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THEMATICAL ARTICLES: IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

Immigration Policies and Criminal Justice Outcomes: The Case of Cuban Immigrants in United States

Viviana ANDREESCU, Dan M. TSATAROS

Abstract. The immigration-crime nexus plays a central role in the United States’ current political debate. The Trump administration’s recent restrictive immigration policies are mostly motivated by the belief that immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants of Latino/Hispanic origin, contribute to crime rate increases. When assessing the potential effects of immigration policy on immigrants’ behavioral outcomes, Cuban immigrants in the United States are of particular interest because until recently they benefitted from a preferential immigration policy that conferred them a special immigrant status and protected them from deportation if they broke the law. Therefore, compared to other immigrants, Cuban immigrants could be expected to have a higher involvement in the criminal justice system and be overrepresented among offenders because they did not face the crime-deterrent threat of permanent removal from the country. Based on a review of prior research and available statistical information we did not find evidence that this would be the case.

Keywords: US immigration policies, immigrants and crime; Cuban immigrants; deportation, immigrants’ criminal justice outcomes

Introduction

A recent analysis of the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey shows that about 44,410,000 foreign-born individuals are currently living in United States. Although the percentage of first-generation immigrants (13.6%) in United States is almost three times higher than it was in 1970, the share of the foreign-born population is currently lower in the United States than in other immigrant-receiving countries, such as Australia (29%), New Zealand (23%) Canada (21%), or Switzerland (30%), Austria (19%) and Sweden (18%) in Europe. The current share of the immigrant
population is also lower than it was in 1890, when the foreign-born population represented 14.8% of the total population of the United States (Connor and Budiman 2019).

Although in the nineteenth century the United States had an open immigration policy, over the past one hundred years, the policy consistently reflected the American government’s ambivalent feelings toward immigration and immigrants. While several more restrictive immigration laws have been adopted, bills providing legal status to illegal aliens have been enacted as well. In 1924, for instance, a national-origin quota system had been established, favoring immigration from Northwest Europe. This immigration system remained in place until 1965, when the US Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act, which replaced the national origins system with a preference system mainly designed to unite immigrant families. As a result, despite a limited number of immigrant visas issued annually for family reunification, immigration from Asia and Latin America increased substantially over the decades that followed. Even if in 1980 a general policy governing the admission of refugees (The Refugee Act) was established, in 1986, US Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which in addition to providing legal status through amnesty to approximately three million immigrants, also contained enforcement provisions meant to deter illegal immigration (Center for Immigration Studies 2018).

Immigration statutes were reformed in the 1990s and 2000s as well and the enactment of conflicting legislative acts continued (e.g., The 1990 Immigration Act; the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996; the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act in 2000). One month after the terrorist attack of 9/11/2001, US Congress passed the PATRIOT Act, meant to improve US law enforcement’s ability to detect and deter terrorism. Legislation to further tighten immigration control and the reorganization of the US immigration and naturalization bureaucracy within the new Department of Homeland Security followed. But examples of post-2001 pro-immigrant measures exist as well. Despite the fact that US Congress rejected the project, in 2012, for instance, President Obama established through an executive order the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which permitted certain undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as juveniles to obtain work authorization and to be considered for a two-year renewable deferred removal action (Center for Immigration Studies 2018; Portes and Rumbaut 2014).
Since 2017, however, Americans have been witnessing significant controversial changes to the United States’ immigration system, which reflect the current administration’s anti-immigrant sentiments. For instance, one week into his presidency, President Trump took action according to the promises he made while campaigning (i.e., to build a wall that would prevent immigrants to cross illegally the Mexico–United States border, deport all illegal immigrants, cut funding of sanctuary cities, ban Muslims from entering the country, limit legal immigration, and increase significantly the number of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents) and issued a travel ban, which prevented the citizens of seven countries to enter legally into the United States. Additionally, the administration announced plans to phase out DACA, which would increase the recipients’ risk for removal and also instituted a major asylum reform, which could effectively close the southwest border to potential refugees seeking asylum in United States (Center for Immigration Studies 2018; Pierce 2018). In summary, immigration plays a central role in the current administration, as demonstrated by the 35-day partial federal government shutdown (from 22 December 2018 to 25 January 2019) over funding ($5.7 billion) requested by the President for a border wall with Mexico (Meissner and Pierce 2019). It should be noted that a 2018 Gallup poll found that most Americans (57%) opposed the construction of walls along the US-Mexico border. Additionally, 75% of those interviewed considered immigration a “good thing” for the United States (Gallup n. d.).

The recent restrictive immigration measures meant to ensure Americans’ security and safety are mostly motivated by the belief that immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants of Latino/Hispanic origin, contribute to increases in crime in general and violent crime in particular. Nonetheless, macro-level research conducted in United States and elsewhere did not find that crime levels increase with an increase in the size of the immigrant population (Adelman, Reid, Markle, Weiss, and Jaret 2017; Bell and Machin 2011; Berardi and Bucerius 2013; Eastman 2017; Kubrin 2013; Martinez and Lee 2000, 2009; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Reid, Weiss, Adelman, and Jaret 2005; Stowell, Messner, McGeever, and Raffalovich 2009). Additionally, research generally concluded that immigrants are underrepresented in criminal justice statistics (Butcher and Piehl 1998; Ewing, Martinez, and Rumbaut 2015; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007; Rumbaut, Gonzales, Komaie, and Morgan 2006) or that their involvement in crime is significantly lower than the natives’ participation in criminal activities (Bersani 2014; Bui and Thingniramol 2005; Morenoff and Astor
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2006; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005). Moreover, a recent longitudinal state-level analysis that examined the macro-level relationship between undocumented immigration and violence from 1990 to 2014 concluded that an increase in the estimated size of the unauthorized population is actually associated with a decrease in violent crime rates in United States (Light and Miller 2018). Similarly, Sampson (2017, 11) argued that empirical evidence demonstrates that immigration should be included among the factors that contributed to the nation’s crime decline and urban revitalization.

Yet immigrants should not be treated as a homogenous group. Even when using pan-ethnic identifiers, such as Hispanic/Latino, Caribbean, or Asian, research may conceal important cultural, structural, and political differences that influenced the assimilation and adaptation processes of the foreign-born persons in the receiving country (Bursik 2006, 29; Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, and Haller 2009, 1101), which may also impact the immigrants’ criminal justice outcomes. By focusing only on one group of immigrants (i.e., Cuban immigrants and natives of Cuban descent), this paper intends to overcome this limitation and contribute to the literature (e.g., Butcher and Piehl 1998; Nielsen and Martinez 2011; Portes et al. 2009; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007; Rumbaut et al. 2006) that took into account the subjects’ ethnicity when examining the immigrants’ involvement in illegal activities.

From 1960 until 2015, the number of Cuban immigrants increased from 163,000 to 1.2 million (Meissner 2017) and about two million immigrants of Cuban ancestry are currently living in United States. Persons of Cuban descent are the seventh largest immigrant-origin group in the country and account for 2.8% of the total US immigrant population (Rusin, Zong and Batalova 2015). After Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Salvadorans, immigrants of Cuban origin represent the fourth largest Hispanic group in the United States. Recent estimates indicate that more than half (57%) of Cuban-origin immigrants are first-generation immigrants (Krogstad 2017).

When assessing the potential effects of immigration policy on immigrants’ behavioral outcomes, Cuban immigrants in the United States are of particular interest because until recently (see Meissner 2017; White House 2017), they benefitted from a preferential immigration policy that treated them as political refugees and not as economic migrants. As a result of this special immigrant status, Cuban immigrants in United States did not have to fear deportation if they broke the law. Consequently, compared to other immigrants of Hispanic origin, Cuban
immigrants could be expected to have a higher involvement in the criminal justice system because they did not face the crime-deterrent threat of permanent removal from the country. Based on a review of prior research and available statistical information, we will try to determine if this is the case.

As recommended by Portes and his colleagues (Portes et al. 2009, 1101), in order to better understand the criminal justice outcomes pertaining to Cuban immigrants, we will first provide a brief historical overview of the political and social contexts of exit associated with various waves of the Cuban immigration to the United States. Additionally, we include factual data that reflect in a comparative perspective the over-time changes in the socio-economic profile of the Cuban ethnic minority in the United States. The Cuban immigrants’ involvement with the US Criminal Justice System will be further explored.

**Global migration flows today**

The term “globalisation” has been interpreted in different ways, and as globalisation scholars Held and McGrew (2002:2) have noted, there is no single account of globalisation that is regarded as academic orthodoxy. Globalisation can be thought of “the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders” and the onset of a “borderless world” (Dickinson, 2017:4). To discuss the globalist claim that we are moving towards a borderless world, a good starting point would be some statistics regarding global migration flows today. In a 2015 United Nations report on international migration, it was observed that international migration is a modern reality touching nearly all parts of the world.\(^1\) The number of international migrants worldwide has grown rapidly from 173 million in 2000 to 244 million in 2015, an international migrant being defined as one who lives outside his or her country of birth.\(^2\) High-income countries host the majority of the world’s international migrants, with 71% of international migrants living in them.\(^3\) Much of the growth in the global population of international migrants has also been concentrated in high-income countries, with migration to high-income countries accounting for 81% of the

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\(^2\) *Ibid* at p5

\(^3\) *Ibid*
growth in the number of international migrants worldwide from 2000 to 2015. 4 65% of international migrants come from middle-income countries. 5

Yet, as a 2009 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report reminds us, international migration is far from a new or novel phenomenon. European colonization, the slave trade and the use of Chinese and Indian contract labourers in Southeast Asia and the Americas all resulted in large migration flows. 6 Taking a longer-term historical view, human migration from one place to another has been theorized to have been taking place since 50,000 years ago. 7 Despite the tendency for historical shortsightedness, Dickinson observes that every person today has an ancestor who migrated from one place to another – the question is only how far back in one’s genealogy one needs to go to find that migrating ancestor (Dickinson, 2017:23).

Demographically, there is a wide disparity between developed and developing countries. The working-age population in developed countries is expected to decline by 2050, 8 and in some of them, such as Germany, Japan and South Korea, their populations are expected to shrink. 9 The aging of populations, especially in developed countries, will pose issues such as the funding of care for the elderly as the number of dependents increases vis-à-vis the working-age population. 10 On the other hand, the working-age population in developing countries is expected to increase in 2050. 11 This demographic disparity between developed and developing countries is expected to widen in the future – a decline in the number of people of working-age in developed countries occurs at the same time as an increase in the working-age population in developing countries. It is on this basis that the 2009 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report predicts that the demographic pressure for international migration flows is likely to increase. 12

4 Ibid at p6
5 Ibid at p14
7 Ibid at p29
9 Ibid
10 Ibid at p44
11 Ibid
12 Ibid at p46
Economically speaking, there remains vast inequality in wealth between developed and developing countries. As Milanovic (2016:132) observes, the country where one lives has an extremely significant impact on one’s lifetime income – more so than class, at least for the time being. Given that 97% of the world’s population lives in the country where they were born, Milanovic (2016:132) proposes the concept of citizenship ‘premiums’ and ‘penalties’. Through pure circumstance, one who is born in a developed country like Sweden can be said to enjoy a ‘citizenship premium’, while conversely a person born in a developing country like Pakistan suffers a ‘citizenship penalty’ (Milanovic, 2016:131). The disparity can be large indeed. To take his extreme example, on average, merely being born in the United States as opposed to Congo would multiply one’s lifetime income 93 times (Milanovic, 2016:133). Migrating to another country can thus be extremely attractive to potential migrants, offering the potential migrant the opportunity to greatly increase his income (Milanovic, 2016:134).

Apart from the traditional explanations of wage differentials and a lack of economic development in poor countries, Massey (1990:68) suggests that the increase in capital-intensive economic development in developing countries as a result of globalization has caused economic uncertainty which makes international migration an attractive option. So long as economic development among countries remains uneven, the existence of migrants who wish to improve their economic position with higher wages, coupled with the demand for cheap labour in developed countries, is likely to continue to create economic pressure for migration. The number of people who wish to migrate is thus likely to far exceed the number that receiving countries are willing or able to accept (Weiner, 1996:18).

**Migratory trends and the United States’ immigration policy toward Cubans**

In search of political stability and economic opportunities, Cubans started to migrate to the United States in the early nineteenth century (Garcia 1996) and a few decades later, important Cuban immigrant communities could be found in Florida (Tampa and Key West), and in New York. The opening of cigar factories in Key West and later in Tampa prompted the immigration of many Cuban workers and businesspersons, especially after 1885. Levine and Asis (2000, 3) noted that during Cuba’s struggle for independence from Spain (1868-1898), approximately 10% of Cuba’s population took refuge in US cities.
Migratory flows from Cuba intensified toward the end of the nineteenth century and during the first decade of the twentieth century, following the 1898 Spanish-Cuban-American war, the first US administration of Cuba, the first Cuban government, and the second US administration of Cuba. Official records show that from 1896 to 1910, 55,718 Cuban nationals migrated to the United States (Perez 1986, 127-128). Yet many of these Cuban exiles returned to Cuba after the country became independent in 1902 (Levine and Asis 2000). Based on Portes and Bach’s (1985, 84) estimates, prior to the 1959 revolution, there were about 30,000 Cuban immigrants living in the United States.

Post-revolution immigration waves

Cuban out-migration increased in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly after the 1959 Castro-led Cuban revolution that prompted a dramatic regime change. In summary, for the past six decades, when large migratory movements from Cuba occurred, they have been prompted by internal socio-political and economic factors, by geopolitical circumstances (e.g., Cold War tensions; the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe; the disintegration of the Soviet Union), and by changes in the US immigration policies and the American Government’s relations with Cuba.

While the first post-revolution immigration wave (1959-1962) included an exodus of upper and upper-middle class Cuban families that feared persecution and tried to escape the communist regime and a radicalized society, a second immigration wave (1965 – 1973) included mainly middle and working class Cuban families (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). From 1959 to 1962, about 212,000 Cuban nationals migrated to the United States (Perez 1986, 131). Statistical information indicates that approximately 37% of the Cuban household heads who relocated to the United States between 1960 and 1962 were proprietors, managers, or professionals while in Cuba, based on 1953 census data, only 10% of the labor force had a similar socioeconomic status. The highly educated were also overrepresented among these early immigrants (i.e., 12.5% had a college degree or more, while in Cuba, in 1953, only 1% of the population had similar education levels) (Perez 1986, 129).

In 1965, the first Cuban ‘boatlift’ occurred when the Cuban government opened the port of Camarioca and allowed Cubans willing to migrate to the United States to leave the country. About 5,000 Cuban rafters managed to float to Florida before the boatlift had been suspended and replaced in December 1965 with an
orderly airlift, which was the result of a US–Cuba agreement meant to prevent people from traveling overseas in unsafe vessels (Perez 1986). From 1965 to 1973, about 300,000 Cuban immigrants were allowed to fly to Miami on US-government chartered flights (i.e., the “Freedom Flights”) (Rosenblum and Hipsman 2015; Rusin et al. 2015). Portes and Bach (1985, 84) contended that from 1959 until 1980, more than 800,000 Cubans left their country. About 85% of these immigrants relocated to the United States and Puerto Rico.

Significant changes that occurred in the mid-1960s in the US immigration policy vis-à-vis Cuban immigrants parallel this second increase in the number of Cuban nationals seeking asylum in the United States. In 1966, a federal law was enacted (Cuban Adjustment Act), allowing all Cuban emigrants seeking entry into United States to be treated as political refugees and to become eligible for permanent residency only one year after their arrival. No other immigrant group received such a privileged treatment at the time or later (Meissner 2017).

The third immigration wave

In a thorough analysis of the post-1959 Cuban migration to United States, Garcia (1996) noted that Cuban immigrants who left the country during the first fifteen years of the Castro regime were welcome with sympathy and admiration by most Americans. They were perceived as heroes and patriots, who were fleeing communism. Consequently, the US Government rewarded them with a relief package and benefits programs meant to facilitate their integration into the American society. However, when the third massive immigration flow from Cuba occurred a few years later, the Americans’ and even the Cuban-immigrant communities’ reactions toward the newcomers were very different. They were no longer welcoming.

In general, the Cuban Government has heavily criticized the US immigration policies toward Cuban immigrants and the Castro administration considered Cuban nationals who succeeded to immigrate traitors to the revolution (Meissner 2017). Yet, in April 1980, Fidel Castro allowed Cubans wishing to migrate to the United States to do that. For several months, about 1,700 overcrowded boats (so-called Freedom Flotilla), carrying approximately 125,000 Cuban refugees left the Cuban port Mariel and reached Florida, the American state located at only 90 miles (about 145 kilometers) north of Cuba (Schmidt 1985). Known as the Mariel Cubans, these new immigrants, who constitute the third wave of Cuban refugees, represented all social classes, including the poor (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). About 30% of the
Mariel Cubans were non-whites, while in the earlier cohorts less than 5% of the Cuban immigrants belonged to racial minority groups (Portes and Bach 1985: 88).

In October of 1980, a mutual agreement between the United States and Cuba ended the six-month exodus of the Mariel Cubans. Later accounts indicate that some of these refugees have been released from Cuban prisons or mental health facilities, making them ineligible for US permanent residency. Garcia (1996) noted that felons have been expelled from Cuba not only to antagonize the US government, but also to discredit the Cuban immigrant community in the United States. Nonetheless, as part of the first formal accord between the American and the Cuban governments since the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, Cuba agreed in December of 1984 to the repatriation of 2,746 undesirable Cuban refugees, who had been in custody since their arrival in United States. The deportation procedures started in February of 1985. In return, the United States government promised to accept each year 20,000 Cubans immigrants. Immigration officials estimated at the time that the Federal Government’s expenditures associated with the continuing incarceration of the Cuban aliens were $41 million a year (Schmidt 1985). While almost 2,000 Cubans included on the 1984 list were eventually deported to Cuba, during the past three decades, the Cuban government accepted the deportation of only five Cuban immigrants who were convicted of crimes in United States and were not among the Mariel Cubans (Alvarez and Hussey 2015).

**Cuban migration to United States in the 1990s**

The fourth wave of Cuban refugees arrived in United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Clinton administration, following the 1994 US – Cuba refugee agreement, a special visa lottery system was implemented and in 1995, a revision of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) was made. The policy known as “wet foot, dry foot” allowed Cuban nationals who reached the United States by land to be legally admitted into the country, while those caught in transit at sea were to be returned to Cuba or to a third country. The illegal Cuban immigrants’ detention costs at the Guantanamo naval base were estimated at about $1 million per day. As a result, in May 1995, the Clinton administration decided to grant immigration status to 21,700 Cuban rafters (balseros) who did not want to return to Cuba and could not be sent to a third country because no country was willing to accept them. Simultaneously, the administration announced that in the future, all balseros would be returned to Cuba as illegal aliens and that temporary refugee status would be granted only to persons able to demonstrate they suffered religious or political
persecution (Garcia 1996, x). In 2004, out of the 913,000 foreign-born Cuban immigrants living in the United States at the time, 30% immigrated before 1980, 12% entered the country between 1980 and 1990, and 21% were admitted into United States after 1990 (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). More recent data indicate that the foreign-born Cuban population in the United States increased from 737,000 in 1990 to 1,144,000 in 2013 (Rusin et al. 2015).

Recent migratory trends

For more than five decades the US immigration policy “has been far more welcoming towards Cubans than to any other migrants from Latin America (Pew Hispanic Center 2006, 2).” Nonetheless, recent important changes in US – Cuba relations prompted by President Barack Obama’s and President Raúl Castro’s historic decision in December 2014 to normalize relations between Cuba and United States (see Rusin et al. 2015) impacted population movements from Cuba to the United States as well. They occurred in anticipation of potential changes to the US immigration policy toward Cubans willing to migrate to the United States and toward those who were already in the country.

