, etc

\textsuperscript{16} The new acquired languages signify languages or/and dialects spoken as the variety generally practiced in the region.

\textsuperscript{17} The Russian – in spite a large policy of imposing it – remained unassimilated in Romania, in Albania, and in a limited measure, in Hungary, too. In the international summer schools, the Romanians, Albanians and Hungarians remained out of the Russian’ speakers’ groups, the people with Slavic roots, but also Georgian, Armenian, Kazaks, Mongol, Uzbeks… Such speakers gravitated informally to the speakers of the other languages, then Russian: Romanians to the Romanic – French, Italian, Spanish - the Hungarians to the German …
criterium of the main speakers, gets two types:

a) the marginal multilingualism of the traditional mobile and informally educated population\(^{18}\) – as the Roma, or others minorities with similar features are;

b) the marginal multilingualism of the contemporary poor migrants\(^{19}\), mobile and informally educated too – recently arrived in Europe as migrants or refugees; In majority, they are unable to speak a *lingua franca* or a language understandable in Europe.

The two types are not exclusive, one to other. By contrary, nearby the large illegal camps of poor migrants in Europe, the Roma groups from Eastern Europe are doing their common business, they interacted. They were notified nearby the ex-European migrants’ camps in Beograd, Madrid, Naples, Roma. They communicated picking up and using the needed linguistic elements.

Considered after the criterium, the number of languages and dialects mastered, the forms of the marginals multilingualism are the classical ones. Namely: bilingualism; trilingualism; multiligualism, polyglot individuals and hyperpolyglots individuals.

In the multilingual contexts, the groups of the marginals are: bilingual or trilingual. In some rare case they are multilingual. The individuals are regularly bilinguals, trilinguals, multilinguals, polyglots or hyperpolyglots. What it is amazing is that the marginal multilingualism is ignored, even there are quite significant number of polyglots among the marginals as there are people that acquired informally the new languages using special methods.

On brief, the marginal multilingualism is the multilingualism that applies to the social marginal individuals and groups - Roma and the poor and uneducated migrants; that is oral, informally acquired, hazardous in composition and with a social utility strictly connected with the origin’ group interests only;that is publicly largely ignored and politically un-valueitized.

3. **Marginal multilingualism in the EU’s policies**

Within the EU philosophy on languages and cultures identity, the
Marginal Multilingualism as the Roma People Identity
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multilingualism\textsuperscript{20} – \textit{de facto} the elites’ multilingualism - is regarded as asset. The languages implicitly advised to be learned are the mother tongue + 2 other different languages, the well-known philosophy: \textbf{M+2}! The choice on which languages are to be selected is rhetorically pretended to be the privilege of the learners themselves. Although, there are two other factors that are the main decision makers in the field: the state linguistic (educational policy) and the major social utility. The position of the languages in the Education Curricula, their categorization – international, national, minorities, local, or neighboring’ language – plus the requirements for the languages’ competences on the labor’ market are the major determinants in the presence of certain languages in a concrete society. The languages spoken in a certain area are: the mother tongues for each group with a linguistic and cultural identity; the language of political identity – national, official or minority language, takes the second position; after it, “the languages with an international circulation”, (known under such a label in the European educational jargon) and reported in the statistics as the \textit{foreign languages}\textsuperscript{21}; the languages largely active in the context, minorities languages spoken as foreign language, not as languages of identity, are included.

In Europe, there are languages with such a status English, French, German and in some extend, Russian, Spanish or Italian from European families and Japanese, Chinese and Arabic from the non-European areas.

It results that the EU today recommended multilingualism invites to learn Mother Tongue plus 2 others from the mentioned list. Recently, maybe under the inspiration of India – which proclaimed Sanskrit as the language of national identity –, CE recommended also the Latin and Greek.

The languages that shaped in large extend the European modernity – the Aramaic, Hebrew, Arabic – are kept under the silence.

The other national languages get limited chances in being Europeanly promoted or to be of the European interests. Except for diplomatic and political reasons or special business they did not capture the foreigners’ interest.

In such a context – modeled by the elites’ multilingualism, strongly directed by the today’s social utility and marked by a high competition for the first positions – the

\textsuperscript{20} See the CE \url{https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/multilingualism_en}, and the special documents on encouraging the EU citizens to become multilingual.

languages of the marginals are excluded from the very beginning. The concept of the EU multilingualism is, by default, limitedly viewed and limitedly valorized for a tolerant and inclusive on contributions and responsibility bases. We need the concept of marginal multilingualism to see the non-international languages as real candidates for an European multilingualism composed on the different bases and opening the ways to other contributors to the European tolerance and inclusion projects.

The marginal multilingualism is absent as a goal in the EU’s education strategies, and as a resource in the inclusion projects and strategies. Unfortunately, it is neither regarded as a resource by the Roma political organization as International Roma Union or others; or the Roma scholars.

4. General features of the Roma groups’ marginal multilingualism

The Roma groups considered as a whole illustrate the marginal multilingualism at the EU level, the EU being taken here as whole, too. The dimensions of the Roma multilingualism in the today EU are amazing.

Quantitatively, the dimensions of the Roma multilingualism result from: the number of the languages that the Roma groups all together, could speak; and from the categories of languages needed by the groups to earn their living. They give an image of a linguistic resource active in today EU and un-valorized in a common interest.

At the EU level, the Roma, as an imagined community, is able to provide speakers for the all the 24 official languages, for all the 60 minorities languages, for all Roma varieties, dialects and jargons – around 100; for some of the languages of the newly arrived in Europe with the so-called migration crisis, the immigrants’ languages that could be estimated to be, at least, 100²².

A fair estimation on the total number of languages available to become Roma’ assets, the languages’ number in which the Roma groups could provide speakers, raises to the 300, or around 300. (Here, the term language is taken as independent idioms, languages and dialects.) It is highly possible to be higher.

In the EU, a maximal list for the component languages’ categories of the Roma marginal multilingualism comprises seven categories. They could be: 1) one of the five/

more forms of Romani, accepted in the scholarly literature as the mother tongue for Roma; 2) the other variety/ies of Romani, than the mother tongue; 3) the different dialects of Romani and related languages; 4) the mixed languages with Romani; 5) and many other non-Romani languages - official and distinct in the majority of the European member states, 6) the languages of European minorities; plus 7) some of the languages of marginal immigrants.

At the EU level, the Roma marginal multilingualism is also a progressive

23 See the note on Romani.
24 Romani is the name for the language/s of the Roma people in Europe. It is frequently used and quite generally embraced in our days.

The language is in progress to multiple codification, based on different Roma’ dialects, in different member states:

- in Austria on the bases of Burgerland’s Romani variety, German script – (Latin alphabet) –, with roots in 1990;
- in Bulgaria Romani language publications use dialects as the Erli of Sofia, the Kalburdžu varieties of the Varna district, and the so-called ‘Drindari’ dialect of Sliven, Cyrillic Script, codification efforts began in 1990;
- in Czech Republic and Slovakia, on the basis of East Slovak dialects and Lovari, Latin script codification efforts began already in the late 1960s, and were revived after the political transition in 1990;
- in Hungary: Written Romani is usually based on the Lovari dialect, Latin script;
- in Macedonia, a flexible form of literary Romani was proposed already in 1980 based on either the Džambazi (Gurbet) or Arli dialects, and using the South Slavic writing system in both its Roman and Cyrillic forms
- in Romania, based to some extent on the Kelderash’ dialect and the Courthiade and Sarau’s inventions; Latin script with special diacritics, efforts stated in 1990;
- in Russia on the bases of Ruska Roma and Cyrillic script, codification effort in the early 1930;
- in Serbia, codification and written materials in the Gurbet/Džambazi dialect, and follow the writing system of Serbian, either in its Cyrillic or, more frequently, Roman variant, featuring {š ž ě} and {ph th kh čh}.

In the Roma’s political documents, there are also alternated terms used: as the Romanes or Romani Chib. The Charter of the Roma Rights, uses the name Romanes. At the Art. 13, it states: “As our language, Romanes shall be equated with all other European languages. States, as well international institutions, shall therefore ensure by all appropriate means that Romanes is protected as a living European language. This includes taking measures to promote public acceptance of Romanes and all measures stipulated in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, as well as support our own educational institutions and native-language classes at schools.”


26 Or a language with an equivalent political status.
multilingualism. The internal mobilities and migrations across the borders generated the needs for communicating in new languages or dialects. Simultaneously, the group’s instruments to meet such needs are generated additional multilingualism “naturally” developed.

The Roma groups in East Europe spoke traditionally the Near Asian’ Roma and Gypsies languages or dialects. Several groups of Roma, Romanian citizens, spoke Tatar Crimean’ Gypsy Language and Turkish Gypsy language. When they involve in emigration. They speak too, the languages of the regions where they emigrate: Turkey and Caucasian’s states were migrants’ destinations for several entrepreneurial Roma families.

The new immigrations in EU – according to the Dom Research Center which reported that among the migrants and refugees from East there are Gypsies too – brought in Europe, Gypsies languages closed with the Romani. The new languages are again new sources for the Roma marginal multilingualism.

The Roma moved nearby the “migrants” camps, in order to do business with them, and they pick up the languages needed. Nearby the Napoli there are Roma doing business – interacting linguistically - with the Chinese people!

The Republic of Cyprus’s Roma – native speakers of Kurbetca27 (in Arabic, with the meaning: foreign) a small population according to the reports – developed their multilingualism as refugees (immigrants) in Turkey, after the 1974 war and the island division. They recently engaged in coming back, in the EU member Republic of Cyprus. A new source of multilingualism, including dialects related with the Turkey’s variety of Romani and Gypsies language and Kurdish language.

After 1990, the Roma marginal multilingualism is increasing as number of speakers, and not only as number of the languages and dialects spoken. The Roma population is around 11 mil. in Europe and 7 mil., in the EU. (It constantly and significantly increases; the Roma being the most vigorous European population.) Similarly, the number of those that newly assumed the Roma identity and practiced the Roma’ marginal multilingualism also did. With them, the total multilingual Roma number evolved dramatically.

On the other side, after 1990, the new Roma intense mobilities28 - inside and

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28 The new Roma mobilities reinvented their traditional nomad live, as circulatory migrations.
cross borders - provided them with multiple opportunities to interact with speakers of different new (for them) languages. With those, the number of the languages spoken diversified and multiplied.

The Roma progressive marginal multilingualism’s evidences do not mean that the dynamic of the Roma multilingualism is exclusively progressive. There are multiple cases of regress in the field as the cases of Romani traditional languages extinction in the Western parts of Europe or the Kashtale group in Bihor, that completely lost their language; or the cases of traditional professions collapse inducing the professional jargon collapse. With their settlements, the impulses to use concomitantly multiple languages dramatically decreased and, again, the urge to practice other languages, new languages decreased proportionally.

That is the Roma are the most multilingual European Union’s mega-group. (Maybe, other European groups could provide speakers for many different languages, excellent polyglots and hyper-polyglots, but there are not known cases of speakers of the Roma varieties and dialect too.)

It is true, this is not credited as a real multilingualism, because it is oral, informally acquired and un-integrated in the EU Transferable Credits System. It is objectionable as superficial, to be only pretended, in several cases, as unable to transfer from one culture to another, the deep and universal meanings. Although it is unfairly rejected as incompatible with the standards created for and by the elites’ multilingualism.

Quality of the Roma multilingualism. For those Roma, that belong to the marginal category – not the educated and integrated ones – the languages are orally, and only orally. That is, they do not read, do not write in the languages that they spoke. In Pisa system of tests, they appeared as illiterates as poor users of any languages, inclusively in the Romani.

Nevertheless, some of them can run successful business in many languages, in those composing their marginal multilingualism. They could communicate using their linguistic abilities in the languages acquired in sensitive issues as the fortune tellers,

29 A hyper-polyglot – an international salesman – in an Interview listed as languages that he can speak: its mother tongue – Shataroshy -, the Romani variety active in Austria (Burgerland Roma/ Sinte); active in Croatia (Gurbet/Džambaz); active in Hungary (Lovari Roma); active in Poland (Bergitska Roma); active in Russia (Ruska Roma), active in Kazakhstan, active in Lithuania; active in Serbia; plus the non-Romani related languages as Croatian, German, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Ukrainian.
magicians, or the Roma traditional healers do. They could entertain in the most demanding area: comedy. Charly Chaplin – an international artist with assumed Roma origins – is the inheritor of a long history of professional Roma comedians, clowns, buffoons, jokers. They made comedy, in many languages, in their circus long routes \(^{30}\), being aside the traders and caravans escorts the historical multilingual marginals.

That is, the exclusive oral linguistic competences do not imply for all the cases, that the speakers are “culturally” illiterate or unable to create and communicate profound meanings, with universal openness. The children of the family with mentioned profession acquired languages as part of their professional abilities and enter early in the artistic-creative responsibilities. The famous *Cirque du Soleil* prove it, beyond any doubt. (They even succeeded to get a formal recognition for their children linguistic abilities\(^ {31}\), among other subjects.)

5. The concrete dimensions of the Roma groups multilingualism

The Roma multilingualism is more obvious when the analyze describes it, country by country.

The TABLE in the Annex 1 provides data on each EU country’s linguistic context and specifies Roma languages spoken there, in a multilingual context. The case of UK, a country engaged in the Brexit, is still preserved in the Table, because of its political inter-conditionalities and similitudes with the EU member states in the field of multilingualism.

