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THEMATIC ARTICLES: ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalisation and Migration: Is the World Transforming into a Borderless One?1

Ivan Ng Yan CHAO

Abstract. Globalisation has radically transformed the world in many ways, one of which is the unprecedented numbers of people migrating across international borders. Starting from the end of the Cold War, there were scholarly predictions that the forces of globalisation would eventually render international borders irrelevant, leading to a borderless world. Migration, however, appears to be an area where the importance of international borders remains strong. Contemporary developments across the world suggest that real and/or perceived negative effects of international migration often lead to international borders becoming strengthened, disrupting migration flows. This paper examines both sides of the debate about whether we are becoming a borderless world in relation to migration today, in light of contemporary events and developments.

Keywords: globalization, migration, migrant, borders, nation-state

The debate about how far and in what ways globalisation has shaped the world has been called “one of the most fundamental debates of our time” (Held and McGrew, 2002). Starting from the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War, an air of triumphalism could be said to have taken hold in Western discourse. Fukuyama (1989) famously proclaimed the “end of history” and that the entire world would eventually adopt liberal democracy and free market capitalism. Other scholars made similar predictions about the “end of the nation-state” and the “end of territory”, convinced that we were ushering in a new age of a homogenous world culture, a

1 Acknowledgement to Professor Volker H. Schmidt, National University of Singapore, Department of Sociology, for whose class this manuscript was originally written for, and whose guidance and comments were invaluable in the writing of this manuscript.
“borderless world” (Antonsich, 2009:789). Cosmopolitan thought was very much in vogue, with its visions of “a borderless and united world in terms of moral obligation and solidarity, if not in terms of actual life circumstances” (Aas, 2011:136).

At the same time, it is also undeniable that globalisation and the numerous changes it has brought have resulted in severe tension, between the global and the local/national (Aas, 2011). The unprecedented September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent “global war on terror” were interpreted by some scholars as a return to the “strong state and the closing of borders” (Held and McGrew, 2007:1). More recent events such as the election of Donald Trump as United States President and his emphasis on “America First” (Bryant, 2018), Brexit (Giles, 2017) and the rise of far-right, anti-immigrant parties in Europe (Bremmer, 2018) would arguably further call into question the idea that the world is transforming into a borderless one, despite what some earlier scholars appeared to think.

This paper looks specifically at the phenomenon of migration and seeks to assess the extent to which the claim that the world is transforming into a borderless one as a result of globalisation holds true. In Section I, I will first set out some definitions, statistics and observations about globalisation and migration flows today, drawing upon recent reports from the United Nations. Section II then considers the arguments in the globalisation literature that nation-states and borders are becoming increasingly irrelevant. In Section III, I will consider the opposing arguments by scholars, particularly considering events in recent years, that we are in fact moving in the opposite direction, towards more exclusionary borders and ‘de-globalisation’, before concluding.

**Global migration flows today**

The term “globalisation” has been interpreted in different ways, and as globalisation scholars Held and McGrew (2002:2) have noted, there is no single account of globalisation that is regarded as academic orthodoxy. Globalisation can be thought of “the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders” and the onset of a “borderless world” (Dickinson, 2017:4). To discuss the globalist claim that we are moving towards a borderless world, a good starting point would be some statistics regarding global migration flows today. In a 2015 United Nations report on international migration, it was
observed that international migration is a modern reality touching nearly all parts of the world.\textsuperscript{2} The number of international migrants worldwide has grown rapidly from 173 million in 2000 to 244 million in 2015, an international migrant being defined as one who lives outside his or her country of birth.\textsuperscript{3} High-income countries host the majority of the world’s international migrants, with 71\% of international migrants living in them.\textsuperscript{4} Much of the growth in the global population of international migrants has also been concentrated in high-income countries, with migration to high-income countries accounting for 81\% of the growth in the number of international migrants worldwide from 2000 to 2015.\textsuperscript{5} 65\% of international migrants come from middle-income countries.\textsuperscript{6}

Yet, as a 2009 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report reminds us, international migration is far from a new or novel phenomenon. European colonization, the slave trade and the use of Chinese and Indian contract labourers in Southeast Asia and the Americas all resulted in large migration flows.\textsuperscript{7} Taking a longer-term historical view, human migration from one place to another has been theorized to have been taking place since 50,000 years ago.\textsuperscript{8} Despite the tendency for historical shortsightedness, Dickinson observes that every person today has an ancestor who migrated from one place to another – the question is only how far back in one’s genealogy one needs to go to find that migrating ancestor (Dickinson, 2017:23).

Demographically, there is a wide disparity between developed and developing countries. The working-age population in developed countries is expected to decline by 2050,\textsuperscript{9} and in some of them, such as Germany, Japan and South Korea, their populations are expected to shrink.\textsuperscript{10} The aging of populations,

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid at p5
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid at p6
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid at p14
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid at p29
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid
especially in developed countries, will pose issues such as the funding of care for the elderly as the number of dependents increases vis-à-vis the working-age population.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, the working-age population in developing countries is expected to increase in 2050.\textsuperscript{12} This demographic disparity between developed and developing countries is expected to widen in the future – a decline in the number of people of working-age in developed countries occurs at the same time as an increase in the working-age population in developing countries. It is on this basis that the 2009 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report predicts that the demographic pressure for international migration flows is likely to increase.\textsuperscript{13}

Economically speaking, there remains vast inequality in wealth between developed and developing countries. As Milanovic (2016:132) observes, the country where one lives has an extremely significant impact on one’s lifetime income – more so than class, at least for the time being. Given that 97% of the world’s population lives in the country where they were born, Milanovic (2016:132) proposes the concept of citizenship ‘premiums’ and ‘penalties’. Through pure circumstance, one who is born in a developed country like Sweden can be said to enjoy a ‘citizenship premium’, while conversely a person born in a developing country like Pakistan suffers a ‘citizenship penalty’ (Milanovic, 2016:131). The disparity can be large indeed. To take his extreme example, on average, merely being born in the United States as opposed to Congo would multiply one’s lifetime income 93 times (Milanovic, 2016:133). Migrating to another country can thus be extremely attractive to potential migrants, offering the potential migrant the opportunity to greatly increase his income (Milanovic, 2016:134).

Apart from the traditional explanations of wage differentials and a lack of economic development in poor countries, Massey (1990:68) suggests that the increase in capital-intensive economic development in developing countries as a result of globalization has caused economic uncertainty which makes international migration an attractive option. So long as economic development among countries remains uneven, the existence of migrants who wish to improve their economic position with higher wages, coupled with the demand for cheap

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid} at p44
\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid} at p46
labour in developed countries, is likely to continue to create economic pressure for migration. The number of people who wish to migrate is thus likely to far exceed the number that receiving countries are willing or able to accept (Weiner, 1996:18).

Globalization and the onset of a borderless world

Having set out a brief overview of global migration flows today, I now turn to examine the globalist claim that we are becoming a borderless world, in the context of migration. Numerous scholars have argued that globalization has resulted in a retreat of the state, the rise of international flows and greater economic integration, such that borders are increasingly irrelevant (Paasi, 2009). The “deep drivers” of globalization, such as improvements in communications and transport, the creation of global markets for goods and services, information flows, global divisions of labour and migration and movement of peoples have created “dense patterns of global interconnectedness” (Held and McGrew, 2007:4), such that nation-states cannot be considered in isolation. On the issue of migration specifically, de Wenden (2007) argues that migratory flows have become a part of this globalisation process, with the potential to “undermine the very system of nation-states” (de Wenden, 2007:52). Compared to the past, the globalization of migratory flows is a relatively new phenomenon, characterized by enhanced mobility and migration from new regions (de Wenden, 2007:52). A desire amongst people living in developing countries to live in developed countries, the increased availability of passports in many countries and the emergence of transnational networks facilitating migration have all caused and facilitated migration flows in unprecedented ways (de Wenden, 2007:52). Globalists argue that nation-states are becoming increasingly unable to control immigration flows across their national borders, to stop “unwanted” migration flows (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004:5). This is despite the fact that control of one’s borders is an aspect of sovereignty, which is vital to the existence of the nation-state (Ataner, 2004). A state’s ability to control one’s borders is never absolute (Sassen, 1998:61), such that attempts to stem migration flows are said to be futile or at least questionable in light of the possibly disproportionate manpower and financial requirements (Pecoud and de Guchteneire, 2007:3). To take a recent example, in the United States, a White House estimate of the costs of constructing the wall along the United States-Mexico border to fulfill US President Donald Trump’s election promise is $18 billion US dollars
(Carroll, 2018) while immigration enforcement costs the United States government about the same amount every year (Massey, 2013). Similarly, the 2015 European migrant crisis saw an unprecedented number of people attempting to enter the European Union. Their sheer numbers overwhelmed the ability of border authorities to stop them – the “weight of numbers ... [was] transformed into a means of resistance” (Anderson, 2017:1530), jumping fences and breaking barricades.

There are two major ways in which globalization can be said to have limited the ability of nation-states to control their borders, leading to a more borderless world – through economic and normative, international human rights constraints on states’ ability to formulate and implement immigration restrictions (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). As some sociologists and economists have argued, both market forces and rights discourse has reduced the efficacy of borders as barriers to the movement of people (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006:206). Freeman (1995:889), for example, posits a theory of “client politics” to explain why immigration policy tends to be expansionist rather than restrictive in liberal democratic states. Under his theory, immigration policy is strongly influenced by pro-immigration groups, especially employers in labour-intensive industries, businesses dependent on cheap labour, and civil and human rights organizations (Freeman, 1995:888). These groups are better able to mobilise and organise politically, exerting pressure on politicians. Together with what he calls the “antipopulist norm” in liberal democratic states, a norm which strongly discourages the exploitation of “racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears” to win votes, immigration policy thus tends to be pro-immigration (Freeman, 1995:885).

The integration of national economies into the global economic order as a result of globalization also means that states are increasingly subject to the vicissitudes of market forces. Sassen (1998:72) notes that economic globalization has led to the emergence of transnational economic spaces, as well as legal and regulatory regimes over which states have much less control compared to the domestic sphere, reducing the ability of states to regulate cross-border labour migration flows. In other words, globalization has transferred functions traditionally associated with state governance from state to non-state entities, reducing the ability of the state to control its borders (Sassen, 1998:69).

Globalist sociologists have also argued that there is a link “between international human rights and the inability of states to control migration” (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000:189). As a result of globalization, the normative power
of human rights (which by definition includes migrants as opposed to civil or political rights which may be limited only to citizens of a particular nation-state) has led to the emergence of international charters and declarations which provide guidelines to nation-states on how they ought to treat foreigners within their borders, putting normative constraints on the ability of nation-states to stop foreigners from entering or simply expelling them (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000:165). International agreements such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the 1951 Refugee Convention for example, may constrain a state’s ability to act as it pleases (Sassen, 1998:58). International human rights norms have led to judiciaries in France and Germany actually frustrating attempts by their respective legislatures to introduce more restrictive immigration laws (Sassen, 1998:58). Thus, despite the tendency for public opinion about immigration to be negative (as a recent 2017 global Ipsos poll indicates14), the constraints as a result of global legal norms have limited the ability of states to police their borders.

Taken together, it would thus appear that the dominant views of political elites, influenced as they may be by powerful economic and human rights considerations, tends to be pro-immigration (Citrin and Sides, 2008:51). Yet, the applicability of Freeman’s theory to non-liberal democratic states can be questioned. One could think of democratic states where, as Cornelius and Tsuda (2004:12) observe as a counter to Freeman’s argument, the pro-immigration lobby is not as capable of influencing government policy, such as in countries like Japan and Korea where immigration policymaking is largely in the hands of career bureaucrats, more insulated from pressures from pro-immigration groups. One could also conceive of states which may be willing to ride roughshod over concerns about human rights and capitalist economies by further increasing migration controls (de Haas, 2007:826).

However, even where political elites actively adopt anti-immigration policies, by introducing more restrictive immigration legislation and stepping up enforcement significantly, migration flows may not be able to be controlled as expected and may actually result in more unwanted immigration. Massey (2013), in a study of United States policies to stop Latin American immigration to the United States, comes to the conclusion that the policies have not only failed, but have in fact

proven counterproductive, on two separate fronts. On one hand, the restrictive policies encouraged a surge in the number of documented Latin Americans in the United States seeking to naturalize as United States citizens (Massey, 2013:9). On the other hand, given the increase in costs and physical danger in crossing the United States-Mexico border illegally, Latin American migrants, upon crossing into the United States, began to settle permanently in the United States so as to minimize journeys, whereas previously they would move between their home countries and the United States in a circular fashion (Massey, 2013:9). As a result, both the proportion of Latin Americans amongst the United States population and the number of undocumented Latin Americans living in the United States increased to unprecedented levels – the exact opposite of what the stricter border controls were meant to achieve (Massey, 2013:5). Restrictive immigration policies are thus argued to have the effect of encouraging even more irregular migration amongst those who have not made the journey yet, while those already within a country illegally would be more likely to settle down permanently (de Haas, 2007:824).

As an alternative to restrictive immigration policies, some states have attempted to tackle immigration at the source – at the ‘sending’ countries. Through developmental aid, some developed countries have attempted to stimulate economic and social development in poor countries. This is based on the understanding that “poverty, crises and general misery” are the reasons why people migrate to more prosperous countries (de Haas, 2007:832). The effectiveness of this is questioned by de Haas (2007), who argues that policies to encourage development in poor countries are fundamentally misguided. The paradox, he argues, is that economic and social development is generally associated with increased mobility and migration (de Haas, 2007:832). By increasing income, education and improving access to information, people not only become more capable of migrating, but also more motivated to migrate – development increases the aspirations of people (de Haas, 2007:833). Indeed, those who remain in their own countries, even if their absolute incomes have increased as a result of development, may perceive themselves to be relatively deprived (de Haas, 2007:833). Thus, de Haas (2007) predicts that the forces of globalization and development in poor countries “are likely to increase people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate”. He concludes that continued migration flows from the global South to the North is both a cause and effect of the broader processes of economic globalization, and is likely to continue to remain a characteristic of our world (de Haas, 2007:838).
Is the world really becoming more borderless?

I now turn to the other view, that instead of the world becoming a more borderless one, it is in fact becoming increasingly divided into various nation-states. Is migration truly an unstoppable global phenomenon today, which will characterize all human societies? For all the observations about greater economic interdependence, human rights constraints on the ability of states to act as they please and the practical difficulties and limitations in controlling one’s borders, there are arguably good reasons to be skeptical of the globalist claim. Kuper (2007:225) bemoans the shortcomings of the current global order, and attributes this to how the world is “stuck with an ineffectual multilateral state system”, where “states, and only states, [are] at the centre of things”. States remain the primary political actors in the world at present, despite some globalist visions for a future world government. All modern states draw distinctions between citizens and foreigners (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:20). As Hindess (1998:62) observes, the discourses of modern citizenship suggest that such distinctions are “normal and acceptable”, and that states not only can, but often should treat citizens differently from foreigners. To be a citizen of a state is to be part of a political community that is territorially bounded (Yarwood, 2014:18). Citizens of a state possess rights and duties vis-à-vis the state (Yarwood, 2014:18), which foreigners do not.

Fundamentally, the very concept of international migration across borders presupposes the existence of the state (King, 2016:4). It is undeniable that the state specifies and regulates nearly all kinds of daily activity, from the issuance of birth certificates to death certificates, the provision of education, healthcare, public infrastructure and the maintenance of law and order – indeed, Held and McGrew (2002:9) call the growth of the state “one of the few really uncontested facts of the last century”. The regulation of migration flows across borders is a matter well within a state’s sovereignty (Xu and Halsall, 2018:50) - indeed, amidst the transformations brought about by globalization, controls over the movement of people have even been described by Dauvergne as “the last bastion of sovereignty” (Bauder, 2016:69). Cunningham (2009:145) argues that state borders have become “repoliticised” – issues relating to migration and the movement of people, far from disappearing, have once again become politically salient. In contrast to the elimination of barriers perhaps most notably encapsulated in United States President Ronald Reagan’s call to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” in Berlin towards the
end of the Cold War, a “fortress mentality” (Marshall, 2018) has arguably emerged. I suggest two reasons why we may not be moving towards a borderless world in terms of migration - firstly, unlike flows of capital or goods in a globalized world, the movement of people is far more politically problematic. Secondly, the contemporary global trend appears to be strengthening of borders rather than the disappearance of them.

As Dickinson (2017:7) points out, a key distinguishing feature of the relationship between globalization and migration is the centrality of actual humans. It is unlike the flows of capital, goods or political ideas like democracy – migrants are not inanimate objects or abstract concepts, but instead bring with them their “cultures, languages, customs, ideas, ways of life” and even diseases and prejudices (Dickinson, 2017:7). It is perhaps unsurprising that migration has thus been described as “the most intimate form of globalization” (Dickinson, 2017:7). While some manifestations of globalization may be welcomed, even celebrated, such as the convenience the Internet and smartphones bring or fresh seafood products from halfway around the world, the movement of people can be said to be more intrusive – a question of who we allow “into our political, economic and social spaces” (Dodgson and Auyong, 2017). One might enjoy imported Darjeeling tea without much thought, but the noticeable presence of Indian foreigners might be food for thought, possibly provoking “astonishing fears” due to how different they are from the local population (Harris, 2007:39). As Pecoud and de Guchteneire (2007:13) pointedly observe, globalization has brought about “a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital, information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization. But when it comes to immigrants and refugees ... the national state claims all its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders”. Migration “generates a high degree of social complexity and raises political challenges that cannot be ignored” (Pecoud and de Guchteneire, 2007:13).

The political and social issues associated with migration thus merit consideration in a discussion about whether we are moving towards a borderless world. This is because the responses that have been adopted to address these issues can and do take the form of barriers to migration flows. Lesinska (2014:41) summarizes the main issues posed by modern migration flows as such – the economic costs of immigration, concerns about security and crime and the threat to national culture and identity. These issues are interconnected. Economically, while
there are undeniable benefits which migration can bring to the economy as a whole (Borjas, 1995), the effect of migration at the level of ordinary citizens ‘on the ground’ may not quite be as sanguine. The actual or perceived competition for jobs, strain on scarce resources like education and welfare benefits and infrastructure such as housing and transport can and does lead to severe anti-immigration sentiment amongst citizens. In Denmark, for example, refugees and asylum-seekers have created a Catch-22 situation. These migrants are much more willing to work for lower wages, causing a fear amongst many Danes that allowing them to do so will lower the wages of native Danes (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:200). Due to this, many of these migrants are prevented from working – but these results in them being provided with state welfare, which makes them appear like a burden to society (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:200). In Singapore, the focus has been mainly on how migrants have been perceived as taking away jobs (especially higher-paying, white-collar ones) from Singaporeans and creating an infrastructure crunch (Yeoh and Lam, 2016).

The issue of security has also been of increasing salience in relation to immigration, resulting in much academic interest in the ‘securitisation of immigration’ (Messina, 2014). Security here refers not just to conventional concerns about territorial sovereignty, but about the “ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Messina, 2014:530). Despite much debate about the extent to which the securitisation of immigration has taken place, Messina (2014:533) observes that the scholarly consensus on the issue is that this phenomenon is “inextricably linked to the political and social conflicts precipitated by the arrival and permanent settlement of ethnically, culturally, and/or religiously distinctive minority populations” within immigration-receiving states. Weiner (1996:24) notes that migrants and people of migrant origin have launched terrorist attacks in host countries (a recent and prominent example being the wave of terrorist attacks across Europe in 2015-2017\textsuperscript{15}), leading rather unfortunately to immigration being linked with terrorism in public discourse (Messina, 2014:534). It is arguably this concern about security in particular which led, for example, to the implementation of “extreme vetting” (DeCell, 2018), as United States President Donald Trump promised, for people seeking admission into the United States.

Lastly, concerns about national identity can lead to powerful opposition to migration. Migration scholar Castles (2000:187) observes that national identities are

\textsuperscript{15} See Guerisoli (2017)
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often based on exclusion – to say one is Japanese, for example, is not simply about having Japanese characteristics, but being able to say who is not Japanese. The migration of people problematizes simplistic notions of national identity – it erodes the idea of a distinct national identity (Castles, 2000:187). Practically all states today claim to represent more than mere groups of people desiring protection in a Hobbesian world of all-against-all – rather, states claim to represent distinct peoples with distinct characteristics, as opposed to foreign “others” (Gibney, 2004:204). Polakow-Suransky (2017:301) argues that it was not merely economic concerns about immigration, but cultural anxiety, that led to the election of United States President Donald Trump. As White Christian Americans increasingly lost their majority status in the United States, many such people were fearful that the America they “knew and had once dominated was disappearing” – thus making Donald Trump and his election promises extremely attractive to many (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:301). In the case of Europe, anti-immigration discourse often pits the “Christian West” against non-Christian, usually Muslim, “enemies” (Lesinska, 2014:43).

These political and social concerns about immigration cannot be ignored. Opposition to immigration, once associated with far-right, extremist parties and politicians, has become part of mainstream political debate and is no longer something from the political margins. Anti-immigration politicians have adroitly appealed “to fear, nostalgia, and resentment of elites” to increase voter support (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:15). Anti-immigration sentiment undergirds much of the increased barriers to migration which have come up in recent times. There are numerous examples, perhaps the most notable being the proposed border wall between the United States and Mexico noted earlier. In response to the 2015 European migrant crisis, an agreement was reached between the European Union and Turkey 2016, whereby significant funding was promised to Turkey in exchange for Turkey securing its own borders (mainly the border with Syria) and keeping any irregular migrants sent back to Turkey from Greece within Turkey (Leiserson, 2017). To address large numbers of migrants attempting to enter Australia by boat, the Australian government led by then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott launched Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013, right after it was elected (Chia et al., 2014:33). A military-led operation, Operation Sovereign Borders involved the interception of boats before they could reach Australian waters, turning the boats away (Chia et al., 2014:29). It has been a tremendous success, with zero successful cases of migrants entering
Australia by boat from 2014-2016. Indeed, in a speech to British politicians, Tony Abbott praised the success of Australia’s restrictive policies as the only way “to prevent a tide of humanity surging through Europe and quite possibly changing it forever” (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:90). I cite these examples from the developed countries in the global north, because the world’s main mass migration routes involve migration flows to these countries in particular, as Figure 1 shows.

That said, border walls and increased border security are by no means unique only to the countries of the global north. To name but a few examples, Saudi Arabia has fenced up its borders with two of its neighbours plagued by violence – Iraq and Yemen. The Pakistan-Iran border is similarly fenced (Marshall, 2018).

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Uzbekistan, a landlocked country with five neighbours, has also closed itself off. Polakow-Suransky (2017) reminds us that anti-immigrant sentiment and state measures to remove those who entered the country illegally do exist, in perhaps equally virulent forms, in the global south. Writing about the example of South Africa, he notes that anti-immigrant sentiment is very powerful in South Africa, where “over half of South Africans surveyed want to deport all migrants not contributing to the economy, and one in four would prefer to expel all foreigners” (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:248). The South African government has engaged in crackdowns on immigrants, deporting many who were in the country illegally (Polakow-Suransky, 2017:248). In the Americas, the attention given to the United States-Mexico border leads to comparatively much less attention being paid to the Mexico-Guatemala border, the site of recent ‘unprecedented’ clashes in October 2018 between Mexican border guards and Central American migrants attempting to cross the border, on their way to the United States. Indeed, Mexico deports more than twice the number of Central Americans that the United States deports (Marshall, 2018). In Malaysia, the number of illegal immigrants, mainly from nearby Indonesia and Bangladesh, has led the government to recently pledge measures to deport them to their home countries. This would not be the first time the Malaysian government has attempted to deal with those within the country illegally – in 1998, it conducted Operation Go Away, where tens of thousands of foreigners were deported (Hahamovitch, 2003). The countries of the global north are thus arguably not the only ones preoccupied with ensuring they maintain control over their borders and removing those in the country irregularly. Rather, the desire to regulate migration is common to countries in both the north and south, especially in contemporary times, for a variety of political and social reasons noted earlier.

Conclusion

Where, then, does that leave us – how true is the claim that borders are increasingly irrelevant in today’s globalized world? As the late United Nations

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18 Ibid
Secretary-General Kofi Annan once said, “arguing against globalization is like arguing against the law of gravity”.21 The forces of globalization have linked the states of the world in unprecedented ways and continue to do so. The push-pull dynamics of migration between rich and poor countries look set to stay so long as the vast inequalities between the north and south remain, and as de Haas (2007:832) points out, even development in the global south may not reduce but instead increase migration flows towards the north. These economic and demographic pressures for migration are simply facts – and thus we can perhaps safely assume that in the years to come, there will always be more people attempting to migrate than receiving states are willing to accept, and this will continue despite state attempts to strengthen their border controls.

Yet, on the issue of migration specifically, even globalist scholars like Pecoud and de Guchteneire (2007:1) concede that a world of “migration without borders” is unlikely anytime soon. As observed earlier, global flows of goods and capital have certainly been liberalized, but the free movement of people is a rather different kettle of fish. In The Wealth of Nations, written over two centuries ago, Adam Smith remarked that “a man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported”. Such a statement seems most prescient in a world where, as Battistella (2007:217) pointedly observes, “we have a World Trade Organization but no World Migration Organization”. While increased migration flows may well strain the capacities of states to control their borders and call into question whether attempts to control one’s borders are a fruitless exercise, successful examples where migration has been cut drastically, such as Australia’s Operation Sovereign Borders and the European Union’s 2016 agreement with Turkey, deserve consideration and problematize globalist claims that attempting to stop migration is a fruitless exercise.

Weiner (1996:33) argues that the only solution to truly addressing the large number of people who wish to migrate is the “obliteration of international boundaries and sovereign states”. Indeed, if nation-states no longer existed, international migration as a phenomenon would ipso facto also cease to exist. This is, however, an extremely unlikely scenario. For the foreseeable future, one could agree with the globalist claim that we are becoming a borderless world in general. Looking at circumstances in a historical perspective, the borders between nation-

states have certainly become less relevant insofar as the flows of goods, capital and ideas are concerned. Even when it comes to people, the past few decades have seen enormous increases in migration flows. However, these flows have long been the subject of state attempts to restrict and regulate them, and have intensified significantly in recent years. The borders have not become closed – the economic and demographic interconnections have arguably made a return to self-sufficient autarkies and hermit kingdoms very unlikely. The borders are, however, certainly not disappearing anytime soon, insofar as migration is concerned.

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We Need Workers and You Need Jobs, What Can Go Wrong?

Sharaf REHMAN, Joanna DZIONEK-KOZŁOWSKA

Abstract. The search for a better life seems to be one of the earliest and most elementary desires of human beings. Those who have been looking to improve their living conditions frequently move from one place to another, which in many cases requires crossing state borders. However, if the foreign workers can meet the labor demand in the host country, market equilibrium is reached and in purely economic terms the problem is solved. In practice, the situation can be much more complicated, especially if the cultural distance between the host culture and the worldviews of the immigrants are significant. Our paper is a case study of one specific group of migrants that came to the United Kingdom: the Pakistanis that migrated to the UK in the late 1950s and early 1960s. We discuss some of the problems in their acculturation and assimilation. We also make some recommendations for avoiding such scenarios in the future and replace the older practices with “smart” immigration policy. Our paper is also a call to the policymakers to revisit the past and existing immigration and labor policies.

Keywords: immigration, Pakistanis, Mirpur, socialization, the United Kingdom, economic policy

Introduction

During human history, mankind has witnessed tens of millions of people raise themselves from poverty to prosperity through migration. The sequential waves of immigration of Eastern Europeans to the United States of America, the settlement of the Sikhs in Canada, and the movement of workers from Mexico to the U.S. are but a few examples of voluntary migration.