Based on data provided by the US Customs and Border Protection agency, in 2016, 56,406 Cubans entered the United States by land. Compared to 2014, when the number of Cubans entering the United States (24,278) was already higher than in previous years (also due to the 2013 Cuban government’s removal of travel restrictions for Cuban nationals), the number of Cuban immigrants who accessed the United States via various ports of entry increased by 31% in 2015 and by 78% in 2016 (Krogstad 2017). Additionally, the number of Cuba-born individuals applying for and obtaining lawful permanent resident status significantly increased from 32,219 in 2013 to 46,679 in 2014, and to 54,396 in 2015 (US Department of Homeland Security 2016: 12). It should be also noted that the number of Cuban nationals determined inadmissible by US immigration authorities also increased significantly from 7,759 in 2012, to 17,679 in 2013, 24,285 in 2014, and 43,158 in 2015. While the total annual number of aliens declared inadmissible into United States remained relatively stable over the past decade, the proportion of Cuban nationals out of the total number of aliens not granted entry gradually increased from 3.6% in 2012, to 8.7% in 2013, 11% in 2014 and 17% in 2015 (US Department of Homeland Security 2016, 98).

Fifty-four years after the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, in July of 2015, full diplomatic ties between the two countries were restored (Renwick, Lee and McBride 2016). As part of the normalization of US – Cuba relations
and prompted by the Cuban government’s agreement to accept Cuban deportees (Meissner 2017), on January 12, 2017, eight days before the end of his presidency, President Obama announced the ending of the “wet foot / dry foot” policy. Under the new regulations, Cuban nationals, whether they arrive by sea or port of entry, need a visa in order to be legally admitted into the country. President Obama also stated that Cuban immigrants who attempt to enter United States illegally and those who do not qualify for humanitarian relief\textsuperscript{13} will be subject to removal. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ended the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program\textsuperscript{14} (White House 2017). President Donald Trump upheld these decisions. It remains to be seen how the new legislation and upcoming developments of the United States – Cuba relations will impact future migratory trends from Cuba and the criminal justice behavioral outcomes of the population of Cuban origin in United States.

**Socio-demographic characteristics of the Cuban immigrants in United States: Brief historical overview**

Based on an analysis of 1980 census data, collected before the arrival of the Mariel Cubans, Perez (1986) noted that over 97% of people of Cuban descent lived in large metropolitan areas, being mostly concentrated in three urban areas (Miami – Fort Lauderdale, Greater New York, and Greater Los Angeles). Describing the Cuban community in Miami in the late 1980s, Portes and Zhou noted:

Over time, Cubans created a highly diversified and prosperous ethnic community that provided resources for the adaptation process of its second generation. By

\textsuperscript{13} Cuban nationals could claim and obtain a refugee status, if admitted into the US Refugee Admissions Program. Nonetheless, the website of the US Embassy in Cuba indicates that the US Refugee Admissions Program “is not currently accepting new applications or processing cases in Havana.”

\textsuperscript{14} In August 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in conjunction with the Department of State announced the establishment of the Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) Program. According to this program, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) allowed US entrance to eligible health-care providers who were Cuban nationals (e.g., physicians, nurses, paramedics, physical therapists, sports trainers, etc.). These persons have been sent by the Castro regime to work or study in a third country, but have often been denied permission by the Cuban Government to migrate to the United States, even if they were legally eligible to do so (US Department of State 2009). Referring to this controversial program, Erisman (2012, 270) noted that CMPP was actually an example of “brain-drain politics” meant to undermine the worldwide political influence the Castro regime was trying to achieve.
1989, the family income approximated the family income of the native-born population; in 1987 there were 30,000 Cuban-owned small businesses that formed the core of the Miami ethnic enclave; in parallel the rise of the private school system oriented toward the values and political outlook of this community. In terms of the typology of vulnerability and resources, well-sheltered Cuban American teenagers lack any extensive exposure to outside discrimination, they have little contact with youth from disadvantaged minorities and the development of an enclave creates economic opportunities beyond the narrowing industrial and tourist sectors on which most other immigrant groups in the area depend. (Portes and Zhou 1993, 91)

The residential pattern of Cuban communities in the United States did not change much over the past four decades. Currently, over 77% of persons of Cuban descent reside in Florida, the Greater Miami and New York metropolitan areas being the US cities with the largest concentration of Cuban immigrants (Rusin et al. 2015). Compared to other Hispanic groups in United States, in the late 1970s, Cubans counted a higher proportion of elderly persons, the median age of the Cuban population was 38, while the median age corresponding to persons of Mexican and Puerto Rican origins was 22. Additionally, Cuban immigrants had lower fertility rates and a lower sex ratio (number of males to 100 females) than Puerto Ricans and persons with Mexican ancestry (Perez 1986, 132-133). In 2013, the median age of Cuban immigrants (52 years) continued to be higher than the median age of the foreign-born population (43 years) in United States (Rusin et al. 2015).

Regarding educational attainment, in 1980, the proportion of Cuban-origin persons with a college degree was similar to the proportion of the US population who completed four or more years of college and higher than the percentage of other highly educated Hispanics. Yet, the proportion of Cubans with eight years of school or less was much higher than the corresponding figure in the overall population (Perez 1986). In 2013, 21% of foreign-born Cuban immigrants (age 25 and over) had a college degree, compared to 28% of the foreign-born population in United States, and 30% of the natives (Rusin et al. 2015). However, compared to other Hispanics, in 2004, the percentage of first and second-generation Cubans with college degrees (25%) was twice higher. At the time, about 39% of US-born Cubans had a college degree or more vs. 22% of foreign-born Cubans. However, Cubans who entered the country between 1980 and 1990 had the lowest educational achievements (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). Nevertheless, in 2013, the percentage of first-generation Cuban immigrants in managerial, business, science, and arts occupations (25%) was lower than the percentage of natives (38%) and the
percentage corresponding to the overall foreign-born population (30%) in these occupations (Rusin et al. 2015).

In 1979, the median income for Cuban families ($18,245) was slightly lower than the median family income ($19,917) for the general population, but higher than the figure corresponding to families of Hispanic origin ($14,712) (Perez 1986, 135). In 2004, the overall median household income for Cubans ($38,000) was lower than the median household income for non-Hispanic whites, but higher than the median income corresponding to other Hispanic households. Nonetheless, US-born individuals of Cuban parentage had at the time a higher median household income ($50,000) than non-Hispanic whites ($48,000) (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). Recent data indicate that the income gap gradually increased, especially when first-generation Cuban immigrants are compared to natives and other foreign-born individuals. In 2013, households headed by foreign-born Cuban immigrants had on average a lower median income ($35,400) than the overall foreign-born population in US ($48,000), than native-born households ($53,000) (Rusin et al. 2015), and also lower than the median income Cuban immigrants had a decade ago.

Although in 1979, 11.7% of the Cuban families were below the poverty level (compared to 9.6% nationwide), in 2013, 23% of first-generation Cuban immigrants lived in poverty, a value much higher than the figures corresponding to natives (15%) and the overall foreign-born population in the United States (19%). This might be due in part to the fact that in 2013, only 57% of Cuban immigrants age 16 and older were in the civilian labor force vs. 67% of the total foreign-born population and 63% of the natives (Perez 1986; Rusin et al. 2015).

Research conducted in the 1980s, shows that Cuban immigrants in United States had a high degree of retention of the culture of their native country; they tended to speak predominantly Spanish at home and, for the most part, had a below-average ability to speak English (Rogg and Cooney 1980 cited in Perez 1986, 136). Recent research concluded that Cuban immigrants (ages 5 and over) had higher limited-English proficiency rates (LPR) than the overall foreign-born population in the United States (e.g., 62% of Cubans vs. 50% foreign-born people declared that they speak English less than very well) (Rusin et al. 2015). Some might interpret these figures as indicators of the Cubans’ lower degree of assimilation to the host society. However, the National Survey of Latinos conducted in 2006 by the Pew Hispanic Center showed that the majority of Cubans (52%) acknowledged United States (and not their country of origin) as being their “real homeland.” This figure was
significantly higher than the percentage corresponding to immigrants from Mexico (36%), immigrants from Central and South America (35%), and Puerto Ricans (33%), who are actually US citizens by birth (Pew Hispanic Center 2006, 4).

Cuban immigrants’ involvement with the U. S. Criminal Justice System

The number of studies examining the Cuban immigrants’ involvement in crime is relatively small. With few exceptions (e.g., Butcher and Piehl 1998; Nielsen and Martinez 2011; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007), most of the works published over the past two decades that focus on immigrants’ criminal behavior in United States tend to contain statistical information that refers to different pan-ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanic, Asian, Caribbean, etc.), which comprise persons ethnically related, but who belong to various nationalities. When information about Cuban immigrants’ involvement with the criminal justice system is included, it generally refers to the first-generation of immigrants and/or to young males only, female offenders being disproportionately underrepresented in both immigrant and non-immigrant populations of Cuban descent.

Using 1980 and 1990 data from the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), Butcher and Piehl (1998) identified the institutionalization rates for foreign-born immigrants compared to natives. Because institutionalization refers to persons in correctional facilities, detention centers for visa violations, homes for the aged, and other institutions (e.g., hospitals, drug treatment centers, etc.), the authors selected data corresponding to males aged 18 – 40, for whom institutionalization was clearly a negative outcome (i.e., 70% of persons in this group were in correctional facilities).

Results showed that foreign-born individuals had on average lower institutionalization rates than natives, both in 1980 (0.69% vs. 1.35%) and in 1990 (1.49% vs. 2.16%). Among first-generation immigrants, in 1980, Cuban and Mexican immigrant males had similar institutionalization rates, 0.57% and 0.55%, respectively, which were slightly lower than the average institutionalization rate (0.69%) for the foreign-born subsample. In 1990, the institutionalization rate for Cuban immigrants (3.57%) increased significantly, being higher than the corresponding rates for natives and all immigrants. The authors observed that among Cuban immigrants institutionalized in 1990 there were included Mariel
Boatlift Cubans that had the highest institutionalization rate (8.6%) among immigrants (Butcher and Piehl 1998, 658 – 660).

Although Mariel Cubans have been associated with drug-related violence (Martinez 2002, 2) and in the early 1980s, they had relatively high rates of homicide victimization and offending that approached those of African Americans, by 1985, the Mariels’ involvement in lethal violence declined to levels similar to those corresponding to other Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites (Martinez 2006, 4). Nonetheless, Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) data show that in 1994, out of 8,594 noncitizens convicted of an offense in US district courts, 3.9% were Cuban nationals (Scalia 1996, 3). It should be noted that historical census data (see Gibson and Lennon 1999) indicate that in 1990, first-generation Cuban immigrants (N = 736,971) represented 3.7% of the total foreign-born population in United States.

In 2000, the incarceration rate for males age 18 to 39 was 3.04% in United States. The incarceration rate for young males of Cuban descent was 3.01% (2.2% for first-generation Cuban immigrants and 4.2% for Cubans born in United States). In summary, young males of Cuban origin had incarceration rates approximately equal to the average rate corresponding to the overall population under study and about three times lower than the African - American males’ incarceration rate (10.9%). However, Cuban immigrant males had higher incarceration rates than their non-Hispanic white and Asian counterparts. Except Puerto Ricans, whose incarceration rate was 5.6%, young Cuban males also had higher incarceration rates than other young males of Hispanic origin (Rumbaut et al. 2006).

A summary of the academic research findings regarding Cuban immigrants’ criminal justice outcomes is presented in Table 1. Although these studies did not offer details regarding the type of offenses immigrants had committed, as Alvarez and Hussey (2015, para 17) noted, “Cuban crime enterprises, particularly involving fraud and theft, have long been a concern for law enforcement” in United States. In support of this assertion, investigative journalists stated in a three-part series published in 2015 in the Sun Sentinel (the largest-circulation newspaper in South Florida) that over the past two decades, Cuban immigrants in United States defrauded US businesses and taxpayers of more than $2 billion (Kestin et al. 2015).
Table 1. Cuban immigrants in the criminal justice system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perez (1986)</td>
<td>1980 Census Data</td>
<td>Persons in group quarters (including inmates)</td>
<td>The percentage of residents of Cuban ancestry in group quarters (1.3%) is much lower than the percentage of other Hispanics (3.5%) and US total (5.9%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butcher and Piehl (1998)</td>
<td>US Census 1980 and 1990; 5% PUMS</td>
<td>Institutionalization of males, age 18-40.</td>
<td>In 1980 and 1990, the foreign-born had much lower institutionalization rates than natives. In 1980, 0.6% of those institutionalized were immigrants from Cuba (vs. 1.35% natives); in 1990, the institutionalization rate of Cuban immigrants (3.6%) surpassed the natives’ institutionalization rate (2.16%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scalia (1996)</td>
<td>US Sentencing Commission, Monitoring data file, annual</td>
<td>Non-citizens in the federal justice system 1984-1994</td>
<td>In 1994, 3.9% of those convicted of an offense in US district courts were immigrants from Cuba; almost 49% of those convicted were from Mexico and 10% were from Columbia. The proportion of convicted Cuban immigrants corresponded to the proportion of Cubans (3.7%) among the foreign-born in the overall population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumbaut et al. (2006)</td>
<td>US Census 2000; 5% PUMS</td>
<td>Males 18-39 incarcerated in US</td>
<td>The average incarceration rate for the foreign-born (0.86%) is much lower than the natives’ incarceration rate (3.51%). First generation Cuban immigrants have much lower incarceration rates (2.2%) than natives of Cuban descent (4.2%). Overall, Cubans have lower incarceration rates (3.01%) than the population average (3.04%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nielsen and Martinez (2011)</td>
<td>City of Miami Police Department (MPD) arrest data 2000-2004</td>
<td>11,000 arrests for robbery and aggravated assault; the unit of analysis is the individual offender.</td>
<td>Immigrants from Cuba represented 9.3% of those arrested for robbery and 15.9% of those arrested for aggravated assault. Compared to US natives, Cuban immigrants were significantly less likely to be arrested for robbery. First-generation Cuban immigrants were underrepresented among offenders who committed assault or robbery.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Based on 2000-2014 federal and local (Miami-Dade County) arrest data, Kestin and her colleagues acknowledged that Cuba-born immigrants were overrepresented among those arrested for certain crimes. Although first-generation Cuban immigrants represent 24% of the population in Miami-Dade County, more than 70% of persons arrested since 2000 by local law enforcement for federal health-care fraud, cargo theft,
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and fuel theft were immigrants from Cuba. Cuban immigrants were also overrepresented among those arrested for marijuana-related offenses (59%), insurance fraud (53%), and credit card fraud (46%). At the national level, first-generation Cuban immigrants, who represent less than 1% of the US population were disproportionately represented among federal arrests for health-care fraud (41%), cargo theft (23%), credit card theft (10%), and marijuana trafficking or production (9%). The analysis showed that between 2000 and 2014, 6,880 first-generation Cuban immigrants have been charged with these crimes in federal or state courts. The study did not collect information regarding the criminal activity of US-born persons of Cuban descent (Kestin et al. 2015).

Although the previously mentioned study gives numerous examples of Cuban immigrants’ participation in organized criminal activities, these are for the most part property and white-collar crimes. No references to Cuban immigrants’ involvement in violent crimes have been made. Nielsen and Ramirez’s (2011) study based on 2000-2004 arrest reports provided by the city of Miami Police Department (MPD) shows that out of 10,767 individuals arrested for robbery, aggravated assault, or both, Cuban immigrants represented 14.3% of the arrestees. Considering the fact that in 2000, almost 60% of Miami’s residents were first-generation immigrants and that Cuban immigrants represented about 51% of the foreign-born population in the city (Nielsen and Martinez 2011, 349), it can be concluded that Cuban immigrants were underrepresented among persons arrested for the two types of violent crimes included in the analysis.

A 2016 report on prison population in United States (Carson and Anderson 2016), shows that in 2015, Florida hosted 6.64% of the prison population in United States, but 11% of the noncitizen (foreign-born) prisoners under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional authorities. It should be also noted that at the end of 2015, out of 46 US states with complete data, after Texas (N = 8,448), Florida had the second largest number of noncitizen prisoners (N = 7,193). Foreign-born inmates represent 7.1% of the population incarcerated in Florida, they are predominantly males (96.8%), and only 1.8% of them are age 17 or younger. Although Florida changed its reporting system in 2013 and the country of birth of noncitizen prisoners is no longer reported (see Carson and Anderson 2016), 2013-2017 foreign-born population estimates in Florida indicate that about 20.2% of the residents are first-generation immigrants (United States Census 2018). This suggests that overall, immigrants, including first-generation Cuban immigrants, were underrepresented among prison inmates.

Nevertheless, an article published in March, 2016 in Miami Herald stated that 28,400 Cuban nationals currently living in United States served prison terms in
this country for committing various crimes (including over 2,000 murders) (Weaver and Mazzei 2016). As previously noted, until recently, the US immigration policy toward Cubans was unique in United States. One of its consequences was that Cuban immigrants who were not American citizens and committed crimes on US soil could not be deported to their home country, even if they pleaded guilty to a criminal offense and/or agreed to be deported, because the Cuban government would not accept them. No longer immune to repatriation, noncitizen Cuban immigrants who committed serious or less serious offenses may soon be removed from the country. However, in 2016, out of 340,056 non-citizens removed from the country only 45 were aliens from Cuba (67% of them were deported because they had a prior criminal conviction and 33% for committing non-criminal violations). The number of Cuban immigrants removed from the country was particularly low, especially when compared to the number of immigrants from Mexico deported in 2016 (i.e., 245,306). Yet, as of December 2017, official data showed that 37,218 Cuban immigrants were facing final deportation orders (Gamez Torres 2017; US Department of Homeland Security 2017).

Conclusion

This paper briefly presented some of the turning point events that impacted the Cuban immigration to the United States. It also tried to determine if based on factual data it can be concluded that US immigration policies related to Cuban immigrants appear to have influenced the Cuban immigrants’ criminal justice outcomes. Although for decades immigrants of Cuban decent were the beneficiaries of a preferential treatment in United States and did not have to fear deportation if they committed illegalities, for the most part, the literature and the available statistical information reviewed here (e.g., arrest and incarceration rates) do not indicate that Cuban immigrants were overrepresented among those involved in delinquent and criminal activities (especially, violent crimes) officially recorded in United States over the past three decades or that they committed criminal offenses at a significantly higher rate than immigrants from other countries.

A recent secondary analysis of panel data collected from 1992 to 2003 from a sample of immigrants and children of immigrants belonging to 77 nationalities (Portes and Rumbaut 2012) also supports this assertion. For instance, when subsamples of first and second-generation immigrants of Cuban and Mexican ancestry were compared, results of multivariate analyses showed that Cuban
immigrants had a significantly lower risk of arrest in early adulthood than their counterparts of Mexican origin. It should be noted that the samples were similar in terms of age and gender distribution and (pre)adolescence (i.e., family of origin structure, school performance, and delinquent behavior) and early-adulthood characteristics (e.g., job instability, marital status). Respondents of Cuban descent were, however, more likely to be college graduates, they attended safer schools, and the incidence of arrest among family members (the strongest predictor of the respondent’s arrest status) was significantly lower (Andreescu and Grossi 2018).

Based on these findings and the additional information examined, it seems plausible to conclude that variations in immigration policy might play a secondary role in the assimilation processes experienced by immigrants in United States. Contextual factors such as immigrant concentration at the community level (see Wolff et al. 2018) and the socioeconomic characteristics of the immigrant community one belongs to, the immigrants’ ties to their community, to the main socializing institutions such as the family, school, and peer groups are probably more important in shaping the immigrants’ life trajectories in the receiving country than immigration policies are. Nonetheless, systematic research is needed to better determine the long-term direct and indirect effects of immigration policies on behavioral outcomes. Additionally, future comparative studies should examine potential generational differences in the immigrant populations’ criminal behavior, when controlling for one’s ethnic ancestry.