It results from the Table, that there are no EU member states without Romani variety spoken there; that the Romani is practically an European language, and the label “non-indigenous language” is a stigma, that is to be removed, from the data bases, and – especially – from the public image on Roma’s languages. The scholars should signalize it, politicians provide the political and legal tools, the bureaucrats implement the administrative conditions to take it as real European languages. The new generation of Europeans would be able to valorize the Roma multilingualism as an European asset in

\(^{30}\) See the novel authored by Bass, (Schmidt) Edward (1941): *Circul Humberto*, [Humberto Circus], Bucuresti, Publisher Editura pentru Literatura si Arta, Romanian version, Marcel Gafton si Lia Toader.

the global competition to universalize the information, ideas, values.

The Table shows too that the Roma - previously settled in Easter and Central EU states, now engaged in circulatory migrations and mobilities across EU - are the most multilingual groups in Europe, obviously multilingual in the sense of marginal multilingualism.

Having in mind the free movement of citizens across the EU and the intense mobilities from East, it is to take into account that the new languages arrived or settled in a certain country change the linguistic landscape, the soundscape there. It introduces for the natives the possibilities to pick up such languages for practical reasons.

An image at a glance of the EU multilingualism with the Romani and its varieties included is provided in the Map below.

Figure 1. The Multilingualism in Europe with the Romani Included

The Map is trying to offer an image of the EU multilingual complexity and the position of the Romani inside. The Map underlines that the Romani language open ways to an internal multilingualism, by capturing varieties – languages, dialects – spoken by the different Roma groups.
6. The concrete dimensions of the Roma persons multilingualism

The field researches allow to consider that the Roma persons speak:

a) at least, two languages in each EU member state; (They are generally bi-
lingual! We did not meet any Roma unable to speak, aside its mother tongue, 
another language, picked up directly in the linguistic context. The single 
exception of non-bilingual marginal Roma meet in the RCIMI field research in 
Romania are the Kashtale-Roma. They do not speak any more their mother 
tongue, but they claimed they are Roma, respecting the Roma rules – 
Romanipen\textsuperscript{32}, living in compact communities of Kashtale. In the case of inter-
marrriages with other Roma – the persons entered in their community is not 
allowed to transmit that form of Romani to the children.

Which the spoken languages would be for each EU member state, it results 
from the Map.)

b) in a multilingual context, they are tri-lingual or multilingual; (In each Oradea 
city’ tram, market, hospital, a common experience is to heard Roma- Gabors - 
Gypsies as they prefer- speaking alternatively their languages – among them 
– Romanian with the Romanians and Hungarian with Hungarians.

Which the spoken languages would be for each EU member state, it could be 
approximately deduced from the Table in the Annex 1, which underlines the 
minorities languages spoken in a certain country. More information on the 
Romani varieties is available in the special data bases as those compiled by 
INALCO Paris, University of Gratz, University of Manchester, or University 
Austin-Texas, \textit{SIL Ethnologue}. A specific data base on the marginal 
multilingualism we did not identified; neither data bases with the 
multilingualism including the competencies in Romani. Such data bases are to 
be compiled in specific EU projects. with these specific objectives. For some 
countries, there are specific research which mapped the languages spoken by 
Roma in the country and let us presume that they have a good command on 
the neighboring areas. \textit{De facto} there are conditions when a specific group as 
the Lovari from Romania speak Hungarian and Lovari from Hungary and 
Slovakia, as the Roma language in the neighborhood areas; there are also 
cases, when the Roma - in Romania - do not speak the Gabors language. 
Special research should compile a repertoire of the marginal multilingualism 
groups and persons, as the EU available resources.)

\footnote{\textit{Romanipen} means: the rules of life (habits, and traditional professions), the institutions 
\textit{(Romani Cris)}, the values of the Roma \textit{(pakiv} = honor, \textit{phralipe} = brotherhood, \textit{pakin} = order).}
c) involved in special mobile activities – salesmen, healers, entertainers, magicians, fortune-teller, clowns and others – the Roma are multilingual, polyglots, or hyper-polyglots. (We quoted before a case of salesman, member of a family of polyglot men.)

For some individuals – those who earn their living in a continuous and variate mobilities as the Roma entertainers or international salesmen do – there is vital to speak many languages and to get methods to rapidly extend their multilingualism.

That is, concretely, the Roma are the most multilingual European Union mega-group, in terms of number of languages spoken and in terms of number of speakers. (Maybe, other European groups could provide speakers for many different languages, excellent polyglots and hyper-polyglots, but, among these elites, there are not known cases of speakers of the Roma varieties and dialect too.) That is the Roma are in the unique position of being the most multilingual mega-group. It is true, this is not credited as a real multilingualism, because it is oral. Or, maybe because, the Roma marginal multilingualism is informally acquired and not registered bureaucratically in the EU systems, as for example, in the EU Transferable Credits System.

7. Conclusions

The obvious linguistic insertion of the Roma people in the EU’s member states is founded in their basic multilingualism, a marginal multilingualism. The marginal multilingualism is a major part in the pattern of their identity! Aside the marginal multilingualism, and in dependence of it, there are their continues mobilities, inside each host society and its culture; and aside the migrations – historical and contemporary - across the languages and civilizations. All together expresses what the Roma are, how they survive, and how they could contribute to an inclusive Europe. Their multilingualism invites to study their methods of acquiring informally new languages and of opening the inter-comprehensibility ways in the Babylonia, as routes to the linguistic mutual inclusion; to use them as multilingual persons to be contributor in the process of the marginal immigrants’ linguistic insertions. That is, the conceptual distinction the multilingualism (de facto, the elite’s) multilingualism / marginal multilingualism could unveil a large European resource: the marginal multilingualism as groups’ multilingualism and persons’ multilingualism.

Looked in its details, the marginal multilingualism reveals also its methods to develop; its potential for the EU inclusion policy and non-conflictual co-existence – its very role to ensure the linguistic insertion in the new socio-linguistic context as the
compulsory stage in the inclusion process.

It suggests, that in the new strategies of inclusion, a preliminary political phase, the linguistic insertion is to be considered and launched as the first workable project addressed to different concrete categories of marginal people. Its distinct instruments of collecting available resources to supplement the public financing, its implementation and assessing process should be separately conceived and implemented. The identification of the possible agents of inclusion inside the groups to be included and of the languages that could mediate the inter-comprehension must be also taken into account. The mentioned insertions should be flexibly accounted and communicated.

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The role of language in mystifying and de-mystifying Gypsy identity.pdf.


http://www.mime-project.


http://internationalromaniunion.
ANNEX No. 1: ROMANI & THE EU LANGUAGES’ CONTEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country + SPEAKERS / main language + the years of report &amp; the sources</th>
<th>LANGUAGE/ S with a national, provincial or educational ... Status)</th>
<th>Total living languages and their origins</th>
<th>Varieties of the macro-language ROMANI [rom] + dialects’ (Ds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium/ Kingdom of Belgium D:5,660,000 (E.C., 2012). F:8,530,000 in Belgium. (E. C. 2012). G:4,630,000 (E. C. 2012).</td>
<td>Dutch, Flemish [nld] 1 (official). French, Vallon, [fra] 1 (National). German deu Standard [deu]</td>
<td>11 living languages 10 indigenous +1 non-indigenous + Immigrants languages.</td>
<td>No reports in the Ethnologue Could be all the Romani varieties spoken in the EU + in other countries Romani Vlax - 15 000 of speakers – are mentioned in the Joshua Project <a href="https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14567/BE">https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14567/BE</a> Lia Pop’ Comments: All the Romani varieties and dialects from Eastern Europe + Rom Ungrika are likely to have been brought</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Non-indigenous after 500 years is a presumption that needs some arguments.
34 The thesis that they are generally Christians needs proves. The magi, fortune tellers, witchcrafts, bears tamers, snakes’ charmers, or fakirs are the Roma specific practices, their brand. Or, those practice are not Christian at all. According with Christians, they are “pagan” forms of religion, harshly rejected by the Christians. More or less, they embraced by some groups of Roma as part of their historical heritage. It is not excluded to be the traces of the ancient religion in the Upper Hindu Valley: the Zoroastrian religion.
35 On the name Vlax-Romani, applied to the Eastern European Romany, there are reasonable doubts. In fact, there is not a single Rom in the whole universe that would recognize himself as a "Vlax”, aying “Ame sam Kalderasha”, or “Ame sam Churarya”, or “Ame sam Lovarya”, or else “Ame sam Gábor”, or other identification, but surely one would never hear from any of them saying “Ame sam Vlaxarya” or “Ame das duma Vlaxitsko Romanes”. (Sándor Avraham: About Roma Denominations at http://www.imninalu.net/Roma_appendix.htm#denominations, consulted March, 14, 2017).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY AND LANGUAGE/S</th>
<th>THE LANGUAGE OF THE ROMA PEOPLE (Gypsies) IN THE COUNTRY, according to 2017 Ethnologue ... SIL International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>there by the recent Roma migrants and Roma EU citizens, especially by the &quot;journalists&quot; – as they call themselves when they take the job of selling newspapers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Bulgaria/Republic of Bulgaria 7,020,000 (E.C. 2012).</td>
<td>Bulgarian 1 (National). Bulgarian 2 (Provincial). 11 living languages (4 indigenous, 7 non-indigenous) 2 Romani [rom] varieties + 2 dialects (Ds) Catalogued in the Ethnologue as: Non-indigenous, Christians-Muslim. Romani Balkan [rmn] Scattered near urban areas Burgas, Gabrovo, Sliven, Sofia, and Grad Sofia provinces; Stara Zagora province: Kazanlak municipality; Alternate Names: Gypsy. Classification: Indo-European, Comments: Religious-Ethnic groups: Jerlídes (western Bulgaria), Drindári (central Bulgaria). Muslim + many others. Romani Vlax [rmy] Sofia province: Ihtiman. 1,830 (2011 census). Status: 5 (Developing). Alternate Names: Rom. Turkish Romani is absent in Ethnologue, but it is reported in the field research. Lia Pop' Comments: There are there all the varieties and dialects of Romani and Gypsies language - from Turkey, and Eastern Europe – Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and the varieties of the Near Asia (Lebanon, Syria) plus varieties of Gypsies languages from Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia ... Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan ... brought recently by migrants)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 In Bulgaria, the Romani Central dialect is from Sofia to the Black Sea; Tinsmiths’ dialect is in central and northwest Bulgaria; Arlija in Sofia region; Drindari in Sliven and Varna provinces. 481,000 in Bulgaria, all users. 281,000 (2011 census). 100,000 Arlija, 20,000 Dzambazi, 10,000 Tinsmiths, 10,000 East Bulgarian. 200,000 (Gunnemark and Kenrick 1985). Dialects: Arli (Erli, Sofia Erli), Tiners Romani, Greek Romani, Dzambazi, East Bulgarian Romani, Paspatian, Ironworker Romani, Drindari (Chalgijis, Kitajis), Pazardžik Kalajdži, Khorakhani. Plus: Ihtiman. 37 See Note 2. 38 See Note 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY AND LANGUAGE/S</th>
<th>THE LANGUAGE OF THE ROMA PEOPLE (Gypsies) IN THE COUNTRY, according to 2017 Ethnologue ... SIL International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czechia/ Czech Republic</strong> 10,400,000 (E. C. 2012).</td>
<td><strong>Czech</strong> [ces] 1 (National). 10 living languages (5 indigenous 5 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cyprus/ Republic of Cyprus 57,000 (E. C. 2012).</strong> 1,410 Turkish speakers in the Republic of Cyprus (2013 UNSD).</td>
<td><strong>Greek</strong> [ell] 1 (National). <strong>Turkish</strong> [tur] 2 (Provincial). De facto provincial language in Northern Cyprus 4 living languages (2 institutionalized) + Immigrants languages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Lia Pop’ Comments:** other unreported varieties are probable. See the varieties in Bulgaria.

2 Romani [rom] varieties + 2 dialects (Ds) Catalogued in the *Ethnologue* as: Non-indigenous. Christians


Lia Pop’ Comments: the language name’ similitude with some Nordic varieties Lule and with the name in Iran (Fereydan) Lule indicated the pre-Romani varieties.

No data on Romani language available in SIL *Ethnologue 2017.*

1 Romani [rom] variety: Kurbetca

Lia Pop’ Comments: According with Dom Research Center - http://www.domresearchcenter.com/journal/18/cyprus8.html. and other reliable sources — there are in Cyprus people — which are taken as Roma, multilingual and speaking also their own language. They are locally named “Gypsies” and “Roma”, such as “Tsiggani”, “Athiggani”, “Yifti”, “Kouroupetti”, “Fellahi” in Greek and in Turkish as “Çingane”, “Fellah” or “Kurbet”. They call themselves as Kurbet-s, which means *foreigners* (in Arabic). They speak a language, that they call Gurbetcha/Kurbetca.

Religiously they are in majority Muslims, but there are Roma, who are Christians and Greek speaking, known as Mantides, and they were included in the Greek Cypriot

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39 See Note 2.

40 Dialects: Moravian Romani, East Slovak Romani, West Slovak Romani. Not intelligible of Vlax Romani [rmy] or Angloromani [rme].