The act of migration is a bold and daring step for the ones that leave their homelands in hopes for greater opportunities. While the act requires entrepreneurial risk-taking on the part of the migrants, it also requires employment opportunities and a humanitarian stance in the host countries. Hence, there are costs and benefits for the migrant as well as the host cultures. In hopes of opportunity, employment, and prosperity, the migrants uproot themselves and venture into a new culture frequently having little knowledge of what may await
them. Some of the surprises can be unpleasant. The changes required in adjusting to a new culture can be taxing and difficult to bear.

The host cultures gain the much-needed workforce that adds to the prosperity of the host nation. However, if the new arrivals seem unwilling to assimilate, adopt the values and lifestyle of the host country, may be perceived as problematics misfits. The disinclination to acculturate may stem from several reasons. Traditions, religious beliefs, and cultural distance are a few of the impeding variables. People with similarities in belief systems, languages, and social norms may assimilate more easily into a new culture than people with differences in their traditions, and values. It may be relatively easier for a German or a British individual to assimilate in Sweden. There are many cultural similarities between Germany, and Sweden, or between Sweden and England. The cultural distance is greater between Sweden and Greece. It’s perhaps more pronounced between Sweden and Romania, or Sweden and Ukraine.

Our paper is a case study of one specific group of migrants that came to England from a distant culture, i.e. the Pakistanis who arrived in the UK around 1960. We describe their experiences and difficulties in assimilation into British culture and point to some parallel experiences in other European countries such as France, Germany, and Sweden, where immigrants’ assimilation has been problematic.

The Mirpuris in the UK

Today, when one speaks of the nearly one million Pakistanis in the UK, one is really talking about the Mirpuris that account for approximately 60-70% of the British-Pakistani population.1 These unskilled workers come to England during the 1960s and their families and dependents in the subsequent decades. The main concern for the first-generation of workers from Mirpur was to work, save money, and either send it back home or bring their families over.2,3 Six decades later, this group has been unsuccessful in assimilating into British culture. Their families, their

children, and the subsequent third generation have remained marginalized and outside of the mainstream culture. The situation has been similar for the Turks in Germany, and the Algerians and Moroccans in France. The workers from Greece, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia that came to Sweden to work have also been less successful in assimilating into the Swedish culture than the workers that came from Germany and the Nordic countries.

The background

Mirpur is a district in the north-central part of Pakistan. The river Jhelum flows through it. In 1960, Pakistan decided to construct a dam on the river to irrigate 30 million acres of land and produce 1000 MW of electricity. Building the dam meant submerging 280 villages and displacing 110,000 people. Mangla Dam was to be the seventh largest dam in the world. Binnie & Partners of London designed and supervised the undertaking; Sir Geoffrey Binnie, a senior partner, led the team. It was a US$1.473 billion project funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. In addition to the government of Pakistan and the UK, several other countries were involved. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Japan supplied the turbines and generators, and an Italian construction company was responsible for the construction. Austria, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, and the USA also partnered in the project.

Mirpur was an economically depressed area with extremely low literacy rates. The Pakistani government offered passports to the displaced and the British government issued work visa if they chose to come to work in the UK. The British contractors provided the Mirpuris legal and financial assistance. During the 1960s and the 1970s, the UK needed workforce for its textile factories. The impoverished rural district of Mirpur had the cheap, unskilled labor. It was a match made in heaven.

Literally, tens of thousands of young men from the Mirpur District came to

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4 Bogumil Terminski, "Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Theoretical Frameworks and Current Challenges", Indiana University, 2013. Available at: http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/8833
By 1966, there were more than 120,000 Pakistani’s in the UK. Many of these men worked in the so-called "Black Country" factories in and around Bradford. According to the 2011 census, 20.4 percent of Bradford's population was Pakistani - the city has earned the name: "Bradistan".

The reasons behind the assimilation's failure

The men that immigrated from Pakistan were mostly uneducated and unskilled. They could only speak the Punjabi dialect used in their region. Most of these men lacked any formal schooling and consequently were devoid of language acquisition skills. For most of them, to try to learn English was unattainable and somewhat unnecessary. Nor had they any experience in using or operating any kind of machinery. Without language or technical skills, what could these people do? How would these people adjust and acculturate in a country with different traditions, dietary habits, ways of dressing, and most importantly, religion?

The answer: They did not acculturate. They did not adapt to the ways of the host culture. They did not blend. These immigrants not only remained on the periphery of the host culture, they refused to accept the British mainstream culture and social mores. What happened to these people? They worked as brickmakers and bricklayers. They worked in textile mills carrying in the bundles of cotton and carrying out bolts of cloth. They worked as loaders and unloaders of produce, meat, and grain. Most of these were low-paying jobs requiring working long shifts, often six days a week. Such jobs were unacceptable to the local workers. Men from Mirpur took these jobs. These men lived in overcrowded houses populated with other men from Mirpur. It was common to find four beds in one room, with barely

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8 Shackle.


10 Bolognani.

enough space to walk between the beds. One person would awaken and go to work his shift; another one would return from his shift and use the recently vacated bed. Beds were doing shifts. To save money, these men often shared their work boots and overalls.

They prepared their own meals and hardly ever went out to eat. The British restaurants that served beef or chicken also served pork which was unacceptable to these men. Nor did these men make any effort to socialize with the locals. In their minds, the wine drinking and pork eating Christians were “unclean”. In their minds, women openly mixing and socializing with men were “contaminated”. The Mirpuris lived in England, but they lived outside British society. They never felt the need to learn the language or integrate into a culture that according to their religion was tainted and unacceptable. They were living in England, yet they rejected her people and culture.

However, these men, working indefatigably, saved money to send it back home to support their families and parents. Their villages, where people once used oil lamps, began to be electrified. The neglected areas began to see signs of development. Roads, sanitation systems, construction of new homes equipped with their own power generators and satellite dish antennas popped up everywhere. Due to the Mirpuri diaspora, the region witnessed great economic boost and became one of the most prosperous areas of Pakistan. A recent BBC report characterized the revived Mirpur as “Little England” in Pakistan.\(^\text{12}\)

Over time, these workers brought their families to England. The first significant step in that direction was made by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. That regulation limited free influx of workers from the former British colonies, however, it made provisions for allowing the families to reunite. Further restrictions came into force in 1969 tightening the immigration. The new laws still allowed the relatives of the male workers already residing in the UK. Among the more than 80,000 Pakistanis who came to the UK between 1973 and 1981, almost all were family members of those already settled there.\(^\text{13}\). The more problematic aspect of the tide of Pakistani immigrants were the wives brought to England from Pakistan. These women stayed at home as homemakers.

Since the law required it, their children attended the local schools in the

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\(^{13}\) Shackle.
mornings. They spent their afternoons studying the Koran and Islamic studies at the local mosques. Just as the men made no attempt to socialize with the local people, their wives did not mix with the women of the neighborhoods. In most cases, the men forbid it, fearing the white women would plant the western ideas into the heads of their Pakistani women. Just as they had avoided socialization, they kept their wives and children outside the mainstream British society. In many instances, they did not permit their children to play with the local children. These immigrants, to a certain extent, created their little Mirpur in London, Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Bradford, and other industrial cities in England.

Since nearly all the workers from Mirpur were uneducated, they paid little attention to the education of their children. Despite some recognition of the benefits stemming from better education on the labor market, they were anxious about the ‘perceived corruptive influence of a largely secular society’ and Westernization. Therefore, in many cases, they neither required it for their sons nor encouraged it for their daughters. As a result, the children of the Pakistani immigrants, unlike the children of the other Asians that generally excelled in schools, did poorly. Neither did these children acquire social or linguistic skills necessary to assimilate and participate in the local culture. Many of the children of these workers grew up with adjustment and identity issues. Since these children interacted mainly with children of Mirpuri parents, the only language they fully developed was the Punjabi dialect of the Mirpur region; the only place where they interacted with other children was at the mosques.

Mosques are segregated places of worship; men and women pray in different parts of the mosques. Boys and girls played, prayed, and studied in different sections of the mosque, or at different times of the day. It was as if these children

15 Rizwan and Williams.
18 Ijaz and Abbas.
20 Rizwan and Williams .2015
were being raised not in England but in a remote village in Pakistan.

These immigrants arrived 60 years ago; the grocery stores and clothing shops serving these Pakistanis in Bradford have announcements and signs in Punjabi language, written in Urdu script. As of 2015, over 60 percent of the Pakistanis in Britain were born and raised in Britain. However, as their tradition and culture dictate, these men insist on marrying within their clans and tribes, often their first cousins raised in Pakistan. The British government has tried to contain the tide of immigration by passing laws requiring that the person sponsoring visas for his wife and children must have a certain level of income. Many of the Pakistani men in Britain are unable to meet such financial conditions. Previously, people could get married at the age of 16. The new laws require that both partners are 21 years old. Both restrictions, the Pakistanis argue, are threats to their traditional family structure and a violation of their tradition of marrying at a young age.

Paradoxically, restrictive migration laws by the UK government only strengthen such practices - getting married to a person already residing in the UK is the easiest way to legally immigrate to the UK. The cultural and economic factors work together according to a very simple pattern that can be boiled down to the statement: “if your son and my daughter marry, our families are further united, and the arrangement comes with a special wedding present, the ticket to migration”. Many of these young brides arriving in Britain were uneducated. Upon arrival, these young women have and raise their children in a culture about which they know nothing. Ignorance and poverty prevail in the Pakistani community in the UK.

**Challenges to the labor market**

In times of economic prosperity, when there are jobs for almost everyone, it is easy to be generous and host both the guest workers and refugees. However, when an economy is in recession, the same guests become a liability. The collapse of

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the manufacturing industries in the 1980s hit the unskilled Mirpuris the hardest and further deepened their dispossession and marginalization. More than half of the working-age Pakistanis are, either not seeking work, or are unemployable. The reason: lack of English language and professional skills. Nearly 75 percent of the immigrants without adequate English language skills are holding menial jobs like farmhands, in the factory workers, or working in cleaning and janitorial position.

There have been no programs for the retraining of the unskilled foreign workforce.

The real beneficiaries of the Mangla Dam construction were the British and the European construction companies, and the industries that acquired cheap labor for their mills in the UK. The British government had no specific plans for the housing, healthcare, teaching of English language, or any social programs for the integration and acculturation of these workers or their families. The British government also failed to include the host communities such as Bradford, London, Manchester, Birmingham, and Leeds into the discussion of hosting, accommodating, and accepting the foreign workers. For most of these communities, the new visitors were a surprise at first and an unwelcome element when these men showed no interest in either learning the language or the British way of life. The areas where the Mirpuris moved in, the White people moved out. In 2016, the city of London elected Sadiq Khan as the mayor. Khan’s parents came from Pakistan. His father was a bus driver and the mother, a seamstress in South London. Mr. Khan is an exception to the rule of the phenomenon of unskilled immigrants. For most of the Mirpuri workers and their families, the reality is still rather grim.

According to a report published in The Economist in 2009, only 25% of the Pakistani women in Britain were able to find work. Thus, through marrying their cousins and bringing them over, the Mirpuri community has been importing poverty. The unemployment in the UK, at the time of this writing (December 2018) is at its lowest (4.0%) since 1975. Nevertheless, the unemployment rates are much higher

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24 Shackle.
(10%) for the foreign-born workers than the UK-born workforce. Hourly wages for the workers from Pakistan and Bangladesh are among the lowest.

The evaporation of the textile and manufacturing jobs in the 1980s is reflected in the drop of Pakistani men and women in the workforce. The second recession of the early 1990s rendered a similar incline in employment for this segment. According to the 2015 Ethnicity Facts and Figures Report by the UK government, the overall employment for Pakistani women has dropped from 71% in 1979 to 23% in 2015. During the same period, the participation rate for Pakistani men dipped from 97% in 1979 to 48% in 2015. Figure 1. presents the employment and participation data for the Pakistani community in the UK.

![Figure 1. Employment and Participation Rates for Pakistani Immigrants in the UK (1979-2015)](https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/)

Source: [https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/](https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/)

This segment of the population is not only poverty-stricken but is also hostile towards the host culture. In April of 2009, the British police apprehended 12 men on suspicion of a terrorist plot. Ten of these were Pakistanis. The London bombing of 2005 that killed 56 people involved four men. Two of these were of Pakistani descent; the third was a Pakistani in Britain on a student visa; the fourth, a Jamaican-born who had converted to Islam while visiting Pakistan. Many of the recent terrorist attacks on European cities have been the work of the offspring of Muslim

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28 Craig Whitlock and Kamran Khan, “3 London bombing suspects were in Pakistan this year.” *Washington Post, July 19, 2005.*
immigrants from Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.\textsuperscript{29} According to one political economist, Pakistani Muslims tend to be more radical than Indian Muslims.\textsuperscript{30}

Hindsight suggests that the policymakers in the UK and other Western European countries that invited foreign workers (e.g. France and Germany) could have developed concrete plans for the socialization and integration of the new workforce. The local communities could have been included in the dialogue before bringing in the guest labors. Neither were the guest workers informed about the sociocultural differences and challenges that awaited them in the foreign lands.

The situation is somewhat similar in Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands where the unemployment rates among the migrants are over 10 percentage points higher than for the domestic citizens. Furthermore, large portions of the non-EU workers are from Muslim countries. Research suggests that individuals with foreign and Muslim-sounding names have a much lower chance of getting shortlisted or hired.\textsuperscript{31}

The policymakers and the politicians justify their past policies as humanitarian acts and as steps taken to protect human rights. The industries that hired the foreign workers in Sweden claim they offered equal wages and benefits to Swedish-born and foreign workers. However, the outcomes of these, so-called, “good intentions”, in many parts of Europe such as Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the UK have resulted in segregation, disproportional unemployment, racial tensions, and homegrown terrorism.

Conclusion and Recommendations

What can go wrong when we need workers and you need work? Apparently, plenty. Legal migration in Europe has been a "recruitment failure", i.e., wrong people are hired, or people are hired for the wrong reasons. Whenever people are hired without a careful job-and-need analysis, or people are hired that are inappropriately qualified, the consequences are costly and frustrating for the employers and the

employees alike. This is what has happened with the legally invited workforce in the UK, France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden. As we pointed out at the onset of the paper, we are not talking about the involuntary movement of people due to political unrests or wars. Instead, we are talking about people that are invited, are documented, and are given permission to stay in a country. The host countries, we argue, failed to do their homework before bringing in the foreign workforce. The people that were brought in to help 60 years ago have become a social and an economic burden; their children and grandchildren have not fully assimilated into the local cultures and the result is a generation of the discontented and disenfranchised young men and women engaging in counter-productive activities.

The past cannot be undone. However, there may be lessons that we may learn from the mistakes made in the past.

There was a disconnect between the industries that invited the foreign workers and the cultural mindsets and readiness of the local citizens. The industries brought in inexpensive labor to cut their production costs and improve their bottom-lines. The workers, in the cases of the UK, France, Germany, and Sweden, came from different cultures, spoke different languages, practiced different religions, and possessed sets of values, customs, and outlooks that were dissimilar from the host countries. Most of the foreign workers were young men. This became an additional factor in creating tension between the local men and the foreign workers. The local perception was that the foreign workers, not only took their jobs but also the women from the local men. The local people had no voice in inviting the foreign workers. The local cultures and the local governments were unprepared to receive, socialize with, and accommodate the guest workers.

Little attention was paid to the housing and social adjustment of the invited workers. The result is a social clustering: people that share a common language or a common cultural background move into one neighborhood. For instance, the Sikhs in the South Hall area of London, and the Bangladeshis in Brick Lane, East London. Result: the foreign workers did not assimilate into the local cultures but developed their own ghettos. This happened in England, in France, in Germany, and in Sweden.

History is unalterable. The oversights regarding workforce/immigration policies or the lack of integration efforts are impossible to correct retroactively. However, we believe that we can learn from these experiences and implement “smart” immigration policies. The authors recommend four specific steps.

Concrete plans should be in place for housing, healthcare, education, and
social needs of the guest workers and their families. Housing should be ready and available before the arrival of the immigrants. The healthcare facilities should be up and running with sufficient professional staff. The schools for the children should be ready and staffed adequately. There should be sufficient language teachers and social workers trained to work with the new immigrants.

The costs for the above should be shouldered by the employers that want to bring in the workforce. This may be a University wanting to invite scholars, a pharmaceutical company needing researchers, or a transportation company needing drivers and technicians. These and other such entities are the ones that benefit from the foreign workers; such entities should pay their fair share. Simply paying the guest workers equal wages and benefits is not enough.

As a matter of democratic principles, the communities and the cities that will receive the new workers should participate in such discussions. The people that will arrive as guest workers should be educated/briefed about the cultural differences that await them in a foreign country. There is a need for orientation and briefing programs that inform them about what is expected, what is permissible, what is disallowed, and what may be shunned in the host culture.

In conclusion, voluntary displacement, migrating to a foreign country, is a serious commitment for the host country as well as the invited. Both parties should be aware of all the terms, conditions, and clauses of the agreement before signing on. Agreements entered with incomplete knowledge and insufficient information, we believe, are the causes of the issues with the immigrant populations in Europe. Thus, there is a need for the host country to spell out the differences and expectations. There is a need for a greater level of openness in communication from all parties involved. As has been witnessed, neglecting to communicate and relying on oversimplification such as, “I need worker, you need work, what can go wrong?” has shown that plenty can, and has, gone wrong.

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The Economy of Switzerland as a Key Attractive Factor for German Immigrants: Aspect of Net Income and Alternative Approaches

Lyutsiya BUKHARMETOVA

Abstract. Over the past several decades Switzerland has become one of most popular destinations for immigration among Europeans, especially Germans. Such attractiveness of the country is associated with the many different factors as language, high standards of living and social protection. However, this article is focused on the economic indicators as the most important, because from our perspective they reflect the actual realities in the both states. Here is important to notice that 85 per cent of Germans migrate to Switzerland for professional reasons. This means that they are particularly interested in the economic dimensions and opportunities provided. And in this regard, the factors of social protection and language are considered as alternative in growing attractiveness of Switzerland for German immigrants.

Keywords: Germany, Switzerland, immigration, economy, language, social protection.

Economic arguments for increasing number of German immigrants in Switzerland

Nowadays Switzerland is known for its strong economy. In 2017 it has been recognized as the most flexible and rival and gained the highest score in the Global Competitive Index\(^1\). Moreover, according to Forbes, Switzerland takes the first place for the trade freedom and innovation in the world rankings\(^2\). Such leading positions highlight the achievements in the field of economy, which in turn attract migrants from all over the world. The best testimony in this regard is the fact that Switzerland is ranked the second among the countries with the highest share of foreign population\(^3\). In 2013 this rate was 23.3 per cent\(^4\), while it has increased by 1.7 per

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3 ‘Foreign population: Chart’, OECD, accessed June 10, 2018, [https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-population.htm#indicator-chart](https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-population.htm#indicator-chart)
4 ‘Foreign population: Chart ’

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cent in 2016\(^5\). Being one of the most economically developed countries it especially attracts Europeans, who numbered 1,759,000 and constitute 83.7 per cent of its foreign population\(^6\).

In particular, it is important to emphasize that Switzerland is clearly preferred by Germans as the best country for immigration and hold the first place in the ranking\(^7\). It is noteworthy that this destination has remained attractive for a considerable time. For example, it recorded 20,715 immigrants from Germany in the first eight months of 2010, up 12 per cent over 2005\(^8\). And after a while, the recent data demonstrates that Switzerland continue to remain a popular destination. According to Federal Statistical Office, the figure has grown up from 284,200 German immigrants in 2012 to 303,500 in 2016\(^9\). Based on this data we can calculate the per cent of this increase during the given period:

\[
G_r = \frac{303500}{284200} \times 100\% = 106.790992 \approx 106.79\%.
\]

Consequently, 6.79 per cent increase in the number of German immigrants (106.79\%-100\%=6.79\%) between 2012 and 2016 leads to the conclusion that Switzerland continues to remain attractive for them over the past several years. Moreover, the recent data shows that this trend has become stable. For example, the amount of German immigrants has increased from 298,000 in 2014 to 300,700 in 2015 and 303,500 in 2016\(^10\). And in order to prove that this trend is being maintained we would like to make the following calculations:

\[
G_{r2015} = \frac{300700}{298000} \times 100\% = 100.90604 \approx 100.90\%;
\]

\[
G_{r2016} = \frac{303500}{300700} \times 100\% = 100.931161 \approx 100.93\%.
\]

This means that the amount of German immigrants has grown from 2014 to 2015 by 0.9 per cent (100.90\%-100\%=0.9\%), while the same rate has increased from 2015 to 2016 by 0.93 per cent (100.93\%-100\%=0.93\%). Thus, these calculations

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\(^6\) ‘Foreign population’

\(^7\) ‘Here are the top 10 countries Germans immigrate to’, The Local, August 10, 2017, [https://www.thelocal.de/20170810/here-are-the-top-countries-where-germans-immigrate-to](https://www.thelocal.de/20170810/here-are-the-top-countries-where-germans-immigrate-to)


\(^9\) ‘Foreign population’

\(^10\) ‘Foreign population’
demonstrate the stability in the annual growth rate. And therefore, it can certainly be observed that there is a trend in the increase of German immigrants over the past years. In addition, special attention should be paid to the fact that they continue to be the second largest group of foreigners in Switzerland, giving way to Italians, who numbered about 316 500 individuals in 201611. Meanwhile, German immigrants make up 3.6 per cent of the country’s population12. All these figures confirm the fact that Switzerland remains an attractive destination for the relocation among Europeans, especially for German throughout the years.

We assume that such interest is connected with the economic success of the country. To prove this, it is necessary to analyze and compare the indexes of the both states. To begin with, it is significant to pay attention to such an important economic indicator as gross domestic product per capita. It enables to measure the living standards, taking into account the size of population. According to the International Monetary Fund, Swiss gross domestic product per capita is 86 840 dollars13. In comparison, Germany, which citizens prefer the neighboring country for immigration, has significantly lower figure. This difference in GDP per capita constitutes 36 000 dollars14. Thus, such figures demonstrate better standard of living in Switzerland and explain its attractiveness with nearly double GDP per capita among German immigrants. In addition, the difference between two countries is even larger, when the annual growth of inflation is compared. In 2017 this rate in Germany was 2.25 per cent, while in Switzerland constituted only 0.53 per cent15. Such level of inflation makes one country with the lower annual growth more attractive than another. In this case it is also significant to notice that this rate was even below zero in Switzerland from 2013 to 201616. For example, in 2015 the annual growth of inflation constituted -1.14 per cent, while in Germany it was 0.61 per cent in the same year17. As a result, this difference in the rates of price increases contributed to the fact that Switzerland has become a popular destination for

11 ‘Foreign population’
14 ‘GDP per capita, current prices’
16 ‘Inflation (CPI): Total, Annual growth rate (%)
17 ‘Inflation (CPI): Total, Annual growth rate (%)'
relocation.

What is more important is to take into account such indicator as the income. It remains one of the most attractive factors, as German citizens primarily immigrate for professional reasons. Therefore, there is no coincidence that 85 per cent of them aged 15-64 are employed in Switzerland. Such level of involvement of foreigners from the neighboring country illustrates their special interest in the career opportunities abroad. And in this case primarily income is the matter of a great concern. For example, in 2017 the average annual wage in Germany was 47 585 dollars, while in Switzerland people earn 62 283 dollars per year. Even the difference constitutes 14 698 dollars, German immigrants are mostly interested in net income. To prove it, we will calculate the Fechner correlation coefficient. It will help to analyze the connection between the growth of German and average annual wage in Switzerland. As the first step we need to find the mean value of each variable:

$$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum x_i}{n} = \frac{1478700}{5} = 295 740;$$

$$\bar{y} = \frac{\sum y_i}{n} = \frac{311564}{5} = 62 312.8.$$  

The calculated mean values are compared with the variables \(x\) and \(y\) and their deviation signs are put in the Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of German immigrants in Switzerland(^{20}) ((x_i))</th>
<th>Average annual wage in Switzerland in US dollars(^{21}) ((y_i))</th>
<th>(x_i - \bar{x})</th>
<th>(y_i - \bar{y})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>284 200</td>
<td>61 567</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>292 300</td>
<td>62 516</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{20}\) ‘Foreign population’

Thus, we can calculate the Fechner correlation coefficient, knowing the number of matched (4) and unmatched (1) signs for differences:

\[ r = \frac{N_+ - N_-}{N_+ + N_-} = \frac{4 - 1}{4 + 1} = \frac{3}{5} = 0.6 \]

As a result, the correlation coefficient 0.6 demonstrates a moderate positive relationship between the two variables \( x \) and \( y \). This means that the annual wage in Switzerland play a role in attracting immigrants from German, but not the most important one.

In this connection it is significant to take into account such a significant factor as the net income. It varies from country to country, as the wages also include taxes and social security. In particular, Switzerland guarantees employees the highest net income in Europe regardless of the sum, which they receive\(^{22}\). And for this reason remains one of the most attractive countries for immigration\(^{23}\). At the same time


Germany has practically one of the lowest one, which constitutes only 54.67 per cent of the average salary\textsuperscript{24}. Thus, the difference in average net income between two analyzed countries is about 20.87 per cent\textsuperscript{25}. In addition, the taxes included in the salaries also play a significant role. Despite they vary depending on the amount of income and other factors, the attention is focused on the share of taxes in the average wages. Specifically, in Switzerland it constitutes 10.23 per cent\textsuperscript{26}. At the same time German spend 20.51 per cent of their average wages on the income tax\textsuperscript{27}. And this difference is twice as big. In order to illustrate the importance of this factor, we would like to examine the relationship between the increase of German immigrants and the reduction of taxing wages in Switzerland. For this purpose, we can count the Spearman’s correlation coefficient, based on the data of Swiss Federal Statistical Office and OECD, and include all the additional calculations in the Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of German immigrants in Switzerland in thousands\textsuperscript{28} (x)</th>
<th>Average tax wage in Switzerland for one-earner married couple at 100% of average earnings and 2 children\textsuperscript{29} (y)</th>
<th>R\textsubscript{x}</th>
<th>R\textsubscript{y}</th>
<th>d=R\textsubscript{x} - R\textsubscript{y}</th>
<th>d\textsuperscript{2}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>284.2</td>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>292.3</td>
<td>9.79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>298.0</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>300.7</td>
<td>9.24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>303.5</td>
<td>9.16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1478.7</td>
<td>47.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having calculated the sum of squares of differences of ranks, which were assigned to each observation of the analyzed variables, we can find the correlation coefficient with the following formula:

$$\rho = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d^2}{n(n^2 - 1)} = 1 - \frac{6 \cdot 40}{5(5^2 - 1)} = 1 - \frac{240}{120} = 1 - 2 = -1$$

As a result, the correlation coefficient -1 proves the perfect monotonically

\textsuperscript{24} Deloitte, European Salary Survey 2017, p.11.
\textsuperscript{25} Deloitte, European Salary Survey 2017, p.11.
\textsuperscript{26} Deloitte, European Salary Survey 2017, p.11.
\textsuperscript{27} Deloitte, European Salary Survey 2017, p.11.
\textsuperscript{28} ‘Foreign population’
decreasing relationship between the variables $x$ and $y$. This means that the lower average tax wage is in Switzerland, the more the number of German immigrants in the country. Consequently, such policy aimed at providing people with the higher net income from 2012 to 2016 contributed to the growing popularity of the state.