References


“What Were You Thinking?”: Race, Gender, Victimhood, and Criminality in US Immigration Court

Arianna MONTERO-COLBERT, Yasemin TEKGURLER, Natalie Delia DECKARD

Abstract. Existing theory posits US immigration policy to be deeply gendered and racialized in its implementation. Existing within an environment in which the identities of victim and criminal are used to construct potential migrants as worthy additions, or dangerous threats, to the state, immigration judges have the latitude to help or hinder applicants appearing before them in their courts. Asking how immigrant physicality coincides with treatment by the judicial representative, we employ participant observation of court cases in a Southeastern US city. We find that, as the extant research would predict, immigrants’ treatment is fundamentally connected to their gendered and racialized performance of the identity of the “Ideal Migrant.”

Keywords: race, gender, victimhood, Criminality, US Immigration Court

Introduction

At the base of the Statue of Liberty, the inscription reads, “Give me your tired, your poor, / your huddled masses yearning to breathe free” (Lazarus, 1883, p. 1). Though many have argued that the choice of poem for this American landmark seems to have aged poorly in the light of the violent refrain to “build the wall” voiced by President Trump and 36% of taxpayers (Newport 2017), in some ways it also seems fitting. Those who reify the national monuments may see an inscription that echoes the ideals of freedom and justice that the United States seeks to protect. Any discordance between migrant treatment and this professed ideology may be found in the identity of the “tired” and “poor.” Who, we may ask, is allowed to be a member of the “huddled masses”? And how do we construct those who should not be included – the modern barbarians at the soon-to-exist gate?

Historically, the call for full citizenship and the rights that citizenship afforded had to be available to selected immigrants, or the settler colonial project of the United States would have never been rhetorically possible. In particular, the entire formation of
the United States depended upon a system that claimed access to new lands and the powers of citizenship afforded to non-native white malehood (Glenn 2015). That is, whiteness was constructed as a tool of native disempowerment and displacement. Without claiming these immigrants as broadly deserving of social inclusion and access to a schema of private property, arguably, the United States would not have had the symbolic power to build a nation.

In keeping with this historicity, there is certainly a sense of inevitability in the contemporary crackdown on border regulation and deportations in the United States, given the numeric predominance of indigenous Americans in the criminalized immigration system (Golash-Boza 2015a, 2015b). The fact that flows of goods and capital are relatively open to the detriment of citizens of nations in the Global South, while the borders are largely closed to labor migration from these same countries implies that the needs of racialized groups are being subordinated to market prerogatives (Deckard 2017, Golash-Boza 2015a). Detention and deportation are tools selectively weaponized against the noncompliant and surplus (Golash-Boza 2015a). As a result of this national agenda, hundreds of thousands of immigrants arrive at immigration courts each morning to plead their case in front of an often unsympathetic judge.

In contrast to the Statue of Liberty, which stands tall in the economic center of the metropole, immigration courts are often hidden in plain sight. In one mid-sized city in the Southeastern United States, immigration court occupies a building with tinted windows, fluorescent lighting, and off-white paneling. The building is in a deep state of disrepair. The deteriorated state of the public building stands in stark contrast with the amount of wealth that enters and exits the building on a daily basis, with the luxury cars that sit in the parking lot, and with the expensive commercial and residential real estate that occupies nearby lots. One thinks, upon approach, that perhaps this is a fitting, if Kafkaesque, setting for families hoping, families crying, and families being destroyed.

In this paper, we employ participant observation of the immigration court in this Southeastern city to contribute to larger sociological discussions about migration, indigeneity and the construction of the criminal and the victim. Acknowledging the ways in which racialized phenotype and gender have played historic roles in the United States settler colonial project, we interrogate the ways in which the criminal other is created in the apolitical judicial space. We also build upon the victim as the embodiment of the “tired” and “poor,” and thus particularly welcome as an immigrant into the capitalist vision of the nation-state.
The Immigrant and the Criminal

Identity Construction

Belonging in the liberal democracy is metered by citizenship – famously defined as “the right to have rights” in the nation-state (Somers 2008, Arendt 1951, Deckard and Heslin 2016). But the acquisition and retention of that citizenship is metered by subtler questions of gender and ethnic identity (Kerber 1998, Arendt 1951, Spinner 1995), which map onto existing social expectations for the embodiments of worthiness and deserved inclusion (Ramos-Zayas 2004, Cacho 2012). One can, therefore, understand the legal fight for citizenship as inextricably intertwined with the social fight for inclusion in the national community.

While there may be a sound theoretical framework for sociological studies of racial identity (T. Golash-Boza 2016), the existing literature struggles to precisely define ethnic identity (Deckard and Heslin 2016; Fearon and Laitin 2000). This lack of precision correctly reflects the fluidity of the concept (Nagel 1994, Harris, Carlson and Poata-Smith 2013, Jiménez 2010). Simply, the constituents of particular ethnic identities and their salience to the construction of identity change over time. At various points, language, cuisine, phenotypical characteristics, shared history and the ever-nebulous cultural values have been deemed either central or irrelevant to the establishment of ethnic difference (Verkuyten 2018). Similarly, while gender identity was once considered to be inescapably bound to biological physicality and performance (Butler, Undoing Gender 2004, Canaday 2009), the variety of physicalities and performances associated with vastly different gender regimes have made these arguments largely moot.

Reliably, however, identity distinctions exist when openings in the power hierarchy render such differences exploitable (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010, Lee 2008, Dunaway 2003). In the case of the settler colonial United States, the historically bi-racial political order in which racialized whites dominated over racialized non-whites (J. Feagin 2000) required both that an ethnic category of White be invented and that it then came to seem natural and obvious (Jacobson 1999, C. I. Harris 1992). Historically, this disjuncture can be seen clearly in immigration legislation and eligibility rules around naturalization – especially at the “margins” of whiteness (Vargas 2014, Treitler 2015). Gualtieri (2009), for example, interrogates the immigration of Syrians into the US, and the community’s struggle to be counted within the boundaries of whiteness in order to gain citizenship eligibility. Citing the ruling decision, Gaultieri argues that:
rather than base his argument in the realities of the Arab immigrant experience, [the ruling judge] preferred to rely on suppositions, and the old imperialist conviction that closeness to Europe meant closeness to "civilization" and membership in the "white race" (2009:49).

For Syrians, with inclusion in Whiteness came inclusion in a common group of "civilized" citizens. Placement within the boundaries of the constructed ethnic identity brought with it some protection from extrajudicial violence, even in the Jim Crow South (Gueltieri 2004). In this case, inclusion also meant exclusion from the unidimensional figure of the criminalblackman specifically (Young 2006), and the other broadly, able to be killed at any moment with no negative legal or social ramifications (Oliver 2001, Agamben 1998). The prism of criminality used here is instructive: White means non-criminal and legal American, non-White renders criminal, illegal, and killable.

The Criminalized Boundaries of Ethnicity and Gender in Immigration

With the boundaries of Whiteness constructed in the language of ethnicity and culture rather than biology (Bonilla-Silva 2001), carefully policed with the employment of a narrative of criminality (Webster 2008, T. M. Golash-Boza 2015a), and existentially important both to those included and those denied (Agamben 1998), it is perhaps little wonder that those most in danger of being deemed non-White are so likely to espouse a politic akin to White supremacy (Vargas 2014, Twine and Gallagher 2008). The extant literature simultaneously notes that non-White people who exist at the boundaries of Blackness and indigeneity appear to be constructing themselves as – and allowing themselves to be constructed as – “honorary whites”, effectively reasserting the positions of Black people (Bonilla-Silva 2002, Kim 2015) and the indigenous (Kim 2015) at the bottom of the racial hierarchy.

Racial hierarchies are not unique to the United States, and race predicts wealth position and class mobility globally (Gott 2007). Immigration policy regimes that allow for legal migration of particularly educated, skilled, or wealthy nationals particularly will be racialized in their outcomes, with phenotypically White migrants being disproportionately documented in the host country and thus literally less likely to be criminalized as “illegal” (Thobani 2000, Mlambo 2000). Thus, though criminality becomes metered through nominally colorblind language around human capital and migrant desirability, more racialized migrants are rendered, systematically, more criminal (T. M. Golash-Boza 2015a). It is important to note that this criminality is embodied, rather than enacted – non-White migrants are not more likely to act in
any particular way, they are simply more likely to exist in a body that is essentially criminal.

The affectation of criminality is clearer with the appearance of a victim (Elias 1993, Bumiller 1992). The extant literature suggests that gender identity may function to construct a binary between racialized men as criminals and racialized women as victims (Hartry 2012, Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013, Cooke 2002, Mishra 2007). In neoliberal regimes of state penalty, the construction of the woman as weak and in need of protection enables the empowerment of an entire government apparatus charged with the revenging of the victim in the aftermath of abuse, using the mechanisms of carcerality (Bumiller 1992, 2009, Bernstein 2010). In the context of late capitalism’s biopolitical tool – immigration control – this would suggest the concurrent expulsion of men and the admission of women with the same approximate narrative of threatening criminality. Indeed, all statistics point to a gendered program of removal in the United States (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013), as well as a broadly espoused narrative of anti-trafficking to incorporate women into the body politic (Bernstein 2010, Andrijasevic 2007).

**Citizenship Law as Criminal Law**

While immigration laws and the strictness of their application have always shifted to reflect the desirability of the bodies migrating (Baines 2004), it is only the most recent chapter of US migration policy that has been managed under the umbrella of criminality rather than labor (Ewing 2012). In response to 9/11, the Bush administration created the twin-headed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) agency to handle all pursuant migration cases (Bush, 2002). This administrative move cemented the growing connection between immigrants, crime, and terrorism in the public imagination (Stumpf 2006). The recent expansion of 287(g) and other programs that work to increase detection through the engagement of local police forces have effectively completed the criminalization of irregular status by making all encounters with the state potential opportunities for deportation (Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act 2009).

For those undocumented immigrants in the United States who are apprehended by police or border control, there are few pathways to legal citizenship available. One potential route remains the political asylum process, guaranteed in principle by international law (Hamlin 2015). The legal procedures surrounding
asylum evolve to reflect the social and political values of the ruling US capitalist class – with asylum from enemy regimes and socialist countries granted far more often than comparable applications from nationals in nations with US-backed governments (Steinbock 2002, Hamlin 2015). Notably, the current process for asylum must be started when one is physically residing in the United States, and before three years have passed since the time of migration (Bloemraad 2006, Hamlin 2015). Due to language barriers and fear of apprehension, many immigrants unintentionally miss the deadline for legal routes to citizenship (Bloemraad 2006).

Loss of the opportunity to access legal citizenship has broad-reaching consequences (Agamben 1998, Lopez 2008, Hartry 2012, T. M. Golash-Boza 2015a). Without the legal papers necessary to obtain an official state form of identification, migrants lack access to even the most basic affordances like transportation, healthcare, and education (Lopez 2008). Even for those who have illicitly obtained documentation for the purposes of securing employment or school registration, fear of the interconnected record-keeping institutions of the state often inhibits interactions with state institutions (Brayne 2014, Menjívar and Lakhani 2016). Finally, though undocumented immigrants organize collective action campaigns with the goal of living “in the light” and without fear (Gonzales 2008), existing as an undocumented person in a space of carceral governmentality requires a level of system avoidance that affects a reality akin to constant terror.

This de facto terror may only be mitigated through the largesse of the same nation-state that caused it (Beck and Willms 2014). With judicial recognition of a right to asylum, the nation-state may grant temporary residency or permanent inclusion as a citizen with “the right to have rights” (Arendt 1951, Hayes 2018). With a favorable court decision, a person becomes worthy, whole, and American. With an unfavorable one, criminal status is made official and the role of criminal alien is designated with all of the force of law.

**Case Law Interpretation and Courtroom as Performance of Legality**

The strategic power of knowledge, it may be argued, is the power to transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces (Certeau 1986). Knowledge is thus conceived as the legitimate and the legible records and analyses of historical events - and certainly involves power in terms of who writes the records (Hetherington 2011, Schram and Pavlovskaya 2017). In the context of the criminal justice system, the white American proverb, “it’s the law,” often touted in response to situations of conflicts between morality and legality, reflects the omnipresent
obsession with the image-objective moral law (Schofield 2018). In this paper, we point to the ways in which the execution of color-blind law that is racialized and gender. Tautologically, if the law were an objective and obvious certainty, there would be no place for the courtroom: the very existence of judges and justices, attorneys and defendants represents that the courts act as a necessary intermediary in the legal interpretation process (Hernandez and Navarro 2018). The law must be applied to cases, and this application often holds great variability (Rugh and Hall 2016).

Further, political persuasions shape legal interpretation. Dworkin (1982) argues that politics do not just affect courtroom etiquette, but also affect judge’s perceptions of prior authorial intentions. In case law, this translates to the ability to interpret loosely what it means to continue precedent through citing earlier justices’ decisions that favor their interpretation. In this way, judges attempt to hide the role of their political convictions in the language of the law (Asad, Deportation Decisions: Judicial Decision-Making in an American Immigration Court 2019). However, there are no politically neutral decisions. To interpret the law is to misattribute clarity over ambiguous definitions of political equality and the role of the courts in administering justice (Dworkin 1982).

According to Stanley Fish (2010), the history of Western thought can be summarized in the debate between the positivists and those who believe that the world is socially constructed and enacted through performance. In the latter vision, perceptions, beliefs, and interactions form the basis of our social institutions. To navigate these social structures requires performance. Thinking of all social interaction as a social stage means that individuals will create a front stage performance of the most idealized representations of ourselves and a back stage where we enact the most genuine aspects of our character external of social pressure, stigma, or judgment (Goffman 1956).

Anthropological performance theorists often conclude that performance represents “making, not faking” (Turner 1979). Under Turner’s framework for cultural performance, to act is not to represent fictional or exaggerated accounts, but rather to create our most authentic selves in the process of social delivery. Alternatively, because ruling authorities create the norms of speech, communication, society, and legitimate participation, other performance theorists argue that performance is inherently tied to power. Specifically drawing on the postcolonial African context, Fabian (2007) theorizes one umbrella of performance
as the “shuffle and dance” oppressed peoples use as an adaptive survival technique in the reign of the powerful. In this vein, we can understand the powerful as those who write the scripts required of their subordinates.

When applied to the United States, scripts are institutionalized in the form of public policy and legislative initiatives. This is especially true with regards to penal institutions. Discipline and Punish (1975) is famously cited as highlighting the performative aspect of punishment as spectacle as well as the rationalization of the penal regime (Foucault 1975). Scholars in the Foucauldian tradition have since noted the institutionalization of the rationalized criminal court proceeding, and the performance of innocence and guilt that are demanded in this particular context (De Giorgi 2017, Leader 2018, Scheffer, Hannken-Illjes and Kozin 2010).

Immigration court becomes a theater where the judge uses the language of objective law and the realities of flexible interpretation to carry out national and personal agendas. As the judge is the sole adjudicator in the immigration courtroom, she embodies the sole audience and her interpretation determines credibility authoritatively; there is no need for further clarification or approval beyond her individual assessments (McKinnon 2009). As audience members, judges performatively substantiate their claim to expertise through practices of documentation, list-making, deflating people into numerical case numbers and legal codes, performing distance, referencing rationality, and most saliently, dismissing the possibility of subjectivity in these performances (Smith and Blumberg 1967). Yet, insofar as immigration outcomes are racialized and gendered while immigration law is ostensibly applicable irrespective of ascriptive identity, it is in the application of that law at the point of the judiciary that performance must be disparately received.

**The “Ideal Migrant”**

Whereas some criminal justice proceedings are adversarial and presented for a jury’s deliberation, immigration court is audienced by a single judge. Because an audience will deem credible those performances which match their expectations of what tone and content a performed script ought to possess, immigration judges may evaluate cases based on which defendants’ performances the judge deems favorable. More times than not, the Western script for immigration court defendant performances is informed by the colonial imagination of the ideal immigrant as the grateful, undeserving other (Shuman and Bohmer, 2004). In defining the ideal immigrant archetype, Marciniak (2006) introduces the concept of immigrants as pharmakon – a Derridean concept indicating both remedy and poison. In this theory,
in order to reconcile these seemingly contradictory parameters, immigrants successfully depart the liminal state when they submit to a process of ontological conditioning of their bodies into the most productive and least threatening form in the eyes of the state.

This adherence to embodied performances, perhaps unsurprisingly, come to strengthen the underlying logic of immigration legislation. While laws have sought to tighten up what types of behavior constitute migrant criminality and the ways in which this criminality becomes inexorably linked to personhood status (T. M. Golash-Boza 2015b, Douglas and Sáenz 2013, Medina 1997), similar laws have been passed around victimization (McCormick 2011).

**Research Question**

How do race and gender affect the ways in which discourses of victimhood and criminality are constructed in immigration court? In pursuit of this question, we conducted ethnographic participant observation in the immigration court proceedings of a major city in the US South in 2018. We focused our attention particularly on immigration judges, those assigned the task of adjudicating and audiencing worthiness to the United States regime of citizenship, asking how these judges respond to the embodiment of the applicants appearing in their courts.

**Methods & Data**

This study is based upon ethnographic participant observation of over 50 hours across ten separate observational periods at an immigration court in a major city in the Southeastern United States. For each day of observation, we entered the courtroom at the beginning of the court’s morning session, 8:30am, and observed the process until the end of the morning session. Each morning, the process started with the judge, government counsel, and English-to-Spanish translator introducing themselves to defendants. There were no other translators available in the courtroom, though when requested, translators for other languages were provided via certified phone translation.

The court audienced several types of cases, though most frequently those who were heard by the judge were revolving around claims to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status or political asylum. Before listening to the court caseload for the day, the judge called all “first timers” to be addressed as a group. “First timers” are people whose first time it is entering immigration court and have been summoned by the state to represent themselves on this given day. Because the path to legal citizenship
is only available through years of court appearances and legal paperwork, the judge uses the first-time speech to communicate information that will be broadly useful to all people summoned, to mark their attendance as a sign of respect and discipline to the court, and to assign new court dates in which they should return with further documentation, ideally with a privately-retained lawyer.

With the extant literature as a starting point, we observed in detail the ways in which ideas of justice are reflected within an immigration court. We noted themes of immigrant dehumanization that occurred in the course of normal courtroom operation, especially in the course of creating a two-dimensional criminal/victim dichotomy. We supplemented ethnographic data collection with semi-structured interviews with agents of the space, including police officers, lawyers, immigrants, interpreters and more. These interviews added remarkably little to the evidence drawn from observing people’s actions as they occurred.

Because we employed participant observation instead of interview, survey, or secondary data analysis, we did not give defendants the opportunity to self-report details regarding their identity beyond what was presented in the courtroom setting. As such, this study reports solely presentations of gender and racial identity for its analysis. In total, this paper represents a total of n = 17 defendants and the differential narratives that the judge employs when hearing their particular cases.

**Causal Variables**

**Race.** While courtroom proceedings did reveal the country of origin of each of the defendants, race must be understood as distinct from, and intertwined with, both nationality and ethnicity (Handlin 1957, Arendt 1951, Spinner 1995). Because race is socially constructed, and imbued with meaning in social contexts, the classifications for racial groupings are contentious. For centuries, scholars appeared in relative consensus that the United States operated in a bifurcated society between whites and nonwhites. The frame of reference for nonwhiteness has always been anchored in blackness because of the belief in the “wages of whiteness” and the inherent historical contradiction in recognizing the material resources and social acceptance that was deprived of blacks as equal human beings (J. R. Feagin 2000).