41 Dialects: Lallere.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Language/S</th>
<th>The Language of the Roma People (Gypsies) in the Country, According to 2017 Ethnologue</th>
<th>SIL International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark / Kingdom of Denmark</td>
<td>5,380,000 (E.C. 2012)</td>
<td>5 languages 4 living + 1 extinct language (3 indigenous 1 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia/Republic of Estonia</td>
<td>1,040,000 (E.C. 2012).</td>
<td>7 languages (4 living + 1 extinct language) (3 indigenous 1 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland / Republic of Finland</td>
<td>5,100,000 (E.C. 2012).</td>
<td>12 living languages (10 indigenous and 2 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 See Note 2.
44 Laiuse Romani.
45 See Note 2.
46 Dialects: East Finnish Romani, West Finnish Romani. Not inherently intelligible of Tavringer Romani [rmu], Traveller Norwegian [rme], Traveller Danish [rmd], or Angloromani [rme].
47 See Note 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>THE LANGUAGE OF THE ROMA PEOPLE (Gypsies) IN THE COUNTRY, according to 2017 Ethnologue ... SIL International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| smn smn 271,000       | 3 Romani [rom] varieties + 3 dialects (Ds)\(^{48}\)  
French: [fra] 1  
(Catalogued in the *Ethnologue* as: Non-indigenous, Christians\(^{49}\).  
(Dispersed). *Alternate Names*: Romanes, Sinte, Sinti, Tsigane.  
*Errominxella* [emx], in the regions of South West 500 speaker out of total of 1,000  
*Lia Pop’ Comments*: The recent migrations and Roma mobilities brought in France the Roma and Gypsies languages from Central and Eastern Europe plus Gypsies’ languages from North Africa, the Languages of Africaya. |
| 0  
France  
French  
Republic  
62,900,000 in  
France. (E.C. 2012).  
2,900,000 (2010). | French:  
[fr]^{}  
(1)  
(National).  
21 living languages  
(15 indigenous and 6 non-indigenous) +  
Immigrants languages |
| 1  
Germany  
/Federal  
Republic  
of  
Germany  
77,800,000 in  
Germany,  
(E.C. 2012).  
Total users in all countries: 129,502,820  
(as L1: 76,813,820; as L2: 52,689,000). | German,  
*Standard*: [de]  
1  
(National). +  
others recognized under CRML.  
24 living languages  
(19 indigenous  
5 non-indigenous) +  
Immigrants languages |
| 1  
1.  
Germany  
/Federal  
Republic  
of  
Germany  
77,800,000 in  
Germany,  
(E.C. 2012).  
Total users in all countries: 129,502,820  
(as L1: 76,813,820; as L2: 52,689,000). | 2 Romani [rom] varieties + dialects (Ds)\(^{60}\)  
(Catalogued in the *Ethnologue* as: Non-indigenous, Christians\(^{51}\).  

\(^{48}\) Romani Sinte’ *Dialects*: Manouche (Manuche, Manush) ; *Romani Calo Dialects*: Catalanian Caló, Spanish Caló. *Classification*: Mixed language, Iberian-Romani.  
\(^{49}\) See Note 2.  
\(^{50}\) Dialects: Gadschkene, Estracharia, Krantiki, Kranaria, Eftawagaria, Praistiki.  
\(^{51}\) See Note 2.
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Classification:** Indo-European, Indo-Iranian, Indo-Aryan, Intermediate Divisions, Western, Romani, Northern.
Yeniche [yec] Baden-Württemberg state; scattered. Status: 6a (Vigorous). Alternate Names: German Travellers, Jenisch, Yenishe. Dialects: None known. German with a heavy cryptolectal lexical infusion from Traveller Danish [rmd], Western Yiddish [yih], Vlax Romani [rmy], and Hebrew [heb]. Classification: Mixed language, German-Yiddish-Romani-Rotwelsch.
Lia Pop’ Comments: The recent migrations and Roma mobilities in the EU are brought in Denmark the Roma and Gypsies languages from Central and Eastern Europe plus Gypsies’ languages from North Africa, the Languages of Africaya. That is the other varieties of Romani could be un-reported yet. |

| 1 | Greece/ Hellenic Republic 10,700,000 (E.C. 2012). |
| 2 | Greek: [ell] 1 (National). De facto national language. |
|   | Turkish: [turl] 2 (Provincial). |
|   | 16 living languages (3 indigenous, 3 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages |
|   | 4 Romani [rom] varieties + 4 dialects (Ds)\(^{52}\) + 1 |
|   | Catalogued in the Ethnologue as: Non-indigenous. |
|   | Romani, Balkan [rmn]\(^{53}\) Macedonia administrative unit (Serres dialect); Peloponnese, Western Greece, and Ionian Islands: Peloponnese (Pyros dialect); Epirus and Western Macedonia: Epirus (Romancilikanes dialect). 40,000 (1996 B. Igla). 10,000 Arlija, 30,000 Greek Romani. Status: 6a (Vigorous). |
|   | Romani Vlax [rmy] Attica administrative unit: Aija Varvara, suburb of Athens; Thessaly and Central Greece administrative unit: Karditsa regional unit, Sofades; Trikala regional unit; Epirus and Western Macedonia: Parakalamos. 1,000. Status: 5 |

\(^{52}\)Dialects: Sepečides Romani (Greek Romani, Sepeči), Arli (Arlije, Erli), Serres (Greek Macedonia); Romancilikanes (Peloponese and Western Greece), Pyrgos Yifti. (Gyptos) +

\(^{53}\)
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Developing). Alternate Names: Rom, Romanés, Tsingani(^{54}). Nonsettled Gypsies are called Yifti. (Gyptos) distinct from Rumanovlach, a variety of Romanian. Christians. Romano-Greek [rge] Thessaly and Central Greece Administrative Unit; secret language, itinerant builders, especially in Evrytania and Fthiotis. 30 (2000). Status: 8b (Nearly extinct). Alternate Names: Hellenoromani, Romika. Structured on Greek [ell] with heavy Romani lexicon. Classification: Mixed language, Greek-Romani. Ethnologue’s Comments: Related variants are Dortika, a secret language spoken by wandering builders from Evrytania Prefecture, K liar da, Athens. May no longer be anyone’s speaker as the L1. Kurbetcha (un-recognised) Lia Pop’ Comments: The Greece reunites the largest repertoire of Romani language and dialects, plus the varieties of Gypsies language plus the mixed language. name’ similitude with some Nordic varieties Lule and with the name in Iran (Fereydan) Lule indicated the pre-Romani varieties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{54}\) Dialects: Lovari, Grekurja (Greco), Kalpazea, Filipidzia, Xandurja. Grekurja is probably Turkish [tur] influenced, distinct from Greek Romani dialect of Balkan Romani [rmn] (I. Hancock);

\(^{55}\) See Note 2.

\(^{56}\) Dialect: Gurvari

\(^{57}\) Dialects: Gurvari, Vend Romani, Verşend Romani.
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000 (E.C. 2012).</td>
<td>English: [eng] (National). Dialects: South Hiberno English, North Hiberno English. Irish: [gle]. Alternate Names: Erse, Gaelic Irish, Irish Gaelic. 5 living languages (4 indigenous and 1 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58 Dialects: Lovari (Hungarian Lovari), Cerhari.
59 See Note 2.
60 Italian Roma (with citizenship): about 90,000, of which: Croatian Roma: 7,000 arrived from northern Yugoslavia after World War II. Kalderasha is a subgroup; Roma Lovari: 1,000, which mainly deal with horses breeding (the word comes from the Hungarian word for horse,
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Latvia /Republic of Latvia 1, 752, 260 | **Latvian [lvs]** 1 [National] **Russian [rus]** is also largely spoken as L1. + Immigrants languages

7 living languages
(4 indigenous and 3 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages

1 Romani variety + dialects (D) 1. Catalogued in *Ethnologue* as: Non-indigenous, Christians.


**Lia Pop’ Comments:** Other varieties and dialects of Romani – resulted from recent migration and free movement within EU - could be un-reported yet.

| Lithuania/Republic of Lithuania 2,800,000 (E.C. 2012). | **Lithuanian. [lit]** 1 (National).

**Russian [rus]** is also largely spoken as L1. 10 living languages
(4 indigenous and 6 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages

1 Romani variety + dialects (1 [rom], + Ds) Catalogued in *Ethnologue* as: Non-indigenous, Christians.


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1. Balkan Roma: 70,000; Yugoslav Roma present mainly in the fields of Northern Italy. Roma arrived from Romania, the group that is growing; have communities in Milan, Rome, Naples, Bologna, Bari, Pescara, Genoa, but are expanding in the rest of Italy.

2. Southern Italy Roma: 30,000 in, distinguished in: Roma of Abruzzo and Molise, who arrived in Italy following the Arbëreshë refugees from Albania after the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1392, speak Romanesque mixed with local dialects and rehearse the breeding and trade of horses, as well as in the case of women, chiromancy (romnia). Several nuclei have emigrated to various centers in Lazio from the twentieth century; Roma Neapolitans (Napulengre), well integrated, until the seventies were mainly engaged in the manufacture of fishing gear and walking shows; Cilentan Roma: 800 residents in Eboli, with high literacy tips; Rom Puglia, are mostly engaged in agriculture and horse breeding (some of them run horse butchers); Calabrian Roma: one of the poorest groups, with 1550 still living in fortune homes; Sicilian nomads – with a language called Baccagghiu.

3. Northern Italy Roma Sinti: 30,000, mainly resident in North and Central Italy, and one of the main occupants of the race, which is disappearing and forcing them to reinvent themselves in new crafts, from scrapers to bonsai sellers.

61 See Note 2.

62 Dialects: Latvian Romani (Lettish Romani, Lotfitko Romani, Lotfitko Romani cib, Lotfitka Romá), North Russian Romani, Estonian Romani (Čuxny Romani).

63 See Note 2.

64 Dialects: Lithuanian Romani, Polish Romani (Polska Roma).
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg/Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [fra] 471,600. 57,600 (2011 census). 414,000 (E.C. 2012).</td>
<td><strong>Lia Pop’ Comments:</strong> Other varieties and dialects of Romani – resulted from recent migration and free movement within EU - could be un-reported yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta /Republic of Malta [eng] 376,200 in Malta, [mlt] 393,000 (E.C. 2012).</td>
<td><strong>French</strong> [fra]: 1 (National). <strong>Alternate names:</strong> Franösisch, Français. <strong>German, Standard:</strong> [deu] <strong>Status:</strong> 1 (National). <strong>Comments:</strong> Non-indigenous. 4 living languages. (2 are indigenous and 2 are non-indigenous. ) + Immigrants languages. No data on Romani language available in SIL 2017 Ethnologue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 37,400,000 (2013 UNSD).</td>
<td><strong>Dutch</strong> [ndl] 1 (National). 15 living languages (13 indigenous, 2 non-indigenous) + Immigrants languages. 1 Romani variety [rom] + + dialects (Ds) 1 Catalogued in the Ethnologue as: Non-indigenous, Christians. <strong>Romani, Sinte</strong> [rmo]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65 See Note 2.
66 **Dialects:** Manouche.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnologue’ Comments: Ethnic group: Sasitka Romá. Lia Pop’ Comments: Other varieties and dialects of Romani – resulted from recent migration and free movement within EU - could be un-reported yet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Romani [rom] varieties + dialects (Ds) 2 Catalogued in the Ethnologue as: Non-indigenous, Christians70.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Romani [rom] varieties + dialects (Ds) 3 Catalogued in the Ethnologue as: Non-indigenous, Christians72.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67 Dialects: Bergitka.  
68 Dialects: Lovari (Polish Lovari).  
69 Dialects: Manouche (Manouche).  
70 See Note 2.  
71 Dialects: Spanish Caló, Portuguese Calão, Catalanian Caló, Brazilian Calão.  
72 See Note 2.
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</table>


\(^{73}\) **Dialects:** Ursári (Ursari).

\(^{74}\) **Dialects:** Galician, Transylvanian.

\(^{75}\) **Dialects:** Sedentar Romani, Kalderash (Coppersmith, Kalderari, Kelderash, Kelderashícko), Ukraine-Moldavia, Eastern Vlax Romani (Bisa), Churari (Churaricko, Sievemakers), Lovari (Lovericko), Machvano (Machvanmcko), Serbo-Bosnian, Zagundzi, Sedentary Bulgarian, Ghagar, Gabor, Vallachian. Kalderash and Churari are occupational ethnonyms; Machvano is a geographical one. Other names are ‘Argintari’, silversmith and ‘Lingurari’, spoonmakers. Machvano and Serbian Kalderash have south Slavic superstratum; Lovari influenced by Hungarian [hun]. All 20 or more Vlax dialects are inherently intelligible; differences are mainly lexical and sociolinguistic (I. Hancock). In the new research conducted by Matras every administrative division language is separately taken.
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>COUNTRY AND LANGUAGE/S</strong></th>
<th><strong>THE LANGUAGE OF THE ROMA PEOPLE (Gypsies) IN THE COUNTRY, according to 2017 Ethnologue ... SIL International</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain/ Kingdom of Spain 45,890,000 speakers in</td>
<td><strong>Spanish Castellano Español, 1 (National). Lia Pop – comment:</strong> <strong>15 living languages</strong> (14 indigenous, 1 non-indigenous) <strong>2 Romani varieties + dialects (2 [rom]. + Ds)</strong> Catalogued in the <em>Ethnologue</em> as: Non-indigenous, Christians. <strong>Calo Romani</strong>&lt;sup&gt;81&lt;/sup&gt;, Gitano, Hispanoromani, Iberian Romani 40 000. <strong>Status</strong> 5 (Developing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<sup>76</sup> Bansko bystricku region: Brezno, Krupina, and Rimavská Sobota districts; Nitriansky region: Šaľa district. Trnavsk region: Senica district (West Slovak Romani dialect); Presovsku region: Bardejov district; Kosicku region: Krompachy area (East Slovak Romani dialect). 123,000 (2013 UNSD).

<sup>77</sup> Dialects: Moravian Romani, East Slovak Romani (Servika Romani), West Slovak Romani, Romungro.

<sup>78</sup> Dialects: Lovari, Kalderash (Kaldařář), Slovak Bougesti.

<sup>79</sup> See Note 2.

<sup>80</sup> Dialects: Prekmurk Romani.