Thus, it can be concluded that the interest of German immigrants towards Switzerland is stirred by its economic success, which leads to the possibilities to have better living standards, higher wage and net income, lower taxes and not to worry about prices because of deflation.

**Alternative attractive factors for immigration**

1. **The aspect of social protection**

There is also another alternative theory, according to which countries tend to be attractive for immigrants mostly because of their generous social protection\(^\text{30}\). However, this statement does not apply to the growth of German immigrants in Switzerland. Being appreciated as highly-skilled labor force\(^\text{31}\) with the share of 58.9 per cent of university graduates\(^\text{32}\), Germans are interested in possibility to have a high net income instead of the generosity of the welfare state, which remains the most important factor for the foreigners with poor qualifications\(^\text{33}\). Thus, the factor of social protection does not play an important role for the Germans.

This is also evidenced by the fact that their own country tends to be one of the most generous welfare states\(^\text{34}\). It means that Germany spends more on the social protection than Switzerland. This fact is confirmed by the statistical data. For example, in 2016 the social spending constituted 25.3 per cent of German GDP and only 19.7 per cent of Swiss\(^\text{35}\). Such a difference in the expenditures between the analyzed countries can be observed when comparing other indicators.


\(^{32}\) OECD, *Talent Abroad: A Review of German Emigrants*, p. 49.


Based on OECD data and our calculations we have built a Chart 1, where the every item of expenditure on the social protection is taken into account. The results show that Germany spends higher percentage of its GDP than Switzerland on pensions, unemployment, labor markets programs, family and social benefits to households. The only exception among the all indicators is public expenditures on incapacity, as in this case Switzerland invests higher percentage of its GDP than Germany. Thus, the analysis of the figures with the help of Chart 1 illustrates the difference in spending of the both countries on social protection. What is more important, the comparison of indicators demonstrates that Germany is more generous welfare state than the host country. And despite this fact its citizens tend to immigrate to Switzerland. This leads to the conclusion that social protection is not the most attractive factor for Germans.

2. Linguistic connections and the example of Austria

Apart from economic factors the influx of immigrants from Germany has been associated with the language issues. Without the need to learn something new
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it is much easier to decide for the move and, for example, get a job in a foreign country. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that migration to the countries, where the official languages are similar to the mother tongue of the foreigners, are by 19-35 per cent higher than to the destinations, where the potential settlers can face the language barriers. However, in the case of Switzerland it is only particularly true for several reasons. To begin with it is important to notice that only 62.8 per cent of the Swiss population speaks German. Furthermore, it is also recognized as the sole official language in 17 of the 26 cantons. At the same time the situation is rather better in the neighboring country than in Switzerland. Specifically, German is the only official language of Austria and the mother tongue for 88.8 per cent of its population. Moreover, it is spoken by 96.9 per cent of country’s inhabitants, including foreigners. This number is by 34.1 per cent higher than in Switzerland. But despite these facts, Austria is less attractive for immigrants and holds only the second place in the ranking as a destination for immigration.

This prove also the statistical data, according to which Austria in 2015 had 220,000 German immigrants, representing more than 2.5 per cent of the country’s population. It is 80,700 individuals less than Switzerland had in the same year. Consequently, such difference in numbers of German immigrants shows that the similarity of the official

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38 Eric Weine, ‘Multilingualism is to Switzerland what politeness is to the British or style to the Italians: a deep source of national pride’, BBC, March 26, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20180325-switzerlands-invisible-linguistic-borders
41 ‘Here are the top 10 countries Germans immigrate to’
44 ‘Foreign population’.
language with the mother tongue is not the most important factor for foreigners. In addition, the refutation of this assumption is even more confirms our hypothesis, according to which economic success make countries attractive for relocation. In this connection it is also significant to take into account that Austria has annual growth of inflation (constituted 0.892 per cent in 2016)\(^{45}\) instead of deflation, lower GDP per capita by 33,080 dollars in 2018\(^{46}\) than in Switzerland. Moreover the average annual wages constituted only 80.8 per cent of the Swiss income per year\(^{47}\). This also means that Austria has lower net income than Switzerland\(^{48}\). Thus, all these economic factors make German immigrants to opt for the country, where they can earn money, not attaching great importance to the language issues.

**Conclusion**

Having analyzed the increase of German immigrants in Switzerland it can be pointed out that it has become a stable trend over the past several years. The calculations showed that the annual growth constituted about 0.9% from 2014 to 2016. Due to the analysis of the different factors of attractiveness of Switzerland we have proved that the economic indicators contributed to such increasing popularity of the country as a destination for immigration.

In particular, it was found out that the possibility to have the highest net income in Europe is the most attractive factor for Germans. This was evidenced by the correlation coefficient equal to -1, which demonstrated the perfect monotonically decreasing relationship between the increasing number of immigrants from the neighboring country and the reduction of average tax wage in Switzerland. At the same time it was figured out that foreign labor force were less interested in annual salaries. This was proven by the calculation of the Fechner correlation coefficient, according to which the relationship between the analyzed variables were moderate and equal to 0.6. Consequently, all these figures have demonstrated that the difference of 20.87 per cent in net income\(^{49}\) between two countries play the most important role in making Switzerland attractive for German immigrants.

\(^{45}\) ‘Inflation (CPI): Total, Annual growth rate (%)’.
\(^{46}\) ‘GDP per capita, current prices’.
\(^{47}\) ‘Average wages’.
This hypothesis was also confirmed due to the overview of alternative aspects such as social protection and language. Specifically, the comparison of expenditures of the both counties showed that Germany is more generous welfare state than Switzerland. Thus, in this case social protection cannot be seen as the factor of attractiveness. Moreover, German language also does not contribute to the growing popularity of Switzerland. Mostly because it is spoken only by 62.8 per cent of its population\(^{50}\), while in Austria this rate is higher by 34.1 per cent\(^{51}\). In addition, the comparison of the economic indicators of Austria and Switzerland proved that language is not the reason of the growth of the foreigners with the same mother tongue from the neighboring country. As a result, it can be concluded that all these facts and figures confirm that the possibility to have higher net income in Switzerland is the most attractive factor for German immigrants.

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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Religious Social Capital in the Political Integration of Second-Generation Migrants

Justice Richard Kwabena Owusu KYEI, Rafal SMOCZYNSKI and Richmond Osei AMOAH

Abstract. The study investigates the effect that religious social capital has in the political integration of second-generation Ghanaians in Amsterdam. The ethnographic research was carried out in the religious field of some African Initiated Christian churches in Amsterdam. Data were drawn from life history interviews of fifty second generation Ghanaians and in-depth interviews of nine representatives of African Initiated Christian churches as well as participant observation and informal interviews. The research revealed that bonding as well as bridging social capital generated within the religious field enhance voter turnout. We also found that there were traces of ethnic voting pattern as well as religiously induced voting behaviour. Moreover, the manifestation of institutionalised and individualised religiosity in less conventional and conventional forms of political participation among the respondents raised questions about the unidirectional shift in secularisation in mainstream Dutch society.

Keywords: Political integration, second-generation Ghanaians, bonding vs. bridging social capital, African Initiated Christian Churches, ethnicity, gender

Introduction

Migration studies generally agree that the success, failure and continuity or otherwise of immigrant integration in the host society is determined by the course followed by second generation migrants (Aparicio 2007; Bolzman et al. 2003; Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Unsuccessful integration of second-generation migrants have adverse effects like early pregnancy, drug peddling, school dropout and low level of social interaction among immigrants themselves as well as on the receiving host nation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou et al. 1993). The presence of second-generation migrants has the propensity of generating intensified relations, exchanges and at times conflict between immigrants and autochthones in the host country (Crul and Heering 2008). If there is no reciprocal and shared consciousness
of these changes in immigrant receiving countries, the risk is that different barriers are going to be built instead of intercultural relationships (Ambrosini and Caneva 2009). For instance, in the long run, there is the risk of the formation of urban and social territories oriented against the mainstream society as it happened in France in the ‘revolt of the banlieues’ between October 27 and November 17, 2005 (Mucchielli and Goaziou 2006).

Migration scholars tend to focus on the secular variables of human capital of parents at the time of arrival in the host country, family composition of immigrant family and mode of incorporation on arrival in the host country (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). These important factors dominate the discussion on immigrant integration while downplaying the persistent function of religiosity in the process of political integration of second-generation migrants. Immigrant integration studies have for some time identified religion as a stepping stone in the process of immigrant integration. Hence the long-term contribution of immigrant Christian churches in the socioeconomic and socio-cultural integration of second-generation migrants in the host country was questioned (Alba 2005; Alba and Nee 1997; Alba et al, 2009; Gordon 1964). Despite the widespread secularisation in mainstream European receiving countries (Bruce 2011) there are processes of religious revival (see: Berger 1999; Turner 2011), especially by the proliferation of immigrant religious groups (Kyei, Setrana and Smoczynski 2017; Kyei and Smoczynski 2016; Yip and Nynä 2012). There is also the persistence of fundamentalism and religious violence. The latter is mostly attributed to terrorist acts carried out by second generation migrants who were born and raised up in Europe (Bergen 2017). These phenomena draw attention to the need to reflect and investigate the effects of religiosity on the integration of second-generation migrants.

The organisational capacity of immigrants in generating religious social capital might be understood as instrumental resources in influencing political integration in the host society (Jacobs and Tillie 2004). Fennema and Tillie (2001) and Tillie (2004) found that the mobilising capacities of Turkish, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in Amsterdam were instrumental in shaping their diverse paths of political integration. Studies in other European cities concluded that social capital accumulated within ethnic organisations did not necessarily enhance political integration (Egbert and Guigni 2010; Jacobs et al 2004). Few studies in Europe (Ekue 1998; Ter Haar 1998; Tonah 2007; Ugba 2008) have demonstrated the multidimensional effect that social interactions and relationships within some
African Initiated Christian churches (AICCs) have in the integration of first-generation African immigrants.

Most studies in the Netherlands focused on the four major minority groups namely the Surinamese, the Turkish, the Moroccans and the Antilleans. Investigation on the rapidly growing Ghanaian population in Amsterdam contributes in filling the research gap on recently arrived immigrant groups in the Netherlands. In 1996, there were only 1,635 second generation Ghanaians in Amsterdam but the number has more than doubled to 4,151 as at 2014 (Statistics Netherlands 2015; Gemeente Amsterdam 2013). Most of the participants in this research reside in the locality of Amsterdam Southeast. Amsterdam Southeast is the only Municipality in Amsterdam with more than 60 per cent of its population as immigrants or of immigrant descent (Gemeente Amsterdam 2013:34). Amsterdam Southeast has a total of about 83,743 inhabitants out of which the highest group are Surinamese with 31.3 per cent followed by native Dutch citizens with 26.6 per cent (Gemeente Amsterdam 2013:34). Ghanaians form the third largest group with 5.7 per cent (4,764) (Gemeente Amsterdam 2013:34).

Moreover, in resonance with previous studies on immigrant religion this paper offers an investigation on how AICCs in Amsterdam impact the process of political integration of second-generation Ghanaians. The study interrogates whether social capital acquired within the religious field bond second generation Ghanaians to their religious group and/or bridge them to mainstream Dutch society. This study conceptualises second generation as any child born in an immigrant receiving country or who entered the immigrant receiving country at/before the age of six (6) with at least one parent as immigrant and is eighteen (18) years and above as at the time of the data collection (see Crul 2005:5; Martens and Veenman 1996).

The research adopted the concept of religious social capital to understand the complexities in the resources accumulated via norms of reciprocity, social network formation and trust (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Putnam 2000:19) in the religious field of immigrant Christian churches.

**Conceptual Framework and Method**

The interplay between immigration and immigrant Christian churches do not terminate with the search for refuge (Hirschman 2004) among first generation immigrants as second generations also benefit from friendship, job opportunities
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and marriage market (Kyei and Smoczynski 2016) available in the religious field. Immigrants’ religion is influential also in the process of political integration of immigrants and their progeny (Ambosini and Caneva 2009; Baffoe 2013; Kyei and Smoczynski 2016; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Warner 2007). Immigrant Christian churches for instance are agents that can remedy the downward integration of second-generation migrants from the underclass subculture in the host society (Cao 2005; Chen 2008; Portes and Rambaut 2006). Similarly, immigrant churches may contribute to the accumulation of social capital that serve as bridging strategies that link their members to mainstream immigrant receiving societies (Bankston and Zhou 1995; Bankston and Zhou 2002; Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). However, social capital may also reduce the pace of integration into mainstream immigrant receiving countries (Portes 1998). Namely, social capital accumulated within ethnic niches may restrict individual members in connecting to other social networks (Fukuyama 1995; Beyerlein and Hipp 2005) or restrict outsiders from benefitting from the opportunities within immigrant churches (Waldinger 1995).

The paper argues that religious social capital cannot be acquired without some form of material investment to establish relation through non-familial networks (Bramadat 2011; Coleman 1990) which yield resources that facilitate action (Portes 1998). In order to ascertain if religious social capital has the consequential effect of enhancing or deterring second generation migrants from political integration, this research – following Putnam (2000) distinguished between two effects of social capital namely bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital is operationalized here as the close relationships between members of the same immigrant Christian church that generate action (Hopkins 2011). Bonding social capital is understood here as the interpersonal solidarity that is present within an immigrant Christian church over a period of time that facilitates the maintenance of close ties (Wuthnow 2002:670). Bridging social capital on the other hand consists of interpersonal relationships that link heterogeneous groups and individuals together in the wider society. Some scholars (Portes and Landolt 1996; Wuthnow 2002) argue that bridging social capital has the tendency of enhancing civic responsibility, tolerance and cooperation among different groups of people occupying a nation state.

Political integration is analysed in the framework of political participation, mobilisation and representation. Political participation is defined as the “active dimension of citizenship in which individuals take part in the management of
collective affairs of a given political community” (Martiniello 2006:84). Political participation is divided into two forms: conventional and less conventional. The conventional form of political participation is operationalised as voting, standing for election, membership in political parties and pressure groups. Less conventional form of political participation includes demonstrations, civic forums, and membership in voluntary and ethnic organisations.

The study adopted ethnographic research methodology of in-depth interviews, participant observation (Flick 2009; Suryani 2013) and informal interviews. The fieldwork took place in Amsterdam from January 2014 till January 2015. Snowball sampling technique was used to recruit sixty (60) second generation Ghanaians within AICCs in Amsterdam to participate in life history interviews but after fifty (50) interviews, new themes were not coming out due to saturation. As a result, fifty (50) second generation Ghanaians participated in the research out of which thirty-five (35) were females and fifteen (15) were males. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were also conducted with nine (9) representatives of AICCs in Amsterdam and they were also recruited through purposive sampling technique based on the dominant churches attended by the second-generation Ghanaians interviewed. All the studied AICCs were registered at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce as voluntary religious organisations.

The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Line by line the data were manually categorised into analytic units under descriptive words or category names. The data from the fieldwork were organised into themes and subthemes (Rossman and Rallis 1998:171). The themes and sub-themes were analysed for each participant and they were also connected to other interviewees with quotations. Descriptive and inferential analyses of data were employed in this work (Guba and Lincoln 1982; Hammersley 1992). Institutionalised and privatised religiosity was considered in this research as the prime variable not secondary. Institutionalised religiosity was operationalised as membership in an AICC, participation in the activities of AICCs and the frequency of church participation while privatised religiosity was operationalised as reading of the Holy Bible, private prayers and baptism of second-generation immigrants. Conventional political participation was categorised as voting in local assembly elections, contesting for elections in Municipal assembly and election as Municipal council member. Less conventional political participation was operationalised as membership in voluntary and/or ethnic organisations and participation in civic education programmes.
Civic Engagement of Second-Generation Ghanaians

Association with voluntary religious organisations has the tendency of creating social networks (Tillie 2004) at the horizontal and vertical levels. The head pastor of one of the participating churches recounted that:

The Pentecostal Council of Churches in Amsterdam organises a forum called the Police Dialogue every quarter of the year. The Police Dialogue brings together Africans and other immigrant communities in Amsterdam to dialogue with the police to understand the operations of the police and how to live together mutually to prevent crime and guarantee public safety (interview on 07-09-2014).

Another head pastor also noted that:

[......] The church also plays a leading role in the Police Dialogue organised every quarter of the year to bring Ghanaians and the entire immigrant community closer to the security agencies in ensuring tranquil environment (interview on 15-09-2014).

The study revealed that the formation of immigrant associations do not invariably yield ‘ethnic ghettos’ or ‘parallel societies’ (Berger et al, 2007: 492) rather some of them are actively involved in the building of civil society. Most AICCs organised public forums for instance the Police Dialogue to boost the interaction between the state and immigrants which generated social networks and mutual trust at the organisational level. The AICCs interviewed reiterated that in the Netherlands, the state and the church were separated and so they did not expect to rely on each other (Field Notes 2014). However, in the question of immigrants’ political integration, there were collaboration and cooperation between some of the studied AICCs and Dutch public administration. Another head pastor in one of the participating churches narrated some of the motivations:

On a Sunday about 8,000 African immigrants attend African churches in Amsterdam and so the African churches in Amsterdam have the platform for the dissemination of civic information. If any section of the public administration has any urgent information, they transmit them through the churches. Sometimes my church organises information sections and invites medical doctors from the teaching hospitals in Amsterdam to discuss the problems they encounter with Africans. Members of the church also ask health related questions that bother them. For instance abdominal pain is different from stomach pains but in Ghana we use one word for it that is Me y3m 3y3 me ya but here in Amsterdam it means stomach pain so through the information sections we have been able to teach the differences.
These are ways that the church connects with the public administration (interview on 07-01-2015).

The analysed AICCs employed the services of experts from Dutch public administration to disseminate information on health and other related issues that had the likelihood of improving upon the quality of life of their members in the Dutch society. The study also found that Dutch public administration officials disseminated immigrant specific information. Consequently, the multiplicity of civic education forums within the religious field empowered second generation Ghanaians to identify with mainstream Dutch society. A key informant recounted that:

The church invites institutions from the public administration to spread information about happenings in their various sectors. Recently the church invited representatives from the tax office in Amsterdam to educate and inform members about the new tax laws and how to handle tax problems. It was successful because the tax officers gave detailed tax information that members were confronted with daily, after which some congregants also asked questions that bothered them (interview on 11-10-2014).

Additionally, the research showed that the seeking of funding from the Municipality opened the door for social interaction between public officials in the Municipality of Amsterdam Southeast and a sizeable number of the second-generation respondents. Ama, a respondent narrated that:

The youth group in my church organises annually Youth Day programme which lasts for two or three days. Officials from the Municipality of Amsterdam Southeast and other public stakeholders are invited as well as youth from different churches. This year I was asked to apply for subsidy from the Municipality in support of the Youth Day and it was a great experience as it gave me the opportunity to learn more about the internal structure and the protocol within Amsterdam Southeast Council. The proposal was accepted, and the youth received the funding, and this boosted my interest in engaging with public institutions (interview on 12-04-2014).

The responsibility entrusted to the studied second-generation Ghanaians was a source of motivation as in the case of Ama to discover their political quest at the local government level that had the possibility of bringing them closer to the Dutch public sphere. In effect, membership in AICCs might ignite conventional form of political participation. Moreover, the invitation of Dutch public officials to the Youth Day celebrations provided the platform that helped to bridge the gap between the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’. The first author witnessed two different Youth Day
celebrations whereby public officials addressed social problems in the local community and also admonished the youth to be more proactive and sensitive to the growth of their neighbourhood. The exhortations might help to avoid the segregation of second generations from mainstream Dutch society.

Social interactions that occurred within the religious field provided avenues for fifteen of the second-generation respondents to put their intellectual and organisational skills together to mobilise and organise programmes that connect other religious organisations and groups in Amsterdam. Afia, a respondent recounted that:

The youth are responsible for the preparation and organisation of the Youth Day celebration. We spend several months to organise the programme which involves choreography, drama, talent shows and presentations. We also mobilise music groups from other churches to form a joint choir (interview on 11-09-2014).

The Youth Day programmes brought together immigrants and autochthones to participate in religious and sociocultural activities. Twenty-five of the second-generation respondents have established organisational working relations with members of other Christian churches in Amsterdam. The practice enhanced the building of social networks in more or less institutionalised manner. The horizontal connection of most of the research participants with the youth from other churches created bridging social capital that yielded into friendship and cooperation in civic engagement.

**Involvement in Dutch Local Elections**

Most of the studied AICCs in Amsterdam did not only facilitate less conventional form of political participation of their members but they also invested in their conventional political participation. Political forums were organised in the religious field during which politicians and experts in the field were invited to disseminate information on the Dutch political system. A founding member of one of the participating churches described that:

Last month the church invited some politicians to inform members about the Dutch political system and how it functions. It focused especially with regards to voting. Unlike in Africa where the media is filled with politics 24/7, here in the Netherlands when there is election, life moves on as usual. Voter turnout of the members of my church was low so the church embarked on the education of the members on the
Dutch electoral process. The programmes were organised through the church’s own initiative as part of its social corporate responsibility in contributing to the political integration of its members (interview on 25-09-2014).

Due to the multidimensional nature of the religious field, almost all the AICCs in this research provided what we called political platform for politicians during district and local level elections in the Netherlands. The Dutch citizenship and electoral laws allowed immigrants with long term residence permit to vote in the local elections (Tillie, 2004). After five years of legal residence in the Netherlands, immigrants could apply for Dutch citizenship. As a result of these provisions, all the studied second-generation Ghanaians were eligible voters. The analysed AICCs had weekly attendance ranging between 60 and 450 congregants depending on the size of the church. Politicians visited these churches and negotiated with the pastors for time slot on Sundays to appeal to the members of the congregation for votes. After church service, the political candidates also distributed flyers and cards to the members of the churches. Some of the pastors directly appealed to the members of the church to vote for preferred candidates (Field Notes, 2014). This practice reoccurred during national and especially local elections.

Among the studied second-generation Ghanaians, few have contested and won seats as Municipal Council members. Akos, one of the respondents narrated that:

An elder in my church informed me about the existence of a youth political organisation that was recruiting Africans in order to have a balanced representation of all minority groups. I acted upon the information and attended the meeting of the Youth Political Organisation. [...]. African churches in Amsterdam Southeast were the core places for my political campaign. I first called the pastor or the person responsible in a particular church to make appointment for the convenient time and date to present my political message to the electorates in the church. Normally I am given about 5 to 10 minutes at the closing session of the Sunday church service. After church service, I interacted with the members of the church and distributed my flyers to them. I managed to get enough votes which permitted me to become a Councillor. I do not know who voted for me, but I am convinced that I got most of my votes from members in the African churches (interview on 06-03-2014).

Another second-generation Ghanaian, Adwoa also recounted that:

I am in my third term of office as Council member in a Municipality in Amsterdam. My political campaign is centred on African churches in Amsterdam because most of the members in these churches live in Amsterdam Southeast. I move from one
African church to the other during electoral campaign to convince people to vote for me and I must say that they do buy my message and vote for me. I am serving this third term thanks to most of the votes of members of the African churches (interview on 11-05-2014).

Thirty of the second-generation respondents acquired resourceful information from the social networks in the religious field about how to join political mobilisation groups, however, only ten acted upon the information. Eventually, the information facilitated their political participation and representation in the Dutch society. The religious field provided the avenue for three respondents who were political candidates to reach out to electorates in their constituency during the Dutch local election’s campaign. The religious field reduced the burden of these political candidates and their colleagues in reaching out to their constituents through door to door campaign which would have been much more expensive.

Even though there were hometown and ethnic organisations in Amsterdam, the data showed that during political campaign, politicians targeted AICCs more than any other immigrant organisation because of the frequency with which AICCs met and the numbers present during church services. All the studied AICCs met at least once in a week while the hometown associations met mostly once a month which made communication within AICCs much easier. Moreover, all the AICCs in this research had fulltime employed pastors with offices unlike the other ethnic organisations which made accessibility to AICCs more convenient. The intensity of engagement in the religious field permitted the studied AICCs to create denser and thicker social capital as compared to secular immigrant organisations.

Five out of the nine AICCs interviewed urged their members to vote as an expression of their basic political rights as Dutch citizens and permanent residents in the Dutch society. These admonishments were imbued with religious connotations of a ‘good’ Christian. Institutionalised religiosity obliged members to move beyond the religious field and be involved in the building of the nation-state as part of their Christian duty. Sanctions were employed in the religious field as prescriptive measures to entice members to strive towards full citizenship which as it were expected of civic citizens within the nation-state. The mobilisation influenced voter turnout among the electorates in the congregation which in turn boosted their civic responsibility. AICCs were not passive in political mobilisation as they increasingly engaged in the public sphere of the host society.
Ethnicity as Instrument of Political Integration

Ethnicity cannot be underplayed in the voting pattern in the analysed context. More than half of the respondents voted in the Dutch local elections in 2014 because the political candidates were members of their churches or the political candidates came to appeal for votes in their churches. The creation of a Dutch national identity is a pivotal tool for the construction of the nation-state. It is however not exclusive in the process of incorporation of immigrants as cultural ethnicity also plays a crucial role. A participant narrated that:

I had to vote because my Sunday school teacher was one of the candidates for Amsterdam Southeast Council and she appealed to us in church to vote for her. I might not have voted if she had not been on the list of the political candidates (Rose, interview on 01-11-2014).

Another respondent, Lin also narrated that:

I did vote in the 2014 elections at the local level. I also voted proxy for another person who was indisposed. I wanted to see my friend from church win a seat as a Council member (interview on 02-07-2014).

The religious fields of AICCs had common interest in achieving spiritual and psychological wellbeing. Members invested resources and sacrificed their interests with the aim of helping to achieve the common good and this also had the consequential effect of generating religious social capital. The formation of religious social capital provided the social space for individual members to engage in different forms of exchange of goods and services that were not directly related to the common interest. AICCs therefore provided guarantee for their members that they were in symmetric relation with each other. The social networks and norms of reciprocity in the religious field have created environment of trust that motivated some of the interviewees to vote in Dutch Municipal elections. The expectation at the individual level that members reciprocate favours in times of need facilitated the trustworthiness which was perceived as form of investment to be paid back in the future. The effect of this form of religious social capital did not only bond but it also bridged some of the studied second-generation Ghanaians to the Dutch public sphere through voting which is categorised as a conventional form of political integration. The study realised that some of the respondents were motivated to vote due to similarity in religious affiliation which we call religiously induced voting pattern. It was
illustrated by this participant:

I used to be indifferent with politics because I do not agree totally with the policies of any political party. My childhood friend from Sunday school is politically active and she convinced me to join her political party to support her candidature. I am a member of the Dutch Labour Party (PVDA) and I do pay my membership fees. I voted for the PVDA and for my friend in the local assembly elections (Tizy, interview on 10-03-2014).

The religious field generates religious social capital that perpetuates intergenerational voting pattern from first generation migrants to their children. A respondent recounted that:

I am not involved in politics, but I vote for (PVDA) but do not ask me why. One thing about Ghanaians is that if one says that something is good, we do not ask why rather we just follow because people in church said it is good (Kojo, interview on 02-02-2014).

The research further discovered that there are traces of affinity to PVDA among the interviewees which are described here as ethnic voting pattern. It is understood as the casting of votes by members of an immigrant group because of affinity to a political party (Wolfinger 1965: 896) or due to belongingness of a political candidate to that particular immigrant group. Ethnicity thus is not just a tool of social solidarity, but it is also a political tool that frames the setting for scarce political resources in a democratic nation state. Ethnicity therefore shaped the identity and opportunities (Puplampu and Tettey 2005:28) for political integration in the Dutch society.