Of course, the idea that there was a black-white racial binary in the United States did not speak to the fact that there were only African Americans and Anglo Americans in the country, but rather that the state, public policy and the culture of our society as a whole only recognized and spoke to the two distinct racial experiences: White and non-White. Nonetheless, skin color persisted as one of the
strongest predictors of the social perception of race and accordingly, of discriminatory treatment. The brown paper bag test is frequently referenced as a particularly discriminatory social practice in which inclusion or exclusion was decided by the lightness or darkness of one’s skin hue as compared to a paper bag (Kerr, The Paper Bag Principle: Of the Myth and the Motion of Colorism 2005). Colorist practices such as the brown paper bag test are rooted in racist beliefs that the blurring of the racial boundaries that signal blackness inherently signal positive social progress. While the brown paper bag test is objectionable both for its obvious colorist philosophy of application, as well as for its centering of blackness on a lightened color continuum, we acknowledge that it still holds power as a symbol of the institutional and social division of prominent national discourses of race (Kerr 2005, 2006).

For the purposes of this study, we divided people into the six skin tines present in the Fitzpatrick skin tone scale (Fitzpatrick 1988) with 1-3 on the scale representing “light skin” and 4-6 representing “dark skin,” and defendants categorized accordingly. While doing so, we acknowledge that there was no reason to believe defendants had African ancestry – the presumption upon which the Fitzpatrick scale is based. Rather, given information about nation of origin, defendants were likely descended from the indigenous people of the Americas and racialized as Indios in their native countries. The race coding in this study, then, become a measure of racialized indigeneity versus White presentation. Existing literature suggests that a migrant’s relationship to indigeneity in Mexico and Central America is an important predictor of documentation status in the United States (Asad and Hwang 2019).

Gender. Similarly, gender was understood as the use of pronouns and the degree to which the defendant’s presentation conformed to generalized standards of feminine and masculine performativity in dress, grooming and affect (Butler 1988, 2004). While these are imperfect measures, there was little to no visible deviation among the sampled participants in their gender performativity, which was uniform enough to perhaps represent an additional form of requisite compliance to court expectations for what this study refers to as the “ideal migrant.”

Dependent Variables
Victimhood
Patricia Connell (1997) suggests that the status of victimhood is accorded to those representing proximity to the expected social norms and physical presentation of white womanhood. Certainly, the question of who can be victimized is gendered and
racialized – with women and White people seen as victims even when they demonstrably aggress (Baumer, Messner and Felson 2000, Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer 1999). Unlike the helplessness and constrained agency paradigm under which victimhood is assigned to acceptance to white womanhood, another avenue for attributed victimhood is the assignation of desirability and thus the implicit willingness to help recruit those who meet our expectations of mothering and domestic labor (Glenn, Chang and Forcey 2016).

**Asylum application.** The most apparent indicator of provisional victim status is the beginning of an unprompted dialogue about the potentiality of abuse. Typically, in the immigration courtroom, this is represented through asking questions which would lead one to be eligible for an asylum application without the defendant actually presenting any information which would make the application relevant or necessary.

**Protective paternalism.** Paternalistic discourse such as, when a defendant talks about a male family member, asking “Did he hurt you?” reinvents the judge as a guardian figure. When the judge positions themselves as a guardian, this inherently positions the defendant as a victim because it removes the opportunity for the defendant in question to have been at fault and instead places them as the subject of some potential harm.

**Actionable advice.** According to standard legal procedure the judge represents a neutral adjudicator rather than an active and helpful participant in the outcome of the defendants. Any attempts to make actionable and specific suggestions for best courses of action is therefore one form of reimagining the characters in the courtroom. When the judge selectively reimagines their role to be partial to the interest of the defendant, this involves using phrases that offer unofficial, unsolicited legal counsel. This happens independent of whether the defendant has an attorney representing them or not.

**Criminality**

The state selectively targets undocumented migrants for removal to instill fear in others and to manage noncompliant workers. Because criminality is an inherent status as a result of the body and the experience of migration, criminal discourse can be deployed selectively and discriminatorily to villainize migrants at hand. Similarly, the illegal body makes it impossible to file complaints about wage theft or other forms of workplace abuse. For the purposes of this paper, narratives of criminality
are those which place the defendant as particularly morally blameworthy. In light of the fact that all immigration court proceedings begin with a restatement of the details of their criminal border crossing or overstaying of their legal documentation, these instances were removed from the record in favor of more subtle and individual narrations of criminality.

**Suggestion of fraud.** The main role for the defendant is to enact a credible performance for the audience of the immigration judge. Under this consideration, the preeminent narrative of criminality that enters the parameter of the courtroom is implications that the defendant is actively engaging in fraudulent reporting. This can come in the form of doubting the credibility of the story the defendant is supplying, questioning the defendant’s tone, or exacting and repetitive investigations of the account presented.

**Fatalism and unworthiness.** While the judges frequently engaged in formal pleasantries and platitudes towards all defendants in the success of their cases, in particular circumstances, judges were not sympathetic towards the plight of the defendants. Instead, the judges deployed discourse about the objectivity of the law and the fact that the defendant would be undeserving of the resources the court provided, or otherwise wasting time.

**Assignation of blame.** Criminality is evaluated through moral blameworthiness. When the judge uses words that imply wrongdoing, the judge insinuates that the defendant is guilty and should be held culpable. Oftentimes, the incidents of blame do not in fact correspond with the severity of the offenses represented, but rather, occur independently.

**Analysis and Findings**

Here we present tabulations and qualitative findings of defendants and their ascriptive characteristics. In our observations, thirteen of the seventeen sampled defendants coded positively for selective deployment of victimhood or criminality discourse. Notably, just one defendant coded positively for both measures of victimhood and criminality. Table 1, below, presents the relationship between courtroom discourse deployed by immigration court judges and the gender of defendants.
Table 1: Courtroom discourse by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victimhood</th>
<th>Criminality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>5 (71%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>5 (71%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the data in Table 1, we can observe a strong correlation between the narratives applied to performances of men and women in the courtroom. As predicted, women coded especially positively for measures of victimhood. This rate is paralleled in the measures of criminality assigned to men. Relatedly, Table 2 presents correlations between courtroom discourse deployed by immigration judges as opposed to the skin color of defendants.

Table 2: Courtroom discourse by color

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victimhood</th>
<th>Criminality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light skin</td>
<td>6 (86%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dark skin</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>6 (86%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this measure, we can observe that people with light skin represented 86% of the people that were spoken to in the language of victimhood. This correlation is even stronger than that of gender.

Considering other factors correlated with wealth, such as the presence of legal counsel, the professionalism of defendant’s dress did not ultimately prove useful in further exploring this question. This study also incorporated the deployment of other forms of worthiness evaluations. These evaluations included the extent in which family and maternal/paternal status were brought into the conversation, and whether they were represented in positive or negative lights. Similarly, for younger defendants, discourse about present and potential future academic status, progress, and success were measured and shown to have no mitigating influence on the deployment of discourses of criminality and victimhood when measures of race and gender were controlled against.

The majority of the defendants were treated in the manner the extant literature would predict, and according to their racial and gender presentation. For example, Rodrigo, who had no prior criminal record, and answered calmly in
response to any questions the judge asked of him was met with contentious accusations. At times, the judge accused him of being fraudulent in the courtroom, despite the availability of evidence to support his story and the ease with which external audience members could follow his story. Undoubtedly, Rodrigo’s status as a dark-skinned man made his classification as a criminal body easier, and thus facilitated the dialogue that followed.

José, another dark-skinned man in the Charlotte immigration courtroom, faced a similar fate. At several points, the judge begrudgingly continued reviewing José’s case. At points, mentioning that he was wasting her time by even presenting his evidence, and in several other occasions, leaving no room for excuses or explanation other than his obvious wrongdoing. The question “what were you thinking?” was pointedly lodged against José when he tried to explain what led him to cross the border.

In the realm of victimhood, the defendants were also received predictably. Amanda’s application was treated with extra care, and her options were carefully reviewed before the rest of the patient court. At no point were accusations of her unworthiness to the judge’s time posed. Similarly, Brenda and Ana were offered asylum applications and given advice about how to proceed for the best possible reception in the next stage of the process. Mariana was given contact information for a lawyer who may be able to help her frame a case around a situation of possible neglect.

Mariana, Brenda, Ana, and Amanda all shared two things in common: they were light-skinned women. It appears as though, not only were dark-skinned women not able to access a framework of victimhood to the same extent as light-skinned women, at times, criminal discourse was even afforded to them. When Jasmine plead her case for asylum in front of the judge, the judge did not have the question of Jasmine’s protection in her mind. Rather, the judge continually utilized references to the different cultural standards in the United States, and Jasmine’s failure to meet those standards in her performance and in her application.

Finally, Milton was the only defendant who coded as being targeted with both criminal and victim discourse. As a dark-skinned man, though the conversation began with allegations and investigations of his possible past wrongdoing, through his hour in the courtroom, he eventually was able to perform his way into a framework of viability. In his performance, he was able to effectively parse his role and previous character assignation, despite the claims lodged against him. Future
research might be interested in Rodrigo’s case of navigating the courtrooms from the perspective of an undesirable body, and which performances allowed for the shift from criminal discourse to victim status.

**Discussion & Conclusion**

Existing research in identity and migration posits that the acquisition and retention of citizenship is metered by subtler questions of gender and ethnic identity (Kerber 1998, Arendt 1951, Spinner 1995), which map onto existing social expectations for the embodiments of worthiness and deserved inclusion (Ramos-Zayas 2004, Cacho 2012). The findings of this research confirm these theories. In the immigration court used as a case study, the presentation and performance of gender and racialized ethnicity predicted treatment by the judicial representative – working to ultimately make migration possible, or deportation all but inevitable.

The extant literature suggests that gender identity may function to construct a binary between racialized men as criminals and racialized women as victims (Hartry 2012, Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013, Cooke 2002, Mishra 2007). Identity distinctions exist when openings in the power hierarchy render such differences exploitable (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010, Lee 2008, Dunaway 2003). Indeed, we have argued that feminized identities are understood to signal powerlessness and victim status, an argument ultimately confirmed by the data we present. Similarly, we have argued that phenotypical distance from Whiteness signals a threat to existing power structures, narrated as criminality. Again, our findings suggest this to be the case. Acknowledging that immigration policy regimes that allow for legal migration of particularly educated, skilled, or wealthy nationals particularly will be racialized in their outcomes (Thobani 2000, Mlambo 2000), with White migrant less likely to be “illegal,” we continued to see more racialized migrants rendered, systematically, more criminal (T. M. Golash-Boza 2015a).

We noted that immigration court becomes a theater where the judge uses the language of objective law and the realities of flexible interpretation to carry out national and personal agendas. Insofar as immigration outcomes are racialized and gendered while immigration law is ostensibly applicable irrespective of ascriptive identity, it is in the application of that law at the point of the judiciary that performance must be disparately received. This research found that the performance of the “Ideal Migrant” is received disparately at the point of the
judiciary – and these disparities are indeed anchored in gendered and ethnic identities.

The ramifications of this empirical confirmation of existing theories for liberal democracies are disheartening. The idea that a breakdown in seemingly egalitarian systems of law is at the very point at which these laws are interpreted is a stunning indictment of the construct of equal citizenship as central to the nation-state.

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Immigrants’ Origin and Skill level as Factors in Attitudes toward Immigrants in Europe

Michelle HALE WILLIAMS, Panagiotis CHASAPOPOULOS

Abstract. The issue of immigration, and policy responses to it, is driving key political debates in most European countries. A growing backlash appears to be manifest on several levels including the attitude of individual members of the public, organized political parties or factions, and governmental policy. While existing research has tended to examine public attitudes toward immigrants with a focus on the individual characteristics of those holding the views (e.g. age, gender, education), few studies have considered characteristics of the immigrants themselves as a driving factor in attitudes toward immigration. This study examines characteristics of immigrants as independent variables, differentiating immigrants’ origin (EU/non-EU) and immigrants’ skill level (low/highly-educated). It utilizes data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the European Social Survey (ESS) to evaluate the extent to which characteristics of immigrants drive anti-immigrant public sentiment. This investigation finds that for immigrants living in a European region, their origin is a significant determinant of attitudes toward immigration. In addition, our empirical results do not reveal any direct effect of immigrants’ skill level on attitudes toward them. Nevertheless, we find some moderating effect between the size and the skill level of immigrant population in shaping natives’ attitudes toward immigration.

Keywords: Immigration, European regions, anti-immigrant attitudes, multi-level analysis

Introduction

Immigration poses a significant policy-making challenge for advanced industrial countries in the 21st Century. Civil wars and conflicts along with economic underdevelopment, instability, and political corruption are among the many factors driving ethnic nationals to seek relocation in foreign lands. Several factors have made Western Europe among the top destinations for immigrants. These include democratic political stability, relative prosperity and higher standards of living, comparatively sizable social welfare states, perceived social opportunity, and central geographic location relative to many areas that emigrants presently flee.

1 The authors are grateful to Professor Arjen van Witteloostuijn and Professor Christophe Boone for their useful comments and suggestions during the writing of this study.
Governments across the advanced industrial world, and especially those of Western Europe, have confronted rising tides of immigration in recent years amidst a backdrop of increased public resentment of immigrants entering their societies. This has made the challenge of policy response especially difficult.

This study examines public attitudes toward immigrants in 78 European regions. Much existing research on Western Europe and beyond has tended to investigate the phenomenon of immigration by linking attitudes toward immigrants to the individual characteristics of those holding particular viewpoints, whether positive or negative (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Pardos-Prado, 2011). However, this study flips the focus by turning attention to the characteristics of immigrants living in a European region. Using existing theories regarding how economic conditions, cultural identity frameworks, and interaction or contact with immigrants may affect perceptions of and attitudes toward them, this paper differentiates itself from much of the past literature by placing weight on the traits of the immigrants themselves as highly determinative of attitudes toward immigration. We do this in our analysis by controlling for individual traits such as age, gender, or employment status that may account for some of the more idiosyncratic factors shaping sentiment toward immigrants.

This study builds on previous empirical research that examines the impact of regional factors on European attitudes towards immigrants (Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Rustenbach, 2010; Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Bridges and Mateut, 2014; Weber, 2015) and attempts to investigate how the characteristics of immigrants drive public sentiment to be more or less anti-immigrant. Utilizing data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) (2012) and the European Social Survey (ESS) (2012) over the period 2004-2012, we evaluate the extent to which origin (EU/Non-EU) and skill level (low/high-educated) of immigrants living in a given region affect natives’ attitudes toward them. Our work is similar to the study conducted by Markaki and Longhi (2013), yet we differentiate ourselves from the authors in several ways, primarily by distinguishing non-EU immigrants into six broad groups of origin which is the main empirical contribution of this study.

Our results indicate that the proportion of foreigners in a given region does not appear to be a significant factor in shaping attitudes toward immigration. However, when we distinguish between different groups of immigrants, we find that immigrants’ origin seems to play a key role. In addition, although we do not find any direct effect of immigrants’ skill level as measured by level of educational attainment
in shaping attitudes toward them, our empirical results reveal some evidence that immigrants’ skill level might interact with the size of the immigrant population to influence the portrayal of immigrants in the minds of natives.

Factors Shaping the Attitudes of Natives toward Immigrants

Traditionally, it is the person holding the attitude and factors shaping it that have been the focus of attempts to account for attitudes toward immigrants. Demographic factors such as one’s age or gender, social factors including one’s level of education, income or social class status i.e. level of wealth, or cultural identity factors that manifest themselves in cultural protectionism and racial prejudice have been considered. Much debate has played out over the relative weight of contextual factors in absolute conditions where economic versus socio-cultural or socio-political factors are weighed against one another (Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2013; Rydgren, 2007). Here crime, economic prosperity, and other social milieu variables are tested in relation to attitudes toward immigrants. Some studies have moved away from demographics and contextual factors or added to those in order to consider transitory and variable beliefs that individuals hold, in other words how certain attitudes held, in turn, affect attitudes toward immigrants (Rustenbach, 2010; Masso, 2009). For instance, trust in government and trust in other people can be considered for how they affect attitudes toward immigrants. Other scholars have focused on politics shaping attitudes toward immigrants, where political actors foment fear to scapegoat immigrants for perceived threats (Norris, 2005; Williams, 2006).

Existing scholarship provides several competing frameworks for understanding the way that attitudes toward immigrants are shaped, both directly by individual conditions and local context but also indirectly by politics and intermediate ideology or values.

Competition Theory / Economic determinants

Competition theory suggests that economic conditions drive attitudes toward immigrants (Malchow-Moeller et al., 2008; Huber and Oberdabernig, 2015; Kazaqi, 2015; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Schneider, 2008; Strabac and Listhaug, 2007). A common notion is that economic downturn fuels anti-immigrant sentiment (Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hatton, 2016). Immigrants
may be viewed as a drain on welfare states extracting a disproportionate share of limited resources (Facchini and Mayda, 2009). Labour market threat has been considered where natives appear to view immigrants as their main competition for scarce jobs (Kunovich, 2013). Some work has considered the difference that the level of education and skill level of the attitude holder make in their attitude toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

Conflict Theory / Identity and Values determinants

The idea that race and racial prejudice drives some people toward visceral negative attitudes toward immigrants has also been evaluated in the literature. This theory tends to reflect a clash of cultures logic, whereby individuals recognize in-group and out-group markers differentiating people according to race and physical features, religious practices and customs, and distinctive traditions or observable cultural practices. It holds that observable difference leads to discrimination and often animosity between groups with a preference for their own race (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Pehrson and Green, 2010; Malhotra, 2013). Some work in this area has drawn upon Ronald Inglehart’s (1990) logic in asserting post-industrial society changes to account for conditions of economic prosperity being correlated with increasing levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in many instances – a paradox given the logic of economic condition and competition theory arguments that suggest the opposite. Such work claims that economic prosperity and security can lead to a focus on identity and culture, or to more emphasis on political preferences and ideology, in structuring attitudes, especially negative attitudes, toward immigrants (O’Connell, 2005; Pardos-Prado, 2011). This logic is used, for instance, to account for advanced industrial societies currently appearing to be prone to the rise of radical-right wing parties and increasing anti-immigrant sentiment.

Contact Theory / Interaction determinants

Contact theory holds that direct experience and interaction between the national population and the immigrants that it hosts tends to build bridges and lead to common understandings. Some contingencies for contact theory have been tested, such as effects of national versus regional effects (Kauffman and Harris, 2015; Weber, 2015), region or city size (urban vs. mid-range population, vs. small / rural) as a factor (Barone et al., 2014), and the role of size and concentrations of immigrant populations (Green et al., 2010; Dustmann and Preston, 2001; Schlueter and
Wagner, 2008; Barone et al., 2014). Notably, some studies have drawn decisive conclusions that contradict contact theory, suggesting instead that interaction with immigrants breeds resentment rather than harmony or is not strong enough to overcome other driving factors that produce anti-immigrant sentiment (Careja, 2016; Karreth et al., 2015).

**Theoretical considerations and related empirical research**

This study situates itself among those studies investigating whether certain characteristics of immigrants affect public attitudes toward them. In particular, we contribute to the literature on attitudes formation by evaluating the extent to which the origin and the skill level of immigrants drive public sentiment to be more or less anti-immigrant. To date, a few studies at European level have emerged that consider the characteristics of the immigrant population as determinative.

A few studies using ESS, Eurobarometer, and the British Social Attitudes Survey data have considered the ethnic origin of immigrants suggesting that immigrants from a different race are perceived more negatively and as a greater threat (Bridges and Mateut, 2014; Dustmann and Preston, 2007). Non-European and non-westernern immigrants produce heightened negative attitudes (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Scheepers et al., 2002). However, the relationship between immigrant presence and threat is complex. Schneider (2008) demonstrated this finding that the effect is not linear as the quadratic term of the variable is found to be negative and statistically significant, suggesting that above a threshold level, the average perception of ethnic threat decreases with an increasing share of non-western immigrants (Schneider, 2008). Existing studies examining immigrant skill level have found little causal connection with anti-immigrant attitudes (Schneider, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2012; O’Connell, 2011).