<sup>81</sup>Dialects: Spanish Calo, Portuguese Calao (Calao Lusitano-Romani), Catalonian Calo, Brazilian Calao. (A cryptological variety of Spanish [spa], Hancock ) Regional dialects have Iberian base Calo, with common use in Spain and Portugal.
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82 See Note 2.
83 See Note 2.
84 Dialects: Kalderash (Taikon Kalderash), Lovari, Arli, Machvano, Gurbet.
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\(^{85}\) **Dialects**: Not inherently inter-comprehensible with Welsh Romani [rmw], Traveller Swedish [rmu], Traveller Norwegian [rmg], or Traveller Danish [rmd]. Grammar is English with heavy Romani lexical borrowing. Many dialects.

\(^{86}\) **Dialects**: Kalderash, Lovari.
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FOCUS: THE NEXUS BETWEEN OPEN BORDERS AND WELFARE STATES

Open Borders and Welfare States: Can’t They Really Get Along?

Melina DUARTE

Abstract. This paper contests the welfare state’s objection to international freedom of mobility. It shows that the trade-off between open borders and welfare states is empirically and morally questionable and it suggests a new way of conceiving the relationship.

Keywords: International freedom of mobility; Libertarianism; Welfare States; Immigration; Citizenship; Economic and Moral theory

Introduction

The Nobel laureate in economy, Milton Friedman, once said that open borders were incompatible with a welfare state (1978). In his view, immigration for work and immigration for welfare were fundamentally different types of mobility producing divergent consequences for the host country. While the former was said to generate additional resources and opportunities for the permanent residents, the latter was alleged to create additional burdens for them. The inverse relation between these different types of mobility was supported by his presumption that, at

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1 I am grateful to Bridget Anderson for the guidance received during the writing of this paper. For all feedback received on previous versions, I thank K. Fjørtoft, T. I. Hanstad, A. Vitikainen, K. Lippert-Rasmussen, A. Føllesdal, A. Frainer and J. Bowman. The paper also benefits from comments and suggestions from the audiences of the Working Paper Seminars, at COMPAS, University of Oxford (specially N. V. Hear, M. Ruhs and F. Düvell), PROVIR Closing Conference on Exceptional Welfare: Dilemmas in/of irregular migration, University of Bergen and at the International Research Seminar on Ethics, Democracy, and Rights, at the University of Córdoba (specially J. M. Rosales, M. Toscano, F. D. Bretones and R. Cejudo).
that time, immigration seemed to be economically beneficial to all parties involved as long as it remained illegal, i.e. as long as immigrants (as any other worker) could work without qualifying for welfare. In this sense, though illegal, immigrant workers were still able to improve their standard of living, while also collaborating to create better conditions for employers and consumers in the hosting country. More specifically, employers could choose from a larger labour pool, contributing to: (1) control of wages through the increase of competition among workers, (2) promote a greater loyalty by the employees, and (3) facilitate further entrepreneurship and generation of new jobs to both native-born and immigrants. At the same time, consumers had a greater purchasing power, since the costs of production and distribution were significantly reduced, due to lower wages. As a result, through the case of illegal immigration, Friedman is supposed to have exposed the overall advantages of workers’ mobility across borders. On the other hand, as illegality implies a wrongdoing that should be criminalised by states and their institutions, turning a blind eye to it, in order to profit from the economic advantages created by labour mobility, was, to Friedman, an inadmissible move made to protect what should, for many reasons, be discontinued: the welfare system. To properly enjoy and fully potentialise the advantages of labour mobility, according to him, borders should be open for the movement of persons at the expense of the welfare states.

After almost forty years since Friedman's lecture, and despite the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric in the public discourse, evidence continues to suggest that an increasing of labour mobility across borders can boost global economic growth (e.g. Legrain 2014; Klein and Ventura 2007). This is because a larger mobility of workers would potentialise the so-called international wage convergence, generate a better income distribution and, under certain conditions, raise the global output (Krugman et al. 2015, 102-7). This model is based on the assumption that borders being open, workers would move to countries where the real wages are higher than their source country. In the short term, this would raise the wages in the source country where the labour force would be reduced and, conversely, lower the wages in the destination country where the labour force would increase. The process would then continue until the wages in both destination and source countries, allowing for the differences in productivity and currency, are equalised, and the international income distribution generates an increase in the global output as a whole. This effect could be verified in the case of the massive immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to destination countries such as Argentina, Australia, Canada and United
States from origin countries such as Ireland, Italy, Norway and Sweden (Ibid, 105). Klein and Ventura (2007) add that, in the long-term, allowing substantial flows of immigrants (not only skilled, but all workers) from low to high productivity countries could increase the global output by up to 45%. According to them, optimal productivity of workers is highly dependent on their experiences in labour environments where they can fully develop their capabilities. These environments are the ones offering stable institutions, access to technology, and the possibility of improving their skills. This means that immigrant workers are able to become more productive when moving to countries where these environments are more readily available. Enabling their movement across borders becomes then, a key factor in increasing global productivity. Linking Klein and Ventura’s model back to the international wage convergence, but focusing more on relocation of capital across borders, Kennan (2013) estimated that gradual opening of borders could contribute to a wage raise of more than 100% for migrants and non-migrants in both source and destination countries. Besides that, the remittances sent by those who decide to migrate are also said to play a significant role in the economic growth of developing and low-income countries. Chang (2014) affirms that remittances can be as high as three times the total amount of aid given by developed countries. In some countries, as in Tajikistan, remittances amount to more than 40% of the GDP. It is important to notice that remittances are sent not only to those who, in a situation of controlled borders, are prevented from moving across borders, but also to those who, for personal reasons, decide to endure the adversities and stay back home. Accordingly, in this perspective, (gradual) opening of borders could be seen as the Pareto optimal policy, i.e. a policy that would make most people better off without making anyone worse off. As zero adverse impact is unachievable, modest compensations are to be given to alleviate potential losses incurred by the few worse off. Who should be compensated and by whom remains fairly unclear though. It is also unclear whether and to what extend states should care about global humankind in general.

Whereas some economists see freedom of labour mobility as an extension of the free trade logic (along with free capital and services as the four economic freedoms), the vast majority of them are still reluctant to accept this move (see Chang 2014, 436; Stephenson and Hufbauer 2011). To Ruhs (2013), for example, the economic effects of human mobility largely depend on the management of the rights granted to immigrants after their admission. If, for instance, immigrants are to access welfare benefits fully or partially, a positive outcome for the hosting countries and
their residents requires a balance between the costs of the migrant rights relative to their contributions. Then, because the visibility of these contributions may vary according to skills, a rational approach demands a selective admission process attentive to the skill composition of the immigrants in relation to variable “‘needs’ of the domestic labour market and the national economy” (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). At the same time, because liberal democracies are ideally increasingly guided by human rights and there is a limit to the restriction of rights for immigrants, the number of admissions should also be regulated. From this perspective, the trade-off between open borders and welfare states shifts focus: the welfare state becomes incompatible with open borders. Starting from the perspective that the main goal of states is to maximise benefits for citizens and minimise adverse impacts that immigration could cause, it is assumed that states are allowed to act in this discriminatory manner. The Pareto optimal criterion here is conceived from a national standpoint. From this particular perspective, considering a clear group target, it can be said that the criterion is taken more literally: the instrumentalisation of immigrant rights in favour of citizens would virtually guarantee that citizens are not harmed by immigration, since, theoretically, the absence of benefits for citizens would mean no admissions to immigrant workers and their dependents. This reasoning, however, when applied to the context of high-income countries, where most resources are concentrated, becomes a powerful tool for maintaining the status quo, since, given that the resources are limited, any move towards global equality would most probably represent a loss for some citizens of such countries.

In all these approaches that maintain the incompatibility between open borders and welfare states, the common ground is that the movement of persons across borders is viewed mainly by its instrumental value in achieving either global economic growth or net economic benefits to citizens and residents of a state. Human mobility, borrowing Sussman’s (2003) terminology, is then reduced to the financial worthiness of the ‘exportation of bodies as pure materiality’, as in the cruel context of the political arithmetic of the eighteen-century. Once more, the danger of these approaches is that—instead of enlightening the complex discussions on immigration and borders by assuming a secondary role of economics in policymaking below universal moral standards—it ends up in overvaluing the importance of numeric symbols in the formulation of the so-called informed decisions aiming at profitable consequences. The result of these forms of reasoning is a critical dehumanisation of human lives, turned into resources to be rationally managed in
the name of efficiency. Considering these potentially serious consequences, what I propose in this paper is a reflective discussion on the matter, starting from, but also going beyond, the short-sighted and goal-oriented accounts on human mobility that only serve the cause of maximisation of either global or national outputs.

I will start the paper by defining some of the relevant features of the concept of ‘open borders’ and ‘welfare states’ (Part I). Playing along with the rules of considering immigration purely instrumentally, I will argue that it is possible to question the alleged inevitability of the trade-off between open borders and welfare states based on some counter-evidence to the fiscal and social strains (Part II). Moving beyond this perspective, by considering human mobility with its intrinsic value, I will claim that the trade-off might be overcome with the proposition of a different starting point for economics since it appears that it is fabricated within a narrow context of neoclassical economics or similar models (Part III). My grounding understanding is that open borders is a fundamental freedom on which the autonomy and equality of opportunities for each and every person depends. At the same time, the welfare states, especially the Scandinavian ones, have played a key role on the development of these values among their citizens, with their experiences being relevant to the global efforts in combating economic inequality. While neither overlooking the spread of potential negative effects of freedom of mobility and membership for individuals, nor being biased towards citizens, it looked like the most serious undertaking of the Pareto criterion would require the emergence of both open borders and welfare states. This way of thinking led me to a deep dissatisfaction with the current ineluctable way of understanding the relationship between open borders and welfare states thereby driving me to explore some ways in which both could be compatible with each other by challenging and then reframing the starting assumptions that are conducive to the postulation of the contradiction.

Defining both sides of the trade-off

*Open borders: Running an Honoured Marathon*

Open borders is not a synonym for no borders. As such, it does not imply that states’ borders are to be dissolved to give place for a world government. It rather means that even though states and their right to jurisdiction remain, the movement of persons across borders becomes free. In other words, states’ territorial rights are revised and they lose some rights to exclude persons from their territories (see Duarte 2015). Furthermore, open borders make for the achievement of equality
of opportunities and freedom of choice possible—two fundamental pillars of liberal democratic theory today, but that are in a new context, specially framed beyond nationalism, i.e. under the context of our universal commitments to equality and freedom. Deriving from freedom, open borders means that, for instance, whenever a person is born, she should be able choose to live in another country that better corresponds to her conception of a good life, instead of having her fate determined by the place of birth. Freedom to choose a place to live in, in this sense, means not only a suppression of arbitrary determinants in one’s life, but also a positive development of a person’s capacity to participate in shaping one’s own moral world and, in Razian terms, in creating one’s own life (Raz 1986, 426). In this context, freedom, more precisely understood as personal autonomy and freedom of mobility, appears as a condition for the possibility for persons to perfect, transform, and create themselves. Deriving from equality, open borders imply, for example, that a person born in less developed countries may have the chance to overcome the initial social disadvantaged position when migrating to more developed environments. After all, how proud would someone be of winning a marathon, having had the chance of starting half way ahead of the others and leaving the competitors no choice but to lose? Pretending there is nothing wrong with such a dishonourable victory would be, as Carens puts it, to admit contemporary ‘feudal birthright privileges’ (2013, 226). He argues that the restriction of mobility used in the Middle Ages was strategic to maintain the feudal system. Back then, it appeared correct to restrain socially disadvantaged persons from overcoming their limitations, by restricting their opportunities and giving them no choice but to back down. What Carens wanted to do with this analogy was to draw attention to the fact that in spite of choice and equality of opportunities being very much stressed in the political discourse, we are still, ‘almost as effectively’, forcing foreigners from developing countries to back down (2013, 255). Equality of opportunities, in this sense, demands open borders as a requirement of justice against the perpetuation of benefits for the old and new nobility. Of course, equality of opportunities, in a full sense, requires more than a mere possibility. Despite the possibility to migrate within the European Union, Bulgarians do not really have an equal opportunity for exercising mobility in comparison with Danes, for example, as their incomes sharply differ. A more complete policy on the matter should then address a range of conditions that would make equality of opportunity more than a formal concern, engaging in debates on minority rights like compensations and affirmative action as well as of the effects of
capitalism in itself. When discussing immigration and borders, we are still very far from these more concrete discussions since, even the mere possibility of giving people the formal right to mobility across borders, is not yet established. It is not, in any way, being proposed here that people from high-income countries should pay for the tickets for people from low-income countries to migrate, but something much more fundamental than that: a recognition that our commitment to universal equality leads, at least, to the acceptance of a formal equality of opportunities among persons by removing the legal barriers that prevent their freedom of movement.