The study realised that gender could not be left out of the discussion because the disproportionate female/male representation in the data were not recruitment bias but reflected the population in the religious field of the studied AICCs. In addition to that, most of the female respondents were more engaged in the civic programmes in the churches that indicated less conventional political participation. A group leader narrated that it is difficult to have access to the boys in planning and organising programmes whereas the girls are more readily available. Moreover, all the political candidates and most of those who acted upon the resourceful information from the social networks in the religious field were females.
Conclusions

Overall, the study found that most of the AICCs in Amsterdam have ripple effects in the political integration of the studied second-generation Ghanaians. The execution of multidimensional interactions towards political integration in the religious field was made possible due to their dynamism and flexibility. The research concludes that institutionalised and individualised religiosity is manifested in less conventional forms of political participation which includes membership in religious voluntary organisations and participation in civic forums. Additionally, religiosity is manifested in conventional forms of political participation namely voting and being voted for among most of the studied second-generation Ghanaians. The outcome of this study showed that the effect of religiosity in mainstream Dutch society could not be neglected as claimed by some secularisation theorists (Bernts et al. 2007). Thus, the study contributed to the discussion of religiosity in the European discourse as it argued that religion is not transient in the process of immigrant integration rather it is extended to the children of immigrants. In a nutshell, there was intergenerational effect of religiosity from first generation African immigrants to their children in Europe.

Secondly, it is established in the literature (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Penninx 2006; Tillie 2004) that voter turnout is generally low among immigrants in most European countries. The study revealed that the religious field provided ample and conducive mobilisation strategies for politicians during Dutch local and national elections compared to secular immigrant organisations. Qualitatively, the research noted that bonding as well as bridging social capital generated within the religious field influenced voter turnout and in effect political integration among some of the studied second-generation Ghanaians. We argued that inasmuch as bridging social capital transcended the social circles of a given AICC in Amsterdam and links the members and/or the church with outside groups or individuals, bonding social capital also manifested signs of linking members to the wider Dutch society. Through bonding social capital, members were able to disseminate civic information about health-related issues and Dutch voting system that contributed to political integration. AICCs have the consequential effect of contributing to the political integration of their members which buttresses the conclusion of Fennema and Tillie that “to have undemocratic ethnic organisation is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all” (1999:723).

Moreover, the study revealed that some of the respondents manifested
religiously induced voting behaviour as some stressed that they voted for certain political candidates because of similar religious affiliation. The study concludes that association with people of similar ethnic or religious origin is not ephemeral phenomena rather stable and somehow permanent (Wolfinger 1965) which influenced political integration. Furthermore, membership in immigrant churches was not a symptom of escapism (Portes and Zhou 1993:96) but an avenue to explore resources that facilitated the linking up with mainstream Dutch society. Even though the Dutch government disentangled itself from multiculturalism (Erlanger 2011), the study suggested that cultural pluralism influenced political integration. The study also revealed that social networks and trust created within immigrant religious organisations were used as tools to perpetuate civic information and enhance electoral behaviour among their members. We also discovered that female respondents compared to male respondents demonstrated more active engagement in constructing religious social capital that shaped political integration.

Finally, the engagement of some AICCs with Dutch public administration was identified as sporadic rather than intense and systematic. For social capital to be built, the intensity or the frequency of social encounter is a prime factor (Coleman 1990) as it facilitates the building of a relationship in a more or less institutionalised manner (Bourdieu 1985). As well as the strengthening of the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness. The study therefore recommends that the local Municipal council systematically engages with the AICCs with large population on regular basis in promoting civic education and voting interest of second-generation migrants.

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Living and Working in Ethno-Cultural and Multicultural Communities in Ottawa: South Asian Immigrant Women’s Journeys

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Abstract. This paper examines the integration and identity construction processes of South Asian immigrant women in Ottawa. Interviews were conducted with seven immigrant women from South Asia who were working in Ottawa in order to understand their journeys in the Canadian context. The women came from different backgrounds and countries in the South Asian region. The findings revealed insights into their memories and ethnic identification, their workplace negotiations, and the importance of multicultural communities and a sense of belonging in Canada. Also, what was striking was their adaptability in the context of managing and balancing their lives in Canada to their new contexts while also retaining aspects of their earlier identities which were important to them.

Keywords: Immigrant women, memories and identity, multiculturalism, workplace negotiation

Introduction

The 2006 Census estimated that Canada’s 3.2 million immigrant women came from over 220 countries. The largest proportion of these immigrant women, 9%, reported the United Kingdom as their place of birth, followed by the People's Republic of China (8%), India (7%) and the Philippines (5%). Of the total female immigrant population, 18% landed recently between 2001 to 2006, coming mainly from Asia. Among recent immigrant women, the largest share came from the People's Republic of China (15% or 84,700 individuals), followed by India (11% or 65,900 individuals) and the Philippines (8% or 43,700 individuals). (Chui, 2011).

South Asian immigration into Canada has had a long history and has been marked by and influenced by the racialized nature of Canadian immigration in the past, which is a common thread in immigration experiences of all visible minority immigrant groups. For example, after 1904 the entrance of Indian immigrants to Canada was restricted: "According to the Dominion Government, the aims of these restrictive measures were (i) to prevent hardship to the East Indians owing to the
severity of the Canadian climate, (ii) to fight racial friction, and (iii) to protect the Canadian working man and his higher standard of living" (Srivastava, 1983: 33). “South Asian women in Canada belong to the larger category of immigrant women of color-a term that is a social construction (Bannerji, 1993; Carty & Brand, 1993; Estable & Meyer, 1989; Leah, 1995; Ng, 1995; Ralston, 1988; Szekely 1990). Technically and legally, the term immigrant women refers to women who were born in other countries and acquired permanent resident status in Canada through the process of immigration” (George & Ramkissoon, 1998:103).

The definition of South Asia used here is taken from SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) which includes eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It is a geopolitical and regional intergovernmental organization of South Asian nations and was formed in 1985. The main goal of this organization is to maintain and promote economic integration in the region. To this end a number of conferences and meetings have been held. In 2007 Afghanistan was included in SAARC.

Research Questions

In this study the following research questions are posed: How do South Asian immigrant women experience the identity negotiation processes in different contexts: personal and professional? How do they experience their integration journeys? How does multiculturalism have an impact on the integration process?

The study

Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with South Asian immigrant women in Ottawa using the long interview format (McCracken, 1988). To be representative of the different countries of South Asia an attempt was made to conduct the interviews with women from all the different countries represented in the definition of South Asian immigrant women. The interviews probed into their journey into Canada and also their early life before they came to Canada and attempted to uncover their life stories through that an understanding of their identity construction processes as they immigrated into Canada. To participate in the study, the women needed to meet the following selection criteria: They had to be first generation South Asian immigrant women living in Ottawa who were at least 18
years of age and who were women who were working outside the home. The interviews were all conducted in English hence they had to be fluent in English and able to speak English and communicate in it. Participants were recruited through personal networks and word of mouth and snowball sampling. The interviews were held at a convenient location of the participants’ choice and at a time chosen by them. The interviews were all audio recorded and transcribed. The data was analyzed using thematic analysis (Boyatkis, 1998). The transcripts of the interviews were analyzed for key themes that helped to uncover the insights into the lives and the identity formation and construction processes of the South Asian immigrant women. Of the seven women interviewed three were from India, one from Afghanistan, one from Bangladesh and two from Sri Lanka. They ranged in ages from 29 to 61 and had very different and varied occupations and professions.

Memories and Ethnic Identity

Memories of home, as well as issues concerning their ethnic identity and identification came through strongly in the participants’ responses. As Sarup (1996, 40) states:

“An important aspect to the construction and negotiation of identity is the past-present relation and its reconciliation. The past figures importantly in people’s self representations because it is through recollections of the past that people represent themselves to themselves. We know that the past always marks the present, but often the past consists of a selectively appropriated set of memories and discourses”.

Wanning (1998) in his study of post national Chineseness reiterates Sarup’s (1994) thoughts who maintained that for people who are migrants, identity is about becoming, and the expression of loss and nostalgia is part of that.

Ethnic identity is usually defined as the sense of belonging and commitment that comes from being part of an ethnic group, and includes the feelings, behaviours and also thoughts based on ethnic group membership. Basically, the sense of self that an individual has in terms of membership in an ethnic group is ethnic identity (Liebkind, 1992, 2001; Phinney, 1990). Ethnic group membership is based on one’s heritage or ancestry (Phinney, 1996).

The sense of identification with a particular ethnic group (Tajfel, 1981) and a sense of belonging and commitment to the core values and beliefs are some of the
characteristics of ethnic identity (Phinney, 1990, 2000, 2003). Currently, the most widely used definition of the construct in psychology is the one developed by Phinney (1990, 2000, 2003). Phinney (1990), notes that there are "widely discrepant definitions and measures of ethnic identity, which makes generalizations and comparisons across studies difficult and ambiguous" (p.500). The definition as articulated by Phinney (1990, 2000, 2003) is used widely as she maintains that “ethnic identity is a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity, or sense of self as a member of an ethnic group” (2003, p. 63). In Phinney’s articulation, ancestry is important as having a common race language culture religion or language or places of origin are important in ethnic identity. She added further, “Ethnic identity is not a fixed categorization, but rather is a fluid and dynamic understanding of self and ethnic background. Ethnic identity is constructed and modified as individuals become aware of their ethnicity, within the large (sociocultural) setting” (2003, p. 63). Phinney (1990, 2000) states that subjective identity then develops into a social identity based on ethnic group membership. There is some overlap and conflation between ethnic identity and racial cultural and even national identity. In Phinney’s conceptualization (1992, 1996), ethnic identity is the sum of the norms attitudes behaviours beliefs and traits of a particular group. It is rooted in tradition and passed on from one generation to the next (Spencer & Markstrom-Adams, 1990). Like Phinney (1996), other scholars (Umaña-Taylor, Yazedjian, and Bámaca-Gómez, 2004) have acknowledged that it is fluid and dynamic and multifaceted as a concept and is used to describe the connection and feelings with regards to an ethnic group (Bernal et al., 1991; Phinney, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In addition, the interpersonal processes that go along with ethnic identity are also important (Phinney, 1992; Sellers et al., 1997).

Trimble (2000) raises an interesting point with regards to ethnic identity, the issue of labeling. According to Trimble (2000) ethnic identity serves a function through naming or labeling people according to their ethnic identity which can be useful in terms of categorizations for demographic purposes such as a census. However beyond this, other aspects of ethnic identity are also important such as participation in religious and cultural activities attitudes towards one’s own and other ethnic groups as well as music and food preferences and patterns of affiliation or friendship.

Trimble and Dickson (2005) argue that ethnic identity is contextual as it is based on social negotiations and declaration of ethnic identity to others, which is
then scrutinized by the others and then accepted or not by the other members of the group. This is done through a demonstration of and adoption of speech patterns, attire and other cultural aspects of the group with which affiliation is identified with. Thus Trimble and Dickson (2005) refer to this as a ritualistic or stylist emphasis which becomes significant when ethnic group members are interacting in areas far from their places of origin; they mention that it is an example of situated ethnicity and situated ethnic identity. Ethnic identity also goes through a process of development especially in complex contemporary societies (Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993). Phinney (1989) described this as a progression where an individual starts with childhood with attitudes that are unexplored and unexamined followed by a period of exploration until a secure ethnic identity is achieved at the end of adolescence.

Through the process of learning about their ethnic identity, youth can either find value in their ethnic group or experience feelings of resentment over how their ethnic group has been treated in the past, or even experience feelings of insecurity or confusion (Brown, 2000; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). The steps and phases of this process will depend on the socialization process and may not be identical for all youth, as not everyone reaches the stage of ethnic identity achievement. Ethnic identity often is composed of four aspects: ethnic awareness (an understanding about one’s own and other ethnic groups; ethnic self-identification (Rumbaut, 1994), ethnic attitudes and shared values, and ethnic behaviours. Ethnic identity and immigrants’ experiences and reception by the receiving society are interrelated as pointed out by Phinney et al (2001).

Participant Five, a 43 year old women from Sri Lanka had been in Canada for 12 years and had a bachelor’s degree in Natural Sciences, and was working as a customer service services representative at a leading phone company. She narrated:

“Ah, growing up, my neighbor was a Tamilian, as I said, and she had two kids. I really don’t where... I wish I knew where they were now, but very nice. We all played together, ...He had a nice bike, and we were all sharing the bike, because not everybody can afford bikes – nice ones, you know. He had this nice 10-speed bike. I remember we used to drive. We used to take turns”.

The participants also talked about the importance of community in terms of their ethnic group and taking part and engaging in community participation. Participant Three, a 29-year-old woman from Afghanistan, who had been in Canada for seven years and had studied up to the high school level, and was an aesthetician
explained:

“Yeah, I like to especially, you know, for my son, because I have a son and I really want him to be in the community, too, so I wanted to be in the community and participate in all the events and stuff and..., like, our New Year or any other celebrations that we have we get together so I all the time try to be there and especially take my son, that he knows a little bit about our land... our culture and language and religion and whatever like we do normally for in our country. I think it’s very good for my son so I just mostly try to do it for my son, too”.

This was echoed by other participants too, who emphasized the importance of knowing their culture and ethnic background especially for transmission to the next generation. Thus, Participant Six, a 38 year old women from India with a Bachelor’s degree in Commerce, was a manager in a bank and had spent seven and a half years in Canada stated:

“The only way is if you hadn’t had the relationship, we wouldn’t know our culture, so for my daughter, it’s very important for her to know the culture, to speak the local language and be a part of it, understand the whole cultural aspect”.

Workplace negotiations

The process of integration especially in the context of employment is fraught with challenges for immigrants in general and immigrant women as well. For immigrant women, one of the barriers to integration is lack of recognition of credentials as well as language barriers per se or discrimination and unfamiliarity with accents. (Jaya and Porter, 2011; Creese et al 2012). A lack of cultural capital and social capital often becomes a barrier for immigrants (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural capital can mean institutionalized cultural capital (credentials) and embodied cultural capital (not having the right accents, not having Canadian work experience). “For immigrants, failure to have their educational credentials recognized, alongside the absence of other forms of embodied cultural capital (like the “right” accents, work experience and cultural knowledge) are central to deskilling and downward occupational mobility in Canada” (Creese and Wiebe, 2012:60).

A feminist and equity perspective (Tastsoglou & Preston, 2005) takes into account the aspects commonly adopted in discussions of economic integration in conjunction with understanding the processes which may be different for immigrant women. Thus, education, while affecting immigrant women’s participation in the
paid labour market, does not always increase participation as might be expected; immigrant women, even after entering the labour force, are more likely to be unemployed than immigrant men. Occupational patterns show segmentation in the occupations of Canadian born women and immigrant women (Tastsoglou & Preston, 2005). Barriers to integration (Tastsoglou & Miedema, 2005) include systemic obstacles such as racism, sexism, language, and accent.

Immigrant women often have to overcome various barriers in their integration process in Canada. Some barriers include systemic racism and sexism as well as barriers to employment due to non-recognition of credentials, barriers due to lack of language proficiency, access to health care as well as isolation due to lack of social capital. These barriers have been documented by many scholars (Jaya and Porter, 2011; Neumann, 2011, Topen, 2011, Ku et al 2011). Others have confirmed that having social supports and networks have proved beneficial for immigrant women (Lamba and Krahn 2003), such as taking part in religious events and in activities through a church, which provides a sense of psychological comfort and support (Da, 2008). Salaff and Greve (2004) also discuss the role and importance of social support in their study of Chinese immigrant women.

Despite having high levels of education and excellent credentials, immigrant women face many obstacles and challenges to integration in the labour force and in being employed in jobs commensurate with their qualifications (Tastsoglou & Preston, 2005; Tastsoglou & Miedema, 2005). It appears that factors like systemic racism and sexism as well as accent (Creese and Wiebe, 2012) impede the progress of immigrant women in the economic settlement process. As Creese and Wiebe (2012) state in a gendered labour market employment discrimination against “African-English’ accents, a key form of embodied cultural capital, was experienced more profoundly by women, in turn significantly reducing women’s employment prospects”. (2012:66). This is echoed by Premji et., al (2014) who state that their study of immigrant women in Toronto “provide rich insights about how racialized immigrant women face triple intersecting layers of barriers and inequalities—based on gender, race and migration/immigration—as they attempt to find a good job, negotiate work-life balance, and take care of their family within the postmigration context in Canada” (2014:135).

Participant Six, the banker, referred to the language issue in terms of how customers would react:
“I think, with regarding to my customers, they’ve really accepted and acknowledged me as a person, and they were surprised, coming from India… “How come your language is so good?” And they’d be like, “Were you born and raised here,” so I was like, “No.” “But how come you speak such good English?” So there’s a lot of myths amongst people that, “Okay, from Third World countries, oh, they’re not educated,” because they think the mother tongue is the first language, and then I had to educate a lot of them saying, “No, English is our first language in major schools in India, and then you kind of take your other language.” With my colleagues… they’ve been very co-operative, understanding; and with my bosses, I think I’ve… knock on wood again, I’ve had really good bosses who have supported me and encouraged me, yeah”.

The respondents also talked about their workplace negotiations and how they responded to difficult situations in the workplace. Participant Three, the aesthetician, explained:

“I just remember one time that I had a client; she was very, very difficult. I don’t know if I can say fussy or anything like that, too, but she was very difficult and she even told me that she had a very bad day and she’s very grumpy, and I said, “Oh, it’s okay, don’t worry,” but she was very rude, and that day she really made me... I controlled myself too much, and after I went... I just left her in the room and I said, “Oh, I cannot handle her,” and I cried. That was the only situation”.

Another respondent, Participant One, who worked in a university setting had a particularly harrowing experience which she had earlier also identified as an experience as a racialized immigrant woman. Participant One, a woman from India who had migrated with her family as a child, was 61 years old and had lived in Canada for 50 years. She was an academic, had a Master’s degree in and a background in Social Work. expressed her frustration at her workplace:

“Yeah, I mean, probably my last year was the... a reminder of how my life had started as very difficult there, and I thought in my last year they would sort of just leave me be and let me leave gracefully, but they didn’t allow me to do that so there was just a... it was like the knives came out in the final year, and it was just a very, very traumatic year when they decided to cancel the courses that I was teaching without having consulted with me even though I had earlier negotiated with the director to teach those courses. And, you know, I had to fight with them every step of the say. I actually got student engaged in that struggle as well”.
Multicultural communities and a sense of belonging and contentment

Being part of multicultural communities was cherished by all the participants. Pluralism and contact with other groups (Winter, 2007; Berry, 2013) was something that all participants seemed to enjoy and see as a positive part of their lives in Canada.

The Multiculturalism Policy of Canada as per the Act of 1988 states that the goal of the Act is to further the diversity of Canadian society through multiculturalism. This would be done according to the intent of the Act by providing the freedom to all Canadians to preserve their unique heritages as well as giving them the right to participate equally in actively shaping Canadian society. The Act fosters the inclusion of all Canadians regardless of origins in terms of equality before the law but also valuing their diversity; as well as maintains that all the institutional systems will be respectful to Canadians of diverse backgrounds and as well appreciates the diverse cultures in Canada. In addition the Act establishes that languages other than French and English may be enhanced while at the same time also balancing out the commitment to the official languages of Canada. While the spirit and letter of the Act provides a very wide scope of expression to different groups in society, it is also true that the uneasy and tenuous relationship between bilingualism and multiculturalism is not an easy balancing act to realize in terms of the actual lived experience and practice of multiculturalism.

While multiculturalism has been established in terms of the legislation and the development of government mechanisms and strategies to promote and take it further, at the same time it has been a debated and contested aspect of Canadian social reality. Arguments such as the divisive and fragmentary discourse of multiculturalism causing a deepening of the differences (Mirchandani and Tastoglou, 2000) as well as the creation of ethnic enclaves and silos in society are reminders of the fractious nature of multiculturalism (Bissoondath, 1994). Bissoondath (1994) argues that the fostering of multiculturalism has led to an increase in ethnic enclaves and a separation of newer ethnic immigrant groups form the mainstream thus creating a lack of unity. Neil Bissoondath stated that multiculturalism would be "...ensuring that ethnic groups will preserve their distinctiveness in a gentle and insidious form of cultural apartheid" and will "...lead an already divided country down the path to further social divisiveness" (1994, 82-83). The fear that Canadians are becoming strangers in their own country (Gwyn,
and the perception that Canadians have no history, culture, and identity (Granatstein, 1998) due to the emphasis on embracing multicultural immigrant groups and their culture have all been voiced as the critiques of the multiculturalism approach in Canadian society and polity.

Participant One, the 61 year old academic, stated:

“Yeah. Our friendships have always been very eclectic, and I think, you know, friendships also... you know, they vary, right, so there’s a different group of friends, you know, when we were younger and working in the immigrant service field more. There was a very multicultural community, and that’s the one we would engage with more. And then as when we were parents and encouraging activities with our son, then it revolved around other parents, which is a whole other mix, but I’ve always had students who have been mostly from the racialized immigrant communities or those who...”

As well Participant Six, the banker, mentioned too:

“I have a mix of everyone. I have a lot of people from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mexico, Spain, Canadians, too. Like, all my neighbours are Canadian, so, yeah, we have a very good relationship with our neighbours.....Yesterday we were talking about it at work, so at work we have a mix of cultures so we have Muslim people. .... We have very hard core French. We have Spanish. We have this. We have that. So it’s funny... we were talking, and they told me, “How come you know about all religions and how come you’re so distinct,” and a lot of my customers, as well, they used to ask me...”

Despite challenges and difficulties, most participants had come to realize their new space and place in the Canadian context as something they belonged to and accepted. This is consistent with the discussion of hybridity as articulated by Bhabha (1994).

One of the early expressions of the psychology of colonialism was by Ashis Nandy (1980, 1983, 1987). Nandy’s exposition emphasizes that domination extends beyond military and economic conquest and in fact involves colonization of the mind and psyche. Homi Bhabha studied the results of neo-colonialism on the individual in the modern and postmodern world. Bhabha (1994) focuses on the effect of the relationship between the colonized and colonizer on the individual psyche.

Hybridity is the creation of new transcultural forms due to the contact with colonization. Bhabha (1994) articulated hybridity through the enunciation of a
‘Third Space’, which is negotiated. The interdependence of both colonizer and colonized and the mutual construction of their subjectivities is part of the hybridity.

Bhabha (1994) goes beyond the binary oppositions juxtaposing West/non-West, center/margin, center/periphery, in that these stark oppositions highlight dual and different sets of identities; he instead restates that as a more nuanced notion of hybridity, which is actually created due to the development of a Third Space, leads to a mixture of identities that is more fluid and complex.

Participant 7, aged 39, who was working as senior software engineer in a firm, and was from Sri Lanka stated this very well:

“... I really like being Canadian. I’m not saying it’s because it’s a developed nation or anything. I don’t really identify with it as well... but if I go to US, yeah, “I’m Canadian.” Like, oh... but the thing is we visited Mexico once, and there were other Canadians. I didn’t know they were Canadians. They asked me, “Where are you from?” They were white people. It felt kind of weird for me to say, “I’m Canadian” because, like, I’m brown and I’m saying I’m Canadian. The first thing that came out of my mouth was, “I’m originally from Sri Lanka, but I live in Ottawa, Canada.” “Oh, you are from Canada.” “Yeah.” Later on, I think more... like, I wouldn’t hesitate... in Canada, I wouldn’t hesitate to say, “I’m Canadian.” I have no issues. “I’m Sri Lankan Canadian.” But when you go somewhere else and somebody asks you, kind of weird to say first thing, I’m... I think I would be more comfortable saying, “I’m Sri Lankan Canadian,” than saying “I’m Canadian.””

Participant Four, a 42 year old academic hailing from Bangladesh, who had a PhD and had been in Canada for 8 years, articulated:

“Yes, certainly, because it’s been eight years, and I guess certainly I do feel that I belong here.... I do feel that I belong here. And also through work because much of my research work is also grounded in the Canadian context so I’m actively participating so I do have a sense of belonging in the sense that I have limited understanding, but I will understand more so to me that’s also part of having a sense of belonging”.

This is echoed by Participant Five, one of the women from Sri Lanka, who said:

“I’m really happy here. There’s no two words. I wouldn’t do anything differently. Maybe just finish my Master’s that I started, but I should have... but other than that... maybe that was the only thing I regret.”
Discussion

The findings from the study revealed that the women while retaining a sense of nostalgia for their memories of their lives in their home countries nevertheless seemed to have a sense of belonging and settlement in their adopted country, Canada. Their integration journeys were also varied in that they all came from varied occupational and professional backgrounds with credentials in some cases that helped them and in others created barriers to the integration process. This is consistent with the literature on immigrant women’s integration processes. They all found their own ways and carved their unique paths in dealing with negotiations in the workplace and moving forward in the integration journey.

In addition, most participants seemed to have found a lot of strength in the multicultural friendships and communities that they built around them in Canada, while at the same time retaining their sense of community with regards to their ethnic roots and groups.

Limitations and suggestions for future research

This study is based on seven interviews and is meant as a starting point for reflection into looking at South Asian immigrant women’s experiences in Ottawa in different contexts. Given the diversity within the South Asian diaspora both in terms of country of origin (as there are eight countries within South Asia based on the SAARC definition outlined earlier) and the different socio economic occupational and immigration journeys of the women, clearly more research is needed in this area. Future research with in depth analyses based on data from particular countries and focused on particular countries within the South Asian diaspora would help shed light on the nuances in the lived realities of people from different country contexts.

Conclusion

This study while providing some insights into the experiences of South Asian women in the Ottawa region was limited in that it represented few voices. Future research on women from individual countries within the South Asian diaspora and also perhaps looking at women form different and varied occupational backgrounds would provide more specific and unique insights into the differences between different women’s paths. Future research could reveal the challenges faced by
women who are not as skilled and have to encounter obstacles due to various systemic barriers and roadblocks. This research builds on existing work on South Asian immigrant women and provides insights specifically about the Ottawa community. The data rooted in the theoretical framework helps to situate the experiences of the women and to highlight the gendered nature of the identity construction and formation processes. Findings revealed differences in the paths to integration and an inclination and desire to integrate into the fabric of Canadian multicultural society while maintaining and celebrating their ethnic identities and diversity. Given the varied countries of origin of the diverse group of respondents, more in-depth research could shed light on experiences ranging from refugee or forced migration situations to immigrants who came by choice.

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Marginal Multilingualism and Its Potential in Fighting the Xenophobia/Romaphobia

Lia POP and Irina POP

Abstract. Exploring the Roma's marginal multilingualism leads to the following three main conclusions. First, the Roma – being present in entire Europe and being largely connected as families practicing the same professions (many times professions for surviving, including those dishonest and dirty) speak almost all the active languages of Europe. That is a) in a traditional multilingual context, temporarily settled Roma spoke fluently all the languages of the context; b) in a new multilingual context, the Roma in mobility speak the languages needed there – the local languages plus the others mobile groups' languages. Secondly, in the Bihor-county they practiced the languages of the loci (Hungarian, Romanian and some variety of Romani). They select only the economically necessary languages. Thirdly, their linguistic abilities are not due to their musical competences, but to the practical reasons: they earn their living due to the linguistic interactions with Others – the speakers of different languages. That is why they acquire rapidly new languages, no matter, how many those languages are and to which family they belong to. The need to survive is the first explanatory factor of their active interest and effectiveness in multilingualism. What we believe it became extremely significant, it is to explore – interpret - the political significance of the Roma marginal multilingualism in the context of the new extreme xenophobia that targets them. Does the Roma's marginal multilingualism carry out a socio-political potential? Does the multilingualism play a role in curving the millennial xenophobia against them? Could it lead to dismantling the Romaphobia in Europe? Answering such questions, we plead for intensively communicate in the scientific milieu on the Roma marginal multilingualism, and to underline constantly its socio-political potential. It is to valorize this positive Roma feature in fighting the stigma on Roma and Romani languages, in curving the xenophobia and to encourage them to contribute to a cohesive Europe.