There have been a few more studies that, like our own, examine natives’ attitudes toward immigrants at the European regional level. With respect to the impact of the size of the immigrant population on attitudes toward immigration, the results of this research seem to be mixed. Trying to explain immigrant derogation between European regions, and using data from the first round of the ESS, Schuelter and Wagner (2008) find that the greater the size of the regional non-national workforce, the greater both intergroup contact and perceived group threat. Yet, others utilize ESS or EVS data at various NUTS levels 1-3 concluding that the number
of immigrants in a region does not appear to affect natives’ attitudes towards immigration (Rustenbach, 2010; Karreth et al., 2015). Moreover, using information from the ESS for Swiss municipalities, Green et. al (2010) note that a higher proportion of Northern/Western European immigrants increases intergroup contact which in turn indirectly decreases anti-immigrant attitudes. These findings confirm the hypothesis of the authors that the presence of ‘culturally similar’ immigrants from rich countries should diminish negative attitudes towards immigration. However, a high proportion of Muslim immigrants in a Swiss municipality is found to increase the perceived threat of immigration. In addition, also drawing data from the ESS, Markaki and Longhi (2013) show that a higher percentage of immigrants in the region increases the probability that the native population perceives immigrants as a threat to the country’s economy, culture and quality of life. Their empirical results reveal that these negative attitudes towards immigration are driven by the number of non-EU immigrants in the region. Finally, contrary to the labour market competition theory, the authors find that a higher proportion of immigrants with low education decreases the perceived economic threat of immigration.

Our research is influenced by the fact that attitudes toward immigrants cannot be adequately explained by economic factors, social factors, political factors, racial prejudice or even the attitude-holder’s own milieu, when these are taken in isolation. Instead, all of these seem to come together and interact to generate anti-immigrant attitudes in much the same way that voting studies have long been frustrated by a lack of clear causal factors driving the outcome. We assert, therefore, that no single theory with corresponding discrete variables captures what is happening and can account for anti-immigrant sentiment, but rather each contributes an aspect of it. For this reason, we build our models in the analysis drawing variables from each of the three theoretical approaches discussed before, also following the design of the few existing studies mentioned above in the literature review where attitudes toward immigrants are shaped not only by individual conditions of the attitude-holder but also by the characteristics of the immigrants.

Several assumptions from the existing literature inform our analysis. First, we may observe that economic conditions correlate positively with attitudes toward immigrants so that better economic conditions correspond to more positive attitudes toward immigrants, as suggested by economic competition theory. Second, we expect that cultural difference correlates negatively with attitudes toward
immigrants whereby attitudes become more negative as cultural difference
increases, which is consistent with conflict and identity theory. Third, we may see
that increasing contact with immigrants produces more positive attitudes toward
them, as predicted by contact theory. We do not set out to test these theories,
however their logic and assumptions inform our framework and understanding of
anti-immigrant attitudes including how we determine variables for our models.

Data and Methods

We use explanatory variables at two different levels, the individual and the
regional. Our central research question focuses on regional level factors that shape
attitudes held by natives toward immigrants living within the same geographic
region. In particular, we investigate how origin and skill level of immigrants within a
given region affect native attitudes toward them. While the focus is on regional level
determinants, we use individual level data in order to control for the more
idiosyncratic factors of individual anti-immigrant attitudes. We do present the
individual level determinants in summary form but treat it as a step in controlling for
factors that could offset our regional level focus.

The structure of our investigation combines individual-level information
with regional-level data from a number of sources. In particular, for our dependent
variables and individual-level predictors we use survey data from the European
Social Survey (ESS). In addition, regionally aggregated indicators are computed from
the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). Finally, data on regional control
variables are provided by the Regional Database of Cambridge Econometrics and the
Regional Statistics Database of Eurostat. We restrict our sample to five rounds (2004-
2012) of the ESS and focus on respondents from 78 regions of 16 European countries.

The regional level we use is based on the Nomenclature of Units for
Territorial Statistics (NUTS) of the EU, which classifies countries into regions
according to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The NUTS are divided
into three hierarchical levels, where the NUTS-3 level represents a more detailed
classification of regions and NUTS-1 level a broader one. We use data at the NUTS-1
level at which regions are geographically large enough to minimize any potential bias
due to self-selection of natives in their location choices (Dustmann and Preston,
However, the NUTS-2 level is used in those cases where the NUTS-1 level corresponds to the whole country and data at the NUTS-2 level are available.

Finally, because this study examines natives’ attitudes towards immigrants, we exclude from the sample all individuals without national citizenship and those who were born outside the country. Nevertheless, similarly to Markaki and Longhi (2013) we include in the analysis ethnic minorities and second-generation immigrants, but controlling for both, to capture differences between individuals who have immigrant background and those who have not. Table 1 in the Appendix presents the structure of the pooled cross-sectional sample.

**Dependent variable**

The dependent variable, anti-immigrant attitudes, is measured using the respondents’ answers to three different questions in the ESS. More specifically, we construct our dependent variable based on the following questions:

“Would you say it is generally bad or good for the country’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”

“Would you say that the country’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”

“Is the country made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”

To evaluate attitudes toward immigrants the questions use a scale that ranges from 0 to 10. The original question items are reverse recoded so that higher values indicate greater anti-immigrant attitudes. The three distinct measures allow us to compare natives’ attitudes towards immigrants in relation to, respectively, the country’s economy, culture and life in general. Alternatively, we argue that these measures represent the economic, cultural and overall perceived threat of immigration. For summary statistics on the average regional attitudes towards immigrants see Table 2 in the Appendix.

**Individual predictors**

We build our individual-level independent variables based on the existing empirical literature on attitudes towards immigration (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and

---

2 It is more likely that those natives who dislike immigrants will respond to an increasing concentration of foreigners within their region of residence by relocating to areas where fewer immigrants live.
Sinnott, 2006; Rustenbach, 2010; Facchini and Mayda, 2012; Markaki and Longhi, 2013). The first set of individual-level predictors consist of the demographic background characteristics of the ESS respondents. We add controls for individuals who have one or both parents born abroad, and for those who belong to an ethnic minority. In addition, we include dummy variables for people who live in big cities, suburbs of big cities and rural areas to compare them with those who are residents of small cities or towns. The education level of respondents is measured using two binary indicators, one for people with primary education (ISCED 0-1) and another for those who have tertiary education (ISCED 5-6). Labour market characteristics are operationalized using various dummies: whether the person is employed or unemployed, whether she or he has supervisory duties, whether the respondent has ever been a member of a union, and finally whether the person has ever worked abroad.

With regard to a household’s economic situation and general satisfaction with the country’s economy two additional variables are used. The first is a dummy variable that indicates whether people find it difficult or not to cope with their current income while the second one measures how dissatisfied respondents feel with the present condition of the economy in the country using a scale ranging from 0 to 10. Furthermore, a set of social indicators are added that measure how religious the respondents are, how important it is to them to follow traditions and customs, how much trust they show in others and, as a proxy for an area’s security, how safe they feel walking alone in their neighborhood after dark. Finally, our analysis includes a variable which evaluates the political ideology of the person based on their self-placement on a left-right scale. Table 3 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for individual-level variables and Table 4 presents their correlation matrix.

**Regional predictors**

To investigate the effect of regional factors on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants we also utilize regional-level variables in our analysis. The regional indicators are aggregates of individual-level data derived from the EU-LFS. We merge the regional-level information from the EU-LFS with the individual-level dataset of the ESS to examine the impact that the share of the foreign population has on natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes.

The EU-LFS provides information on the nationality and country of birth of each respondent. This information can be used to measure the foreign and foreign-born population in each region respectively. The foreign population consists of
people who have a different nationality from that of their current country of residence, while the foreign-born population includes all those who have migrated from their country of birth to another host country. Both measures have pros and cons and therefore it is difficult to find a perfect measure to identify the size of the regional ‘outgroup’ population (Coenders, 2001). This is probably the reason that some previous studies in the literature have used the regional percentages of foreign-born (Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Weber, 2015), while other studies prefer to use the proportions of nonnationals in a region (Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Bridges and Mateut, 2014).

We choose to calculate the share of foreign population in each region on the basis of both individuals’ nationality and country of birth.\(^3\) By focusing on both criteria simultaneously we actually measure all persons born abroad who have not yet been naturalized, and thus are likely to be more salient in affecting current attitudes of natives toward immigration. However, we also use the separate shares of foreign nationals and foreign-born as alternative measures, the results of which are presented in the robustness analysis section that follows.

In a similar fashion to previous studies (Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Weber, 2015), apart from the total share of foreigners in a region we also compute the proportions of EU foreigners and those from countries outside the EU. However, attitudes toward immigrants might be affected by the composition of the non-EU foreigners in the country, due to significant cultural and socioeconomic status differences among them. Therefore, the main contribution of this study is that we additionally distinguish the non-EU foreigners into six broad groups of origin\(^4\): Other Europe, Middle East & North Africa, Other Africa, East & South Asia, North America & Australia and Latin America.\(^5\)

In order to measure the direct effect of foreigners’ skill level on natives’

\(^3\) Because the EU-LFS lacks information for Germany on individuals born abroad, we measure the share of foreign population in the German regions based only on individuals’ nationality.  
\(^4\) We categorize the foreign population of our sample into seven broad groups of origin following Dohse and Gold (2014).  
\(^5\) For those few individuals in the EU-LFS dataset who are foreign nationals and born outside the host country but whose nationality does not match with their country of birth, we choose to categorize them into a group of origin according to the nationality they hold. We argue that a different nationality indicates that the individual has been naturalized in a country other than his/her country of birth or reveals some preference of the person to be identified as a member of that nation and its culture Therefore, we suggest that in this case, between the two measures, nationality would be a more appropriate measure of individual’s origin.
attitudes toward immigrants, the proportions of economically active foreigners with primary or lower secondary education and with tertiary education are included in our model. In addition, we include interaction terms between the share of foreigners in a region and the proportion of them with primary or lower secondary education as well as with tertiary education, in order to capture any potential moderating effects between the size of and the skill level of immigrant population. Finally, in line with previous literature (Rustenbach, 2010; Markaki and Longhi, 2013; Weber, 2015) we add controls for the unemployment rate at the regional level as well as a measure of regional economic performance, using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of each region as a proxy for the latter. Table 6 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for regional-level variables and Table 7 presents the corresponding correlation matrix.

**Multilevel model**

To analyze differences in natives’ attitudes toward immigrants across regions we follow a multilevel approach similarly to previous studies (Rustenbach, 2010; Weber, 2015). Because each of our three dependent variables is an 11-category ordinal variable where the different categories are evenly spaced, we treat all of them as continuous. Thus, we estimate the following multilevel linear\(^6\) regression model:

\[
Y_{ijt} = X'_{ijt}\beta + Z'_{jt}\gamma + Fshare_{jt} \times Low_{jt}\delta + Fshare_{jt} \times High_{jt}\theta + u_j + \eta_t + \epsilon_{ijt}
\]

where \(i\) indicates respondents, \(j\) indicates regions within which respondents are nested and \(t\) indicates year. The dependent variable \(Y_{ijt}\) represents natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. \(X'\) is a vector that contains variables summarizing the individual characteristics of the respondents and \(Z'\) is a vector which contains variables that summarize the regional indicators. The interaction terms \(Fshare_{jt} \times Low_{jt}\) and \(Fshare_{jt} \times High_{jt}\) capture any moderating effect between the total share of foreigners\(^7\) in a region \(Fshare_{jt}\) and the proportion of them with primary or lower secondary education \(Low_{jt}\) as well as with tertiary education \(High_{jt}\),

\(^6\) Additionally, we also checked the non-linear effect of the shares of foreigners on anti-immigrant attitudes but we did not find any significant evidence for that.

\(^7\) We estimate the interaction effect only for the total share of foreigners, because the average cohort size of the rest of the foreign groups becomes too small to receive reliable results if we distinguish them according to their education.
respectively. Region-specific effects $u_j$, year-specific effects $\eta_t$, and unobserved individual effects $\varepsilon_{ijt}$ are also included in this two-level mixed model. Regional random effects are used to adjust for correlations across observations within the same region. Year-specific effects are treated as fixed to control for unobserved effects of time. We run a multilevel regression on each dependent variable. In each case, four different model specifications are estimated. The first model specification includes only the individual-level predictors. The following three contain, apart from the regional control variables, respectively the total share of foreigners, the shares of EU and non-EUs and the share of foreigners by each specific group of origin in a region. Finally, all model specifications are estimated by using the \textit{-mixed-} command in the statistical analysis software package Stata14.

Our work is similar to that conducted by Markaki and Longhi (2013), yet we differentiate ourselves from the authors in several ways. First, with respect to our sample, although we include in our analysis respondents from a smaller number of European regions than Markaki and Longhi (2013)$^8$, we use data from more recent rounds of the ESS. Second, in their study the authors decide to recode the ESS dependent variables which are measured on a scale from 0 to 10 into binary variables. However, we prefer not to alter the original variables in order not to lose the valuable information that they contain. Moreover, our study differs by distinguishing non-European immigrants living in a region into six different groups of origin as mentioned above, and this is our main empirical contribution to the literature. In addition, as discussed earlier in this section, we choose to measure the share of the foreign population in a region based simultaneously on both individuals’ nationality and country of birth. This is contrary to Markaki and Longhi (2013) who use the share of foreign-born residents in their analysis. Furthermore, with respect to the modelling strategy, the authors follow a two-step modelling technique by first estimating the models at the individual level and then attempting to explain any regional differences in a second stage. Nevertheless, as previous studies have done (Rustenbach, 2010; Weber, 2015), we apply a multilevel model to analyze differences in natives’ attitudes toward immigrants across regions. Finally, we extend our analysis by including an interaction term in our model to capture any moderating effect between the size and the skill level of immigrant population.

$^8$ Due to data unavailability for some countries in the LFS about the detailed origin of immigrants in a region.
Empirical results

Tables 8 and 9 report the estimated effects of individual and regional variables on the three different measures of anti-immigrant attitudes, respectively. In what follows, we refer to the empirical findings of these models as the results of the economic, cultural and overall threat models respectively. The results of individual and regional predictors are presented separately in this section.

Individual characteristics

We introduce individual level factors as controls to allow focus on regional level determinants as discussed in the description of our methods. We present a summary of those findings here (Table 8). Our individual level findings are consistent overall with what other studies have found (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Rustenbach, 2010; Facchini and Mayda, 2012; Markaki and Longhi, 2013).

With respect to demographic features, males have a greater negative attitude towards immigrants than females do in relation to culture and quality of life overall, and a lesser anti-immigrant attitude than females with regard to a country’s economy. Furthermore, older people have a more negative opinion on immigration than the youth population, although age does not present itself as a significant predictor in the economic threat model. In addition, we find that individuals with one or both parents born outside the country and those who belong to a minority ethnic group are more positive about immigration. Our final demographic background variables reveal that respondents living in big cities exert less negative attitudes towards immigrants than those living in small cities or towns, while the results are opposite for the residents of rural areas.

As we expected, our results show that individuals educated to primary level have stronger anti-immigrant attitudes than those with a tertiary level of education. Regarding labour market characteristics, the empirical findings are mixed across the different models. The employment status of individuals does not appear to be statistically significant, neither in the cultural threat nor in the overall threat model. However, the respondents who are employed seem to believe that immigrants might be bad for the country’s economy. Similarly, although being a union member currently or in the past is not an important predictor in the overall threat model, the variable has a negative and statistically significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes in relation to economy and culture. Moreover, having a permanent job contract does
not play an important role in explaining natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. Nevertheless, managers and senior officials or people who shoulder supervisory responsibilities are clearly less negative toward immigrants, while the opposite is true for those in elementary occupations. Additionally, the respondents who have worked abroad for a period of more than six months during the last ten years are found to carry less negative attitudes toward immigrants across all the models.

With regard to economic indicators, our empirical results in all three models indicate that people who find it more difficult to cope with their present income and those who feel more dissatisfied with the current condition of the economy in their country have higher anti-immigrant attitudes. The results move in the opposite direction for those who are more religious, feel safe in the dark and believe that most people can be trusted. Finally, we find evidence of a positive association between opposition to immigration and the variable measuring the importance of following traditions and customs. The same holds in case of an individual’s political affiliation with the right.

**Regional determinants**

The primary focus of this investigation is on the regional level. More specifically, the study focuses on those factors shaping the attitudes held by natives toward immigration that are conditioned by the origin and the skill level of immigrants living within the same region. Table 9 reports the empirical results of the regional determinants.

As the variance components at the bottom of the table show most of the variance of natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes is explained by individual level factors. This is similar to previous studies (Rustenbach, 2010; Weber, 2015). For instance, in the third specification of our economic threat model, where we distinguish between different groups of immigrants, the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is $r=0.055$ [$0.247/(0.247+4.24)$]. This indicates that 5.5 per cent of the total variance of the dependent variable is due to regional differences, which offers empirical support for applying a multilevel model. The ICC for the corresponding specification of the cultural threat and overall threat models is $r=0.084$ and $r=0.042$ respectively. This suggests that the observed variance of the dependent variable in these models can be attributed to differences at the regional level by 8.4 per cent and 4.2 per cent respectively. Therefore, while natives’ attitudes toward immigrants can mainly be explained by individual characteristics, the regional factors seem to play an important role as well.
The first specification of each model includes the total share of foreigners in a region. At the regional level, the total share of foreigners does not present itself as a significant factor in any of our models. The second specification of each model distinguishes between EU and non-EU foreigners. In the economic threat model, the regional percentage of EU foreigners has a negative impact and is found to be statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. More precisely, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of EU foreigners decreases the perceived economic threat by 0.59 percentage points. The coefficient of this variable is almost fifty per cent larger and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in the cultural threat model; while in the overall threat model the effect of the percentage of EU foreigners is a bit larger in magnitude than in the economic threat model and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.

To the contrary, the proportion of non-EU foreigners in the economic threat model has a positive and statistically significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes at the 5 per cent level. More specifically, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of non-EU foreigners in the region increases the perceived economic threat of immigration by 0.43 percentage points. The size effect of this variable is more than fifty per cent larger and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level for the perceived cultural threat of immigration. However, the number of non-EU foreigners in the region does not seem to increase the overall perceived threat of immigration at any level of significance.

Furthermore, the third model specification in the table separates non-EU foreigners into six broad groups of origin. This further distinction allows us to take into account any possible influence on attitudes derived from cultural or socioeconomic status differences between the native population and various groups of foreigners. Our empirical results indicate that proportions of non-EU foreigners by group of origin explain anti-immigrant attitudes in more detail and provide us with useful information. In particular, we find that natives living in regions with higher percentages of foreigners coming from European countries outside of the EU are more likely to believe that the cultural life in their country is undermined. Our estimated coefficient suggests that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of Europeans other than EU living in

\[ \text{If changing the independent variable by one unit, the dependent variable changes by } \gamma \text{ (coefficient) units. Thus, a one percentage point increase in the regional percentage of EU foreigners decreases the perceived economic threat by 0.046 points in the 10-point scale or differently by 0.46 percentage points.} \]
the region increases perceived cultural threat by 0.76 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. However, we do not find any significant impact of this group of foreigners in the economic threat and overall threat models.