Although open borders can be derived from our universal moral commitment to freedom and equality, even those who defend these values may oppose open borders. Liberal nationalists, for example, challenge it by understanding one’s place of birth as more than a mere accident. For them, the place of birth reveals important cultural, historical, and more permanent socio-political dimensions of persons that cannot be erased by a cosmopolitan abstraction. Although no one can reasonably disagree with moral universalism without falling into racist discourse, leading Blake to affirm that we are all cosmopolitans now (2013), the real debate rather revolves around the primacy of either moral universalism or moral particularism as guides for action. Miller (2002, 57) for example, argues that a moral universalism is unable to offer a comprehensive account of moral agency. Such a comprehensive account, to him, is better achieved by conceiving the moral agent embedded in a historically constructed community of values. The moral motivations would then arise from the concreteness of the particularities that the agent represents. However, I take it that even if this could be the case in the context of such communities, the rights and duties we have as members of communities are very different from the rights and duties we have as members of a state, for example, rights and duties derived from citizenship. From the point of view of immigrants, history is not static either, but written everyday with new agents and places. I concede, however, that the motivation for moral agency appears much more clearly in communal contexts. A proof of this is in the larger appeal that passionate discourses of “anti-others”, i.e. anti-immigration, have in public opinion (see Field 2015 from the House of Commons in the UK grounding his case against immigration on the appealing moral particularism of protecting ‘our own country’s poor’). The problem is that the force of the appeal does not make it right. It is frankly unreasonable to expect that the communal boundaries coincide
with borders of, not only nations, but also of contemporary multicultural and pluralistic states. In such multifaceted states, to assume the moral particularism as a binding common force is a prelude to failure. In the moral context, the binding-force to peacefully connect different communities and nations into one state seems to be a prior commitment to moral universalism, where despite all the differences, all persons understand each other as equal and free (autonomous). Therefore, I place moral universalism here as the basis for the justification of open borders, by which the place of birth does not compromise anyone’s opportunities. Moral particularism might then justify boundaries, but not state borders. On those grounds one can, if one wants to, select friends and exclude personal enemies based on communal morality, but one cannot pretend to expand that practise to the state level given the current definition of liberal democratic states.

**Welfare States: Neither Nassau Sr. nor Marx**

On the other side of the trade-off is the welfare state. Welfare states are broadly defined as forms of government that undertake the promotion and distribution of social wellbeing and the protection of a minimal level of income for every citizen or legal resident against the insecurities of the market. Contemporarily, these states do not accept Nassau Sr.’s radical form of *laissez-faire* that rejects any form of social provisioning that does not belong to the cash nexus, nor do they accept a radical Marxist opposition to capitalism; they rather impose some regulations on the market. Consequently, any welfare state today incorporates key social policies towards a well-functioning system, even though they accept the role of the market in the efficient production, distribution and consumption of resources. They include more than a system of mere cash transfer or tax deduction for the needy, such as education, health, and other public services. Considering this, it is important to point out, especially to non-Europeans, that welfare states are not socialist states in any meaningful sense of the word. The surplus is not seen as something negative, but as something that will actually make the welfare system possible. In order to guarantee a minimal income to every citizen and compensate those negatively affected by the market, it is necessary that the active labour force is able to produce more than they need for themselves. The surplus must exist for the welfare to exist, but severe accumulation of capital is what brings about demands for social reforms. Being ‘on welfare’ is not synonymous to ‘living on somebody else’s money,’ instead of making a living from one’s own work. Workers can also be ‘on welfare’ despite having a high income from their work as we will see in a moment with a more specific definition.
of welfare regimes. Refining this broad definition, Esping-Andersen (2013, 26-9), in a seminal work, proposed a distinction between three types of welfare regimes based on the variation of social de-commodification and stratification considerably affecting the ways the state, the market and the family are organised, namely: liberal (e.g. US), conservative (e.g. Germany) and social democratic welfare states (e.g. Scandinavian countries). De-commodification means the reduction of dependency on the market to survive through, in Polanyi’s sense, the acquisition of rights such as to a pension, parental, sick or educational leaves, and unemployment insurance. These are social rights that can be attached to work performance, in relation to prior earnings, tax contribution, need or citizenship, and legal residency. Social stratification means a structure of inequality, i.e. the ordering of social classes. In relation to both factors, we see that when the social rights focus, for example, on the needy as in the liberal welfare regime, a division between the needy and the providers produces a dualism intensifying social stratification, even though the goal was to supposedly promote a greater equality between them. When social rights focus, instead, on the citizens and legal residents in general, as in the social democratic welfare regime, social stratification is reduced considerably. While being ‘on welfare’ might sound negative in the context in which social provisioning is means-tested, it rather denotes strong social cohesion and equality in the context in which social provisioning is universal: where everybody lives at the expense of everybody else.

Considering these differences, it appears that we have reasons to believe that open borders would affect the welfare regimes differently: the social democratic welfare regimes would suffer most due to their higher standards of distribution and equality. Opening the borders would then more seriously compromise the welfare states based on universal social provisioning. The problem arises when we notice that, according to recent studies (e.g. Wilkinson and Pickett 2011; Stiglitz 2013), these are exactly the states that are performing better in many areas of life owing to their astonishing capacity to promote equality. This means that to compromise the social democratic welfare regimes in the name of open borders could currently mean the loss of the ability for the improvement of the conditions for people in well-functioning of societies. Under the mask of the GDP, it looks like the three welfare regimes are comparable successful economies. However, looking more closely into the particular spheres of life such as health, violence, criminality, drug use, life expectancy, education performance, and social mobility, among others,
we see that the income gap in unequal societies is much more damaging than we once thought it to be. Intergenerational social mobility, for example, is much lower in countries with higher income inequalities, with the US and the UK at the bottom of the scale with less mobility and the Scandinavian countries at the top (Blanden 2005 cited by Wilkinson and Pickett 2011, 159). This suggests that a libertarian-like position liking freedom of mobility to free market and weaker social rights might negatively affect the autonomy and the equality of opportunities of individuals. In view of this, it becomes hard to accept Friedman’s solution of opening the borders at the expense of the welfare system as something we have to aim for today. The belief in the higher efficiency of competitive markets is being largely demystified to give place for the need of more efficient societies based on equality (see also Pontusson 2005). At the same time, it is also hard to accept Ruhs’ solution of controlling borders in order to promote an inner equality, especially if this inner equality, in the context of high-income countries, is sometimes only possible at the expense of the perpetuation of inequalities abroad—a dishonourable victory, to recall the marathon example.

The Trade-off from the inside of the box

Given these definitions of open borders and welfare states, looking from an ‘inside’ perspective where the trade-off seems to emerge, we can locate the tensions between both as operating on two circumstantial levels: economic and social. Although these levels are blurred in practice, they are divided here for analytical purposes. At the economic level, the challenge is to keep the national fiscal balance given the possible arrival of more tax receivers than taxpayers. At the social level, the issue is to ensure that social heterogeneity will not compromise the welfare state’s public support. Behind both the fiscal and the social strains is the selfish conception of the individuals defined as those conceiving the states and the

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2 I recognise that this way of portraying the economic objection to open borders is very limited and that I am risking to concede too much to my potential opponents when looking at welfare states mostly in terms of direct taxation. A fuller account on contributions should consider indirect taxation such as consumption taxation as well as the fact that the host states benefit from immigrant workers who were educated elsewhere. My goal is, however, to attempt to dialog with those who assume this limited view as a starting point.
communities only according to the benefits that they might produce to themselves. In this radical approach, individuals are thought to be incapable of supporting any causes that does not benefit themselves. They are portrayed as incapable of accepting any economic or status loss in order to improve the wellbeing of others, because this would be considered irrational. This extreme view of individualism is very different from the Razian conception of the individual as being the one able to create one’s own life which is the basis of the argument of open borders. This is because in the Razian sense, freedom in the sense of autonomy has primarily an intrinsic, not an extrinsic value. Autonomy is compromised when individuals are conceived as being merely goal-oriented to succeed and to succeed in certain terms. This is to say that, like Raz, I am not entirely rejecting the instrumental worth of freedom, but rather considering that freedom, in the sense of autonomy, must allow individuals to choose to lose without being considered irrational. The instrumental value of freedom as moral particularism, sometimes offers the most appealing arguments because it provides clear guidelines for agency when prioritising the agent to the detriment of the others. The point here is that the instrumental value of freedom should remain instrumental, i.e. subordinated to its intrinsic and absolute dimension. If the line between the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions is not clearly drawn, the scope of human agency can be limited in the way that any action that is not selfish and goal-oriented will appear as sanctified rather than simply correct.

**Economic strain: Immigrants as free riders**

From the purely economic standpoint, the trade-off between open borders and a welfare state arises when, due to the high levels of inequality worldwide, it is expected that, in protectionist states, free immigration would seriously compromise the fiscal balance between taxpayers and tax receivers. Considering this, a number of studies have been conducted trying to disclose whether immigration burdens or booms the economy in hosting countries (e.g. Borjas 1995ab, 1999; Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Card 2005; Ruhs 2008). These findings are contested from all sides. This is not only because of a lack of data and differences in methodology (short or long-term approach), but also because of a combination of various specific and dynamic factors, beyond the rigid relation between natives and immigrants, that have a great influence on the net impact of immigration. Rowthorn (2008), for example, showed that such impact is relative to age, income, entitlement to welfare
provisioning, type of welfare system, and the interaction between their measurable contribution and usage of the welfare provided. It is also important to consider whether the cause of the immigration was, for example, persecution or the wish to learn a new language. Furthermore, the education level of the immigrants is also said to be a determinant factor, as the mobility of high-skilled workers tends to be facilitated assuming that, in contrast to low-skilled workers, they will contribute more to the public funds than they receive from the government in welfare benefits (Boeri and Brücker 2005). On the top of that, it should be accounted that many factors such as skill composition and skills shortage are dynamic and vary largely according to time and place (Ruhs and Anderson 2010).

Recently, Kerr and Kerr (2011) have found that in the European countries, immigrants rely more on social security and employment benefits than natives. The relation is even stronger in the Nordic countries, particularly in Denmark and Sweden (where more data is available): according to them, immigrants are 5-8% more likely to receive social benefits than natives, even 20 years after residing in these countries. Let us avoid playing the ‘ignorance argument’ when referring to a range of conflicting data and assume this really to be the case: that immigrants do seek more welfare benefits than natives. What does this tell us? Just to be sure, it certainly does not tell us anything about the character of the immigrants, as we will see in a moment when discussing the perception of the immigrant as the menacing ‘other’. Arguing that it tells us something like this, is to commit the same methodological flaw as the seventeenth century studies that showed that people from cold countries were more hardworking than people from warm countries, based on an evaluation of the size of the countries’ economies; and avoiding to mention that the larger economies of the industrialised countries were, in many cases, made possible thanks to the surplus generated during the colonisation period and the exploitation of people and resources in ‘warmer’ lands. The varying reliance on welfare benefits rather tells us then that immigrants are more vulnerable (for example, to suffering discrimination, having lower wages, being more susceptible to unemployment due to the lack of networks, communication skills in the foreign language, and probably being less educated than the average natives, among other factors). Then, countries that are more attentive to such inequalities, such as the Nordic ones, are more likely to offer admitted immigrants a wider access to the welfare benefits they need to overcome such unequal conditions. The obvious inference that most vulnerable persons need more welfare benefits (this independently of whether they are foreigners or
nationals), allows for a better integration of immigrants, which would then make the welfare benefits less necessary in the long run.

In opposition to this reasoning for accelerating the integration of immigrants in order to decrease their dependency on welfare as soon as possible by giving them the opportunity to become effective and self-dependent workers in a near future, Ruhs (2013) proposes the restriction of rights to immigrants during the first years of their stay in the high-income hosting country. The level of the restrictions, however, may vary not only according to the time of the stay, but also according to the skill composition of the immigrant workers. After an initial period of residency has ended, immigrants would either have to leave the country or be granted full rights. However, it turns out that this initial period might be crucial to the development of the necessary capabilities of immigrants. Not lifting them up precisely when they need it the most, would most probably seal their fate to minor and marginal roles in the economy of the hosting countries. This leads one to think that after the increased openness for immigration passed the initial period of residency, immigrants would most likely be expelled: being in the periphery of economy, their benefits to the hosting country would be considered marginal.

Discussing the relationship between rights and skill composition, Ruhs observed that states purposely use, as they should use according to him, a different measure for high- and low-skilled workers as a policy to attract skilled immigration. According to this logic, states offer a larger range of rights to high-skilled immigrants while being more restrictive to the low-skilled. When selectively restricting rights, states are able to be more open to immigration, since the risks of immigrants becoming a burden to the public finances are significantly reduced. The problem with this approach is that it is not the high-skilled immigrant workers who need more rights in the hosting country, since they will, most probably, be able to pay for the care and services they need. But then, it is precisely because they can pay for it that the rights are more easily allocated to them. The conclusion that I inevitably come to is that rights are for sale. From this perspective, it seems that the entire meaning of rights is being corrupted and it becomes acceptable to be selectively attentive to the needs of those who are not really needy. In my view, despite the specificities, this position is shown to be sharply aligned with Friedman’s analogy to illegal immigration: increase labour mobility across borders by decreasing their rights.

When discussing fiscal balance, it is also worth mentioning that the natural population growth in Europe is now very close to negative (Eurostat 2014a).
deaths almost outnumbering births, the age dependency ratio indicated that in 2013 there were, in the EU-28, already two workers for every dependent person (young and old) (Eurostat 2014b). Immigration is already accounting for more than 80% of the population growth in Europe and it is possible that bigger flows could immediately rectify the ageing imbalances that cause fiscal stress (see Coleman 2008). Freeman (2013), however, describes this argument as being absurd. Although he acknowledges the temporary benefits of ‘constant influx of young and fertile immigrants’, this solution is, to him, temporary. We could only ‘buy us some time’ with this strategy, but not solve the problem. Indeed, Eurostat (2009) predict that immigration could have a positive impact on keeping the fiscal balance until 2035. However, for me, the temporary character of the solution does not make it absurd. Affirmative action, for example, is meant to be temporary and it is not, for this reason, absurd. More freedom of mobility could well serve as a temporary, but immediate solution, giving us 20 years to come up with a more stable solution. I believe it is much more unreasonable, for example, to stimulate natural population growth in a planet that already has more people than it can support. The baby boomers of the sixties, for example, are getting close to retirement now, and in order to keep the fiscal balance using this strategy, we would instead have to promote larger birth rates in every generation. But the worst problem is not the temporality of this solution, but the fact that incentives to increase the natural population growth could lead us to extinction when the resources on earth have completely dried out. This is what sounds more absurd to me.