Keywords: Roma, Roma marginal multilingualism, sharing the multilingualism as way to fight Romaphobia

Introductory considerations

The traditional Roma are prone to multilingualism because they must interact and do interact with the Others- speakers of different languages - to earn their living. Multilingualism, therefore, is the mark of their identity [Sarău, 1998, p. 129, Pop, 2016; Horvath, 2017; Pop, 2018], just as much as their own language is.

The European Roma's marginal multilingualism is a fact easy to be
experienced by anyone in direct interactions with their mobile groups alongside Europe. It is simply to scientifically prove it, as this paper is trying to do, by developing estimations on the Roma's multilingualism European geography and by investigated it in the delimited European areas.

We propose here a European panorama on it and a concrete investigation on the Roma marginal multilingualism in the Bihor county, Romania.

To go further and to articulate a theory on it, it is much more complicated. In this phase, we postpone the attempt to articulate a coherent general theory on the Roma's marginal multilingualism. We just strive to

a) prove it scientifically - by using, personal, cultural and sociological methods;

b) describe concretely how many languages the Roma groups in Europe acquired;

c) explain it and to explore its meanings in fighting Romaphobia.

That is, the core chapters of our study are:

1. Proves on the European Roma marginal multilingualism
2. How many languages the Roma groups speak?
3. Roma marginal multilingualism: explanations and perspectives

In the Conclusions we focus on the Roma's marginal multilingualism socio-political potential. We see it as an effective tool in fighting the Romaphobia. For us, the Romaphobia or the Anti-tsiganism is the most extended form of the xenophobia, from the geographical, historical or cultural point of view. By revealing real positive facts on Roma – as their marginal multilingualism is – we draw the scientific community attention that the xenophobia against them is possible to be curved, by communicating on them as possible contributors to an inclusive society. Also, we underlined the idea that sharing the courage to practice the non-scholar multilingualism it is to contribute to a cohesive Europe.

1. Proves on the European Roma marginal multilingualism

1..1 Common experience regarding the Roma multilingualism

The Roma multilingualism is simply to be noted. In the multicultural areas of Central Europe, anybody knows that the Roma speak all the languages active there. Nobody doubts on it, but nobody mentions it as a special feature, just because it is so common. Commenting on their trilingualism, two non-Roma students in Journalism in the University of Oradea, who, for twelve years have lived in areas with
trilingual Roma – at Valea lui Mihai, Bihor and Carei, Satu Mare county – affirmed independently: “Only they can speak Romanian and Hungarian too”! (obviously apart from their own language.) The conclusion comes with some surprise for the two of them.

An excellent linguist, R. H. wrote privately to Lia Pop:

“Btw, I was thinking of your work recently when I was in Belfast, as I was approached by some gypsy ladies in the street selling me flowers, I replied to them in Romanian after which point, they refused to believe I was English! Then, when I politely declined their flowers, they went to the next guy in the street who happened to be Canadian, and they spoke to him in (very broken) French!”

The experience is available to anyone, anywhere in Europe, because the Roma move anywhere, and are anywhere, and the groups' multilingualism is the necessary ingredient in any new spot. That is their multilingualism is extended as their mobility is.

Looking for scientific confirmations of the Roma's multilingualism we look for scientific direct and indirect proves.

1.2 Direct confirmations of the Roma marginal multilingualism

The reality of Roma marginal multilingualism is beyond any doubt. It is confirmed in direct observations – repeatable anytime – and from experiments conducted with such a purpose.

Such proves were collected in Bihor county, Romania. Indeed, the Roma marginal multilingualism is a common experience in many zones of Bihor county\(^1\), and also, in the municipality of Oradea, Romania. Day by day and all over, the Roma – specifically dressed, (and thus unmistakably) can be heard speaking their language, as well as Romanian, Hungarian\(^2\) and switching between the languages naturally. The same group of Roma address Romanians in Romanian, Hungarians in Hungarian and speak among themselves in their own language. Anytime, a visit to the marketplace, at the railway stations, to the hospitals or a simple ride on a tram provides observers with the experience on their multilingualism.

For the sake of methodological correctness, the RCIMI team – in the context

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\(^1\) A village monograph confirms the general Roma bilingualism. [Cordovan, 2012.]

\(^2\) According to a local philosopher, of Transylvania of the XIX century, there was active another Romani variety: that influenced by the German. (These days, it is not active any more). [von Wilislocki, 1887, 1998, p. 20.]
of the MIME project organized two specific experiments, in Bihor county: a focus group on Romani and multilingualism and investigations on the linguistic competences of the Roma people, attested by others and claimed by the Roma themselves.

The focus-group proving the multilingualism. The 10 Roma leaders from different local communities of the Bihor county were involved in a focus group on Roma multilingualism and Romani language organized at the headquarter of the Bihor prefecture, June 22, 2016, 12-14. They were engaged in a discussion concerning the languages spoken by their group members and on an evaluation of the social utility of each of them. All of them assumed the Roma identity, due to the fact that they speak Romani, is their mother tongue. The discussion was conducted in the Romanian language, that is all of them were bilingual, at least. They all confirmed personally and all their group’s members speak Romani and Romanian. They actually asserted and proved their oral bilingualism. None of them claimed that they can also write in Romani. The ones living in the localities with Hungarian speakers as the majority confirmed they can speak all the three languages, asserting their oral tri-lingualism. The interest in keeping Romani alive was only partly reaffirmed. Some of them underlined explicitly. The Romani competences do no offer opportunity for a career or for a better life. (They pleaded for English!) It comes in total contradiction with the Romanipen imperatives. They punish – corporally included – those who lost their mother tongue: Romani. A Kashtale man told in an interview, that in the prison, he was severely bitten – bitten to death, he said because he cannot speak Romani.

Direct confirmations based on the participatory observations. Such investigations were conducted by the RCIMI team in the classroom with the Roma pupils. They confirmed again the general bilingualism of the Roma. To the general question addressed in Romanian to the Roma children: “Who can speak Romani?”, the large majority of the group raised their hands and voices: “I do! I do!”. When the question for confirmation came: “Who cannot speak Romani?”, they all pointed out the two children with Kashtale origins: “They cannot!”.

Direct confirmations based on the interviews. In the RCIMI’s interviews with Roma people of Bihor on their multilingual skills, out of the 20 illiterate or limitedly literate Roma (with no more than a fourth-grade education), all 20 were fluent and correct in the Romanian language, the second language for them. Their phonetics was similar to that of other speakers in Bihor county. (The interviews were
conducted in Romanian.) Only one single person, a Roma-Kashtale declared he is monolingual, as his entire Kashtale group is. (It is a group known as Roma who lost their mother tongue. This peculiar sub-group can speak only Romanian.) That is, 19 out of 20 interviewees are bilingual.

Seven individuals declared that they are fluent in Romanian and also Hungarian, beside their own languages. They are trilingual, speaking Romani, Romanian and Hungarian.

Those people involved in the circulatory migrations declared they can get by speaking in the language/s of migration place/s. French and English were the languages most frequently mentioned.

One person out the 20 Roma interviewed - a trader - stated that he can speak all three languages plus German, Croatian, Polish, Estonian, Russian, Ukrainian and can manage in Kazakh. These are the languages of the countries where he conducted business for a while. He also spoke about his son who speaks 11 languages and other family members, also polyglots.

The interviewed Roma individuals also claimed they speak many Romani dialects. Three, out of 20, insisted they (and their groups) cannot speak the Gabors’ language. (The Gabors from Romania adopted the endonym Gaborian for themselves as defining another linguistic identity. In Bihar Hungary, there is a village with a similar name suggesting that there are several areas where the language is spoken. After discussions with the elders, the Gabor informants told us the endonym for their language. “In our language, the language’s name was Shataroshi.” – one told us.)

Some claimed they can speak plus one or more Western European languages. Once the special finding was that the Roma in migration from the Western Countries declared that in the “platz” of Lyon - the word that they used for the Roma migrants’ camps - they can understand the languages of the Roma coming from Hungary, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria and other countries. They confirmed a progressive form of their multilingualism.

1.3 Indirect confirmations of Roma’s multilingualism

Indirect confirmations of Roma multilingualism based on the school teachers’ estimations on what language the Roma primary and secondary school children speak and at what level.

The traditional Roma multilingual abilities were confirmed by the Roma
pupils’ linguistic skills. (A questionnaire on the Roma children’s linguistic abilities applied in 2016-2017, by team member Mona Stănescu, in Bihor county, Romania - and in other two regions, for comparison – proved the multilingual skills of Roma children. The questionnaire was not evenly distributed and answered in the zones with Hungarian majority speakers. That is why the data on the Roma-Ungrika speakers seems to be skewed.) According to their educators in the classrooms, all the Roma pupils enrolled in pre-schools and primary schools – in Bihor (Ro) areas - are bilingual. To the questionnaires distributed among the educators and teachers with Roma pupils in their classrooms, out of 772 children, all 772 were reported as bilinguals. Among them, 160 were trilingual (being competent in the Hungarian language too).

**Figure 1. Roma pupils’ multilingualism**

![Languages spoken by the 772 Roma pupils from BIHOR (Ro) 2016, according to their teachers evaluations](image)

Source: The table synthetizes the work done by Mona Stănescu – in the context of MIME project. Mona conducted investigations among the teachers of Romani in the Bihor County.

*Indirect scholarly confirmations.* The Matras [Matras, 2013] and Horvath studies [Horvath, 2017] confirm that in the same proximity live people self-identified as Roma that are bilingual and also speak different dialects. The speakers are interacting on the basis of the mutual command of each dialect, especially when they

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3 The field researches reflected in the graphic were done by the assistant researcher Mona Stanescu.
are influenced by the same language spoken by the majority, Romanian or Hungarian). A unique Roma common language is in progress, but there are obstacles to its standardization. [Matras, 2005.]

2. How many languages the Roma groups speak?

Briefly answering the question, it is to say: a) there is not any limit in the number of languages that the Roma groups considered all together speak in Europe; b) one single group could be able to speak over ten languages, regularly, due to some intrepid persons who are hyperpolyglot. They are practicing the same languages learned from one to another.
2.1. Panorama of languages spoken by Roma groups in Europe

A detailed view on the Roma positions toward the languages is revealing that the settled and isolated groups are monolingual, but any group living nearby a non-Roma community is, at least, bilingual. Those living in the multicultural zones are trilingual, and those engaged in trans-border mobilities are multilingual.

Looking to the entire EU, the Roma groups considered all together are the most multilingual groups speaking at least the number of languages represented in the map bellow. The affirmation is supported by the International Databases on languages.

The Map in Figure 2 shows how many languages the mobile Roma speak in today’s EU. The number of the mastered languages/group is proportional with the number of linguistic areas that they crossed in their recent history. (The linguistic accuracy is out of their interest. They practice the marginal multilingualism.)

2.2. History and Roma’s marginal multilingualism

Historically, they were small mobile groups forced to become inserted into many new linguistic contexts and, socio-economically, totally dependent on their good command of the language spoken in situ. They have thus rapidly become bilingual in any place where they moved. When a Roma group limited itself to the poor linguistic abilities some formulae learned by heart) and to too superficial individual interactions with the indigenous population, its members got into in harsh conditions, as clients of charity, police or even worse. Advances in the language/s of the context resulted in their success to get inserted in the new context and, moreover, to get promises of inclusion.

Any Roma group – deprived of the free movement beyond the borders of the state where the majority of the groups’ members were born - is at least a trilingual group. They speak a Romani variety, the language of the majority and one (or more) language/s practiced by the minority/ies with which they interact or a special invented pogadialect, which mixes the Romani with the language of a specific minorities. (Such a language was current in Transylvania of XIX century. It mixes Romani and German. Now it is extinct.) [Wlislocki, 2000].

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4 Some illiterate Roma consider that the abilities to use several linguistic formulas and some standard answers represent a fair language command because it leads to their temporary socio-linguistic insertion.
2.3. Recent Roma’s mobilities and migration and their marginal multilingualism

Nowadays, the traditional Roma – inheritors of the oral marginal multilingualism - are engaged in new large circulatory mobilities and migrations to the prosperous EU countries. During such “expeditions”, they interact with speakers of new languages for them, the local or migrants’ languages active there. As a consequence, any mobile Roma group speaks at least:

a) Romani, a variety or more, plus dialects, pogalects, cryptolects of interest for its surviving

b) the language/s active at home,

c) the language/s required in the new location.

With the new language acquired, those who are trilingual at home are already speaking 4 languages. Those groups, that are speaking besides the native Romani variety other varieties of Romani too, become speakers of, at least, 5 languages. Some groups – due to their polyglot members - can get by in 6 or 7 languages.

When, during their mobilities, the Roma groups live in “international” camps – as they did in the Camps nearby Napoli, Marseilles, Lyon or the ex-jungle of Calais, or Berlin – the most linguistically qualified add to the above-mentioned patrimony of 6/ 7 other languages spoken, the languages of some migrants’ group living there. When the new comers are the Roma from Albania, Anatolia, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, ex-Serbia, Syria (Gurbets or Narwars), learning is a natural process. Nevertheless, even when the migrants’ languages are distanced from the European family and have arrived in EU from Asian, African countries the learning of their languages is not avoided *ab initio* by the Romani speakers. Some of these languages are picked up [Pop, 2018], for the Roma to be able to interact with them, to sell them services and merchandise.

Similarly, when some Roma groups are engaged in mobilities with long duration (two years or more) and with diverse destinations they add new languages to their linguistic patrimony. In terms of the languages spoken, such travelers, their vast majority, become polyglots and some hyperpolyglots, speaking 9 languages. All of them are promoters, speakers and beneficiaries of marginal multilingualism. They are also its promoters. The inferences proposed above were confirmed in the field researches, directly and indirectly. The indirect confirmations resulted from the claims articulated in the Romani speakers’ interviews and from the Romani classrooms teachers’ estimations on what language the Roma primary and secondary school children speak and at what level. The other related researches also confirm it.

2.4. Roma of Bihor and their marginal multilingualism
Our own data collected in the field correlated with the other sources specifically focused on the Roma in Bihor and their languages result in a panorama of the Roma’s multilingualism in the contemporary Bihor county.

Table 1. Categories of the Roma’ traditional multilingualism in Bihor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context’s Languages and Dialects Spoken by the Roma</th>
<th>New Languages Acquired in Mobilities (reported in the researches)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context’s Languages</strong></td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother tongue’s dialects with historical roots</td>
<td>Romani, Shataroshi, Rom-Ungrika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context’s Dialects</td>
<td>Mother tongue’s dialects with Romanian influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influenced by the languages spoken in the civilizations, that they crossed⁵</td>
<td>Romani professional dialects (Roma-Lingurari, Ćurari Karamidari and so one)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁵ An estimated group of such languages depicts some lines of continuity from the Indian sub-continent, Iran, Arabian zones, Armenia, Turkish, Kurdish & Latin and Greek of the Byzantine Konya -; Greece, to Western Europe.

Logically, the linguistic lines of influences must be multiple and generative of multiple dialects. The ancestors of today’s population identified as Roma could have migrated West in historical waves – crossing civilisations with different dominant languages and acquiring such influences. They could have migrated also on multiple and sinuous routes – crossing civilisations based on different languages. (At least, five such routes are obvious: the terrestrial North-Western one toward Russia, Finland, and the Baltic states; the Western central toward the North of the Caspian Sea and Black Sea; the “silk route” central toward Turkey; the terrestrial to South Est, crossing historical Persia, Armenia and Syria; the maritime one to West-South arriving at today Eritrea and following the Nile North and populating the South-Mediterranean coastal regions, from Egypt to Morocco, and continued their routes to Spain and Wales and further.) The varieties of the Roma endonyms in Europe
Such competences lead us to compile the Table above to offer a synthetic view on the dimensions of their multilingualism. The Table maintains only the samples of Romani varieties (without dialects or cryptolects). It left out the newly acquired languages confirmed by three independent sources.

Some dialects – considered as languages by their speakers - are not sufficiently confirmed as independent languages. There are the cases of those spoken by the so-called ‘Rom de Mătase’ [Silky Roma] RO-049; by the Luti/Luri. Similarly, the dialects (languages?) spoken by musicians, dancers and professional entertainers [POP, 2013, and the publications of the Dom Center]; forró zsebek [pickpockets] are not included in the Table.

Secret languages are also omitted. Neither the relations between the argot spoken by the Manouches’ and those reminding the Tuggees’.

As completeness the table is amendable. New elements could be added, possible new categories related by the stigmatised secrete languages.

As principle, it is to be continued with investigations in other multilingual areas. The hypothesis is that the Roma are marginal multilingual anywhere. For us, their competences are one of the major elements that describes them and their language positively, that attract respect for them. Or such a respect in an age when the world is trapped in an emerging, but accelerate xenophobia is the main ingredient in a strategy in fighting the xenophobia. For a group repeatedly victimised in history, to gain cultural respect is a matter of surviving. For Europe, it is a matter of enforcing its space of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The Gabors’ way of speaking – categorized in the experts Databases as a dialect, RO-010 – is de facto a different language, according to the Romani speakers and the Gabors’ claims.]

The classification of the Romani varieties is – according with our understanding – in need to be unified and correlated with the linguistic reality. (It is now under an accelerate dynamic, which push some varieties on extinction, other on renewal or reinventing process.)

The well-known gypsologists, from the Romantic generation – Grellmann, Kogălniceanu, Vaillant, Pott, Paspati, Miklosich, Josef of Habsburg (The Archduchy) Colocci and many others - to the contemporary ones - Courthiade, Friedmann,
Gheorghe, Grigore, Hancock, Hubschmannova, Kendrick, Marushiakova, Matras, Popov, Sarău⁶ - proposed several classifications of Roma languages and dialects, scholarly coherent. The existing classifications of Romani varieties and of its related languages are impossible to operationalized in Bihor and it relativized the line between a language and a macro-language till the impossibility to use it. Similarly, in the case of the border language dialect. The mentioned classifications are even impossible to reconcile with the reality. That is why we did not appeal to them.

For the study on the Roma multilingualism in today Bihor we took the speakers’ linguistic self-identifying.

3. Roma marginal multilingualism’ explanations and perspectives

3.1. Explaining the Roma multilingualism

From a socio-linguistic perspective, the Roma marginal multilingualism composes a complex image. The image of the Roma marginal multilingualism, as it was illustrated above, comprises the sets of languages practiced group by group, in a certain period of time, in a particular zone.

It encompasses also multiple elements, with different functions plus the relations among them. The main elements, that we identified are a) the communicational practices of the talented groups for multilingualism; b) those groups' cultural strategies in becoming multilingual and in valorizing this cultural capital in earning their lives; c) the Roma's special methods and techniques in acquire new languages (Learning all from all, and Learning by doing); d) the specific ways of practicing multilingualism, as a simplified use of any language within this patrimony; as a totally oral use of languages, and as a “fluid” language. (A set of language competences that “easily comes, easily goes”, as a professor in socio-linguistic portrayed it).

Roma marginal multilingualism - in spite of its simplifications - is effective. It ensures their early insertion in a new area, no matter which language/s the area speaks.

This multilingualism is really amazing because it is so largely spread in Europe and so largely scholarly un-analyzed. Its dimensions lead to transforms Roma mobile groups - considered altogether - in the most multilingual people in Europe. They

⁶ Sarău was trying to compile a repertoire of them. [Sarău, 1998, pp. 129-149.]
speak almost all the active languages of Europe. Such a condition of groups of people able to acquire rapidly any language deserves some explanations. How do they succeed?

De facto any group selects only the economically necessary foreign languages and focus on them. The "necessary language" is the key concept in the development of their multilingualism. For them, the necessary languages do not mean a prestigious language. In a traditional multilingual context, temporarily settled Roma spoke fluently all the languages of the context, because they need to interact with that language speakers. They try to sell to the Others (non-Roma) merchandises or services. Fortune telling, charming, witchcraft, or healings with ayurvedic practices or fake ayurvedic are the most common services. The necessity to interact with Others – to adapt to the context for economic reasons – is explaining why in a new multilingual context, the Roma in mobility spoke the languages needed there, the local languages plus the others mobile groups languages.

Practically, each group pays attention to the language/s spoken in the context where they live for a while. This language is seen as the first requirement for the interactions with the locals.

It is also to see as an explanatory factor the attitude that they take to the language' learning. They look to a language acquisition as the tool to access an opportunity. Not a burden or an obstacle to be overcome.

Their learning is a group's activity, accomplished with the intense support the most gifted of its members, but encompassing all the group members. The gifted members explore the resources of learning, valorize them, develop the strategy to manage with the new language and call all the people to contribute and to share their accomplishments.

Their linguistic abilities are not the results of their musical competences. They are the outcomes of practical reasons: they earn their living due to the linguistic interactions with Others – the speakers of different languages. That is why they acquire rapidly new languages, no matter, how many those languages are and to which family they belong to. The need to survive is the first explanatory factor of their active interest and effectiveness in multilingualism.

The concrete explanations are those related to their success in doing it. Their success comes from the group learning; the method and techniques developed; historical experiences of language practicing.

3.2. The meanings of Roma’s marginal multilingualism
For the Roma groups, foreign languages acquirement is undoubtfully an added value. A new language means new ways to access a new market. Is such a linguistic asset value for the general society too? Answering such question, we like to underline that, in the economically globalized world, the multilingualism per se is and will be the first cultural capital. It is prestigious and productive, and its prestige develops exponentially. That is why, a form of multilingualism, accessible to anybody interested in, constitutes a society's asset. The Roma abilities to rapidly become multilingual is highly encouraging. To reveal it is in the general society's benefits.

We plead for intensively communicate in the scientific milieu on the existence of the Roma marginal multilingualism, and on its methods and techniques.

Going further it is to look for answers to socio-political questions. Does the Roma marginal multilingualism carry out a socio-political potential? Could the revealing of their multilingualism play a role in curving the millennial xenophobia against them? Could it lead to dismantling the Romaphobia in Europe?

We do believe it. To underline the very existence of the Roma's multilingualism it is to attach to them a positive feature. It comes from the prestige of the multilingualism, but it is not enough. The peculiarity of the Roma's multilingualism is to related to a positive feature. Or it really exists! It unveils that nearby the elites' multilingualism, sophisticated and exclusivist, there is one largely available to anybody. Indeed, the nucleus of positivity here is that the multilingualism's strategy is available to be largely shared.

At a deeper level, the sharing accompanied by the acknowledgment that it is a Roma contribution could fight the stigma on Roma and Romani languages. It could curve the xenophobia as Romanophobia.

Finally, it could heal the society by tendencies to blame, stigmatize, exclude or send to crematories the excluded. It could lead to rational behavior and to human solidarities in hard times.

**Conclusions**

We consider that the evidence confirms that the Roma are multilingual and developed a special form of multilingualism: the marginal multilingualism. The marginal multilingualism provides them with competences to interact with the speakers specific to any multicultural context.
The field studies in Bihor county describes traditional categories of languages spoken by the Roma: a) the languages that are traditionally spoken in situ (Romani’s varieties, Romanian and Hungarian) b) and the languages newly acquired in the recent mobilities.

The meaning of the Roma multilingualism is positive. It confers prestige to the speakers and groups able to practice it. It encourages ordinary people to acquire the new language/s. The non-Roma could be convinced to inhibit their own tendencies of xenophobic behaviors or even to prevent or cut the elements of Romanophobia in their milieu if they acknowledge the Roma linguistic abilities. The Roma respected for their qualities gain the self-esteem and the sense of duty toward the community where they live. Even more, the conscience on Roma positive features opens the way to mobilize the Roma potential to contribute to the developing a Europe able to directly communicate too at the lower levels.

Due to their multilingualism the Roma could consider to be an original contributive part in a cohesive Europe.

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Cinema of Going West and the Emergence of Transnational Memory Communities. The Case of Romania

Antonela GYÖNGY

Abstract. Since the fall of Communism in Romania, migration has been emerging as a prevalent cinema theme. Various Romanian and foreign filmmakers are drawing public attention to the social phenomenon of migration and the challenges of social inclusion not only by bringing these issues to the screen and shaping different migration narratives, but also by increasingly involving film crew members from emigration and immigration countries. In doing so, these films have a significant contribution in shaping a transnational social space or communities of remembrance. This paper investigates the emergence of transnational memory communities by analyzing two feature films produced in Romania and Germany: Occident (Cristian Mungiu, 2002) and Offset (Didi Danquart, 2006). It argues that feature films are reinforcing transnational communication between emigrants and those staying behind, including the host society.

Keywords: transnational cinema, transnational memory, Romania, Germany, migration

Introduction

Contemporary societies create new socio-spatial linkages and boundaries in order to identify and assure themselves as communities. Not only as a result of political and social upheavals but also because of the various long-term globalization manifestations and, in particular, the accelerated development of media and media usage, old spaces and borders become more fluid, whereas new borders and social spaces emerge instead. In the context of accelerated social change, migration proves to be a significant social phenomenon that creates new spaces of belonging, which are no longer supported by the container structure of the national state, but rather by transnational links and socialization processes. People are increasingly involved in migration networks, which in turn are being transformed by changing migration goals and reshaping the regions of the origin and host countries. Ludger Pries refers
in this context to “permanent transnational connections”\(^1\) having as consequence that “people’s subjective localizations of the self and the other are spanned in a plurilocal and transnational space.”\(^2\) This applies also in the case of Romanian (labor) migration. Romanian (working) migrants are neither accommodated by the host countries inasmuch as they could homogenously integrate in the culture of entry. Nor are they given the opportunity to similarly integrate in the political, cultural and economic spheres. In addition to this gradual and sectoral integration which leads to a diversification of the migrant community, migrants are also creating transnational networks and thus maintain contact with their country of origin in different forms: whether through economic investments, retirement plans, political participation, holiday arrangements or even just by media consumption and social networks. After arriving in the host country, the migration process is far from complete, but is continued through the interaction with the host society, the other migrant or diaspora communities and the own (Romanian) migration community. Migration experiences are thus the common denominator that ultimately shape the identity of migrant communities. Following Ludger Pries, it can be argued that these communities do not constitute “either-or-identities” confirming the affiliation to one or another community, but rather “hyphenated identities”\(^3\) that rely precisely on intertwining of various spaces of belonging. Consequently, migrant communities can not develop homogeneous cultural identities, if uniform cultural identities can be assumed in the present days at all. According to the cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall – who himself have had migration and diaspora experiences as a native Jamaican in England – the diaspora community is characterized by heterogeneity and hybridity being further reproduced by representations.\(^4\) He also states that “...as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant difference which constitute ‘what we really are’; or rather – since history has


\(^2\) “die subjektiven Selbst- und Fremdverortungen der Menschen in einem plurilokalen und transnationalen Raum aufgespannt.“ Pries, “Integration als Raumentwicklung,” 138-39.


intervened - `what we have become`.\(^5\) Thus, such communities are not constant in their nature and identity, but they are changing due to their interaction with other migration or host communities, as well as in the relation to their own past.