Additionally, our findings show that the presence of a larger-sized foreign population from the Middle East and North African countries in a given region increases the perceived economic threat of immigration. A one percentage point increase in the percentage of Middle East and North African foreigners increases anti-immigrant attitudes in the region with respect to economy by more than 2 percentage points. The results for the same foreign group in the cultural threat model are similar. Finally, the regional category Other African has a positive impact on anti-immigrant attitudes with respect to perceived undermining of a country’s culture. The coefficient of this group is a bit smaller than that of Middle East and North African foreigners and it is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The Other African foreign group is the only one found to have a positive and statically significant effect at the 10 per cent level in the overall threat model. Consequently, the results confirm our expectation that cultural distance and different values increase anti-immigrant attitudes.

Our findings concerning the skill level of immigrants do not reveal any significant direct effect of immigrants with high-level qualifications on anti-immigrant attitudes. Nevertheless, the last specification of our first model show that immigrants with low-level qualifications have a small but statistically significant effect on natives’ attitudes towards immigrants with respect to the country’s economy. However, the proportion of low-educated immigrants in a region does not seem to have any significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes in the rest of the models. With regard to our control variables, we find no evidence that regional GDP per capita is significantly associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. Our results regarding the unemployment rate at the regional level are mixed. Although we find that a higher unemployment rate in a region increases the perceived economic threat of immigration, our results indicate that in the cultural threat model the regional unemployment rate has a negative and strongly statistically significant effect on attitudes toward immigrants. In the overall threat model, we do not find any significant effect of the regional rate of unemployment.

Finally, Table 10 presents the moderating effects between the size and the skill level of the immigrant population for each of our three dependent variables. As already mentioned above, we estimate an interaction effect only for the total share of foreigners in a region because the average cohort size of the rest of the foreign groups
becomes too small to allow us a further separation. Our results do not reveal a significant moderating effect between the share of foreigners in a region and the proportion of them with tertiary education in any of our models. However, we find that the proportion of low-educated immigrants positively moderates the effect of the total share of foreigners on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants with respect to the country’s economy, at the 1 percent level of significance.

In particular, our results indicate that when the proportion of low-skilled immigrants in a region is low (one standard deviation below the mean) increasing the total share of foreigners from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean decreases perceived economic threat by 5.3 per cent. On the contrary, when the proportion of low-skilled immigrants in a region is high (one standard deviation above the mean) our results indicate that increasing the total share of foreigners from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases perceived economic threat by 4.0 percent.

Similarly, in the cultural threat model we find a significant moderating effect, at the 5 per cent level, between the total share of foreigners in a region and the proportion of them with primary or lower secondary education. More specifically, our results show that when the proportion of low-skilled immigrants in a region is low (one standard deviation below the mean) increasing the total share of foreigners from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean decreases perceived cultural threat by 2.7 percent. On the other hand, when the proportion of low-skilled immigrants in a region is high (one standard deviation above the mean) our results indicate that increasing the total share of foreigners from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases perceived cultural threat by 2.9 per cent.

Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix present the predictive margins with a 95 percent confidence interval for the total share of foreigners between low and high proportions of immigrants with primary or lower secondary education, for the economic threat and cultural threat models respectively. The graphs illustrate that the positive effect of the total share of foreigners on anti-immigrant attitudes, with respect to the country’s economy and culture, is stronger in regions where the percentage of low-educated immigrants is higher. However, we do not find any significant moderating effect between the size and the skill level of the immigrant population in the overall threat model.
Discussion and Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to investigate factors affecting national attitudes toward immigrants based on the characteristics of the immigrants living in the region. Our empirical results show that the total share of foreigners is not a significant predictor in any of our models. These findings are consistent with the empirical studies of Rustenbach (2010) and Karreth et al. (2015). Neither study found evidence that the regional proportion of immigrants has an impact on anti-immigrant attitudes. However, the results of previous research are mixed. Some studies show that a larger population of immigrants in the region increases perceived threats (Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Markaki and Longhi, 2013) in contrast to others which find that the perceived threat from immigrants decreases with the percentage of immigrants present at regional level (Weber, 2015).

Moreover, we find that a higher regional percentage of EU foreigners decreases the natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes in both economic and cultural threat models. As the EU foreigners mainly represent the highly-educated immigrants in a region, these findings could be explained by economic theory which suggests that natives might favour highly-skilled immigration that benefits the country’s economy. However, we find that the proportion of highly-skilled immigrants in a region has no significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes. Thus, some other plausible economic explanations of these findings could be that there are lower unemployment rates among EU immigrants or that they are likely to depend less on the welfare state. In addition, since the EU foreigners have values more similar to those of natives, allowing them to integrate better into the social life of host communities, our findings can also be supported by conflict theory.

Furthermore, the results of our analysis support our assumption that where immigrants to a region come from outside the EU both the perceived economic and cultural threat from immigration increase, with the latter threat perceived to be greater. These results are consistent with the findings of Markaki and Longhi (2013). Moreover, our results indicate that greater cultural distance between nationals and immigrants living in the region produces stronger negative attitudes toward immigrants. Perceptions of cultural distance or difference in common values may derive from observed physical difference or from more ideological and behavioral differences, including religious beliefs and practices. In particular, our findings show that natives living in regions with higher percentages of foreigners coming from
European countries outside of the EU are more likely to believe that the cultural life in their country is undermined. Additionally, we find that a larger-sized foreign population from the Middle East and North African countries increases both the perceived economic and cultural threat from immigration. Considering that the Middle East and North African foreign group geographically represents the Muslim communities, these findings are similar to those of Green et. al (2010) who find that a high proportion of Muslim immigrants in a Swiss municipality increases the perceived threat from immigration. Finally, the foreign group Other African has a positive impact on anti-immigrant attitudes with respect to perceived undermining of a country’s culture but also on overall life satisfaction.

Regarding the skill level of immigrants, our findings do not reveal any significant direct effect of immigrants with high-level qualifications on anti-immigrant attitudes. Similarly, in his empirical analysis about Western Europe, Weber (2015) finds that the percentage of highly educated immigrants at the national level has no significant impact on the perceived threat of immigration. However, we find some evidence that immigrants with low-level qualifications have a small but statistically significant effect on natives’ attitudes towards immigrants with respect to country’s economy. Therefore, we confirm the results of Markaki and Longhi (2013) who also find that a higher proportion of immigrants with low education decreases the perceived economic threat of immigration in European regions. A plausible explanation for this finding could be that immigrants with low qualifications might be perceived by the natives more as a cheap labour force rather than as a substitute for their own low-skilled segment.

Nevertheless, the proportion of low-educated immigrants in a region does not seem to have any significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes in the rest of the models. Thus, our findings are partly consistent with those of Schneider (2008) who found that, in European countries, a higher percentage of low-educated immigrants does not increase the negative attitudes of natives towards immigration. Finally, our empirical results reveal some moderating effects between the size and the skill level of the immigrant population. More specifically, we find that the positive effect of the total share of foreigners on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants, with respect to the country’s economy and culture, is stronger in regions where the percentage of low-educated immigrants is higher.

An important insight from our study emerges in the finding that the origin of immigrants living in a European region appears to be key in natives’ attitudes toward
immigration. A higher proportion of EU foreigners in a region decreases anti-immigrant attitudes while a larger non-EU foreign population is found to increase them. By looking at the proportion of non-EU foreigners in a region in a finer grain, where we are able to separate them according to region of origin, we discern a hierarchy in terms of the preferability of foreigners from one region relative to those of another region. We find Middle East and North African concentrations of non-EU foreigners, which geographically represent the Muslim communities, to elicit the most negative attitudes toward immigrants. This suggests that a greater degree of perceived cultural distance and difference proves decisive in shaping anti-immigrant attitudes. In other words, Muslims are perceived as more divergent in values from European attitude-holders than are Asians or Latin Americans. The more that the values of the immigrants present in a region diverge from those of the nationals of that region, the more an immigrant threat is perceived and this produces a stronger anti-immigrant attitude.

Of course, this study is not without limitations. First, as described before in the data and methods section, using the EU-LFS data we are not able to actually measure the second-generation immigrants, neither by the share of foreign-born nor by the share of foreign nationals in a region. However, many second-generation immigrants are not fully integrated into the local communities and might be discriminated against although they have been naturalized. Moreover, our study examines anti-immigrant attitudes without focusing on a specific segment of the native population. Thus, an interesting extension of this work will be to examine cross-level interaction effects and investigate how origin or skill level of immigrants interacts with the education level, employment status or political affiliation of natives. Finally, following the main results of this study, future work may examine degrees of cultural distance and identify the factors that comprise cultural differences. It may be interesting to know if it is ideology, traditions, experiences, religious practice or other traits that prove most important in the mind of the attitude holder who perceives cultural distance. More in-depth knowledge of the immigrant traits that drive anti-immigrant attitudes could help to shape integration policies and strategies.

References


European Social Survey (2012). Cumulative File, ESS 2-6. Data file edition 1.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data lies entirely with the authors.


Appendix

Table 1 Pooled cross-sectional sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (ID)</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>NUTS-Level</th>
<th>Round 2</th>
<th>Round 3</th>
<th>Round 4</th>
<th>Round 5</th>
<th>Round 6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Austria (AT)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NUTS-1</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2977</td>
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<td>661</td>
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<td>541</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>2558</td>
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<td>1377</td>
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<td>5344</td>
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<td>1270</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>6471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom (UK)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NUTS-1</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>1732</td>
<td>1762</td>
<td>1682</td>
<td>1543</td>
<td>8127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>18975</td>
<td>19212</td>
<td>19702</td>
<td>20451</td>
<td>18730</td>
<td>97070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The NUTS-2 level is used in the cases of Finland, Norway and Portugal where the NUTS-1 level corresponds to the whole country and data at the NUTS-2 level are available. For the Netherlands data are available only at the country level (NUTS-0). The two autonomous regions of Portugal, the Azores and Madeira, are excluded. For Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic and Greece, ESS does not provide information for the missing rounds. For Norway (Round 4), Spain (Round 6) and France (Round 2) there are too many missing observations in our dataset that the samples could not be representative of the entire regions for that particular year and thus we exclude them from our analysis.
Table 2 Dependent variables summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Regional Economic Threat</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>.722</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>7.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Regional Cultural Threat</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>.909</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Regional Overall Threat</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>7.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents summary statistics for the average regional attitudes towards immigrants in our three models. The number of observations for all variables is N=349.

Table 3 Individual level summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic Features</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.497</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 years old</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60 years old</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big City Resident</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs of Big City Resident</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Area Resident</td>
<td>.359</td>
<td>.480</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Parent(s)</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belong to Minority</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qualification Level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>.583</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Duties</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Union</td>
<td>.494</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Worked Abroad</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to Cope on Income</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied with Economy</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Others</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Individual Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max
---|---|---|---|---
Religious | 4.32 | 2.95 | 0 | 10
Feel Safe in Dark | .796 | .402 | 0 | 1
Believe Traditions are Important | .717 | .450 | 0 | 1

Political Affiliation

Right-wing Ideology | 5.10 | 2.16 | 0 | 10

Note: The above table presents summary statistics for all individual level variables included in our empirical analysis. The number of observations for all variables is N=97,070.

Table 4 Correlation matrix of individual level variables

| Economic Threat | 1.09 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cultural Threat | 0.62 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Overall Threat | 0.65 | 0.89 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | -0.56 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Under 25 years old | -0.39 | -0.05 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.19 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 60 years old | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.03 | -0.11 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Big City Resident | -0.34 | -0.05 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.02 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Suburban or City Inhabitants | -0.36 | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rural Area Resident | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.36 | -0.29 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Foreign Parent(s) | -0.35 | -0.06 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.03 | 0.00 | -0.25 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belong to a Minority | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Primary Education | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.04 | -0.08 | 0.31 | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.95 | 0.00 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | |
| Tertiary Education | -0.24 | -0.20 | -0.14 | 0.01 | 0.12 | -0.09 | 0.09 | 0.06 | -0.10 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 1.00 | | | | | |
| Employed | -0.09 | -0.11 | 0.07 | -0.04 | -0.38 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.26 | 0.20 | -1.00 | | | | | | | | |
| Unemployed | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.90 | 0.66 | -0.11 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.27 | 1.00 | | | | |
| Supervisor Duties | 0.19 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.30 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.01 | -0.16 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| Member of a Union | -0.37 | -0.11 | -0.56 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.05 | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.06 | -0.04 | 0.10 | 0.01 | -0.05 | 0.07 | 1.00 | |
| Have Worked Abroad | -0.34 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| Difficult to Cope on Income | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | -0.05 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.14 | -0.17 | -0.16 | -0.17 | -0.14 | -0.09 | -0.01 | 1.00 | |
| Dissatisfied with Economy | 0.39 | 0.27 | 0.07 | -0.05 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.08 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.13 | -0.03 | 0.11 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.08 | 0.25 | 1.00 | |
| Trust in Others | -0.33 | -0.31 | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.18 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.02 | -0.22 | -0.33 | 1.00 | |
| Religious | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.16 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.07 | -0.09 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.02 | -0.13 | -0.08 | 0.00 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.06 | -0.03 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 1.00 | |
| Feel Safe in Dark | -0.17 | -0.17 | -0.19 | 0.21 | 0.09 | -0.11 | -0.06 | -0.02 | 0.12 | -0.09 | -0.02 | 0.10 | 0.14 | -0.01 | -0.07 | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.15 | -0.18 | 0.20 | -0.05 | 1.00 | |
| Believe Traditions are Important | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.09 | -0.06 | 0.10 | 0.14 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.01 | 0.08 | -0.05 | -0.09 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.29 | -0.05 | 1.00 | |
| Right-wing Ideology | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.08 | -0.06 | 0.02 | 0.06 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.05 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.04 | -0.04 | 0.09 | -0.05 | -0.12 | 0.03 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 1.00 | |

Table 5 Classification of individuals as foreigners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (ID)</th>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Both criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (AT)</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>8.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (BE)</td>
<td>12.07</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (CY)</td>
<td>16.77</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (CZ)</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (DK)</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (ES)</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>9.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (FI)</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (FR)</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (GR)</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (HU)</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: This table presents the share of individuals by country in our sample that, according to the EU-LFS, are classified as foreigners based on their country of birth, nationality and on both criteria.

Table 6 Regional level summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Total Foreigners</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>25.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EU Foreigners</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-EU Foreigners</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>12.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Other Europe</td>
<td>.973</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Middle East &amp; Northern Africa</td>
<td>.475</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Other Africa</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% East &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>.462</td>
<td>.637</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Northern America &amp; Australia</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Latin America</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>.991</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreigners with low qualifications</td>
<td>30.80</td>
<td>13.55</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>66.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreigners with high qualifications</td>
<td>27.45</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>60.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Unemployment</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (000s)</td>
<td>28.07</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>77.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for regional level indicators and controls included in all different model specifications. The number of observations for all variables is N=97,070.
Table 7 Correlation matrix of regional level variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Economic Threat</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Cultural Threat</td>
<td>0.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Overall Threat</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) % Total Foreigners</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) % EU Nationals</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) % Non-EU Nationals</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) % Other Europe</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) % Middle East &amp; Northern Africa</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) % Other Africa</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(10) % East &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) % Northern America &amp; Australia</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) % Latin America</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) % Non-Nationals with low qualifications</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) % Non-Nationals with high qualifications</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) % Unemployment</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16) GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 Individual determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Variable</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
<th>Overall threat</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed-effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.153*** (.026)</td>
<td>.211*** (.036)</td>
<td>.104*** (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 years old</td>
<td>-.005 (.045)</td>
<td>-.139*** (.033)</td>
<td>-.180*** (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60 years old</td>
<td>.007 (.029)</td>
<td>.281*** (.034)</td>
<td>.223*** (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big City Resident</td>
<td>-.168*** (.038)</td>
<td>-.170*** (.045)</td>
<td>-.136*** (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs of Big City Resident</td>
<td>-.025 (.035)</td>
<td>-.063* (.034)</td>
<td>-.011 (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Area Resident</td>
<td>.145*** (.030)</td>
<td>.148*** (.034)</td>
<td>.143*** (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Parent(s)</td>
<td>-.311*** (.055)</td>
<td>-.378*** (.055)</td>
<td>-.329*** (.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belong to Minority</td>
<td>-.204*** (.075)</td>
<td>-.233*** (.078)</td>
<td>-.387*** (.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qualification Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>.428*** (.043)</td>
<td>.480*** (0.52)</td>
<td>.340*** (.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td>-.767*** (.028)</td>
<td>-.786*** (.032)</td>
<td>-.622*** (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour Market Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>.050* (.027)</td>
<td>.026*** (.032)</td>
<td>-.006 (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.115** (.055)</td>
<td>-.047 (.063)</td>
<td>.014 (.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Duties</td>
<td>-.107*** (.022)</td>
<td>-.110*** (.024)</td>
<td>-.079*** (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Union</td>
<td>-.104*** (.023)</td>
<td>-.101*** (.030)</td>
<td>-.038*** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Worked Abroad</td>
<td>-.247*** (.045)</td>
<td>-.125*** (.036)</td>
<td>-.155*** (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Variable</td>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
<td>Overall threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to Cope on Income</td>
<td>.211*** (.030)</td>
<td>.176*** (.038)</td>
<td>.216*** (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied with Economy</td>
<td>.222*** (.007)</td>
<td>.138*** (.010)</td>
<td>.173*** (.008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Social Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Indicator</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
<th>Overall threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Others</td>
<td>-.174*** (.005)</td>
<td>-.189*** (.007)</td>
<td>-.183*** (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>-.024*** (.005)</td>
<td>-.023*** (.006)</td>
<td>-.031*** (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel Safe in Dark</td>
<td>-.429*** (.034)</td>
<td>-.492*** (0.40)</td>
<td>-.525*** (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe Traditions are Important</td>
<td>.199*** (.027)</td>
<td>.280** (.034)</td>
<td>.193*** (.030)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
<th>Overall threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right Ideology</td>
<td>.128*** (.011)</td>
<td>.186*** (.014)</td>
<td>.156*** (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.93 (.105)</td>
<td>4.10 (.114)</td>
<td>5.03 (.095)</td>
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</table>