In order to tackle this problem of an increasing dependency ratio between working-age persons and retirees, the intergenerational pension system (PAYGO) is being revamped towards more individualised savings systems. These individualised systems operate as a type of investment fund that can be implemented via government or privately; they are called funded pensions. Since they are based on direct ownership, i.e. a person’s life savings will generate her own pension after retirement, they appear as more reliable options for the future. As good they might sound, these systems are not miraculous. Bowman (2014) has explained the systematic problems of substituting the PAYGO system with funded pensions. One of the problems he identifies is that the investments in funded pensions are not as reliable as they appear to be, since the savings are subject to inflation and fluctuations in the market (e.g. stocks): a large pension fund today might not be nearly large enough in the future. Another problem is that it becomes very
demanding for workers, who will have to invest a considerable share of their incomes for a long period before generating an adequate pension income that will support them. Based on that, it is reasonable to expect that less successful workers will not be able to generate their own pensions and poverty among the elderly will increase. Furthermore, this system is also unable to offer a solution for workers injured in their early careers, the sick, the unemployed, the disabled, children, and other individuals who are dependent on social security and are unable to work. Finally, the most important contribution of a public pension system is, to Bowman (ibid), its capacity to reduce income inequality and poverty among the aged and vulnerable. Considering this, we can infer that, after all, there is no way out: a social problem must be treated collectively. So, in my view, we would be better off using the next 20 years of stable of economic growth fuelled by immigration to head in the direction of a new economic model, starting not from the perspective of the selfish being—radically individualistic seeking to maximise her benefits as much as possible, not even looking after the elderly—but from the perspective of the more complex being, we actually (still) are; a comprehensive economy guided not only by an egotistic nature, but by an altruistic one based on mutual care and respect.

By highlighting the relevance of mutuality, individuals should become more responsive to redistribution and become more supportive of the welfare system in general. With the spreading of more robust welfare systems worldwide, open borders and welfare systems can become complementary, rather than contrary to each other; this would remind everybody concerned that they have the same goal of promoting universal inclusion of persons in their institutions. This connection indicates that the solution to the problem of making open borders and a welfare state compatible with one another might be found on a larger application of policies and measures already used in the social democratic welfare states to keep the fiscal balance. It might be true that on the one hand, opening the borders could create an additional challenge to the social welfare states because a constant source of inequality would be entering their systems, and the balance would be more difficult to maintain. However, this aspect does not actually challenge the quality of the problem, but only its quantity suggesting then that a larger application of this social model worldwide could meet the challenge. After all, to eradicate poverty worldwide, as Pogge showed (2011), requires no more than two-thirds of the US military’s expenditures. Based on that, we can say that to redistribute resources a bit more evenly would hardly overwhelm or break the welfare systems.
Social strain: Immigrants as undeserving creatures

From the social standpoint, the trade-off between open borders and a welfare state has to do with the potential loss of public support for the welfare system among the nationals when they see exploitation of benefits by ‘undeserving’ immigrants. This trade-off can have many dimensions. One of the dimensions can be framed as a question of citizenship rights versus human rights, in which the former is overemphasised. In such a conception, solidarity is still viewed as attached to citizenship as the primary binding factor. Citizenship is conceived as still attached to nationality, and national identity is seen as an important ground for solidarity. The tension emerges when the allocation of rights starts increasingly to depend more on state membership, being linked to residency, than on citizenship. This creates a fear that welfare states will lose legitimacy when solidarity does not follow this move. In this sense, one might see immigrants as ‘undeserving’ of welfare because they have resided elsewhere and, as such, might not share the same collective identity and might not have contributed enough to the system to be entitled to its benefits.

Another dimension of this conceived trade-off assumes, however, a much more radical position when defining the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ of welfare. “Deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ become definitions not only applicable to nationals and immigrants respectively, but they acquire a racial, social, and gendered dimension diffused among immigrants and nationals. Legal citizenship or residency then goes to the background giving place to a more complex socially constructed image of the ‘undeserving’. Consistent with the complexity of this radical dimension, Anderson remarked that, in the public eye, not every foreigner counts as an immigrant: the term is ‘heavily raced, classed, and gendered’ (Anderson 2010, 105). The ‘undeserving’ are then, more radically, the immigrants as the ethnically diverse, poor, and more dramatically, heartless mothers who are said to have babies just to take advantages of the welfare system; but there are also the nationals fitting these stereotypes that are considered ‘undeserving’, though not as pronouncedly as the immigrants (see Anderson 2013 for an historical account of these conceptual relations in the UK). And this raises the question of whether a broader solidarity based on residency would really be an issue if it did not incorporate the other specific differentiations mentioned above.

Freeman, in his controversial thesis (1986), and endorsed by his recent article (2013) has clearly expressed such a fear of the effects of increasing racial diversity to the welfare states. He is implying that citizenry does not entail only a
common national identity, but a common ethnicity. To him, the increasing racial diversity in Europe brings the danger of its Americanisation due to the consequent erosion of support to the more generous welfare systems. Later, the same argument has been revived by Alesina and Glæser (2004) on an empirical basis. Alesina and Glæser observed that ethnically diverse countries spend less on social services than more ethnically homogeneous countries. Given this correlation, they concluded that as Europe becomes more diverse, like the US, it will be more difficult to suppress the discourse of fear that devastate public support for a more robust welfare state. Alesina and Glæser’s influential study has, however, been criticised for relying too much on social spending as a measure of solidarity, without considering other important variables such as the attitude of nationals towards the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare schemes. Indeed, in more complete studies, taking into account factors other than public expenditure on social services, the findings looked different. Mau and Burckhardt (2009), for example, also analysed the opinions of nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) on the extent to which states should be responsible for promoting equality between nationals and immigrants. They considered the level of acceptance and integration of the immigrants by asking nationals whether they believed immigrants should be granted similar rights as them and whether they believed that immigrants produce a net cost to the welfare system.

The results are surprising. Although in most EEA countries, nationals think immigrants take a greater share of the welfare benefits relative to their contributions (except in Portugal and Italy, where the nationals believe immigrants take less or as much as they contribute to the welfare system), in all these countries the majority of the natives believe that immigrants should have the same rights as natives (except in Switzerland with 45% agreement). Sweden, Norway, Portugal and Denmark were at the top of the list with more than 80% in agreement. This is to say that the European countries with higher expenditures on welfare programmes are also more inclusive when it comes to immigrant rights. Thus, the fact that natives in most EEA countries do think that immigrants benefit more from the welfare system, and that they believe rights should not be restricted for immigrants, is enough evidence to, at least, challenge the easy assumption that says that an increase on social spending on immigrants necessarily undermines public support for the welfare system. When including in this analysis the relation between heterogeneity and welfare state solidarity, removing outliers such as Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg, Mau and Burckhardt, contrary to Alesina and Glæser, found that heterogeneity has an overall
positive influence on public support for welfare. Taylor-Gooby’s (2005) study, has previously found similar results when removing the US from the analysis. What we might conclude from this, based on new empirical data, is that Europe might not be in danger of having its welfare system Americanised as once feared, and that factors other than ethnic heterogeneity might be playing a stronger role on the public welfare support. Brady and Finnigan (2014), for example, suggest that immigration might undermine the public support to some, but not all, welfare policies. A difference among states might also be expected. But considering the question more broadly, Wilkinson and Pickett (2011) argue that income inequality is what strongly affects trust towards any perceived ‘other’. In this sense, the US may not have a smaller welfare system owing to its ethnic heterogeneity, but rather owing to its high rates of income inequality.

One of the determinant factors in this relation between solidarity and ethnic heterogeneity is undoubtedly the varying perception of the ‘undeserving’ in all welfare regimes even inside Europe. Even following an increasing amount of sceptical literature refuting Alesina and Glæser’s findings, it cannot be undermined that these variations in the notion of the ‘undeserving’ might change according to the circumstances and affect the public support for the welfare programmes in unexpected ways. A presidential campaign or a referendum can, as we are seen with Trump and Brexit, bring out choleric images of the “underserving”. In some liberal welfare regimes, for example, depending on the spokesman, the concept of ‘undeserving’ might include the elderly, the uninsured sick, or even victims of structural poverty seen as losers. While in social democratic regimes, as opposed to this, the concept of the ‘undeserving’ tends to be much narrower than that. In these latter countries, most deprived persons are still seen as victims, whether they are nationals or foreigners. Remembering that Mau's and Burckhardt’s data showed that the social democratic welfare regimes (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) were in the very top of the ranking granting equal rights to nationals and foreigners when compared to conservative or liberal welfare regimes. This indicates that collective solidarity is, in fact, strongly related to the way the welfare system is organised and the immigrant perceived. Having means-tested, instead of universal access to welfare programmes, seems to inevitably result in high visibility of the differences and thereby engenders a notion that some are paying for others. When the ‘others’ then are represented as reckless opportunists (free riders) or as militarised invaders, the mere possibility of co-existence with such ‘otherness’ produces an involuntary
rage and a sensation of being extorted by them. The support from the public for a means-tested welfare system tends to be smaller than in universal welfare systems. What this relation reveals is that, perhaps, homogeneity is not a prerequisite for a generous welfare state as we are used to thinking, but rather a product of it. Therefore, it seems that not only education and the increasing co-existence with the ‘others’ would contribute to change the distorted perception of the ‘undeserving’, but also a change in the way means-tested welfare regimes are organised.

We cannot, underestimate the power of the media in constantly feeding people with a rather garbled and misrepresented image of the immigrant as the ‘undeserving other’ (e.g. Kellner 2013; Rahman 2013). It is hard to argue that this exposure is not already affecting even the universal welfare regimes; the resurgence of a cosmopolitan solidarity binding persons by a universal morality is urgently needed. It might be clear that being sympathetic to an ‘undeserving creature’ somehow requires a quasi-religious strength, but that is why it is important to highlight the value of the person as a human being in such choleric times. But, assuming for the sake of argument, that we all get delusional and believe indiscriminately that the immigrant is the menacing ‘other’ (threatening the national’s jobs and careers, occupying their public spaces, and so on): would that be the end of the generous welfare states? The answer might be no, if we take into account Luhmann’s (1991) unusual interpretation of the welfare states as the result of the, not necessarily collective, way of managing risks. According to his reasoning (used to explain the survival of the welfare states facing globalisation and individualisation), the worst fear of immigrants taking over and putting the nationals in all kinds of situations of vulnerability, would actually lead to an increase, rather than the decrease, support to the welfare system among them. This unusual reasoning makes a lot of sense if we think that when the threat is perceived as very high, it might not be a good idea to rely on just private insurance policies, but on the contrary, on public welfare programmes. This is because one is not certain of having the funds in the future to purchase a private insurance in the first place. Corroborating Luhmann’s theory, Burgoon et al. (2012) found that the increased percentage of immigrants raises the public support for stronger welfare programmes. So, if the insecurity and vulnerability level becomes high, Luhmann seems to be right; the rational decision would be, contrary to the expected, to support a generous welfare state.
The Trade-off from Outside the Box

From the inside of the box, we saw that the trade-off between open borders and welfare states arises from the primary extrinsic approach on immigration and borders. Either open borders were defended in order to maximise global economic growth at the expense of the welfare states, or the welfare states were defended in order to maximise net economic benefits to nationals and residents at the expense of open borders. In both cases, the tension arose with the risk of severe fiscal stress and, in the latter case, an additional risk of a negative impact of heterogeneity on the public support for a stronger welfare system. We have seen, however, that, on the same grounds as an extrinsic approach on immigration and borders, immigration can actually immediately rectify the high age dependency ratio in Europe, contributing positively to the temporary fiscal balance. Furthermore, even in a worst-case scenario, in which heterogeneity would provoke a radical social fragmentation, it is possible that this would not weaken, but rather reinforce the support for welfare systems. The trade-off is then shown to be, at least, questionable. Both counter-arguments presented here, in response to the fiscal and social challenges of keeping both open borders and welfare states, as well as the arguments which they address, are circumstantial. They show competing views of what is more likely to happen based on both empirical and theoretical analysis. From the philosophical point of view, the data sometimes seemed unequivocal, but the premises on which the data was based appeared to be highly questionable; sometimes the premises seemed plausible enough, but the data showed that they were actually questionable. The limitations of this account were exposed when a large part of the discussion was dedicated to dealing with better ways of accommodating market-based solutions in conflict with a moral view of human beings, seeing them not as consumers, but as natural holders of basic rights. In order to overcome these limitations, I argue that we have to think from outside of the box of neoclassical economics and similar models and envision a new starting point for thinking intrinsically about what is essentially intrinsic and extrinsically on what is essentially extrinsic. This demand might sound pretty obvious, but when we see that more and more of the most intrinsically valuable spheres of human life are being commodified, rights now becoming a bargaining chip, we can see how quickly the obvious is forgotten.
What is the colour of Napoleon’s white horse? If your answer is ‘white’, congratulations, you are correct! But you are correct not because you are lucky, know history well or have a detailed and fresh memory of Jacques-Louis David’s famous painting. Actually, if you are a history expert or an art connoisseur, you would probably say that Marengo was grey, but, in this case, your answer to the above question would be wrong. This is because the question already presupposes the answer in its formulation. The obvious problem with this is that it is not a real question, but a trap. Friedman’s question was ‘what was wrong with the welfare states?’, and the answer was ‘many things are wrong with the welfare states’ and therefore they need to give place for a better regime. How many coconuts does a date palm tree produce in a season? I bet that, if you were not warned about ‘trap questions’, you would be tempted to answer it with a number, before you realise that date palm trees do not produce coconuts, but dates. This follows because sometimes we tend to search for an answer too quickly and forget to reflect upon the question itself. Something similar can be said to apply to the nationalists’ set of economic questions: How many and what kind of people can come in order to maximise productivity without causing trouble? What rights could they have in order to balance it against their contributions? When such questions are in place, what we see is that regulated admissions will have to be in the answer, because the question already assumes it. From that, an answer with a clear number is expected, even if the forgotten obvious is not likely to be a numerical answer at all. Taking the second example more seriously, we see that ‘persons’ and ‘coconuts’ become interchangeable concepts, i.e. the same logic of trade in goods is applied indiscriminate of whether one is discussing coconuts or people. How many and which kinds of coconuts can be traded to maximise profit and minimise costs? How much can be invested in the production and distribution of coconuts in order to balance consumption? When treating persons as coconuts, economics extrapolates its original aim of managing production, distribution and consumption of goods to manage rights and human mobility in the same way. Human beings then become commodities. The problem with this approach is well defined by Michael Sandel, who says that economics is emptying the debate of morality when ‘putting a price on noneconomic goods’, such as on human lives (Sandel 2013). In his account, it is clear that, morally, not everything is for sale. Therefore, he argues that to decide what is subjected to the market and what is not is an urgent task in contemporary politics:
there is a great difference between having a market economy and being a market economy (Sandel 2013).