Given these introductory considerations, the present paper focusses on the Romanian migration community and its cinematic self-image. It argues that shaping the image of oneself also implies a confrontation with direct or mediated migration experiences, ultimately leading to the emergence of a community of remembrance. The question to be raised is: what cinematic self-representations and migration narratives can be evidenced and to what extent does a transnational community of remembrance articulate in the case of Romanian migration? The investigation of this issue requires firstly a closer look to different forms of collective memory and their media, provided in the first section of the paper. The increasingly transnational functioning of migration communities and cinema are also emphasized here. The second section deals with the cinema of going west, namely with cinematic representations of migration in the feature films *Occident* (Cristian Mungiu 2002) and *Offset* (Didi Danquart 2006), which consequently permits formulating conclusions on the emergence of transnational communities of remembrance.

### The Role of Cinema in Shaping Transnational Memories

Taking the above described cultural identity into account, migrant communities can be furthermore considered as communities of remembrance where migration, integration, inclusion, exclusion or even commuter experiences are shared. They also evolve in a mutual relationship with the communities of origin and arrival. But what forms of remembrance can be identified, given the heterogeneity and transnational functioning of these communities? Following Jan Assmann, one can firstly mention “communicative memory”\(^6\), which is shaped and supported by human bearers and is based on direct, everyday communication of contemporary witnesses, in this case the first generation of migrants. This implies a confrontation with the near, experienced past that is mutually shared in the community. However, the author distinguishes between this form of memory and what he calls “cultural

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\(^5\) Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” 112.

memory”⁷, which implies an evocation by means of communication and symbolic support of a distant past. This enlarged spatio-temporal frame does not include the recent (lived) past, but spans several generations, with contents of the cultural memory coming under the authority of so called “memory specialists”.⁸ Although Jan Assmann himself has applied the concept of cultural memory to the migration and diaspora experience of the Jews, this apprehension of collective memory seems to be less tenable for our concern, as it addresses the contemporary social phenomenon of migration with its experiences grounded in the recent past. Rather, one can further differentiate the communicative memory by the memory of the first generation, the “postmemory”⁹ of the following generation, and the “prosthetic memory”¹⁰ of non-members of the community. Marianne Hirsch introduced the term “postmemory” in order to describe the inter- and trans-generational transmission of traumatic memories of the Holocaust through the medium of photography. Despite indirect knowledge transfer, the postmemory generation appropriates the traumatic past of the predecessors as its own memory.¹¹ The mediated memories differ, however, from the direct memories of contemporary witnesses not only in terms of “post-ness”, namely the temporal delay, but also because of the critical distance to the narrated events and the closer connection to the memory transmission forms and vehicles used by the witness generation. The affective attachment to the familial transmission forms gives rise to “affiliative acts of postgeneration”, which are no longer just a vertical transmission within the family setting, but also a horizontal identification with contemporaries of the second generation.¹² This seems to be of particular importance for conveying migration experiences, since second generation members are no longer oriented solely to the memory formed in their own family, but generally to that of their contemporaries. In Hirsch’s words, postmemory implies even an “oscillation between continuity and

⁷ Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 52.
⁸ Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 54-55.
rupture”\textsuperscript{13} that can be nonetheless applied to the second generation of the migration community still influenced by the migration background, but more tied to the host community. Regarding migration or diaspora societies, one can also talk about “prosthetic memory”\textsuperscript{14}, the memory of those who do not belong to the diasporic community. They present the past rather from the perspective of the “other” and, depending on their position, they are also able to mediate between diasporic communities and the host or home society. They can not only promote more convergence, but also reinforce clichés, opposed to or counter-productive for the diasporic group.\textsuperscript{15} It can be therefore concluded that the transnational migration space is shaped as remembrance community by the communicative memory of the migrant community, the postmemory of subsequent generations and the prosthetic memory of non-members. Now that the various memory forms have been discussed, one can ask what role media – in this case the feature films – play in the memory construction process within the transnational migration space.

Daniela Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg refer to feature films as migrant communities’ “self-representations”\textsuperscript{16} which evolve with the increased number of filmmakers having direct or indirect migratory experiences, who deal either with their own past or that of their community. But feature films could be considered more than simple self-representations, they could also contribute to the construction of a transnational communicative space. Both through their content and form of production and reception, feature films can reflect a transnational community and at the same time contribute to its further reproduction. Their material and social dimension transform them into what Astrid Erll calls “media of collective memory“\textsuperscript{17}. While the materiality of feature films serves as a precondition for the extension of the communication space, for the message structure and, in general, for representations of the past, the social dimension of media is what concretely allows the construction of memory discourses. Social actors as knowledge producers or so called “memory specialists“ are those who attribute a feature film,

\textsuperscript{14} Landsberg, “Prosthetic memory.“
\textsuperscript{15} Berghahn and Sternberg, “Locating Migrant and Diasporic Cinema,” 18.
\textsuperscript{17} Astrid Erll, Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen (Stuttgart/ Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 2005).
for example, a formative or prescriptive function, while at the moment of decoding, the audience confer this film a mnemonic function. Therefore, the media of collective memory are closely related to this interplay between the material and social function which differentiates them from classical mass media. The film has the capacity to store and disseminate information, and implicitly extend the communication range by its technology. Moreover, the social dimension of institutionalization and functionalization can articulate a film as a medium of memory triggering remembrance processes either during the film’s appearance or later. A closer look to the social function of contemporary feature films shoes that filmmakers in particular have accompanied the social phenomenon of migration by further developing the transnational migration space both through the cinematic portrayal of migration experiences and the trans-nationalization of film production. Film scholars refer in this regard to “transnational cinema” as being not only a consequence of the free market economy and the global consumer society, but also a reaction of former colonized communities when dealing with their own migration and diaspora experiences. Here are even some former established cinema movements such as the Black Cinema in the UK, Beur Cinema in France or German-Turkish Cinema in Germany. These may be followed by the East European film after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Thus, the medium of film has been invested with the social function of dealing with the past and the new cultural interferences. But how does cinema deal with the above mentioned issues and what characterizes these new cinemas? Some general features relevant to the following film analysis are presented by Daniela Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg, and therefore they are briefly summarized below:

The film topics, production and reception overcome the national state as reference term by constructing transnational identities and emphasizing diversity instead of uniformity. These films reflect the difference between migrant and diasporic experiences in terms of the first generation and the subsequent ones. They

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19 Erll, *Kollektives Gedächtnis*, 137-139.
are the expression either of the filmmakers’ direct experiences, their postmemory, or of their external observations. The film aesthetics also draw on the „double consciousness“ regarding artistic conventions, music, narratives and performances belonging to different aesthetic cultures.

European migration films are characterized by the predominance of spatial tropes concerning not only mobility between different social spaces, but also the immobilization or captivity in closed spaces reflecting marginality. However, marginality moves to the center, becoming the core of the plot.

Finally, the “otherness” is being considered in terms of cinema traditions and ideological divisions. “It is a cinema of identity politics that probes difference along multiple coordinates of race, colour, ethnicity, nationality, regionality, language, religion, generation, class, gender and sexuality.”

Given this analytical framework but without systematically addressing the above listed features, the following section concentrates mainly on transnational remembrance and migration narratives.

Cinema of Going West: Occident (Cristian Mungiu, 2002) and Offset (Didi Danquart, 2006)

After the collapse of Communism in Romania an internal migration occurred along with a significant East-West movement that continues until today. This movement expanded with the accession of Romania to the European Union and the later lifting of the restrictions on the free movement of workers in the developed old member states. Romania has become a country of emigration and has been dealing with its social consequences ever since. But for the Romanian emigrants it does not seem to have been a one way path. Rather, they have created a cross-border social space in which mobility prevails. The migration theme – whether as emigration or return – has been and continues to be a concern of old and new generation Romanian filmmakers: from Radu Gabrea who deals specifically with the German minority, to Ioana Uricaru extending the subject to the cinematic depiction of the Romanian migration to the US (see Lemonade 2018). Except Radu Gabrea’s German exile experiences, these directors, and in particular those of the new generation, have no direct migration background. Dina Iordanova also points this out in the case

of the East European migration cinema. Consequently, there are mostly filmmakers who might be seen at first glance as taking the perspective of the emigration country, but their increasing transnational activity has turned them into so called “transnationally mobile filmmakers”, who share to some extent the experiences of multiculturalism, and as a result, they will not unilaterally address these issues.

In the following, the two feature films *Occident* and *Offset* are considered in more detail. While the first feature film is a Romanian production, where foreign film characters are mostly represented by respective foreign actors, *Offset* is a co-production (Germany, Romania, France, Switzerland) based primarily on the cooperation between Romanian and German directors and actors. Here are the directors and screenwriters Didi Danquart, Cristi Puiu and Răzvan Rădulescu to mention as well as the actors Alexandra Maria Lara, Katharina Thalbach and Răzvan Vasilescu. In this respect, *Offset* increases the formation of transnational social space even by means of film production circumstances, whereas in the case of Cristian Mungiu and his feature film debut *Occident*, one can consider him as being a “transnationally mobile filmmaker” who engages “per project” on transnational level. Both films have been produced in the run-up to Romania’s accession to the EU and deal in comical tones with the East-West interferences, however, the film setting is being placed exclusively in the emigration country Romania.

*Occident* starts with an image of crossed railway lines, pointing already in the opening credits to a possible direction change. The issue of life change is in fact the main concern of the characters throughout the plot. The film is divided into three episodes (1. Luci and Sorina/ 2. Mihaela and her mother/ 3. Nae Zigfrid and Mr Colonel), each considering a figure couple dealing with the decision to emigrate to the West. Being rather interwoven, than running parallel, their everyday stories are revealing different perspectives on the same issue of going west.

Unable to pay their rent for an old apartment on the outskirts, the young couple Lucian (Alexandru Papadopol) and Sorina (Anca Androne) were urged one day to leave their home. As they literally end up on the streets, Sorina decides to leave her poor living conditions, to distance herself from her boyfriend Lucian and move in a luxury neighborhood with a French businessman, with whom she eventually

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immigrates to France. While trying to save the situation and engage as an advertising agent, Lucian meets Mihaela (Tania Popa).

The second part of the film focuses on Mihaela and her mother trying to find her a suitable husband to ensure her a safe and wealthy life in which she should not have anything else to do but raise children. After several encounters with different foreign men, the matrimonial agency came up with a concrete suggestion: a rich Italian who owns a publishing house and who has the opportunity to publish Mihaela’s poems. But this option was eventually a failure, after the Italian, hosted by her family in an „Italian ambiance“, turned out to be of African origin. Therefore, Mihaela’s father, colonel Vișoiu (Dorel Vișan) looked for other solutions.

The third part emphasizes the story of the colonel and Nae Zigfrid (Valeriu Andriuță), old acquaintances from the communist period, when Nae Zigfrid with his friend Nicu tried to cross the border over the Danube. Because he helped him recover his stolen luggage and announce Nicu’s family about his death in Germany, colonel Vișoiu asks Nae Zigfrid for a favor: to take his daughter Mihaela with him back to Germany. The film ends with a series of farewells: Sorina takes leave of Lucian, Mihaela also departs from Lucian and finally, two orphaned children, one of whom was adopted by a Dutch, are also constrained to separate.

The migration narratives point to spatial mobility and hybridity. Marginality is brought to the center and this new center is infused with mobility. It moves to the center not only because of the film’s emphasis on the simple, everyday life of the characters living on the outskirts, but also because of the West’s great interest in discovering the country: the French businessman takes Sorina with him to France, the Dutch businessman adopts an orphan, the Italian of African origin visits Mihaela, but proves to be unsuccessful in his request, and finally Nae Zigfrid who has previously emigrated to Germany, reports in the local police magazine about his escape on the Danube during communism. This creates a „double space“ between East and West, in which translators take on the roles of mediators. This double space also exists in the minds of the film characters. They see the West as a space of prosperity and hope, the only place in which to shape the future of the younger generation. However, this perception is counteracted by the only „direct witness“, Nae Zigfrid, who lost his old friend Nicu in Germany, because the latter could not

give up his „old habits“. Nevertheless, the mobility remains inevitable. The generation of former pioneers finally decided to move to the West, whereby this decision is accompanied as leitmotif by the pioneering song „Noi in anul 2000“ promising a flourishing future. However, these compressed life stories with their decisions to move west are combined with comic elements, which not only emphasize the naive film character’s expectations towards the unknown West, but also make this resettlement process appear in an ambivalent light.

The other feature film - *Offset* deals with a similar story, focussing, however, on the characters’ triptych Nicu Iorga (Răzvan Vasilescu) – Brândușa Herghelegiu (Alexandra Maria Lara) – Stefan Fischer (Felix Klare). Brândușa Herghelegiu works as a secretary in a printing company and has an occasional love affair with the manager Nicu Iorga. But now she wants to marry Stefan Fischer, a German engineer who had fixed an offset at the company. Iorga opposes this marriage by all means of blackmail and violence, succeeding ultimately on the wedding day.

A „double space“ emerges in this case, evidenced firstly by the mission of the German engineer Stefan Fischer who comes to Romania, namely to Nicu Iorga’s printing house, in order to repair a machine imported from Germany. The German expert evaluator Peter Gross arrives in Bucharest shortly after, and finally the German family Fischer visits Romania, in order to participate to Stefan’s and Brândușa’s wedding. On the other side, the French delegation, with whom Iorga starts business negotiations, is presented as competitor to the German partners. The social „double space“ now encompasses both the encounter of different corporate cultures and everyday cultures. However, the film plot does not point to a possible convergence between them, but rather to differences and divergences. Due to her German language skills acquired at school, Brândușa assumes the role of translator and mediator, which proves to be more authentic with the Romanian origin of the actress Alexandra Maria Lara. At the same time she wavers in her decision to start a new life in Germany or to continue her old one in Romania. The divergences between the different everyday and corporate cultures are mostly evidenced through dialogue and acting figures. The commonly used stereotypes such as „Don’t work so hard. You are Romanian“ (Stefan Fischer to the other secretary), the machine is

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31 *Offset*, [0:32:09].
from Germany, it can not have technical problems\textsuperscript{32} (Peter Gross, the expert evaluator) or „Don’t worry. That’s the German traditional family. But should not be contagious”\textsuperscript{33} (Iris to Brândușa) point to a communication that, despite its joking intention, is usually prejudiced and conflict oriented. This is particularly expressed by the German family, who can hardly cope with unknown situations in Bucharest and are skeptical of their surroundings. The future of Romania in the EU also came up as a conversation subject at the German-Romanian joint family dinner, where again different views occurred: while Brândușa’s father regarded Romania as a poor but culturally rich country that could be profitable for European culture, the German family believed that Romania, still having the post-socialist work ethic, would hardly manage in the EU. On the other hand, the authoritarian, unleashed behavior of Nicu Iorga points out that cultural rapprochement is hardly possible: „You are not at home!”\textsuperscript{34} is what he tells the Germans at the marriage registry office. In fact, there is no rapprochement, as even Brândușa finally decides not to enter into this marriage anymore. Only the final intertitle gives further information about the engineer Stefan Fischer and the expert Peter Gross, who have started running a business at European level, about Brândușa Herghelegiu’s application for a study abroad and Nicu Iorga reopening business negotiations with the French.

As in Occident, this film narrative emphasizes the emergence of a social double space, which is also characterized by transnational mobility. However, cultural differences and discrepancies are more evident in this social space. On the one hand, the West is no longer unconditionally accepted as a place of prosperity and hope, on the other hand, the alienation and Western visitors’ lack of trust is clearly noticeable.

Conclusion

The present paper has attempted to show how transnational social spaces are shaped and reinforced by means of feature films as media of collective memory.

\textsuperscript{32} The expert Peter Gross: “Es ist daher sehr unwahrscheinlich, dass die bereits von Ihnen beschriebenen Probleme auftreten. Immerhin kommt die aus Deutschland”; Brândușa’s translation: “Mașinile sunt din Germania și în principiu funcționează impecabil.” Off\textit{set} [0:10:59].

\textsuperscript{33} In original: “Keine Angst, so ist die deutsche traditionelle Familie. Ist aber nicht ansteckend.”, Off\textit{set} [0.48.04].

\textsuperscript{34} Off\textit{set} [1.38.00].
The focus has been set on the Romanian migration, considered in this respect a transnational social phenomenon. Without drawing the actual migration process into the foreground, the paper has dealt rather with the cinematic examination of identity and community formation and with the cinematic tropes of spatial affiliation. The question that has been raised concerned the cinematic self-representations of the Romanian migrant community and the extent to which it can be considered a transnational community of remembrance. By referring to concepts such as “communicative memory”\(^{35}\), “postmemory”\(^{36}\) and “prosthetic memory”\(^{37}\) as well as to the “media of collective memory”\(^{38}\), the Romanian community of migration and remembrance has been more closely grasped. It has been shown that the medium of feature film helped working out the Romanian migration experiences especially in the context of the communicative memory of the witnesses’ experiences, and of the prosthetic memory. Moreover, the trans-nationalization of this cinematic confrontation with the Romanian migration issue has been also evidenced. Trans-nationalization emerged not only because of the media usage, but was reinforced by the film production and reflected in the self-representations of the migrant community as well. The discussed feature films Occident and Offset – shot in a period in which Romania was particularly involved in the European integration process but had not overcome yet the post-communist transition – have articulated the transnational social space of Romanian migration as marked by diversity, mobility and spatial interferences. Focusing on the same theme, namely that of going west, the films differ in terms of the perspective addressed. Occident proposes, on the one hand, the perspective of the Romanian emigration society looking hopefully at the unknown West, whereas the film does not hesitate to put this attitude into question. Being a co-production, Offset addresses, on the other hand, a dual perspective, namely that of the Romanian-German relations in which the attitude of both the Romanians and Germans were overemphasized. However, both feature films perform as media of collective memory that, among other memory practices and vehicles, shape the Romanian transnational community of remembrance.

\(^{35}\) Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, 2000.
\(^{36}\) Hirsch, “The Generation of Postmemory.”
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FOCUS: MANAGING REFUGEES' STITUATION

Romania's Approach to Managing the Refugees’ Situation

Andreea Florentina NICOLESCU

Abstract. In the context of the crisis of refugees and sharing the responsibility of receiving refugees in the member states as a result of the wave of refugees which arrived in Europe, Romania is one of the countries which confronted with the reception of refugees on its territory. The main objective of this research is to identify the capacity of Romania to grant asylum and to integrate refugees in the Romanian society. The article is structured in 3 parts, in which it is presented the situation of refugees in Romania. In the first part of the article it is analyzed the flow of refugees who arrived in Romania and requested protection from the Romanian state between 2008 and 2018. This analysis presents the characteristics of the asylum applicants who handed in an application of humanitarian protection in Romania. The second part of the research displays the reality from the accommodation centers from Romania, as well as the possibility of extending the capacity for these in case of crisis situation. The final part of the study exposes the measures adopted by Romania regarding the integration of the refugees through the programs applied with the help of Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (FAMI).

Keywords: refugees, accommodation centers, integration, grant projects

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to identify the situation of the refugees from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Algeria in Romania, who, because of the war conditions from their countries were forced to migrate. So, the article presents the characteristics of the refugees regarding their flow, gender, age, as well as the nationality of those who handed in application for asylum in Romania. Also, the article makes a presentation of the statistics regarding the Romania accommodation centers and their capacity in different cities of Romania.

The final part of the article shows the different projects financed by FAMI Program which was established for 2014-2020 interval in order to develop the common asylum system, maintain legal migration, support return strategies but also
the assurance that EU member states which have been highly affected by the crisis of refugees can count on the rest of European states.

The main objective of this article is to identify the situation of refugees in Romania, an eastern European developing country. The article aims mainly the methods through which refugees are supported for the integration by applying the implemented projects by different Romanian non governmental organizations and financed by FAMI European Fund (Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration).

Methodology of research

The first part of the article referring to the features of refugees was realized using data provided by Eurostat, the institute which handles European Commission statistics. The method of research used in this situation was the analysis of statistics by taking the data delivered by Eurostat, processing those in Excel and creating graphics to highlight the situation of refugees in Romania, but also the interpretation of the results obtained.

The second part of the article was done with the help of research method which involves the analysis of the documents. In this way, to emphasize the situation of the accommodation centers from Romanian cities, as well as their capacity, I analyzed the reports created on this topic by the Institution – The People’s Advocate, which has as objective defending the rights and liberties of the individuals in relation with the public authorities. In this regard, analyzing the reports of this institutions had the purpose of identifying if the accommodation centers are enough in order to be sure about the principle of respecting the human rights.

The ending part of this article was achieved by analyzing the provided information from General Immigration Inspectorate from Romania towards the implemented projects by different non-governmental organizations through the FAMI program (Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration). The research method applied here was the one of analysis of official documents supplied by site of General Immigration Inspectorate.

1. The analysis regarding the characteristics of the asylum applicants in Romania

The first part of the study identifies the characteristics of those who requested asylum in Romania, like: the flows of asylum applicants in the interval 2008 – 2018, their gender, age but also the nationality.
Thus, in this study, the main features of the ones who applied for humanitarian protection in Romania, as a result of the wars in Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria.

To accomplish this research, I used data provided by Eurostat regarding the number of asylum seeker in Romania, between 2008 and 2018. The choice of this interval is due to the fact that it includes the period between the crisis, up to 2015 but also its beginning and the first years when Romania received requests from the refugees. It is necessary to mention the fact that the inquiry was made in the previous mentioned interval, since the available information started with year 2008, no other data being available on Eurostat for the previous years.

The importance of this analysis is highlighted by the fact that emphasizes the evolution of asylum applications by refugees in Romania.

We can observe from figure 1.1 the fact that the highest number of asylum seekers was recorded in 2017, when 4815 applications were made in Romania.

![Figure 1.1 The number of asylum applications in Romania during 2008 - 2018](image)

Source: Eurostat http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do

From the available data at the time when the research was done, we can identify two moments in which the number of asylum applications recorded an ascending trend. The first one can be noticed in the time interval of 2011-2012, when the number of seekers grew with 790.

The second one from the analyzed stage when a growth was recorded is between 2015 and 2017, which recorded an increase of 3,555 requests, being also the peak value from 2008 to 2018. So, we can state that this crisis of the refugees
influenced also the statistics of asylum seekers in Romania, an expansion being able to be observed starting with 2015. The status of the asylum applications registered in Romania in 2018 show a decrease of demands compared to previous year.

In the following it is displayed the situation of asylum seekers and their applications in Romania, between 2008 and 2018, according to their gender. The data used for this analysis was provided by Eurostat.

Thereby, we can see in the below graphic the fact that in the whole analyzed period, the gender of the majority of the solicitants is male. Overall, between 2008 and 2018 there were 15,590 asylum applications recorded from males, while only 4,795 came from females.

So, from the total of application on Romanian territory, approximately 76% were made by males and only around 24% were from females.

**Figure 1.2 Evolution of asylum applications in Romania according to the gender of the applicants between 2008 – 2018**

Source: Eurostat http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do

In figure 1.2 we can notice that for both females (1,745 persons) and males (3,075 persons), the most asylum seekers were registered in 2017. At the opposite, the smallest number of applications from females (95 persons) came in 2011 while for males (770 persons) in 2010.

In the below analysis we can notice Figure 1.3, in which it is highlighted, with the help of the Eurostat data, the situation of the applications for asylum in Romania, based on the age of the seekers, in every year starting with 2008 and ending with 2018.
A such research is mandatory for the analyzed topic in order to identify how many refugees could be integrated in the market labour in Romania, taking into consideration the ones who have the required age to work.

Thus, we can observe in the next figure the fact that the most demands made the minors in Romania have been recorded in 2017 (1,595 persons) and the least in 2009 (95 persons). The number of applications of the minors registered in Romania grew between 2009 and 2013, afterwards, it decreased in 2014-2015, and then increased again 2016, getting to the point when in 2017 it had the highest number from people under 18 years.

In 2018, the number of asylum application from minors decreased with approximately 66% in comparison with 2017.

Figure 1.3 Number of asylum applications in Romania between 2008 and 2018 according to the age of the asylum applicants

Concerning the situation of the demands for asylum made by the people with the age between 18 and 34, it can be seen that the biggest number of them were recorded in 2017 (2,475), representing the peak value from the whole interval included in the study (2008-2018) among all the age categories analyzed. Thereby, we can state that the most people who sought asylum in Romania have the age between 18 and 35 years.

As regards the category of age of 35-64 years, we can discover that the largest number of applications were committed in 2017 (730 persons), as well as
2013 (365 persons). The lowest number of requests for humanitarian protection recorded by this age section were in 2010 (170 persons) but also in 2009 (185 persons).

At the other end, there is the other age group, 65 years and over, where there were enrolled the least applications. So, the ones who are 65 or over, applied in Romania 100 times in the interval included in the inquiry. In 2011 there wasn’t any asylum seeker in this category of age.

The next research aims to point out the primary nationalities for the asylum applicants, as well as the evolution of the humanitarian protection demands placed in Romania between 2008 and 2018, based on the origin of their deponents.

Figure 1.4 The main nationalities of those who submitted asylum applications in Romania between 2008 – 2018

THE MAIN NATIONALITIES OF THOSE WHO SUBMITTED ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN ROMANIA BETWEEN 2008 - 2018

Source: Eurostat http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do

The data used in this analysis was furnished by Eurostat, being annual data. It can be remarked in figure 1.4 the fact that the main nationalities analyzed in this research are: Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria. This classification has been made by selecting the states of origin of the asylum seekers who deposited the most request of humanitarian protection in Romania. So, from realized ranking, 23% of the
applicants come from Syria and 26% from Iraq.

Also, a significant percent of 7% is represented by Pakistanis, and 6% by the afghans. Likewise, 5% of the ones who requested asylum in Romania, come from Algeria and 33% are illustrated by other nationalities.

Table 1.4 The evolution of asylum requirements registered in Romania in 2008 – 2018 based on the nationality of their demanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>2.745</td>
<td>1.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.175</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>1.720</td>
<td>2.510</td>
<td>1.495</td>
<td>1.545</td>
<td>1.260</td>
<td>1.880</td>
<td>4.815</td>
<td>2.135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.4 shows the annual evolution of the asylum applications registered by Romania, in the interval 2008 – 2018, according to asylum seekers’ nationality. So, the yellow arrow represents a stagnation of the number of demands compared to previous year, the green arrow means that the number increased and the red arrow indicates a decrease of the requests of humanitarian protection in correlation with the year before.

2. The situation of the Regional Centers of Procedures and Accommodation in Romania

This analysis has the role of presenting the accommodation centers in Romania, their ability to receive refugees, as well as the situation in these centers. In order to perform this research, I analyzed the data provided by the reports of the People’s Advocate Institution in Romania. The analysis shows the location of the accommodation centers in Romania, the accommodation capacity, the year in which they became operational and the number of additional places within these centers, as a result of the refugee crisis and the need for additional accommodation.

In Romania there are six Regional Centers of Procedures and Accommodation for asylum seekers, these being subordinated to the General Inspectorate for Immigration. These centers have a total capacity of 900 places, arranged as follows¹:

¹ Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Inspectorate for Immigration, „Domain of torture in places of detention”, 2017
Table 2.1 The accommodation centers for asylum seekers in Romania (location, accommodation capacity and year of commissioning)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Location of centers</th>
<th>Accommodation capacity</th>
<th>Year of commissioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Bucuresti</td>
<td>320 places</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Galati</td>
<td>200 places</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Radauti – judetul Suceava</td>
<td>130 places</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Somcuta Mare - Maramures</td>
<td>100 places</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Giurgiu</td>
<td>100 places</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Timisoara</td>
<td>50 places</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total accommodation capacity</strong></td>
<td><strong>900 places</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is necessary to mention that, as regards the accommodation center from Timisoara, which became operational in 2004, it currently has a capacity of 50 places, but the initial capacity of the center was 250. In 2008, the destination of 200 accommodation places was changed, these being used to host other categories of applicants only if needed and within availability\(^2\).