**Random-effect Parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual variance component</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
<th>Overall threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>4.24 (.084)</td>
<td>4.69 (.122)</td>
<td>3.77 (.067)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional variance component</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
<th>Overall threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>.184 (.027)</td>
<td>.423 (0.61)</td>
<td>.160 (.033)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log-likelihood</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
<th>Overall threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-200,639</td>
<td>-206,282</td>
<td>-195,577</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
<th>Cultural threat</th>
<th>Overall threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>95,099</td>
<td>95,314</td>
<td>95,260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the ESS. All regressions in this table control for time fixed effects.
### Table 9 Regional determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Variable</th>
<th>Economic threat (1)</th>
<th>Economic threat (2)</th>
<th>Economic threat (3)</th>
<th>Cultural threat (1)</th>
<th>Cultural threat (2)</th>
<th>Cultural threat (3)</th>
<th>Overall threat (1)</th>
<th>Overall threat (2)</th>
<th>Overall threat (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Foreigners</td>
<td>.000 (.014)</td>
<td>.004 (.018)</td>
<td>-.013 (.014)</td>
<td>% EU Foreigners</td>
<td>-.059** (.025)</td>
<td>-.056* (.031)</td>
<td>-.081*** (.031)</td>
<td>-.065** (.027)</td>
<td>-.061** (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EU Foreigners</td>
<td>-.059** (.025)</td>
<td>-.056* (.031)</td>
<td>-.081*** (.031)</td>
<td>% Non-EU Foreigners</td>
<td>.043** (.019)</td>
<td>.066*** (.025)</td>
<td>.022 (.023)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-EU Foreigners</td>
<td>.042 (.029)</td>
<td>.076*** (.025)</td>
<td>.030 (.025)</td>
<td>% Other Europe</td>
<td>.212** (.091)</td>
<td>.242** (.099)</td>
<td>.134 (.087)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Middle East &amp; Northern Africa</td>
<td>.212** (.091)</td>
<td>.242** (.099)</td>
<td>.134 (.087)</td>
<td>% Other Africa</td>
<td>.010 (.080)</td>
<td>.183* (.109)</td>
<td>.151* (.084)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Other Africa</td>
<td>.010 (.080)</td>
<td>.183* (.109)</td>
<td>.151* (.084)</td>
<td>% East &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>-.060 (.065)</td>
<td>-.032 (.077)</td>
<td>-.073 (.069)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% East &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>-.060 (.065)</td>
<td>-.032 (.077)</td>
<td>-.073 (.069)</td>
<td>% Northern America &amp; Australia</td>
<td>.076 (.206)</td>
<td>.279 (.224)</td>
<td>.090 (.195)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Variable</td>
<td>Economic threat (1)</td>
<td>Economic threat (2)</td>
<td>Economic threat (3)</td>
<td>Cultural threat (1)</td>
<td>Cultural threat (2)</td>
<td>Cultural threat (3)</td>
<td>Overall threat (1)</td>
<td>Overall threat (2)</td>
<td>Overall threat (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.010 (.042)</td>
<td>.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.002 (.002)</td>
<td>-.050 (.056)</td>
<td>-.000 (.002)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreigners with low qualifications</td>
<td>-.004 (.003)</td>
<td>-.004 (.003)</td>
<td>-.006* (.003)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>-.003 (.003)</td>
<td>.000 (.002)</td>
<td>-.000 (.002)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreigners with high qualifications</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>.001 (.002)</td>
<td>.002 (.002)</td>
<td>.002 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Unemployment</td>
<td>.034*** (.010)</td>
<td>.034*** (.009)</td>
<td>.032*** (.009)</td>
<td>-.024*** (.007)</td>
<td>-.024*** (.007)</td>
<td>-.025*** (.007)</td>
<td>-.010 (.008)</td>
<td>-.010 (.008)</td>
<td>-.011 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (000s)</td>
<td>.001 (.006)</td>
<td>.002 (.006)</td>
<td>.000 (.007)</td>
<td>-.004 (.007)</td>
<td>-.002 (.007)</td>
<td>-.008 (.008)</td>
<td>-.001 (.005)</td>
<td>-.001 (.005)</td>
<td>-.004 (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.86 (.254)</td>
<td>4.81 (.263)</td>
<td>4.86 (.253)</td>
<td>4.44 (.224)</td>
<td>4.35 (.224)</td>
<td>4.45 (.242)</td>
<td>5.16 (.170)</td>
<td>5.12 (.178)</td>
<td>5.18 (.189)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Random-effect parameters</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual var. component</td>
<td>4.24 (.083)</td>
<td>4.24 (.083)</td>
<td>4.24 (.083)</td>
<td>4.69 (.122)</td>
<td>4.69 (.122)</td>
<td>4.68 (.122)</td>
<td>3.77 (.068)</td>
<td>3.76 (.068)</td>
<td>3.76 (.068)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region var. component</td>
<td>.206 (.039)</td>
<td>.240 (.048)</td>
<td>.247 (.056)</td>
<td>.394 (.057)</td>
<td>.429 (.064)</td>
<td>.430 (.068)</td>
<td>.154 (.034)</td>
<td>.168 (.035)</td>
<td>.165 (.036)</td>
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<td>Log-likelihood Observations</td>
<td>-200,587 95,099</td>
<td>-200,578 95,099</td>
<td>-200,566 95,099</td>
<td>-206,259 95,314</td>
<td>-206,242 95,314</td>
<td>-206,224 95,314</td>
<td>-195,569 95,260</td>
<td>-195,562 95,260</td>
<td>-195,548 95,260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the ESS. All regressions in this table control for individual characteristics and time fixed effects.
Table 10 Interaction effect between immigrant values and the skill level of immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Economic threat (1)</th>
<th>Cultural threat (1)</th>
<th>Overall threat (1)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed-effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total Foreigners</td>
<td>-.086*** (.032)</td>
<td>-.023 (.039)</td>
<td>-.014 (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreigners with low qualifications</td>
<td>-.014*** (.004)</td>
<td>-.006 (.004)</td>
<td>-.001 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreigners with high qualifications</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.001 (.004)</td>
<td>.004 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total Foreigners X % Foreigners with low qualifications</td>
<td>.002*** (.001)</td>
<td>.001** (.000)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total Foreigners X % Foreigners with high qualifications</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Unemployment</td>
<td>.031*** (.008)</td>
<td>-.026*** (.007)</td>
<td>-.011 (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (000s)</td>
<td>.002 (.006)</td>
<td>-.003 (.008)</td>
<td>-.001 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.15 (.245)</td>
<td>4.49 (.300)</td>
<td>5.13 (.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random-effect parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual var. component</td>
<td>4.24 (.083)</td>
<td>4.69 (.121)</td>
<td>3.77 (.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region var. component</td>
<td>.206 (.040)</td>
<td>.410 (.058)</td>
<td>.160 (.034)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Log-likelihood Observations</td>
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<td>-206,248</td>
<td>-195,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95,099</td>
<td>95,314</td>
<td>95,260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates for multilevel mixed linear regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by region, are presented in parentheses; *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. Our estimations use both design and population size weights provided by the ESS. All regressions in this table control for individual characteristics and time fixed effects.
Figure 1 Margins plot of total share of foreigners and proportion of low-educated immigrants (Economic threat)

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

Figure 2 Margins plot of total share of foreigners and proportion of low-educated immigrants (Cultural threat)

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
Local Engagements, Transcultural Belonging: The Lived Experiences of Second-Generation Hungarian Australian Adults through the Formation of a Simultaneous Self

Julia KANTEK, Irena C. VELJANOVA, Helena ONNUDOTTIR

Abstract. This paper draws on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with second generation Hungarian Australian adults (aged 50 years and above) from Sydney, exploring and introducing the concept of a simultaneous self. The simultaneous self refers to both the tacit and intentional processes of identity construction as well as the meaning making practices the research participants have used to understand their diverse experiences and memberships across both Hungarian and non-Hungarian communities in Sydney. The paper argues that the research participants have formed a transcultural belonging through constructing this sense of self. In doing so, the paper will identify and analyse the factors which have informed these simultaneous self-identifications, including personal experiences of cultural diversity, level of Hungarian language competency, and active engagements with the Sydney Hungarian community. This paper will contribute to the transcultural critical and analytical perspective, by introducing the simultaneous self as a workable concept which illuminates the reflexive articulation processes and (re)construction practices involved in the research participants’ transcultural belonging overtime. In doing so, it will further emphasise the importance of their everyday, local experiences within their perceptions of belonging and formations of self.

Keywords: transcultural, second generation, identity, belonging, Hungarian, hybridization, simultaneous self, Australia

1. Introduction

1.1 Toward a transcultural perspective

As migration processes during the 20th century have changed, international migration scholars have moved away from their initial understanding of migration as a linear trajectory to the critical analysis of migration as a set of multiple and diverse experiences which underpin new forms of migrant identities, relationships and
sense(s) of belonging (Tan et al. 2018). In early analytical frameworks, migrants were assumed to forego any previous attachments to their country of origin and demonstrate their commitment to the host society through assimilation and acculturation processes (Berry 1997; Berry et al. 2006). Accordingly, belonging and identity were viewed as singular and fixed, as migrants were expected to undergo a process of identity replacement, relinquishing their ethnic identity in favour of a new, national identity. This alteration of identity was frequently defined and outlined on the basis of changes or adjustments to both material and ideological traditions and practices, usually driven by the demands, policies, and politics of the new host nation. For instance, Australian assimilationist and integrationist policies between the 1950s and 1970s emphasised the adjustment of migrant traditions and ways of life to mainstream culture to enable social cohesion, at times leading migrants to develop an assimilated or marginalised self in response to these pressures (Bourhis et al. 1997; Phinney et al. 2001).

However, abandoning cultural practices and ideas proved difficult and unrealistic for migrants, who demonstrated that bi-cultural identities could be formed through negotiating their membership with the host culture alongside retaining elements of their home culture. Such negotiations were commonly achievable for migrants from Northern Europe and many parts of Eastern and Central Europe given their whiteness and thus, their ability to align more closely with the broader-cultural ways of life discoverable in Australia. This in turn, afforded them the opportunity to express their bi-culturalism more readily. Furthermore, the revision of the previously linear understanding of migration and belonging became evermore porous, as scholars continued to realise the complexities of the migrant and second generation experience when coupled with globalising processes that facilitated active engagements between home and host countries in new ways (Bloch 2017; Inglis 2011).

This realisation has led to the current transnational model of migration, referred to as the multi-stranded and interconnected relationships which are constructed and sustained across various geographical borders, and occurring through participation and exchange of communication, material and non-material culture and ideas. Within this framework, the migration process is multidirectional, with belonging diversified, and the self as transcending ethnic-national and host-home dichotomies. As such, this model acknowledges the continuity of culture in the migration experience and the multiplicity of identity which migrants and their
families experience between various cultural contexts and across national borders (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc 1997; Vertovec 1999). A transcultural form of belonging is prominently discussed within the broader transnational framework, as regular cross-border engagements between multiple national and cultural contexts allow for multiple cultural experiences to occur, having impacts on identity. During this process, as Vauclair et al. (2014) argues, individuals undergo a process of self-selection, interweaving and internalising their diverse cultural experiences into bricolage formation. Further, these multiple, cross-cultural experiences influence the ways in which individuals develop a sense of belonging and identity, as the self is no longer constructed of multiple, separated experiences but is an entity which understands these experiences as indivisible and therefore, whole.

1.2 The simultaneous self and Transcultural belonging

The simultaneous self – deriving from the personal experiences analysed - is a concept tested in this paper which can be located within a transcultural perspective. The transcultural perspective highlights the ways in individuals (re)define and (re)discover their belonging through numerous cultural experiences, understanding one’s sense of self as hybrid, fluid and interactive (Welsch 1999). Following from the work of Ritcher and Nollert (2014), transculturalism focuses on the cultural components of belonging and how they overlap due to the multiple experiences one has gathered across different social groups and contexts. Therefore, this perspective emphasises the transcendence of boundary demarcations between ethnic and national identity, by interconnecting a series of material and non-material cultural elements encountered throughout various life experiences. In doing so, transculturalism results in the decoupling of identities to create a ‘neo-culture’, illuminating how individuals simultaneously amalgamate their belonging to demonstrate how intermeshed their cultural belonging is experienced within their self-conceptualisations (Ritcher and Nollert 2014; Welsch 1999).

The concept of the simultaneous self draws from this perspective insofar that it recognises that the self is a whole entity which is influenced by, and inseparable from, multiple cultural experiences. In addition, this concept similarly acknowledges the importance of cross-cultural engagements and various social contexts in the ongoing process of identity formation. In drawing on the transcultural perspective, this paper analyses interviews with members of the Hungarian second generation in Sydney who share their experiences of growing up in 1960-70s Australia as the children of forced migrants. Their accounts will highlight that they
have developed, what the authors call, a *simultaneous self*, which represents both their reflexive processes of identity construction as well as, the *meaning making practices* these participants have used to understand their multiple, cross-cultural engagements overtime. In doing so, this concept encapsulates both the intentional process of self-performance and at the same time, the tacit self-conceptualisations that the participants in this paper have formed from their multiple cultural engagements which have spanned across their lived experiences.

The *simultaneous self* therefore develops from accumulating and internalising a series of cultural experiences and practices which are performed across various cultural contexts over time. As such, this sense of self involves a process of hybridisation, where the sense of belonging is integral to the self. As will be demonstrated, the research participants’ self-identifications have drawn from their various memberships and modes of participation in a diverse array of communities and social institutions predominately located in Sydney. The participants’ level of agency is important within their sense of self, as they have reflexively engaged with a variety of cultural experiences which they deem important and have chosen to participate in both Hungarian and non-Hungarian cultural communities which they feel best represent who they are. As a result, these participants have interwoven numerous cultural experiences from these communities and internalised them, constantly revising, (re)shaping and recalling their transcultural belonging throughout various life experiences. This process of negotiation highlights that the *simultaneous self* is both intentional and tacit in its performance and construction, as the participants see it as ‘natural’ and irremovable from their day-to-day lived experiences.

Furthermore, the importance of ‘place’ and ‘physicality of community’ has been re-integrated into understanding the experiences of this group, as it has shaped how these participants have understood their cultural experiences and their formation of self. The research participants’ transcultural belonging has not developed through migration from one country to another, but through their lived experiences; as members of the Hungarian community in Sydney, and in general, as citizens of Australia. Therefore, the participants have demonstrated that a transcultural belonging does not always require involvement(s) in more than one country but can involve participation across different cultural settings in one’s local environment. Hence, the Sydney Hungarian community has provided a local platform for accessing and performing Hungarian culture within Australia for the
research participants. This platform has been of great importance for these participants, particularly during their childhood and adolescence, giving them insight into Hungarian culture and sense of their Hungarian ancestry.

2. Hungarian community-building in Sydney

The participants in this paper share conceptualisations of the Hungarian community as defined by membership in key community organisations as outlined below. The participants in this paper have participated in these community organisations from a young age and – as their stories will indicate - have created a web of interlocking Hungarian ties that they have drawn on throughout their formation of self and senses of belonging overtime. As a result of their experiences in these organisations, the participants view the Hungarian community as a material entity – as opposed to ‘merely imagined’ - linking their Hungarian belonging to their active participation in the community. Hence, these Hungarian community organisations in Australia have not only provided venues for Hungarian cultural reproduction for both migrants and their children who are the focus of this paper, but also facilitated in the building of social networks which help affirm their connection to their Hungarian culture.

The Hungarian ethnic organisations which form the nucleus of the Hungarian community in Sydney were established as a result of two main migration waves from Hungary. The historical events which sparked these migration waves were the World War II and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, events which resulted in a significant number of Hungarians migrated to Australia over a timeframe of two decades (Kunz 1969). Due to repressive socio-political conflicts in Hungary in the course of these events, a number of Hungarians sought out assisted migration schemes as ‘Displaced Persons’ (Kunz 1989). As is common with displaced people, most Hungarian migrants lacked political, economic and social-networking resources in Australia. Due to their migrant status, many World War II Hungarian migrants developed a series of Hungarian community organisations to facilitate the building of networks sustained through volunteer work (Kunz 1969; Kunz 1989). One example includes the Hungarian Council of New South Wales which was developed in 1952 and which has continued to oversee the management of multiple Hungarian associations in New South Wales including the Hungarian Scouts association, the Hungarian community language school and dancing groups introduced in Australia in 1950s (Hatoss 2006).
These local community organisations have continued to provide significant linguistic, cultural and social opportunities for migrants, allowing them to continue practicing the Hungarian language and traditions in a communal context in Sydney. In addition, they also operated as a strategy of cultural preservation to manage the impact of acculturation.

In the course of the second wave of Hungarian migrants – the 1956-ers – the community in Australia continued growing, and membership in the Hungarian schools and Hungarian Scouts increased significantly (Jupp 1988). Subsequently, the community members introduced Hungarian cultural and political celebrations and events to Australia including Hungarian scout and language school fundraising picnics and celebrations of Hungarian national holidays such as St. Stephen’s Day (Fenyvesi 2005; Smolicz 1984). These community events provided an opportunity to perform and maintain Hungarian culture, assisting migrants in the strengthening of Hungarian networks in Australia by creating physical spaces where Hungarian culture and commemorations of Hungarian history could be performed and experienced within a communal setting (Andits 2017; Cutcher 2015). However, it is also important to acknowledge that these participants, as ethnocultural Hungarians, represent only one segment of a rather diverse Hungarian population in Australia, which also includes Jewish-Hungarian, German, Slovak, Romanian and Croat ethno-minority communities.

3. The research participants

This paper draws on six semi-structured in-depth life-story interviews conducted with second generation Hungarians born in Sydney, who speak the Hungarian language and whose parents fled Hungary to Australia. The term second generation will be used to describe the participants in the study. The interviews with the participants – aged between 50-62 years - ranged between one to two hours and were conducted over a two-month period in 2016. One condition related to the participants having to have been members in key Hungarian community organisations from an early age. Purposive sampling was used to recruit individuals meeting the following criteria: Second generation ethnocultural Hungarian adults either born in Australia or having migrated with their parents as newborn to Australia in the course of World War II or following the 1956 Revolution. This sampling strategy, coupled with one of the authors’ own positioning as an active member in
the Hungarian community, facilitated natural snowballing to occur across various Hungarian organisations in Sydney.

The sample size reflects the aim of prioritising experience and voice over access, as the purpose according to O’Reilly and Parker (2013, 192) “is not to count opinions or people, but explore them, and should be concerned with the richness of data, not its amount”. The participants were recruited on the basis of having experienced socio-political changes towards a Multicultural Australia (1970s), and also times when travel and technology were not easily available for the purpose of maintaining contact with their Hungarian roots: hence, the importance of close engagement with the local Hungarian community. Therefore, the purposeful recruitment (age category and community participation) was based on seeking out common experiences, as this draws attention to the (shared) macro-economic and socio-political contexts which have impacted on the ways the self and belonging are experienced and have been performed among the research participants.

4. Transcultural belonging: a simultaneous self?

4.1 Acceptance in a multicultural society

Most of the research participants were approaching adolescence during the time period when Multicultural Policy was introduced in 1973 by the Whitlam Government. Hence, in their early years, the research participants experienced life in a society which was beginning to accept cultural diversity and encourage the acceptance of difference. However, it must be recognised that policies can take a long time to find their way into everyday life, and different migrant individuals and groups would have different experiences of a multicultural Australia. Overwhelmingly, the participants in this study have claimed positive experiences of multiculturalism, indicating that the ideals and actualities of Multiculturalism have enabled them positive self-identifications, providing empowerment and a vehicle for the formulation of a sense of self which belonged simultaneously to their Hungarian cultural background and the Australian society: A simultaneous self. One research participant, Rose describes her sense of self as the result of both the Hungarian and Australian cultural experiences and elements she has received from both the private (home) and public spheres. Interestingly, Rose attributes multiculturalism as a vehicle which facilitated her equal engagement with her Hungarian cultural heritage and Australian dominant culture, hence a formation of a self which draws from the two:
While I do have Hungarian culture within me, the Australian culture has also shaped me, and you can’t deny that. This [Australia] is where we go to school together and where [we] work together, we follow the same rules and share the same values of multiculturalism and then in addition you go home, and you learn the [Hungarian] traditions and values as well, so you can’t separate the two (...) I wasn’t able to say I am completely Australian or I am completely Hungarian because I had – and still have - such a blend of friends, such a mixture of different backgrounds in my friendships (Rose, 50yrs, Interview 2016).

In Rose’s mind, her belonging in Australia is the result of her participation in the Australian education system and workplace alongside holding shared national values of multiculturalism. In addition, her appreciation of the cultural diversity which she attributes to living in Australia has allowed her free and active engagements with her social environments and friendships, facilitating not only an acceptance of self, but an active agency in such an acceptance. Interestingly, whilst Rose appears to list distinct factors which inform her belonging to Australian and Hungarian culture, the values and diverse friendships Rose has gained from the various areas within her life in Australia including; school, dancing and Hungarian scouts have influenced her reluctance to perceive her self in separation, understanding it as an amalgamation of both Hungarian and Australian cultural engagements and relationships. In particular, Rose’s experiences of ethnic diversity during school helped her view her participation in Hungarian cultural activities and traditions positively, positioning Australia as the backdrop where Hungarian performances were welcomed, stating, “I think mixing with [people of] other nationalities helped me accept and embrace my background and heritage (...) I didn’t have to downplay [my ethnic background]”. Therefore, Rose’s experiences indicate how her ‘mixing’ among diverse nationalities in a multicultural context provided her with the ability and means to combine her ethnic and national identities and merge them on equal footing in a simultaneous self. Interestingly, five of the six interview participants identified living in a multicultural society as important in influencing their sense of self, providing them with a sense of cultural diversity. This subsequently provided a means of integrating Hungarian cultural belonging – that of their family and home – with the cultural diversity they experienced during their upbringing, proving that cultural diversity was integral to the formation of the self. In particular, they referenced their friendships with other students from diverse ethnic backgrounds as critical in shaping their self:
There were a lot of Greek kids there [at school] and I usually did make friends with the Greek kids because there was a mutual understanding of what it was like to have migrant parents, and that you spoke to your mum in one language and you spoke to your friends in another. That was just quite normal for all the kids to do and it made me feel normal (Natalie, 50yrs Interview, 2016)

Similar sentiments were also shared by Michelle:

Well when I was in Primary it was very multicultural, a lot of Greeks, Maltese, Italian. I don’t even remember having been bullied. I mean I got called four eyes, but it had nothing to do with being Hungarian (laughs) (Michelle, 52yrs Interview, 2016).