**About Persons and Coconuts**

Economics is indeed a very powerful tool in times when many things depend on money; it helps us manage the resources in an optimal way: gain, spend, save and invest according to demand and supply; it assists us on reflecting upon ways we can improve the everyday life of people. When, more specifically discussing human mobility, however, it can only matter after the main decisions are put in place to create opportunities for persons who immigrate or emigrate. To expect to manage human mobility according to its economic advantages is wrong for at least four reasons: (1) persons are not coconuts; (2) the meaning of one’s life cannot be reduced to a monetary value; (3) basic rights should not be for sale; and (4) basic rights should not be inheritable.

(1) Human beings are not commodities and, as Kant has already wisely stated, they should not be used merely as a means, i.e. as pure instruments for achieving something else such as profit. If we challenge the settled assumption that says that each person should be respected as such, we can, perhaps, expect to have slavery back in the near future—if we agree that we do not already have it in the present (see Home Office, Modern Slavery Bill). Not to mention the opening of new markets for human organs and kids, the renting of the right to life and so forth. No doubt, it requires a bit of imagination to envisage new markets for what was previously not saleable (it is possible that the examples that I chose here are already a reality somewhere), because even if there used to be a limit to what is commodifiable, this limit has been breached: from the commodification of CO2 emissions to the commodification of freedom. But we have to keep in mind that it is not alright to manage immigration as the pure movement of ‘material bodies’, to recall Susmann’s illuminating term. When they are not valuable enough, they are sent away to become somebody else’s problem. This is very much like throwing the garbage in the neighbour’s property in order to clean up things at home. We have to be attentive, however, that when portraying the ‘others’ as pure materiality, we get the impression that we can evade the responsibility to respect them as equal and free persons. Suddenly, the wrongness of treating persons as garbage becomes trivial. It dissipates itself in a sentence: ‘We did what we had to do’. At this point we end up in a very dangerous mind-set for humanity.
(2) Putting a price on human lives would imply that we are living for nothing more than profit. How much is your life worth? It depends on how much and where you produce during your lifetime. The excellence of a carpenter, for example, would not be measured by one’s mastery on the art of carpentry, but by the monetary value of what one’s expertise is able to produce. To some extent, the division of labour already does that. Doctors, for example, are better paid than carpenters and companies are used to offer better wages for those they believe will contribute more to their goals. However, this does not imply, by any means, that in a situation of, for example, drowning, we are to save first the doctors and then, if possible, the carpenters or that we have to rescue our compatriots by letting immigrants drown. Human worthiness and genuine human values cannot vanish amidst numbers in any respectable society.

(3) Making rights a commodity would not only imply that economically deprived persons would not have a claim to equal rights, but there are other implications as well. We all know that, in practice, equality of rights is already subjected to economic inequality and that, for example, the right to emigrate means a lot more for those able to afford it than to the penniless. Even though this happens more frequently than imagined, there is a moral constraint pushing us to fight for distributive justice in order to make equality of rights more effective for everybody. What would happen if we decide to stop pushing in this direction? Well, it would be very different just to assume that rights are for those who can afford it, but the consequences do not only affect the needy. By bringing the commodification of migrant rights to the forefront of politics as a basic rationale, informed and dispassionate decisions, not only degenerates the very meaning of human rights, but also the meaning of justice itself. Following these pragmatic guidelines, governmental decisions are to be based on cost-effectiveness, not justice. These become ‘business decisions’ and the states, instead of being promoters of human rights, act like corporations that do what they are designed to do irrespective of the externalities that such decisions might cause. The constraint is that states are not corporations and they have never been designed to pursue their national interests in isolation of other states, reminding us that the birth of states came together with the birth of international law. When citizens themselves, as politicians or househusbands, start to appropriate this pragmatism, they fragment themselves into a moral person, on one side, and into a businessman, on the other. When confronted with a supposedly difficult decision, they allow themselves to decide as
a businessman and regret like a moral person; at that point, the personal responsibility for cruel acts has already dissipated. With no responsibility in place, right and wrong also cease to exist.

(4) If you now think that it is unjust for rights to be in the market for those who can pay for them, what does one say about rights being exclusive for those who are already born with them? People born in high-income countries are destined to have a much better life, fuller of opportunities and achievements, than people born in low-income countries. Some people in developing and low-income countries even hope to be born again elsewhere just to have the opportunity for a better life. They risk their lives to cross the borders. This is because where they are born, they are prevented from developing the capabilities that would enable them a basic and a decent life. A person born in Norway will, according to the statistics (World Bank), live as long as thirty years more than a person born in Angola. Imagining two persons born at the same time in those two countries, when the Angolan is dying, the Norwegian might be achieving a stable career. The Norwegian-born will have, at least, seven times more resources than the Angolan-born during one’s lifetime and while the Norwegian-born will most likely finish school and probably get a university degree, the Angolan-born has only 50% chance of finishing elementary school. Certainly, Norway is aware of these discrepancies and it has done a lot more than larger economies to tackle poverty abroad. The problem is that to help the Angolan-born is still a question of charity, and while some states contribute more, others are able to get away with giving less or nothing without any sanction. Recalling the marathon example, we can see that some have won and others lost the marathon even before being born. Winning becomes a matter of inheritance, and no duty, but charity, is meant to mitigate others’ losses. We then see that when mobility is restricted, citizenship becomes as valuable as inherited property in determining one’s opportunities in life (Shachar and Hirschl 2007). It is not even a marathon anymore, but a Mugabe-like lottery in which the organiser of the lottery is, of course, the winner.

This list does not pretend to be exhaustive, but it is certainly sufficient to show that economics cannot deal with immigration issues alone without being bounded and subordinated to universal morality in a serious manner. In liberal democracies, our commitments to universal morality require us, above all, to regard all human beings as equal and free. This should be irrespectively of race, religion, sex or sexual orientation, political views, social status or nationality. In order for these
values not to be added to the list of the forgotten obvious, we have to start over, think outside the box and formulate a fresh starting question for economics. There might be other promising questions out there, but my proposal is the following:

What are the mechanisms that should be in place to maximise the overall wellbeing and minimise adverse impacts on human beings, as free and equal persons?

Conclusion and Perspectives

From the inside of the box, we have seen that the trade-off between open borders and a welfare state is questionable and, as such, it should not be taken for granted. This is because the two assumed strains, the fiscal and social, might not hold as expected. While it was expected that open borders would lead to breaking of the welfare economy due to the fiscal stress provoked by the arrival of more taxpayers than tax receivers, we saw that without immigration, Europe, and other places with low or negative natural population growth, would already have more tax receivers than taxpayers and their economies would be weakened given their current economic model. In this sense, the lack of immigration would, for these countries, mean more than economic stagnation, even economic decline. For the near future, immigration has the potential to secure economic growth by rectifying the age dependency ratio for twenty more years, giving us time to come up with more stable solutions. The solutions currently presented for changing (or mixing) the intergenerational pension system to funded pensions are still unsatisfactory because they fail to take into account the persistent social inequalities. For this matter, I have argued that a better solution would require us to step back from the generally individualistic approach that guarantees rights for those able to pay for them, and move towards a more comprehensive economic model that takes seriously into account, our universal moral commitments. While it was expected that the increased ethnic heterogeneity would undermine the welfare system’s public support, we saw that not only is the available data is highly inconclusive and contested, but also that, in the worst case scenario, assuming that the tribal behaviour is really the basis of our contemporary societies, the overwhelming threat caused by an increase of ethnic heterogeneity would possibly enhance, rather than a diminish, the support for the welfare systems.

From outside of the box, we have seen that the trade-off between open
borders and welfare states might be more than circumstantially overcome by having a different starting point for economics. A starting point that does not prioritise either global or national economic growth, but addresses the wellbeing of human beings as free and equal persons. With this in mind, I finish the paper with a start: a fresh question towards a new economic model. This start is needed because we should not keep justifying our bad behaviour in order to achieve purely economic goals anymore. Note that the question proposed does ask for a simple numerical answer. It requires thinking instead. To purely manage numbers, is an ability that, in society, does not replace thinking. I define ‘thinking’ beyond strategic abilities because by thinking, one could also decide to lose. When framing our lives in society strategically, by which certain goals of maximising cost-efficiency for ourselves are settled, there is no doubt that the answers to our questions will arise directly and clearly. This straightforward method can produce the view that one cannot argue against facts and high probabilities, but then numbers, not agents are taking the decisions: businessmen, not moral persons. However, by accepting this method and calling it a rational approach, we delegate precisely what makes us rational beings in the first place, i.e. our ability to think and distinguish right from wrong. A genuine rational decision does not take the assumptions and data for granted without questioning them first; it requires doubt, followed by certitude and criticism.

It might be that my question is too broad and that requires economics to account for some things that are not clearly measurable, such as wellbeing. It might also be that the question is embedded in notions that are, in any meaningful sense, at the periphery of economics: such as moral judgments and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values. But I believe that these tensions are exactly what make this question relevant. In such a view, a genuinely informed decision on human mobility and wellbeing takes into account also things that are not immediately measurable or evident; it requires observation, deliberation, and judgment. A reframed question for economics certainly does not entail a complete reorientation of empirical research to normative standards meaning that the questions of ‘inside the box’ are to be made irrelevant. They complement each other and the challenge of political philosophy that is attentive to our current problems is to interplay between both. To diagnose how the world appears, is, in this sense, essential to create a world as how it should be based on realistic steps. Economists already ask such normative questions when exploring what mechanisms should be in place in order to maximise the overall wellbeing and minimise adverse impacts on citizens.
Normative questions are not a prerogative of philosophy. What I proposed here is the expansion of this question, beyond the egotistic view of the individual that can only help but him/herself to the broader frame of free and equal individuals that can also chose to lose in order to help the other. In other words, the proposed question requires us to think not only from the inside, but also from outside the box.

References


The book of Harvard professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt appears at the moment when threats to democracy, including to the American one, are vigorous and new forms of authoritarianism are emerging around the globe. Populist governments have assaulted democratic institutions in Hungary, Poland or Turkey, extremist forces have registered important electoral gains in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and other European countries, while in the United States a president with little commitment to constitutional rights and clear authoritarian tendencies was elected in November 2016. What does all this mean? The authors are trying and doing very well to explain us, during the nine chapters of the book, that we have reasons for alarm. Appealing to older and newer examples, they show that democracy can dye not only with a coup d’état, but also slowly, from the inside, step by step.

The first chapter, Fateful Alliances, starts from examples of leaders such as Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, who, despite the differences, followed routes to power that share striking similarities: “Not only they were outsiders with a flair for capturing public attention, but each of them rose to power because establishment politicians overlooked the warning signs and either handed over power to them (Hitler and Mussolini) or opened the door for them (Chavez)” (p. 19). We should learn from these experiences how to keep extremists and demagogues far from the centers of power. And what matters more than mass responses to extremists’ appeals is whether responsible political elites and parties serve as filters. Having as reference point the Juan Linz’s book The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, published in 1978, the authors develop four key indicators of authoritarian behavior: rejection or weak commitment to democratic rules of the
game; denial of legitimacy of political opponents; toleration or encouragement of violence; readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. These behavioral warnings can help us to identify antidemocratic politicians.

The following two chapters - *Gatekeeping in America* and *The Great Republican Abdication* - are dedicated to American democracy, where both Democrats and Republicans succeeded for decades to keep extremist figures out of the mainstream. Until 2016, when Republican Party failed to keep Donald Trump, real estate developer, reality-TV star and a man with no experience in public office, from gaining the nomination. The book examines the factors that contributed to Donald Trump’s stunning political success, emphasizing that, first of all, there is a “story of ineffective gatekeeping”: “Party gatekeepers failed at three key junctures: the *invisible primary*, the primaries themselves, and the general election” (p.57).