Thereby, taking also into consideration the capacity of extension for the accommodation places in the Regional Centers, in times of crisis, the total number of accommodation places in Romania is 1,162\(^3\).

As a result of an increase in the number of asylum applications in Romania caused by the refugee crisis, the Immigration General started a project that involves increasing the accommodation capacity with funding through the FAMI program.

The purpose of this project is to increase the accommodation capacity in the following three centers: Galati with 300 places, Timisoara with 100 places and Radauti with 100 places. However, in case of crisis, the number of accommodation places can be extended by 262 places, each center being able to expand as follow\(^4\):

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\(^2\) Ibidem 1, pag 2  
\(^3\) Ibidem 2  
\(^4\) Ibidem 2
Table 2.2 The capacity of expansion of the accommodation places in Regional Centers in Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Location of centers</th>
<th>Number of additional accommodation places</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Somcuta Mare - Maramures</td>
<td>100 places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Giurgiu</td>
<td>70 places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Bucuresti</td>
<td>52 places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Radauti – Suceava county</td>
<td>20 places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Galati</td>
<td>10 places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Timisoara</td>
<td>10 places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total number</strong></td>
<td><strong>262 places</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Also, in order to manage better the situation of accommodation centers in Romania, the General Inspectorate for Immigration intervened in order to take over a building in Crevedia, Dambovita county, which will be arranged for hosting the asylum seekers and the center will have a capacity of 500 places\(^5\).

Excepting the accommodations spaces that were previously presented, in the centers are made available to asylum seekers the following: medical offices, rooms for leisure, sports and educational activities.

3. Analysis of grant projects funded by the Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration in Romania between 2015 and 2019

The last part of this article aims to present the projects implemented in Romania under the Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration. To accomplish this qualitative research, we have used data and information provided by the Immigration General Inspectorate on migration management, implementation, consolidation and development of the asylum and migration system.

The FAMI Fund was set up for 2014-2020 and the budget amount allocated to projects is € 3.137 billion. Thus, there are four specific objectives of the Asylum,

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\(^5\) Ibidem 2
Migration and Integration Fund, these are the following:

1. Developing the Common Asylum System by ensuring an effective and uniform legislation in the European Union;
2. Supporting legal migration in the EU in line with labor market needs and supporting the integration of refugees;
3. Supporting the return strategies to fight against illegal migration;
4. Guaranteeing that the EU member states that have been severely affected by refugee flows can count on the help of the other states.

From the Asylum, Migration and Integration projects are implemented two categories: The Grant Projects and The Monopoly Projects. According to the Immigration General Inspectorate, 40 grant projects were implemented in Romania between 2015 and 2018 and 24 monopoly projects between 2016 and 2018.

**Figure 3.1 The projects implemented by non-governmental organizations and associations for refugees in Romania between 2015 and 2019 from the Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration**

Projects implemented by non-governmental organizations and associations for refugees in Romania during 2015-2019

- Romanian National Council for Refugees 3,7%
- Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania 1,3%
- Association Refugee Jesuits Service in Romania 8,20%
- International Organization for Migration 6,15%
- World Vision Romania 13,32%
- ICAR Foundation 1,2%
- LADO Cluj 4,10%
- Romanian Association for Health Promotion 1,3%
- Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrari, “the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund” http://igi.mai.gov.ro/ro/content/fondul-pentru-azil-migra%C8%9Bie-%C8%99i-integrare
- Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrari, “Grant projects/Monopoly projects” http://igi.mai.gov.ro/ro/content/proiecte
This article is based on the analysis of grant projects, given that they were more numerous. A further study also aims to evaluate monopoly projects, considering that their analysis is necessary to be able to have an overview over the implemented projects to improve the conditions of reception and integration of refugees in Romania.

From Figure 3.1 we can see that between 2015 and 2019 there were 9 organizations/associations that implemented a total of 40 grant projects in order to improve the situation of refugees in Romania.

Most of the completed projects (13 projects) during this period were those implemented by the Romanian National Council for Refugees, representing 32% of the achieved projects between 2015 and 2019.

The Association of the Refugee Jesuits Service in Romania, which implemented 8 projects, representing 20% of the total grant projects identified in this analysis, lines up second in the ranking of those who have implemented grant projects during this period.

The third place in the ranking of those who have implemented most of the grant projects in the above mentioned period, from the FAMI fund, is the International Organization for Migration, the Bureau of Romania. It has completed 6 grant projects, representing 15% of the total implemented between 2015 and 2019.

Between 2015 and 2016, the National National Council for Refugees implemented three grant projects, benefiting from euro 246,662.58 from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund.

Also, between 2015 and 2016, the Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania was the beneficiary of a grand project called "Assistance and Complex Services for Asylum Seekers in Romania", which aimed at providing a complementary material and social assistance system.

Another non-governmental organization that benefited from grant projects between 2015 and 2016 was the Refugee Jesuits Service Association in Romania. JRS has implemented two grant projects totaling euros 287,182.70.

At the same time, between 2015 and 2016, the International Organization for Migration with the Bureau in Romania was the beneficiary of the grant project "Support Program for Assisted Humanitarian Repatriation and Reintegration". This project aimed at providing support for voluntary humanitarian repatriation and reintegration.
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Table 5. Grant projects with implementation period 2015-2016 in Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counseling and legal assistance, interpretation and legal representation in court for foreigners who are the subject of a return decision from the territory of Romania</td>
<td>18.11.2015 – 18.11.2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material Assistance to foreigners for whom a return decision has been issued and are taken into custody</td>
<td>18.11.2015 – 18.11.2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the implementation of grant projects from 2015 to 2016, a budget of euros 979,883.08 was used.

In the table below, we can identify nine grant beneficiaries who have implemented 13 grant projects between 2016 and 2017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Romanian National Council for Refugees (CNRR)</td>
<td>Monitoring of forced return missions</td>
<td>29.03.2016 - 29.03.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managing the processes of research and use of information in the countries of origin</td>
<td>08.07.2016 - 08.07.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialized legal assistance for asylum seekers in Romania</td>
<td>12.07.2016 - 12.07.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counseling and material assistance provided in public custody centers</td>
<td>05.12.2016 - 05.12.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counseling and legal assistance, interpretation and legal representation in court for aliens who are the subject of a return decision from the territory of Romania</td>
<td>05.12.2016 - 05.12.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania (AIDROM)</td>
<td>Integration services for beneficiaries of a form of protection and aliens residing legally in Romania, Western Region</td>
<td>13.05.2016 – 13.05.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (OIM), Office in Romania</td>
<td>INTERACT Integrated services for migrants, social and multicultural dialogue</td>
<td>06.05.2016 - 06.05.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;STARRT I - Transfer and assistance services for refugees relocated from Turkey&quot;</td>
<td>23.11.2016 - 23.07.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision Romania</td>
<td>INTEGRATION Migration assistance services in Region 2</td>
<td>13.05.2016 – 13.05.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAR Foundation</td>
<td>Integration of foreigners with legal residence in Romanian society - a mutual challenge</td>
<td>13.05.2016 – 13.05.2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LADO Cluj</td>
<td>MigraNet The regional network for migrants integration</td>
<td>11.05.2016 – 11.05.2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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The Jesuits Refugee Service in Romania (JRS)
ALTERNATIVE - Temporary support for tolerated people

Romanian Association for Health Promotion
The context of integration matters. Increasing the capacity of public and private actors to interact effectively with migrants.

Source: General Inspectorate for Immigration http://igi.mai.gov.ro/

The non-governmental organization that implemented most of the grant projects, between 2016 and 2017, was The Romanian National Council for Refugees, which completed five grant projects.

During 2016 – 2017, The Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania benefited from a project related to "Integration services for beneficiaries of a form of protection and foreigners with legal residence in Romania, West Region".

The International Organization for Migration implemented between 2016 and 2017 two grant projects totaling EUR 867,545.2. The first project implemented by IOM was "INTERACT-integrated services for migrants, social and multicultural dialogue", aimed to support social, economic and cultural integration of migrants, beneficiaries of international protection and nationals of their third countries in Romanian society through an integrated approach.

The second project implemented by IOM was "STARRT I - Transfer and assistance services for refugees and resettlers from Turkey". It aimed at supporting the active participation of the Romanian state in the efforts of the EU Member States to implement sustainable solutions in response to the real international protection needs of displaced persons due to the conflict in Syria in the closest countries around.

Between 2016 and 2017, World Vision Romania implemented the grant project "INTEGRATING Migration Assistance Services in Region 2", which had a budget of EUR 315,967.20. The goal of the project was to offer appropriate support services adapted to the specific requirements of the
beneficiaries of international protection and third-country nationals legally residing in Romania. Region 2 refers to the cities in Romania: Galati, Vrancea, Bacau, Vaslui, Brăila, Tulcea and Constanța.

The ICAR Foundation implemented between 2016 and 2017 the grant project involving "Integration of Foreigners with Legal Stay in the Romanian Society - A Mutual Challenge". This project had a budget of EUR 164,378, which was intended to the contribution on social integration of beneficiaries of a form of protection and foreigners with legal residence in Romania by implementing a model of regional integration.

LADO Cluj Organization implemented during 2016-2017, the grant project "MigraNet Regional Network for the integration of migrants", which had a budget of EUR 202,808.67. This project aimed to improve the process of integrating their beneficiaries into a form of protection and the residents of third-country nationals residing in Romania in Region 4. Region 4 consists of the following cities: Maramures, Satu Mare, Salaj, Cluj, Bistrita Nasaund, Mures, Harghita, Sibiu and Alba.

“The Refugee Service for Refugees in Romania Association” implemented between 2016 and 2017 the grant project "ALTERNATIVE - Temporary Support for Tolerated People", which benefited of a budget of EUR 238,944.75. The objective was improving the social-economic situation of foreigners whose public custody ceased.

The Romanian Association for Health Promotion implemented between 2016 and 2017 the project "The Context of Integration Matters. Increasing the capacity of public and private actors to interact efficiently with migrants". The project benefited of an amount of EUR 158,056.77, having as objective the increase of the capacity of relevant actors to contribute to the social integration process of foreigners from third countries legally residing in Romania.

Among the organizations that have completed projects that had implementation periods 2016-2017, respectively 2017-2018, it is found the Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania. It received EUR 807,803.10 through the "Assistance and Services for Asylum Seekers in Romania" program. The objective of implementing this program was to improve the situation of asylum seekers in Romania and the increase of the standard living of asylum seekers in Romania.
Table 7. The grant projects that had as implementation periods 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 in Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania (AIDROM) | Assistance and services for asylum seekers in Romania | I - 06.07.2016 - 06.07.2017  
II - 06.07.2017 - 06.07.2018 |
II - 14.07.2017-14.07.2018 |
| ICAR Foundation | Adapted and affordable health services for asylum seekers in Romania | I - 08.07.2016 - 08.07.2017  
II - 08.07.2017 - 08.07.2018 |


The Jesuits Refugee Service Association in Romania benefited of EUR 643,343.59 through the project "A New House", whose main objective was to promote the process of regional integration of beneficiaries of international protection.

During the two implementation periods 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, the ICAR Foundation carried out the project "Adapted and Affordable Health Services for Asylum Seekers in Romania ", which had a budget of EUR 598,350.44. The objective of this project was to improve the reception and assistance conditions for asylum seekers in Romania by providing basic needs in their physical and mental health.

The LADO Cluj Organization benefited of a budget of EUR 218,985.97 seeking to create a new conceptual framework for documentation and information, and new research tools on the study of integration processes of the beneficiaries of international protection and of third country nationals in the Romanian society. Therefor, The Romanian Center for Research on Migration in The Center for the Comparative Study of
Migration from the Faculty of Political Science, Manageative and Communication of the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, the project "Romanian Center for Research of Migration", was set.

In the table below we can see seven implemented grant projects by three beneficiaries between 2017 and 2018.

**Table 8. The grant projects that had the implementation period 2017-2018 in Romania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Romanian National Council for Refugees (CNRR)</td>
<td>Monitoring of forced return missions</td>
<td>28.03.2017- 28.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counseling and material assistance for migrants in public custody</td>
<td>30.11.2017 - 29.12.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal aid to foreigners for whom a return decision has been issued</td>
<td>30.11.2017 - 29.11.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jesuits Refugee Service in Romania Association (JRS)</td>
<td>I am a stranger until you know me</td>
<td>10.03.2017 - 10.03.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration-return training</td>
<td>15.01.2018 - 14.01.2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALTERNATIVE - Temporary support for tolerated people</td>
<td>09.12.2017 - 08.12.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office in Romania</td>
<td>STARRT II - Transfer and assistance services for refugees relocated from Turkey</td>
<td>09.05.2017 - 09.01.2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Romanian National Council for Refugees benefited of three grant projects between 2017 and 2018, totaling EUR 196,842.93. The first is "Monitoring the missions of forced return" which aimed to ensure the compliance with EU standards, human rights and dignity of migrants residing in Romania, during operations of forced return under escort.

The second project implemented by the Romanian National Council for Refugees was "Counseling and material assistance for migrants in public custody". Ensuring their rights, obligations and rules of conduct in the Centers for the accommodation of foreigners detained in Arad and Otopeni by the General Inspectorate for Immigration was one of the objectives of the project.
The third project between 2017 and 2018, in which the CNRR was the beneficiary, was the "Legal Assistance to foreigners for whom a return decision was issued".

The Jesuits Refugee Service in Romania Association benefited from three grant projects in the period 2017 - 2018, amounting to EUR 625,722.25. The first grant project of the association, which was implemented in the previous mentioned period, is called "I am a stranger until you know me". This grant project was designed in order to create a favorable environment among the Romanian population in order to integrate foreigners.

The second JRS project is "Migration-Return Domain Training". The project was intended to increase the country’s level of cooperation between institutions and other relevant entities in the domain of immigration, based on the exchange of best practices, information and analysis to combat illegal immigration cases, return and retention of foreigners.

The third grant project from The Jesuit Refugee Service in Romania Association was "ALTERNATIVE - temporary support for tolerated people" for the social - economic situation improvement of foreigners for whom the public custody measure has come to an end; or for those who have been granted tolerance as an alternative to public custody.

During the period 2017 - 2018, International Organization for Migration, was the recipient of the grant project "STARRT II - Transfer and assistance services for refugees resettled from Turkey". This project’s target was supporting the active participation of the Romanian state in the efforts of the EU Member States to implement sustainable solutions in response to the real international protection needs of displaced persons due to the conflict from Syria in countries in the immediate vicinity.

The Romanian National Council for Refugees benefited from two grant projects during the years 2017 - 2018, respectively 2018 - 2019, amounting EUR 707,265.40. CNRR implemented the project "Management of research processes and use of information from countries of origin" that aims to maintain functional Country of Origin Information Portal and assuring it’s availability to all the relevant actors for the asylum procedure.

The Country of Origin Information Portal (COI) is the first Romanian Country of Origin Information Portal, created by CNRR in collaboration with the Romanian General Inspectorate for Immigration.
The portal plays an essential role in ensuring the quality of the decisions in the asylum field. This project was initiated in order to increase the share of information concerning the countries of origin in order to provide relevant, reliable, balanced, accurate, verifiable and transparent information. The portal can be accessed by policy makers, legal advisors, judges, lawyers, legal representatives etc.\(^8\)

Table 9. Grant projects that had implementation periods 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 in Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Implementation Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Romanian National Council for Refugees (CNRR)</td>
<td>Managing the research processes and use of information in the countries of origin</td>
<td>I: 11.07-2017 - 11.07-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>II: 11.07-2018 - 11.07-2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialized legal assistance for asylum seekers in Romania</td>
<td>I: 11.07.2017-11.07.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>II: 11.07.2018-11.07.2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania (AIDROM)</td>
<td>Integration NOW - Complex and unitary approaches for migrants</td>
<td>I: 29.05.2017 - 29.05.2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>II: 29.05.2018 - 29.05.2019</td>
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<tr>
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Romania's Approach to Managing the Refugees’ Situation

The second grant project of the CNRR, which has the two implementation periods is called "Specialized Legal Aid for Asylum Seekers in Romania", aims to provide specialized counseling and legal assistance to all asylum seekers throughout the whole procedure (including the Dublin asylum procedure), beneficiaries of international protection whose situation is re-examined or have made requests for family reunification.

The Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania is the beneficiary of the grant project "Integration NOW - Complex and Unified Approaches for Migrants", which has two implementation periods 2017-2018, respectively 2018-2019. This project has a budget of EUR 483,439.76 and has aimed to support social-economic and cultural integration of international protection beneficiaries and third country nationals by providing them information and services that they need. Some examples are employment to access the health services, educational services, cultural, housing and social services.

The Jesuits Refugee Service in Romania Association is the beneficiary of the project "My Place - A Bridge for Integration of BPI and RTT in Romania", which has an amount of EUR 740,549.28 available to support the process of effective integration for vulnerable and special needs categories.

International Organization for Migration, is the recipient of two grant projects totaling an overall budget of EUR 1,893,986,11. The first project is the "Humanitarian Volunteer Assisted Repatriation and Reintegration Support Program (RVAR)" which aims to contribute to the efficient management of the migration phenomenon in Romania by repatriating safely and dignified 240 migrants to their countries of origin. The project calls for sustainable measures of social-economic reintegration of 90 migrants by 2020 and for strengthening institutional cooperation amongst actors with competences in the field of migration.

Source: General Inspectorate for Immigration http://igi.mai.gov.ro/
The IOM's second project is "INTERACT PLUS - Integrated Services for Migrants, Social and Intercultural Dialogue", which targets to contribute to strengthening of the social - economic and cultural integration of migrants.

At the same time, the ICAR Foundation benefits from the grant project "Integration of Legally Staying Foreigners in the Romanian Society: A Joint Action", with a total budget of EUR 527,638.92 and aims to socially integrate the beneficiaries of a protection form and foreigners with legal residence in Romania by consolidating a model for regional integration.

Also, LADO Cluj is the recipient of the "SIM CIS 4 - Integrated services for migrants - intercultural and inclusive communities" that has an available amount of EUR 572,774.49 in order to improve the process of integrating the beneficiary of a form of international protection and nationals of third parties members, with legal residence in Romania.

The Intercultural Institute of Timisoara benefits of a grant project called "REACT RO: Educational Resources for learning romanian language and Cultural Accomplishment of BPI and RTT in Romania", with a total budget of EUR 170,690.03 necessary for the development of the systemic framework, the integration tools and institutional capacity to ensure the adaptation and integration of beneficiaries of a form of international protection of and third countries nationals in Romanian society.

Conclusions

The article represents an overview of the situation of refugees in Romania. The importance of this article is given by the fact that Romania is one of the European countries that received asylum seekers, both before the year of the 2015 refugee crisis debut and after.

In Romania, during period 2008 - 2018 were registered 20,380 asylum applications, most applications were registered in 2017 (4,815 requests for asylum). The analysis also highlights the year 2012, when 2,510 requests for humanitarian protection were recorded as a result of escalating conflicts in Syria.

The article highlights, after analyzing the data provided by Eurostat, that over the targeted period, most asylum seekers are males. In the analyzed period 2008 – 2018, approximately 76% of the applications were submitted by men and about 24% of the requests were submitted by the female.

As far as the age of asylum seekers is concerned, we can conclude that most
of those who have applied for asylum in Romania are included in the 18-34 age group, at the opposite end are those in the category aged 65 and over. This shows that Romania could successfully integrate refugees into the labor market, considering their predominant age.

Regarding the main nationalities of those who filed an asylum application in Romania, these are: Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria. So, the article shows that of the top score, 23% of the asylum seekers who applied for humanitarian protection in Romania come from Syria and 26% from Iraq. Also, a significant percentage of 7% of asylum seekers come from Pakistan, and 6% was being recorded by those with Afghan nationality. Last but not least, 5% of those in the ranking come from Algeria. The remaining 33% represent requests from other nationalities.

The second part of the study highlights the existing asylum centers in Romania. They are located in 6 major cities of the country, such as: Bucharest, Galati, Radauti, Somcuta Mare, Giurgiu and Timisoara, which accumulate 900 accommodation places. At the same time, in cases of crisis, the number of accommodation places can be extended by 262, reaching the total number of accommodation places in Romania in the periods of crisis of 1,162 places. Apart from accommodation spaces, asylum centers, medical offices, recreation, sports and educational facilities are available at the centers.

The last part of the research presents the grant projects implemented between 2015 and 2019 by the 9 organizations / associations that have implemented a total of 40 grant projects in order to improve the situation of refugees in Romania. Most of the projects implemented (13 projects) during this period were those completed by the Romanian National Council for Refugees, representing 32% of the projects implemented between 2015 and 2019.

The budget allocated to improve the situation of refugees through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, that was set up for the period 2014 – 2020 is € 3.137 billion.

Therefore, the article identifies Romania’s capacity to receive and accommodate refugees as well as the efforts made by migrant management organizations to facilitate the integration of refugees into Romanian society through grant projects made under the Migration and Asylum Fund. One of my further research will focus on the monopoly projects and their importance in changing for better the lives of the refugees in Romania.
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BOOK REVIEWS


Review by Cristina MATIUTA

Considered a modern form of slavery, human trafficking, in its various forms (sexual exploitation, forced labor, exploitation for the purpose of forced criminality etc.), is a complex phenomenon, often hidden behind other criminal offences such as prostitution or irregular migration and involving victims exploited in multiple ways. It requires both adequate understanding and appropriate measures.

The book of Nicola Mai, *Mobile Orientations: An Intimate Autoethnography of Migration, Sex Work, and Humanitarian Borders*, investigates the relationship between migration and sex industry and “the dissonance between the complexity of migrant sex workers’ experiences of agency and the ways in which that complexity tends to be ignored by antitrafficking policies and interventions” (Preface, p. 1).

Culmination of two decades of extensive research projects across Europe conducted by the author, professor of sociology and migration studies at Kingston University, London, the book is innovative firstly by the methodological combination of ethnographic observation, semi structured interviewing and participatory approaches: “In all of the projects I directed, I adopted self-reflexive and observational interview methodologies, acknowledging the intersubjectivity between researcher and researched as a key methodological dimension of knowledge production” (p. 30).

Organized in nine chapters, the book deals with a range of cases and tells detailed storied from sex workers belonging to two well-established and intersecting transnational social fields and migration spaces: one between the Western Europe
and Eastern Europe and the other between the European Union and sub-Saharan Africa. Nicola Mai chooses the concept of “sex industry” (rather than “sexual commerce”) to address the different experiences of sex work and intimate labor. Just like another sector that absorbs migrant labor, sex industry includes services, practices and establishments that are integral to a sector of economic activity relatively regular and routinized.

Exploring, with autoethnographic lens, the context of male sex work in Italy and Greece (Chapter 2), interviewing migrant sex workers from Albania and Romania, the author finds that, despite their different ethnic and sociocultural backgrounds, they have things in common, seeking “fast-track economic gain in order to afford self representations both as traditional male breadwinners (by remitting money home) and as proficient and individualized late-modern consumers” (p. 42). Chapters 3 and 4 explore the engagement of young male migrants, including minors, in multiple and itinerant forms of mobility, with reference to Moroccan migrants in Spain and Romanian migrants in Amsterdam, while the Chapter 5 analyses the experiences of young men working in the tourist sex industry in Tunisia. Linking the stories of those analyzed in these chapters, the author underlines they attempt to become successful men. Thereby, “addressing their need to migrate only in terms of poverty, vulnerability and irrationality misses the existential resonance that the possibility of going to Europe has within their mobile orientations, within their sense of self” (p. 105).

The following chapters move attention to migrant women working in the sex industry in the United Kingdom. Conducting a previous research project (Migrant Workers in the UK Sex Industry, 2007-2009) that produced one hundred in-depth, qualitative interviews with migrant women, men and transgender people working in London’s sex industry, Nicola Mai found that only a minority of migrants working in the UK sex industry (approximately 6 percent of female interviewees) are forced or trafficked. Immigration status and restricted access to the labor market are the most important factors shaping their decisions to work in the sex industry, which is often a way to avoid the unrewarding and exploitative conditions they meet in other sectors. Chapter 6 and 7 analyze the impact of project findings on policymaking and public debates in the UK and discuss the resistance that the research findings met among institutions and organizations that target all sex workers as potential victims of trafficking. The stories of women working in sex industry often highlight the role played by “love” in experience of being trafficked. Adopting participative
ethnofictional methods, these chapters show that the concepts of trafficking and pimping are often confusing in women’s understanding of their own and other women’s involvement in the sex industry. Their sentimental and economic relationships with those who facilitate their social mobility through migration and sex work are characterized by “a fluid intricacy of love, support and exploitation” (p. 140). These ambivalent personal and professional relations between female sex workers and male third-party agents are analyzed also by interviewing male thirty-party agents from Albania and Romania (Chapter 8), in order to draw their profile and to understand their diverse life and work experiences in the sex industry.

Taken together, the chapters of this book challenge the usefulness of the concepts of trafficking and modern slavery for addressing migrant sex workers’ experiences of agency and exploitation. They suggest that only a labor-migration perspective recognizing and framing sex work as work can explain the complex understandings and experiences of migrant and non-migrant sex workers. The voices, stories and experiences of sex workers which frame this book suggest that decriminalization of sex work (endorsed by Amnesty International in 2015) is the most appropriate and least harmful policymaking framework in order to protect those selling sex from harm and that ”any policy and social on sex work, and particularly those embedded in the sexual-humanitarian frameworks of antitrafficking and antislavery, will only have a chance if they are matched with prospective migrants’ legal rights to access the labor market, which would reduce their socioeconomic vulnerability to exploitation by the people who facilitate their labor-migration trajectories” (p. 194).

Review by Dan APĂTEANU

The first chapter is *Introduction: the unexpected legacy of the Post-World War II Migratory Regime*. The book suggests that the idea of a Janus-faced image is more adequate for describing European migration policies and the stances towards them.

The migratory regime established in the postwar period has influenced the current one. It was heavily defined by economic interests. The author defines the traditional European model as the *economicistic* approach.

European countries, such as Germany, exemplify the *Temporary Labor Model*, where foreign workers are assigned specific positions in firms, sectors or activities, in a process supervised by national agencies, labor mobility is severely restricted and the employees need residence permits, with frequent renewal.

This model is in contradiction with the European model of rights and solidarities, so it was intended to be modified. However, it was, and it still is, the existing model of many European countries, where it is an import of foreign workers, in order to meet the demand of that national labor market. After the World War II, the labor market could be characterized by the *Guest Worker* paradigm, characterized as an economic phenomenon, legitimizing a differential treatment of the migrant workers and promoting the temporary nature of the migration.

The current status as immigration countries of several European countries results from rather unwanted social processes that occurred in the last decades, such as decolonization, the transformation of temporary migrants into permanent ones, or even citizens, that eventually reunited with their families, the fall of the communist regime and the large movements it provoked, EU enlargement, the humanitarian migrants or the demographic changes. These processes took place in a context of embedded liberalism, that restricted the ability of the states to control
migration.

The European countries have to solve the tensions between several key factors: the inclusionary versus the exclusionary processes, discriminatory versus equalitarian treatment of labor migrants and recognizing diversity versus promoting uniformity.