Applying the grid of the four key indicators of authoritarian behavior to Donald Trump, the authors found that there were all signs of concern before his nomination. Despite the opposition of some Republican leaders who refused to endorse Trump, the abdication and the transfer of authority to a leader who threatens democracy could have two explanations: “The first is the misguided belief that an authoritarian can be controlled or tamed. The second is what sociologist Ivan Ermakoff calls *ideological collusion*, in which the authoritarian’s agenda overlaps sufficiently with that of mainstream politicians that abdication is desirable, or at least preferable to the alternatives” (p. 67). The book also makes an “authoritarian report card” of Trump’s first year in office (chapter 8), noting that, as president, he exhibited clear authoritarian tendencies. He attempted all strategies by which elected authoritarians seek to consolidate power and which are described in a distinct chapter of the book (chapter 4 - *Subverting democracy*). These strategies are: capturing the referees (judicial system, law enforcement bodies, intelligence, tax and regulatory agencies, institutions that, in democratic regimes, are designed to serve as neutral arbiters); sideling or bribing the key players (such as opposition politicians, business leaders who finance the opposition, major media outlets, intellectual/cultural or even religious figures whose popularity or moral standing makes them potential threats); and, not least, rewriting/changing the rules of the game (“reforming” the constitution, the electoral system and other institutions in ways that disadvantage or weaken the opposition). All these strategies are carried out piecemeal and with the appearance of legality, so as the citizens are often slow to realize that their democracies are dismantled, even if this is happening before their eyes. As the authors point out, “one of the great ironies of how democracies
die is that the very defense of democracy is often used as pretext for its subversion” (p. 92).

The question is if democratic institutions are so easy to sweep away. The chapters 5 and 6 of the book (The Guardrails of Democracy and The Unwritten Rules of American Politics) emphasize the factors that sustain democracy. They include not only written rules (constitutions), but also unwritten rules and norms, shared codes of conduct that serve as guardrails of democracy. All functioning democracies rely on informal rules that, even if not stipulated in constitution or any laws, are widely known and respected. Unwritten rules were everywhere in American politics, two of them- mutual toleration and institutional forbearance- becoming the foundation of American much-admired system of checks and balance. “Mutual toleration refers to the idea that as long as our rivals play by constitutional rules, we accept that they have an equal right to exist, compete for power, and govern. We may disagree with, and even strongly dislike, our rivals, but we nevertheless accept them as legitimate” (p. 102). The other one, institutional forbearance, can be understood as avoiding actions that, while respecting the letter of the law, violate its spirit. “Where norms of forbearance are strong, politicians do not use their institutional prerogatives to the hilt, even if it is technically legal to do so, for such action could imperil the existing system” (p. 106). Without the two interrelated norms, not written in the American constitution, the constitutional checks and balances will not operate as we expect them to.

The importance of these norms is also underlined in the final chapter of the book (Saving democracy), in which, ascertaining the recession of democracy worldwide, the authors review possible scenarios for a post-Trump America. The most optimistic one is a swift democratic recovery, but it is not easy to accomplish it, because the polarization of American society and the weakness of democracy’s guardrails began well before Donald Trump ascended to the White House. A second scenario, much darker, is one in which President Trump and the Republicans continue to win with a white nationalist appeal and the third, most likely in the authors’ view, is that one in which Trump will fail but this failure would do little to narrow the divide between parties or to reverse the decline in mutual toleration and forbearance. The authors’ call is to learn from history. Both Republicans and Democrats need to reform their parties and to address adequately the two underlying forces driving American polarization: racial and religious realignment and growing economic inequality.

The equalitarianism, civility, sense of freedom that were the essence of mid-twentieth-century American democracy are today under assault not only in the
United States, but also across the industrialized West. Restoring democratic ideals and norms must be today accompanied by their extension through the whole of increasingly diverse societies. The book ends with the hope that we will face this challenge, reconciling democracy with diversity: “Previous generations of Europeans and Americans made extraordinary sacrifices to defend our institutions against powerful external threats. Our generation, which grew up taking democracy from granted, now faces a different task: We must prevent it from dying from within” (p. 231).

*Review by Marius Ioan TĂTAR*

Social scientists have made contradictory claims about the impact of ethnic diversity on social cohesion, the levels of social trust, civic and political engagement (Tătar, 2011). This is so because various societies perform differently in accommodating ethnic diversity. Ethnic boundaries can act both as spaces of mutual understanding and inclusion of various ethnicities, as well as contact areas based on divergence and exclusion between different ethnic groups (Tătar, 2003). Given these divergent outcomes, scholars have suggested that it is not ethnic diversity per se that is relevant, but the degree to which ethnicities are politicized and become salient in the political process. However, few studies convincingly explain and illustrate with in-depth case studies why and how ethnic identities become politicized. The book authored by Anke Weber, Wesley Hiers, and Anaïd Flesken, *Politicized Ethnicity: A Comparative Perspective*, aims to fill this gap in the literature by offering an extensive comparative analysis of five cases: Kenya, Tanzania, Bolivia, Peru, and the United States.

In the introductory chapter, the authors develop a comprehensive theoretical framework which both conceptualizes politicized ethnicity as a dependent variable and identifies a comprehensive set of factors that lead to the politicization of ethnicity. The authors start from a constructivist approach of ethnicity, that is both dynamic and relational, aiming to explain why ethnic identities become important issues in the political arena (p. 3). They argue that the politicization of ethnicity occurs when specific types of “ethnic actions” are carried out in the context of institutions that are linked to the state/political arena” (p.4).
According to the authors, politicization of ethnic identities can take various discursive and nondiscursive forms. The most important discursive forms appear when actors frame various issues in ethnic terms and bring them into the political arena (p.4). On the supply side of the political process, the authors also emphasize other forms of ethnicity politicization through the formation of ethnic parties and their competition in the electoral arena, ethnically based public policies, and other legal and administrative forms (pp. 5-6). On the demand side, the authors pinpoint the support of the population for the actions of ethnic actors, illustrated for instance by voting for ethnic parties (p. 7). Based on these indicators, the authors place the five cases analyzed in this book on a continuum of ethnicity politicization: Kenya (high), US (medium-high), Bolivia (medium-low), Peru (low), Tanzania (low) (pp. 137-138).

To explain differences between these countries in terms of ethnicity politicization the authors provide an integrated analytical framework that considers the interplay between structure and actors in creating salient ethnic identities and the subsequent politicization of these identities (p.15). As the authors argue, “ethnic markers are typically among the most important salient identities around the world” (p. 15) and out of the pool of potential identities only a small number of identities become salient and get eventually politicized (p. 15). As the authors claim, the emergence of “salient ethnic identities is a long-term process and depends on structural factors” while “the activation of salient ethnic identities for the political purpose, on the other hand, is a shorter-term process driven mainly by political actors” (pp. 16-17). Structural and actor centered explanatory factors are grouped into four categories (see Table 5.1): “a. Resource distribution (land, education, housing) was biased along ethnic lines; b. Nation-building policies inadequate for targeting all ethnic groups in population; c. Electoral system and geographic location of ethnic groups supported the use of ethnic identities for political mobilization; d. Political entrepreneurs used ethnicity for political purposes” (pp.138-139). The influence of these factors is then empirically tested using a structured and focused comparison of the five cases belonging to different geographical regions: The United States, two pairs of most similar cases from Africa and Latin America.

Chapter two examines the two African cases: Kenya and Tanzania. Despite having many similar features, the two countries have registered very different outcomes in terms of ethnicity politicization. The authors highlight the fact that average levels of politicization in Kenya remained high throughout the observation
period. In contrast, politicization of ethnicity in Tanzania remained very low throughout its history (p. 61). The authors argue that these differences can be primarily explained by their different institutional settings: Kenya having deeply divided ethnic groups reflected in the electoral process, while in Tanzania the ethnic divisions were weaker favoring pan-ethnic political organization (p. 64). Nation-building policies aiming to create a national language and to favor interethnic cooperation through education lessened the politicization of ethnic identities in Tanzania. Moreover, biased distribution of resources such as land, political posts and infrastructure fostered the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya by politicians (p. 64).

In chapter three, the cases of Bolivia and Peru, two highly heterogeneous societies of Latin America, are comparatively analyzed. According to the authors, in both countries politicization of ethnicity has been rather low but changing over time (p. 88). During colonialism and early independence periods, politicization mainly consisted of creating parallel legislative and administrative systems for indigenous and creole inhabitants and afterwards “politicization consisted of efforts to include the indigenous people into the nation” (p. 89). These developments have been influenced by the interplay between various actors (governmental and opposition elites and grassroots movements) and structural factors (colonialism, nation building and resources).

Chapter four examines the United States, a case that has, according to the authors, a medium/high level of ethnicity politicization. The chapter focuses on the ethno-racial boundaries between whites and African Americans, the largest non-white group in the US that has been socio-politically excluded for much of US history. As the authors demonstrate, “ethnoracial politicization in the United States was fundamentally shaped by colonial administrative legacies and, following independence, by political institutions and processes as well as nation building policies” (pp. 130-131). The authors mention a variety of forms of ethnoracial politicization in the fields of party system, political claim making, and policy (p. 96).

Chapter five combines evidence from all five cases in a comparative analysis that aims to display the similarities of the foundation and development of ethnicity politicization. The authors conclude that “nation-building policies have the potential to reduce ethnicity politicization and to work toward an inclusive society” that can effectively manage ethnic diversity (p. 151). The authors acknowledge that nation-building policies operate in conjunction with resource distribution and other institutional factors and further research is needed to
better understand how nation-building policies interact with the institutional environment.

The study is based on a relatively broad conceptualization of politicization of ethnicity. The authors measure this concept through 3 indicators (see Table 1.1, p. 9): ethnic rhetoric in the political sphere, electoral support for ethnic parties, and overt exclusionary policies (all these indicate a variation from low to high degree of politicization). The authors mention that their specification of ethnic politicization places politicians, political parties, policies and power at the center of the analysis (p. 3). Thus, the analysis focuses on certain actors (politicians, party officials, voters), actions (claim making, state policy creation and implementation, voting) and institutions (parties, state bureaucracies and elections). One could reasonably argue that all these traits belong to an empirical inventory of the politicization of ethnicity, but they may describe various dimensions of the concept that are qualitatively different from each other. Moreover, these dimensions might also have different weights in measuring the concept with some of them being more important than others for understanding ethnicity politicization. In additions the indicators mentioned by the authors are also measured at different levels and units of analysis: claims made in the public sphere, individuals voting for ethnic parties, pieces of legislation and other public policies. It is not clear how information on such diverse areas is combined to assess politicization of ethnicity on a continuum1, as the authors claim (p. 8). Thus, identifying potential dimensions could be useful both for clarifying the concept and for building a typology of ethnicity politicization that could be a guide for the empirical study of this phenomenon.

In terms of explanatory framework, the authors seem to favor macro-structural determinants that are generally long run in nature, as the major factors contributing to politicization (p.2). The authors claim that: “Colonial administrative rule, access to resources, and nation building are the major factors that determine the degree to which ethnicity is enduringly politicized. Actions by political entrepreneurs, in contrast, play a major role in short run, intense bursts of politicized ethnicity” (p. 2). While this approach clearly favors a historical approach to ethnicity politicization as nationally bounded, it seems to be less adequate to study ethnicity in the contemporary context of globalization marked

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1 This seems to suggest the idea of a politicization of ethnicity concept having a single dimension.
by increased ethnic identification of migrants and political mobilization of anti-immigration forces. Despite these limitations the book is clearly structured and develops interesting hypotheses that contribute to the scholarly literature on the role of ethnicity in political processes and could provide a solid basis for future research.

References

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Ludmila BOGDAN, PhD, is Postdoctoral fellow in Sociology, Harvard University and Max Kade Fellow at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Contact: bogdan@g.harvard.edu

Ivo BOSILKOV is a PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP), based at the Department of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Milan. He is a joint-degree PhD candidate in Political Communication at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) at the University of Amsterdam. His research interests include framing, populism and European identity.

Henry P.H. CHOW holds a Ph.D. from University of Toronto. He is a Professor and Graduate Program coordinator in the Department of Sociology and Social Studies at the University of Regina in Saskatchewan, Canada. His major teaching and research interests are in the areas of ethnic studies, the sociology of education, the sociology of religion, social gerontology, criminology and criminal justice, and survey research methods. Contact: henry.chow@uregina.ca.

Dimitra DRAKAKI holds a Master degree from the programme ‘Erasmus Mundus Journalism, Media and Globalization’, with a specialization in War and Conflict Reporting from Swansea University. Her research interests include journalism and migration.

Melina DUARTE is post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Philosophy, UiT-The Arctic University of Norway.

Cristina MATIUȚA, PhD, is Associate Professor at the University of Oradea, Department of Political Science and Communication. She teaches in the areas of Civil Society, Political Parties and Theory and practice of democracy. She is Jean Monnet professor in the field of European integration studies. Contact: cmatiuta@uoradea.ro
Nicolas PARENT is an independent researcher, having conducted extensive field work in Turkey, along the Balkan Route, and in Peru, where he is currently working on a research project that explores the impact of extractive industries on indigenous displacement. He is the former lead researcher at the Observatory for Human Rights and Forced Migrants in Turkey (OHRFMT).

Lia POP, PhD, is university professor at the Department of Political Sciences and Communication, University of Oradea, researcher and the founder of the Research Center for Identity and Migration Issues (RCIMI).

Šárka PRAT is a researcher at the University of Economics in Prague (VŠE) and Executive Director in a think-tank Institute for Politics and Society. Her research specializes in migration, the results of which were published on the Web of Science.

Piper QUINN is a research fellow at the Institute for Politics and Society. Her research interests focus primarily on Russia, East-Central Europe, and immigration policy. She is currently pursuing dual degrees in International Relations and Russian Studies at New York University.

Marius Ioan TĂTAR, PhD, is Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Oradea, Department of Political Science and Communication. Between 2015-2016 he was Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. His main research areas include political participation and democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. Contact: Str. Traian Blajovici nr. 2 Oradea, 410238, Romania, E-mail: mariustatar@yahoo.com.
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