Chapter 2 is entitled *The (Un)Ethical Foundations of the Borders of Membership: Inclusion versus Exclusion*. In the tradition of the European Nation-States, citizenship is the institution that defines membership in the political community and guarantees access to citizenship rights—that is, civic, social and political rights. European democracies tried to realize what is called the principle of universal human dignity and equality, despite its particularistic nature, as they excluded from these rights the people who were not citizens residing in their countries, such as the migrants. This shows the artificial and arbitrary nature of the borders, that have been imposed, as states have formed their national identity. The borders defined the possibility of entering and living in a country. This was even more important when the Social State was created, that provided benefits only to its members. The problem is what means these to the concepts of belonging, solidarity and social justice in a global world, as there is a tension between the citizenship rights, reserved for citizens and the human rights, for people such as the migrants.

The introduction of the European citizenship created a form of apartheid, segregating EU and non-EU citizens. This has also assumed the invention of a European culture different from the one in the rest of the world. EU policies of integration of migrants, target only non-EU ones, considering the EU migrants as integrated. EU citizens are viewed as having the right to free movement across the borders, while non-EU ones do not have this right, and EU states are required to have the ability to control their borders. There is a debate about the right to migrate, crossing the borders and obtaining a certain citizenship.

Other countries in the world select their migrants, truly applying the Temporary Labor Model, while EU have pursued an integration of the migrants in the system of citizenship; even if the EU model promoted the temporary migration, there were processes that transformed this into a permanent move. One of these was the family reunion procedure, that received most of the migrants; another one was the definition of new typologies of asylum seekers.

Countries have begun to question their model of citizenship, adopting a civic conception of membership, adopted even by countries that traditionally followed
the jus sanguinis concept. The most known case is that of Germany, who have adopted an ethnic-based model of citizenship, but who changed it partially, having now a mix of jus sanguinis and jus soli elements in the citizenship law. These changes in legislation led to an increase in the number of migrants, as many reached the seniority of their stay or because of the facilities for the children of migrants. In 2016, almost one million people became citizens of a EU state, the largest groups being from Morocco, Albania, India, Turkey, Romania and Ukraine.

The process of inclusion entails another important modification, namely the introduction of the European citizenship, that give millions of migrants, that became citizens of an EU state, the right to free movement. Less known, was the establishment of the status of long term resident, that give the migrants, who resided legally and continuously in a EU country more than 5 years, most of the citizenship rights; it has appeared even a concept - denization - to name this situation. Temporary migrants have received many rights also in the social field. There have been taken measures to protect even some categories of illegal migrants, based on the fact of being a person, hence moving into the direction of a post-national citizenship. The inclusion process of the illegal migrants has been encouraged by local authorities and civic groups advocates.

However, inclusion processes are imperfect and have limitations. There are three main limits to inclusion in the citizenship rights. First, not all systems are homogeneous, being civically stratified, the most emblematic case being the distinction between EU and non-EU foreign residents. Also there are fine lines being drawn amongst the economic and humanitarian migrants. Second, non-naturalized migrants have limited rights, mostly civil and social, but not political ones. Even more, nationals claim that only they are entitled to rights as they belong to the nation and the citizenship received by migrants is a concessionary form. They are still viewed as aliens, a menace to the identity of Europe. Thirdly, following the liberal reconfiguration of citizenship, came a neo-national reinterpretation of it, having different arguments and sometimes a supranational identity.

For migrants, citizenship is not a real border separating them into included or excluded, as they have advantages, but also disadvantages, the best case being the educational and professional trajectories of second-generation migrants. Even if official statistics report that they do not have problems in finding a job, they feel discriminated, being unequally treated in their access to jobs, based on being a foreign or coming from a disadvantaged area.
Italy is the EU major receiving country and is now confronting with the challenge of integrating the second-generation migrants offspring. Their poor economic conditions affect the chances of their educational results as well as getting a good quality job. They are more likely to have jobs beneath their educational attainment, the so called migrant jobs, such as waiter, porter, domestic worker. Also, in this regard, their ethnic background seems to be a penalty, driven by cultural factors.

Migrants offspring suffer from the paradox of integration: it is more probable that the role of ethnic division is visible for those who are more integrated; if first-generation migrants remained somehow invisible to the rest of the society, their offspring who try to integrate, are more visible, and suffer more from discrimination in places where they try to integrate.

The next chapter, the „Schizophrenia” of the European Approach: Equality Versus Discrimination, starts with a reminder of the Temporary Labor paradigm that dominated the postwar period. However, after the 1970 crisis there have been developments, as a new wave of migration began, a so called unwanted one, and also, millions of workers who were supposed to be temporary, choose to remain permanently, eventually becoming full citizens. Even more, the crisis put millions of migrants in unemployment, so the cushioning role of the temporary labour has been invalidated. These phenomena brought along with them the resentment against the migrants.

Even if countries tried to close their borders to the migrants, they did not succeed, as another type came, those that arrive for family and humanitarian reasons. Furthermore, there was a pressure to integrate them, into the labor market and into the welfare system. Also, legal measures have been taken to combat the discrimination of the migrants. However, the author argues that the European approach reflects a sort of schizophrenia that reflects discrimination: while measures have been taken to integrate migrants and encourage their equal chances, states still use regulations for labor markets inspired by the old Temporary Labor Model.

The European legislation stipulates the right to the family reunion, so they have been transformed into countries of permanent settlement. The support for the migrants and their offspring gave rise to several models of integration: from the differential inclusion in Germany, to the assimilationist model in France, and from the perspective of racial equality in Great Britain to the Dutch policy of minorities. There were direct and indirect policies aimed at improving migrants access to health
and education services, but often through the implication of civil society actors. Initiatives promoted at the local level have a high level of visibility and there is a tendency to promote transnational partnerships. Of the most significant field of intervention is the one aimed at protecting undocumented migrants.

The integration goals have also been assumed at the European level, such as the Tampere program (1999-2004), Hague program (2004-2009), Stockholm program (2009-2014) or the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (2005). The Agenda sets as goals, acquiring language knowledge, participating in the labor market, improving education and standard of living. Also, the EU Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration (2004), is a non-mandatory source for the definition of integration. It puts an emphasis on knowledge of host institution culture, on the interaction between citizens and migrants and on respect for the diverse cultures and religions. These measures have been supported by programs such as the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, the European Refugee Fund and the European Social Fund.

Efforts to integrate migrants have included encouraging their civic and even political participation, so that now non-EU nationals, in certain conditions, can participate as candidates, vote locally, regionally or nationally. EU has adopted a strong anti-discrimination law, imposed by the Directives 2000/78 and 2000/43, that beside enumerating different kinds of discrimination, include also affirmative actions, in order to ensure full equality. Another route to combat discrimination against migrants is to promote equal opportunities in the workplace.

Since the turn of the century, economic migration has been highly relevant on European public agenda and states started to manage it proactively and selectively. In 2000, European Commission started to encourage more economic migration. However, this did not translate into a common European policy; states such as Germany or Netherlands, started attracting highly qualified workers. These schemes are insufficient to cope with the labor demand. On the background of the economic crisis, many states closed their borders, or admit only seasonal or selected migrants.

Even if there are different schemes, there can be noted a persistent economicism of the European approach. The entry and work permits are issued only if no native or resident worker is available for the same type of job. These ways permitted the recruitment of labor with a low level of qualification, that are neglected by recruitment schemes; the family and humanitarian migrations have
been more selective, reducing the possibility of entries. So, the way in which these entries are managed produce new lines of division and exclusion at the societal level.

Regarding the family migration, some states permit family members to have unrestricted access to the labor market, while others, with limitations based on the nature of the activity; there are only a few cases where they do require a work permit. Access to self-employment is not restricted in most of EU, while for members from refugee family there are no restrictions. Even more, in the context of the refugee crisis, they put an accent on their quick integration in the labor market.

The nearly zeroing of the recruitment schemes would attract a very cheap labor force, very malleable because of its clandestine situation, and even the policies of border enforcement are viewed as part of this strategy. These people enter the labor market under the worst conditions, being part of a *differential inclusion*.

Between equality and discrimination

A corollary of the European approach is represented by the labor market segregation in the *3D jobs* (dirty, dangerous, demanding), that contradicts the principles of universalism and meritocracy. Migrants are typically over-represented in these kind of jobs. Pro-migrant organizations support these kind of jobs, so they endorse an economicistic approach and ignore their consequences. One of the most known consequences is the social dumping phenomenon, exacerbated during crises, when migrants are even more willing to accept these jobs, hence, putting a pressure on local workers as they increase competition for jobs. The main victims of the “unfair” competition are the local workers, hence it is them that them to perceive the most the negative aspect of the migration and that are attracted by the rhetoric of the populist parties. Migrants are affected by irregular employment, either in the informal, or formal economy. Illegal unemployment is present especially in the 3D type of jobs.

Migrants are overrepresented in the shadow economy, and beside tax evading, their situation is also a cause for wage dumping. Some measures have been taken in this regard, but it seems that the problem is underestimated. Another consequence is that it worsens the overall labor conditions on a long-term basis, and even erect symbolic barriers in front of employment of local workers.

These type of migrant jobs have exposed migrants themselves to the risks of the economic crises, when the rate of unemployment for them was significantly higher than that for the natives. Their jobs are more exposed to unemployment due to the automation progress, as almost half are employed in occupations that
primarily require routine tasks.

This model of migration management has generated a sort of imbalanced integration, where the focus is on their occupational situation, neglecting to invest in their human capital or trying to recognize their diplomas, and where sometimes they are self-segregating, not taking part in the life of the community. This model has produced a structurally disadvantaged population, where also the second-generation migrants are affected.

This structural disadvantage is related with the reluctance of the governments to provide official entry channels for the migrants; however, it will lead to a vicious circle where is attracted a poor migration, that will generate economic and social problems on a long term. A consequence of these types of migrants is the increase in the inactive migrant population; during the period 2008-2016, the non-EU born migrants had lower activity rates than EU-born migrants or the native-born population. The problem is bigger for the women born outside EU, who had 63,1% activity rate, compared to men with 84,2%.

Third-country nationals’ unemployment rate, especially for family members and refugees, is caused by their difficult access to the labor market, due to their low employability, such as lack of linguistic competences, and also poor opportunity structure, because of the stereotype that they are suited for the migrant jobs.

When we consider employment there are gaps between the natives and the migrants, especially for those born outside EU. Again we see there is a gender gap, that may be a reflection of different work opportunities or cultural differences regarding the balance work-life. Even more dramatic is the situation of young first and second generation migrants, that are more likely not to be in employment, or education, or training (NEET), especially in some countries, such as in Italy; there, a high incidence of NEET is amongst females, many married with children, reflecting a patriarchal pattern of gender roles.

Even if discrimination seems to be in the advantage of the majority, as they seem to maintain access to privileges, in the end, there are other costs, such as the social ones, that makes the society less competitive. This explains why there are many initiatives to promote equality of chances and to combat discrimination.

The discrimination issue has been put on the political agenda by the second-generation migrants, that have reconceptualized its distributional issues. Today, the discrimination issue is viewed as a consequence of the ”normal” functioning of the social and political system. As an example, in many European countries the
proportion of students born in another country has rapidly grown, reinforcing the process of educational segregation based on a socio-economic criterion. However, the early insertion in the educational system breaks the cycle of disadvantage; the dispersion of immigrant children in different classes is beneficial for the whole community.

There are arguments in favor of migration and also against it, but the author states that what is problematic is the economicism implied in the immigration process that is contradictory - discriminating and equalizing - in its consequences. The migrants are viewed as people who do our jobs that we do not want, so they are regarded somewhat as inferior, and also as an alien part of society. They are considered very adaptable on labor market, so they are accused of social dumping, but this contrast with their vulnerable economic situation. It is important to reframe social expectations, to consider diversity as a structural attribute of Europe, not merely a conjectural phenomenon.

Chapter four, *The Identity Challenge: Diversity versus Uniformity*, begins showing that as many migrants acquired the citizenship of the member state where they reside in, their condition of structural disadvantage is a matter that undermines of the social cohesion and economic competitiveness of the Europe. Even if they have acquired most of the rights guaranteed to the citizens, they still remain at risk of exclusion, at least partially. The insertion models have created an unbalanced integration model, according to Zanfrini, inhibiting migrants’ professional mobility, their civic involvement and sense of belonging to the society. Also, spatial segregation, political discourse and daily interactions have reinforced this model. The condition of the structural disadvantage of the migrants has heightened their visibility in the public sphere; religious affiliations, also, played a role in positioning them as being different from the national identity. All these produced the feeling of cultural incompatibility, of not being fully integrated, and even the risk of radicalization.

The reinforcement of the *jus soli* and *jus domicilii* in the legislation of the member states marked the transition from the ethnic to the civic concept of citizenship, making possible to the recognition of the *diversity* in society. Going even further, in recognizing the diversity, was defined the concept of *transmigrant*, by recognition of migrants „dual belonging”, where they enjoy rights in more than one country. One example in this regard is the *dual citizenship*, where migrants are allowed to maintain their citizenship after naturalization. The same approach - the
dual belonging - is contained in the new approach to integration proposed by the European Agenda. The establishment of intercultural education programs and intercultural dialogue is an effort from the part of European actors to recognize the diversity.

The diversity is becoming an asset in many private firms, supported at European level, by the 2004 Diversity Charter initiative. The diversity management at the organization level can promote a truly intercultural society, not based on ethnic traits, but rather on individual ones. Another important step was taken by the recognition of the skills and competences, of the qualifications received abroad such as the European Credit System for Vocational Education and Training and new methodological approaches were developed for people who lack the necessary documents such as the refugees. More difficult is the recognition of non-formal and informal learning, as national systems are very different.

Diversity is also encouraged by promoting the political participation, such as the right to vote at the local level or involvement in active citizenship programs, supported for example by religious organizations. However, these actions produced different reactions from the society.

Recent trends in migration management tend to reproduce the idea of temporariness, of the circular migration, and this is visible in programs such as Action Plan for Legal Migration. Another policies try to contain the „unwanted” migration, trying to select new migrants according to their level of education or other filters that favor their integration. This approach is underlined by the Hague program, adopted in 2004 by the European Council. European Commission adopted the Blue Card scheme that tries to attract highly qualified migrants, that will be integrated easily economically and culturally.

Civic stratification systems represent a selective system, as they favor some categories of migrants, with legislation on family reunion being an example. It has a normative content, mirroring the European idea of family. The right to reunion is based mostly on the relation of dependency between the applicants and their family; also, on the socio-economic status of the applicant. But these criteria violate the principles of equality and also fundamental freedoms and rights.

Nowadays, there are policies that focus on the notion on cultural integration, viewed more as a duty, than as a right. The integration is a kind of filter, that will select those individuals able to adopt the values of the receiving society. An example is the conditioning of the residence permit renewal on the signing of an
integration agreement. The turn in the integrationist movement has inspired legal developments such as the naturalization process, where the applicant has to prove the knowledge of language and culture. This tendency has occurred also in countries that were viewed in the past as liberal toward the migrants. Some scholars appreciated that even the position of the EU institutions favored this tendency - to view integration more as a duty than as a right. These developments have been criticized by appealing to the human rights and been attacked in courts. Even the management of humanitarian migration or the approach of business organization toward diversity management have been affected by this selective tendency. The call for conformity is probably related to the surge in the terrorist attacks done by the citizens born and raised inside the EU, that shows problems related to their real integration in their society.

The most controversial issues, such as family reunification, have political support to prevent discrimination and segregation, especially for vulnerable categories, such as women coming from patriarchal cultures. This happens in a context of *ethnicization of sexism*, that for example, associates Islam with gender violence and female subordination.

Migrants are the target of measures in the framework of active labor market policies, to reduce their burden on the social assistance system. But, as these are standardized measures, they rather exclude migrants, as they do not possess the required skills. There were studies that show that the offspring of European migrants do not assimilate the national culture in the same measure as their American counterparts. Also, the migratory history of Europe has an influence in this regard. Trying to understand this phenomenon, the author presents several factors.

The first is the migration regimes, that continue to influence the relationship from the majority and the minorities. While countries from the Settlement model have seen immigrants as a permanent constituent of the country, European countries viewed immigration more as a „historical incident“. Immigrants children who arrived in America received a strong push to integrate, while in Europe, they were raised with the myth of the return. Many of them experimented with a continued commuting between the origin and the destination country, up to the point of viewing their integration progress as a conflict of loyalty.

The second factor concerns *citizenship regimes*, as for example in US and Canada, the second generation automatically receive citizenship at birth, while in Europe, the right can be claimed at the third generation at birth or at the second
generation, in certain conditions. Even if the resident foreigners receive many rights, the lack of citizenship impacts on their identification process. Also, where there was an ethnic conception of nation, not even an inclusive legislation could develop the sense of belonging.

The third factor is the presence of minority communities and their prevailing identity choices. In USA, the historical presence of minorities made viable the coexistence of a strong belonging to the nation and the strong identification with the ethnic group, forming so-called *panethnic identities*, such as Italian-American. In Europe, this type of identity is harder to accept.

Next, it is necessary to consider the role of religious affiliations; for example, in America it helped immigrants find a place in the society, while in Europe, it rather leads to exclusion, as the society is secularized and it affects negatively the inter-ethnic relations. In the wake of the recent terrorist attacks, the attention focused on the *reactive religiosity* (particularly Islamic) that involves second generation migrants. Lastly, the condition of being a migrant - indicated by ethnic or racial markers - can produce a different treatment towards them.

Chapter five, *The (Un)Ethical Boundaries of the European Fortress: Openness versus Closure*, begins by presenting the fact that the peak flow of the refugee crisis seems nowadays to have past, as indicated by the 2017 OECD yearly report, and now we should consider how is best to integrate them into the society. The refugee status is defined by the *Declaration on the Status of Refugee*, but the current refugees resemble less with the ideal type proposed in the 1951 Geneva Convention. This situation contributed very much to the crisis of the international protection system, and the oscillation between the „closure“ and the „openness“ of the European countries.

Forced migration usually have a collective configuration that happens in situations where a person flees from a crisis situation that have unpredictable consequences. The threat may be represented by an agent of civil society and the person fear for a wide range of human rights. The Convention does not adequately protect people who cross international borders in a context of war and civil unrest. Also, this is the case for women and especially minors. The mixed flows - composed of people with different origins and conditions - put a strain on the states response, raising criticism both from people who say there is not enough protection for refugees, and from the ones that say the state is too indulgent with people that try to cross the borders. The failure to manage the migration show the limits of the
states in their response to the demands of justice and belonging. It is also evident a paradox - while opening borders to the flow of capital, goods, services and desired migrants, states filter the access of unskilled workers and refugees.

The progressive abolishment of internal borders has gone hand in hand with the reinforcement of the external frontiers. However, we see currently a tendency to reintroduce the internal borders, popularized by extremist, and now gone mainstream.

After the end of the Cold War, European democracies were faced with the arrival of many immigrants from the former communist countries, including those that do not fulfill the requirements to obtain the refugee status. After the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, European law introduced a form of subsidiary protection and a type of humanitarian protection. As a consequence, many persons receive a status that is different from that of the refugee, but that entails a reduced degree of protection. Migrants arriving through mixed channels have been party escaping the registration system.

The phenomenon of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) recently reached dramatic figures calling for measures to be taken. The European Commission issued The Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors 2014 - 2020, aimed at guaranteeing their protection. The process of openness has been supported not only by public agencies, but also by the mobilization of civil society actors.

There is a tendency in nowadays Europe to adopt the position of „defending from the migrants“, that questions the right to asylum. This outcome is related to the European migration history. The current refugee system was put in place to support people displaced from the war, political refugees and economic migrants. The end of Cold War marked a decline of the political reasons for the refugees and also various attempts of closure, part of a securitization strategy to limit the number of migrants. The Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs, the Schengen Agreements and the Dublin Convention (the so-called „Dublin system”), indicate a European restrictive migration policy and transforming it into a matter of security. The Dublin system reduce border management to a technocratic task, measured in terms of economic terms and efficiency, symbolized by the establishment of Frontex. The militarization of borders completed this strategy of protection from migrants.

A questionable practice implemented is the externalization of border controls preceded by the agreements signed in the 1990s with the CEE candidate countries to EU accession. Further measures are represented by the introduction of
visa requirements for citizens of countries previously exempted from this obligation and by the introduction of sanction for the carriers of these migrants. Other measures intended to reduce the flow of migrants were: the asylum procedure examination made more difficult or diminishing welfare benefits to refugee and asylum seekers.

In the last years, the call for safeguarding the external borders, put into question the idea of a common European space and reintroduce internal controls and boundaries. Some countries have even erected physical barriers to prevent border crossing.

The EU common strategy on asylum provoked different responses from the states, showing their interests and strategies. Many countries have shown their reluctance in receiving the migrants, especially Central-Eastern European countries. The intensification of mixed fluxes of migration negatively influenced public opinion. There was a limited success in the awareness raising campaigns conducted by the international organizations and pro-migrant civil society actors. When an individual make improper use of entry procedures in a country makes a contribution to the degradation of the sense of legality, helping to delegitimize the system of international protection. Those who claim a „natural” right to migrate say that every person has the right to dignity, which include the right to go abroad and look for better opportunities, usually expressed by non-governmental actors. The final part, *Conclusions: The Refugee Crisis - A Prophetic Challenge for European Societies*, reiterates the main conclusions of the book in a more concise manner.

Review by Marius Ioan TĂTAR

The media play an essential role in democracy, being at the center of political communication flows between citizens, political and social actors and institutions. Mass media not only inform the public about key issues and decisions, but also influence the attitudes, perceptions and, eventually the public participation of audience members, by selecting and emphasizing certain topics, and framing them in particular ways. Acknowledging that the media play crucial functions in society, the book edited by Erik Bleich, Irene Bloemraad and Els de Graauw focuses on how the media depicts migrants and minorities and what are the implications of media coverage for participation in the public sphere. The volume provides a series of comparative media analyses on migration and diversity in countries from Europe, North America and East-Asia. The chapters of this book were originally published as articles in a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.

In the opening chapter, Bleich, Bloemraad, and de Graauw situate the contributions to this volume in the broader research landscape. The editors mainly delineate three ways to connect media studies to scholarship on migrants and minorities. These three areas that stand out as arguments for why media studies should be of interest for scholars of migration and minorities: the media provide a source of information about groups or issues related to migration and diversity; the media convey or construct particular representations of minorities and immigrants, including negative depictions; and the media act as a space for the participation of migrants and minorities in a public sphere where they can advance their interests and identities. The second part of this introductory chapter deals with methodological issues regarding the selection of media sources, sampling and
analysing the data. In terms of methodology, the contributions to this volume are using computer-based coding and human coding, as well as both quantitative content analysis and more interpretative examination of tone and group portrayals of migrants and minorities. The last part of this chapter summarizes the contributions in this volume, highlighting that all the chapters adopt a comparative approach and are organised along the substantive dimensions mentioned above, namely the media as a source of information, a site of symbolic representations, and an arena of participation.

The media as a source of information is analysed in chapter 2 by Bloemraad, de Graauw, and Hamlin. They focus on immigrants’ civic visibility by examining coverage of the Vietnamese and Indian communities in newspapers in San Jose, Boston, Vancouver and Toronto from 1985 to 2005. The chapter aims to measure visibility and to explain variation in newspaper coverage by place and national-origin group. The authors find little evidence that newspaper coverage is affected by the demographics of an area, newsroom factors or simplified models of the national political and discursive opportunity structures. Instead, they explain the variation of coverage between various groups and places by an embedded context of reception approach that highlights the dynamic interplay between national opportunity structures and an immigrant group’s mode of incorporation. The authors suggest that migrants whose arrival is facilitated and valorised by government or who make their voices heard through political structures gain civic visibility in the local media and, presumably, in the eyes of decision-makers and residents.

In chapter 3, Alexander Caviedes presents a quantitative examination of how newspaper articles in the UK, France and Italy, most commonly frame immigration and migrants. The author aims to test whether the narrative linking immigration to security issues is gaining relative prominence in the European news, compared to narratives that associate migration to economic issues. While security related topics such as references to physical threat, crime or discussions of the border are present in the news, they are not necessarily becoming more salient than economic themes such as the labour market, asylum and fiscal costs. The findings of this chapter challenge assertions of an emerging single coherent European-wide mode for framing immigration along the lines of securitisation, and it reveals that economic issues remain at least equally important in the press’ depiction of immigration.

In chapter 4, Andrea Lawlor asks if news framing of immigration varies between local and national media and between traditional and new gateway cities
for migration. Using 12 years (2001–2012) of print media data from 15 Canadian and British print media sources, the authors conduct cross-city, within-country and cross-national newspaper comparisons based on various economic change and threat of violence media frames. Findings suggest both that there is little variance between national and local media and that cross-city news coverage does not vary based on local contextual factors such as changes in the unemployment rate or rate of foreign-born persons. The main variation observed is between countries, with Canadian newspapers using more economic frames, while British media using more crime and security frames.

To understand how the media portray minorities, Erik Bleich, Hannah Stonebraker, Hasher Nisar and Rana Abdelhamid, are focusing in chapter five especially on testing scholarly propositions that Muslims are depicted in a systematically negative way. They compare the tone of newspaper headlines across time and across newspaper type and compare the portrayal of Muslims to that of Jews and Christians, in the British print media between 2001 and 2012. The findings presented in this chapter show that the British press headlines do not portray Muslims in a consistently or uniformly negative light. However, the most widely read paper in the study’s sample (the right-leaning tabloid) were notably more negative than those from the lowest-circulating paper (the left leaning broadsheet). Moreover, Muslims are consistently portrayed more negatively than Jews and frequently more negatively than Christians.

In chapter 6, Erin Tolley proposes a theory of racial mediation and examines how candidate race affects media coverage of political viability. Using two different types of content analysis—manual and automated—the article assesses print media coverage of white and visible minority candidates in the 2008 Canadian federal election. Although the study found no relationship between candidate race and overall viability coverage, it did suggest that candidate race influences the viability coverage of new political entrants, a finding that was confirmed by the automated analysis. According to the author, this finding suggests that some degree of racial mediation is occurring, with journalists making choices and judgements about the potential of candidates based partly on their race. Methodologically, the chapter highlights how a researcher using an automated approach to content analysis could reach different conclusions than a researcher relying on a manual approach.

Chapter 7 by Joseph Yi and Gowoon Jung explores the media as a public space that offers participation opportunities to discuss migration and minorities related issues
in South Korea. As the authors point out, much of the multicultural discourse occurs in the internet-based cyber-media, which offer space for various producers, including mainstream media professionals, netizens and resident foreigners. The findings reveal that a prevailing discourse of victimhood is associated with small, ideologically homogeneous groups of media producers, namely mainstream media and nativist websites; in contrast, mixed and nuanced discourses are more common in large and heterogeneous, online communities, where users interact with a variety of viewpoints. These conclusions are drawn from an empirical analysis of 16 websites, supplemented with informant interviews and observations.

Overall, the book brings substantive and methodological contributions to the studies focusing on the complex interplay between migrants, minorities and the media. All that contributions to this volume adopt a comparative approach that tie their conclusions to broader debates about the role of the media in covering, representing and channelling public participation on issues such as migration and minorities. Moreover, this volume opens several fruitful directions for future research. While most chapters of this book focus on the print media, the editors acknowledge the need for more research on the coverage of migrants and minorities in other types of media. The written press has received much scholarly attentions since, as the editors of this book point out, in practical terms, it is easier to study the written press because of better archiving, and it is easier to deal only with words during coding and analysis than to include an evaluation of visuals, as with television and magazines. However, the written press is only an ingredient, and probably not the most important, in the media mix the public consumes in an increasingly digitalized world (Tatar 2016, 2018), marked by the expansion, diversification and fragmentation of the media space.

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