The positive experiences of cultural diversity expressed by these participants has been to some extent, influenced by the diverse friendships and cross-cultural exposures they experienced as children in their schooling community. This community can be considered to provide multiple, cultural socialisation opportunities, as frequent contact with students of different cultural backgrounds impacted on their evaluations of self and normalising cultural behaviours such as speaking a second language. As such, the experiences of the research participants at school allowed them to understand their Hungarian heritage as normal and accepted, given that their friends, as Natalie stated, “also had migrant parents and could speak a second language” like she did. The positive experiences of diversity expressed by these participants can also be attributed to their advantaged positionality or otherwise, their assimilability, as blending into the dominant culture with little resistance (Voloder and Andits 2015). This assimilability affords individuals, such as the participants in this study, with the ability to move ‘between’ various cultural contexts with ease, allowing them to accept their belonging to both their Hungarian and non-Hungarian groups in their lives and view them as ‘normal’. This is because their Hungarian ethnocultural background is not generally identifiable, nor “intrudes upon their day-to-day experiences” as Doane (1997, 378) has previously suggested.

Therefore, the positive experiences of acceptance and inclusion outlined by the research participants gave them the opportunity to exercise their reflexive talents and engage with their peers from Anglo-Australian backgrounds on equal basis. One participant George alluded to this reflexivity stating that he “could play both the Anglo card and the ethnic card” in the context of negotiating his self according to the given environment. Similarly, Maria shared that she often had to emphasise her ethnocultural belonging to friends and colleagues, who otherwise
would not have recognised her Hungarian background, stating that “people were surprised [when I would say I was Hungarian] because I don’t look ethnic or Hungarian, I mean even I don’t know what a Hungarian looks like (laughs)”. Maria’s experience thus reveals the intentional element of her self-performativity, as she often felt the need to announce having a Hungarian background for recognition. These experiences highlight the role their whiteness has played in easing the participants’ effortless movements between communities whilst also influencing their intentional performances to affirm their Hungarian cultural background. Additionally, the importance of acceptance and role of agency is also highlighted in their experiences in terms of facilitating the construction and maintenance of a simultaneous sense of self, due to their various engagements and cross-cultural exposures within Sydney coupled with minimal experiences of discrimination.

4.2 Transcultural exposure within Sydney

A transcultural belonging develops from the process of interpreting and internalising a diverse array of experiences and interactions from a myriad of cultural contexts. This often occurs on a transnational level, where cross border engagements create an interwoven sense of belonging which spans across cultures. However, as this paper shows, a similar sense of belonging can occur through the numerous cross-cultural experiences individuals accumulate throughout their lives in Australia. In particular, the participants in this paper spent most of their socialisation from childhood to adulthood in Australia due to various political and socio-economic constraints which made transnational engagements difficult to pursue and maintain. As a result, the participants in this study were encouraged to participate in various Hungarian organisations by their parents from early childhood, whilst also participating in extra-curricular activities after school:

You just didn’t even have to think about it, it was just my life. I came home from school and we got in the car and did the activity of the day like piano or dancing. So that routine became so natural for me. It would be the same for the weekends, I’d wake up, go to Hungarian school and Hungarian scouts and come home. The week would be how I always knew it to be. It was all the same to me (Natalie, 50yrs, Interview 2016).

According to Natalie, no real distinctions were traceable between the activities she undertook at school, extra-curricular activities after school, and life at home. Whilst some were labelled Hungarian, all activities nevertheless were part of
the everyday, with Maria claiming that she “didn’t know any differently” and that she “didn’t even have to think about it”, life was ‘normal’. Hence, one can argue that Natalie did not view herself as that of two distinct cultures, but one whole self, where belonging to Australia and Hungarian culture became routine and performed simultaneously throughout her everyday life. These simultaneous understandings have also translated into definitions of home, as Michelle explains:

Australia, regardless of anything else is home. This is where I was born, and I enjoy that there are Hungarian things to do in Australia. I live here, I work here, I’ve gone to university here and my lifelong friends from the Hungarian community are here. I’m both [Hungarian and Australian] (Michelle, 52yrs, Interview 2016).

Michelle’s experiences have highlighted the interrelated relationship she has formed between her Hungarian and Australian culture. In particular, Michelle’s description of home accentuates the simultaneous quality of her self, as her belonging to Australia is partly the result of participating in the Hungarian community and culture which is located in Australia. Therefore, the opportunities Australia has provided for Michelle to engage with her Hungarian culture and friends through the Sydney Hungarian community are irremovable from her everyday lived experiences, influencing her claim of identifying as ‘both’ Hungarian and Australian. Such sentiments are similarly expressed by Maria, who combines favourable elements from both Hungarian and Australian culture;

I feel Hungarian because I love the [Hungarian] language, the food, the Hungarian community here, and I feel Australian because I love Australia as a country, I love that we have such freedom. I wouldn’t like to live in Hungary even though I love being Hungarian. My Hungarian and Australian friends are here (Maria, 52yrs, Interview 2016).

Maria, like Michelle, claims to be simultaneously influenced by her Hungarian culture and community, as well as Australian friends and the broader social value of freedom she enjoys in Australia. Furthermore, Michelle stresses that her Hungarianness is clearly situated within the Hungarian community in Sydney – her place of birth – rather than relating it back to the State of Hungary as might be the case for her parents. Therefore, the Hungarian community (in Australia) is central to her sense of self. The importance these communal friendships have also played a pivotal role in forming the simultaneous self, as evident when Michelle discussed a case of contention with her cousin who had accused her of speaking too much about her Hungarian belonging:
A few years ago, one of my cousins told me to get a one-way ticket back to Hungary and she said that I am not to talk to her about anything Hungarian. I sat there thinking ‘hang on, I was born here!’ and I’m talking about my life and when people ask what I’ve been doing I say ‘oh well I’ve been doing this with the Hungarian scouts and Hungarian this and Hungarian that’, and it’s because my friends here [in Australia] come from the Hungarian community (Michelle, 52yrs, Interview 2016).

Therefore, a relationship of simultaneity; belonging to two cultures, can be detected in the accounts given by both Michelle and Maria. Both conceptualise their sense of self and belonging as members of the Hungarian community and firmly embedded in Australian society and culture. Furthermore, such embedded-ness was not only based on sense of belonging but facilitated by fluency in Hungarian.

4.3 Bilingual language proficiency

All the research participants are bilingual, fluent in both Hungarian and English. As members of second generation migrants, they were brought up speaking Hungarian at home with their families and in the Hungarian community and speaking English in school. Earlier accounts in this paper indicate how the research participants moved effortlessly between Hungarian and non-Hungarian cultural contexts and their bilingual language capacity would have been essential in easing such ‘movements’:

It’s a subconscious switch, like you know exactly who you’re going to talk with, so you simply talk to them in that language, whether that’s English or Hungarian. It’s just automatic. It’s just who I am (Natalie, 50yrs, Interview 2016).

Maria also refers to this ‘switch’, or transition:

There wasn’t a conscious transition like I never even thought about it. I didn’t know any different, that’s just what I had to do (Maria, 52yrs, Interview 2016).

This experience was also supported by John:

I didn’t think about it. When I was in school, I don’t have to think in Hungarian and translate that to English, or vis-à-vis. It just happens, it’s just natural [laughs] (John, 62yrs, Interview 2016).

Transcultural belonging as argued by Vauclair et al., “develops out of the necessity to process multiple cultural experiences and to engage in meaning-making of different cultural forms as well as possible cultural conflicts and inconsistencies” (2014, 12). Together, the experiences expressed by the research participants
highlight that in light of their common experiences related to speaking Hungarian at home and English at school, their bilingual skills have helped them to not only respond and participate within various Hungarian and non-Hungarian groups with ease, but also have, in the process, become tacit performances due to how often situations arose where bilingualism was required. For example, Michelle’s kindergarten experience provides a unique insight into both the tacit and embodied nature of her bilingualism and its role in the formation of her *Simultaneous self* which merges both her Hungarian and Australian cultural belonging:

> I’d be speaking English the whole day at school and then when I’d go home, I’d have to speak Hungarian but that was natural to me (…) My kindergarten teacher was the one that marvelled at it when I’d be talking to the teacher in English and then in mid-sentence I’d turn towards my parents and I would switch to Hungarian (Michelle, 52yrs, Interview 2016)

Therefore, in considering their bilingual capacities, this group’s effortless movements between English and Hungarian have allowed them to view their communication with various groups and settings as a combined and embodied, rather than separated performance which enables them to live in-between or rather, in a space of simultaneity (Gilsenan-Nordin, Hansen and Zamorano-Ilena 2013). The research participants’ belonging to both Hungarian and non-Hungarian communities and social groups since childhood have enabled them to exercise their reflexive bilingual skills within their everyday lived experiences, to the extent that these performances became natural.

### 4.4 Belonging to the Hungarian community

It is evident, that the research participants considered the Hungarian community as vital for developing both a sense of belong and sense of self. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the participants in this study attended Hungarian language school and scouting throughout their childhood and adolescence and have actively continued their adult membership through upholding volunteer roles and attendance at fundraising and cultural celebrations. The friendships these participants have formed from childhood in the Hungarian community have also continued into adulthood and have served as a form of social capital that they have drawn on throughout their lives. The Hungarian community – i.e. intentional participation in the community and a place which provides a sense of belonging – is evident in George’s story;
I was previously married to someone else who was not as interested in my Hungarian identity and that’s why I withdrew from the community (...) I drifted back when I remarried to a supportive partner and I reconnected with my Hungarian ties and I got more involved [in Hungarian scouts] again. When I was less engaged [in Scouts] I was less happy with myself because my identity is tied to what I do, and the community was a big part of who I was (...) Reconnecting with the community gave back a part of myself which I had temporarily lost (George, 50 yrs, Interview 2016).

George’s experience highlights the importance of the community in the maintenance of a Hungarian belonging and sense of self, as it relies heavily on community engagement and active membership. In particular, re-instating his previous role as a scout leader helped him reclaim ties with Hungarian friends he had known from a young age, demonstrating the intentional performances which help develop and maintain the Simultaneous self. Further to his community engagements, George’s experience can be related to those highlighted by Fortier (2006, 67) who has argued that “as a site of reassurance, the cultural community operates as a scene for performing and referring collective belonging”. This is because George has reflexively drawn upon his membership to the community and used it to rediscover his belonging when attachments to Hungarian culture were weakened by external factors or life changes.

Furthermore, as argued by Sayols (2018), when undergoing a process of transculturation, individuals experience a series of losses and gains, selecting and rediscovering the self through a variety of cultural experiences. Collectively, both Sayols (2018) and Fortier’s (2006) arguments are clearly visible in the case of George’s lived experiences of belonging, as the absence of Hungarian cultural experiences impacted on his sense of self. In addition, his decision to reinvigorate his links with the Hungarian community demonstrates this process of intentional cultural rediscovery, with the Hungarian community occupying a space of reassurance which can be engaged with reflexively to maintain the Simultaneous self. The importance of life events in the negotiation of belonging and the reflexivity of the simultaneous self was also highlighted by John:

When I was young, I felt more Hungarian and then I went through a stage where I left [the] scouts and didn’t really associate with Hungarian friends and got more into the Australian way of life, and that was when my mum suddenly passed away, I was still speaking Hungarian with Dad, so I never lost my Hungarian identity, but it took a backseat for a while. Then I went overseas to visit my family and my Hungarian
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identity re-energised having met my relatives and realising that I have that Hungarian culture within me (...). Then I met my Hungarian wife and it only strengthened as I re-entered the Hungarian community with her in Australia and we built up really close friendships. So since then, I feel Australian but also Hungarian (John, 62yrs, Interview 2016).

John’s and George’s collective experiences highlight that cultural attachments are fluid in the self and require intentional performances. As such, the Simultaneous self can be (re)shaped according to life experiences. John’s experiences are demonstrative of this, as his movement toward Australian culture was deemed the result of an intentional distancing from the Hungarian community, similar to the experiences expressed by George. This reveals the importance of community and social networks in sustaining Hungarian cultural attachment, as isolation from other Hungarians lead to a revaluation of John’s Hungarian belonging, coupled with the loss of his mother and experiences in Hungary. In addition, the community, as a static social infrastructure in Sydney, serves as an ethnocultural resource which can be reflexively drawn on to respond to life changes and for the purposes of reinforcing the simultaneous self. John’s experiences also begin to shed light on the relevance of transnationalism during adulthood as reinforcing a transcultural belonging for this generation, who are better resourced to engage in transnational practices at this period in time. As such, whilst John’s experiences reveal that transnational experiences in the form of VFR travel - visiting friends and family (Lee, 2011) - can lead to the reproduction of Hungarian belonging, it can also encourage the re-investment of cultural efforts and engagements back into the local community, continuing the efforts to maintain the simultaneous self at home in Australia (Welsch, 1999).

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the second-generation Hungarian-Australian group from this paper have constructed a simultaneous self which has enabled them to perform and maintain a transcultural way of belonging. This analytical concept has provided insight into how this group of second-generation adults have (re)constructed their self-identification and articulated their diverse cultural engagements throughout their lived experiences. The simultaneous self that has been internalised by this group comprises of distinct, self-defined Hungarian and Australian cultural elements.
and experiences informed by their local community engagements in Sydney. Their experiences of multiculturalism, bilingual language competency, and participation within the Hungarian community in Sydney have been pivotal to the development of their simultaneous self. The participants learnt the Hungarian language at home, practice Hungarian traditions with their families and have also reinforced these practices within the Hungarian community through the relationships that have stemmed from their membership. Their local engagements have also drawn from their participation in the education system, workplace and development of both Hungarian and non-Hungarian relationships. For this reason, this group of participants have developed a transcultural belonging overtime through their multiple, cross-cultural experiences and social networks predominately situated within Australia, highlighting the significance of local engagements in their identity construction processes.

These local experiences are considered to have provided sufficient performative opportunities and exposure to Hungarian cultural elements, especially during childhood and early adolescence, where social, technological and financial restrictions on transnational practices made these engagements difficult. Positive experiences of diversity during formative years of socialisation have also influenced the transcultural belonging of this group, positioning Australia as the broader context within which their simultaneity was accepted and performed. As a result, this article aims to contribute to the transcultural framework, introducing the *simultaneous self* as an analytical concept to illuminate the ways in which second generation Hungarian Australians construct and (re)produce their belonging to both Australian and Hungarian cultural frameworks over their life experiences and at the same time, develop an identity which draws from and is the resultant of, these diverse attachments. Therefore, the *simultaneous self* may be applied to other second generation groups to understand their identity formation and how they at once, construct and internalise their lived experiences to absorb and maintain a transcultural way of belonging overtime.

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Children of Chinese Migrants in Spain: New Expressions of Dual Identities and Identities in Between

Paloma ROBLES-LLANA

Abstract. Migration scholars have consistently referred to the cultural identities of migrants and migrant children as constructed out of elements from both their host and heritage cultures. They have drawn on cultural dichotomies and described these identities as dual, bicultural, hyphenated or in-between. Through a case study of three children of Chinese migrants living in Spain, this article questions the accuracy of using these categories to describe the cultural identities of the participants. Results show that the expressions and manifestations of dual or in-between identities of the participants were grounded in a biographical intersectionality that resists categorization and that is much more complex and diverse than what previous literature on the topic has suggested.

Keywords: Chinese migration, children, Spain, identity

Introduction

Chinese migration to Spain began in the 1980s and has traditionally been composed of a majority of people from low socio-economic backgrounds originally from China’s Southeastern province of Zhejiang. Since the 1990s, however, the exponential growth in the Chinese migrant population has resulted in a great diversification of migration profiles which includes migrants from different regions and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as business people and international students.

One important aspect of this diversification has been the coming of age and increasing visibility of children of first generation migrants who were either born in Spain or arrived in childhood or adolescence through family reunification processes. Besides a few studies which have documented the difficulties encountered by this migrant children community in terms of language and academic adaptation, cultural and intergenerational clashes with their families, or issues with discrimination (Beltrán Antolín and Sáiz López, 2001; Sáiz López, 2006), little is known about their life experiences and their sense of cultural belonging.
The present study seeks to address this gap by asking two main questions: first, what are the life experiences and cultural identities of children of Chinese migrants in Spain? And, second, can these experiences and identities be inscribed within dominant scholarly discourses and theories on migrant children’s identities? I will try to argue that although the participants refer to their identities as dual or in-between, the form of dualism or in-betweenness that is suggested by their narratives is much more complex than what previous literature has suggested.

**Dual and In-Between Identities: Overview**

By virtue of their condition as individuals who live in a country different from where their ancestors were born, children of migrants may be said to be located at the interface of cultures. They are expected to comply with the socio-cultural norms of the society where they live while at the same time maintain a degree of closeness with their families and ethnic communities and meet their different expectations (Min and Kim 2000; Wang and Collins, 2016). This is true of individuals who were born in the host society, but even more of those who migrated in childhood or adolescence, because they retain memories of their country of origin while simultaneously beginning their socialization in the host society. This cultural dichotomy has consistently been adopted in the literature to describe the life experiences and cultural identities of migrant children. The term “in-betweenness” has been used by scholars to refer to the “dual living realities (two cultures, two languages and identities)” (Wang and Collins, 2016, 2780) of children who migrated in childhood or adolescence, and different manifestations of this duality or “in-betweenness” have been identified in their everyday realities, such as their roles as cultural brokers for their parents (Bartley, 2010).

The literature on transnationalism has also emphasized the idea of dual practices and dual identities, and although transnationalism has been widely used to refer to the lives of first-generation migrants, the extent to which children of migrants engage in transnational practices and embrace dual identifications has long been the subject of scholarly debate. Some studies have observed that children of migrants are often not even fluent in their parents’ mother tongue and sustain minimal or no ties with their families’ country of origin (Kivisto 2001; Levitt and Waters 2001; Portes 2001; Kasinitz et al. 2002; Rumbaut 2002; Levitt and Schiller 2004).
Other studies, however, have stressed that by being exposed to the values, goods, memories, ideas, patterns of human interaction and transnational practices of their parents in their households on a daily basis, migrant children’s identities also become transnational (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Ngan 2008; Somerville 2008).

Moreover, children often establish contacts with other Chinese children recently arrived from China, or, with the expansion of Chinatowns, develop life practices in increasingly multicultural landscapes. In the Spanish context, Sáiz López (2015) for example has observed that the plurality of Chinese networks established in Spanish society played a vital role in the development of cultural identities that were no longer located in the heritage country but rather in a symbolic transnational space. Masdeu Torruella (2014) has also described the transnational identities of second generation Chinese who make use of the cultural capital acquired in the host society and return to their homeland to open businesses. It has also been noted that transnational connections follow a pattern of ebb and flow and acquire different intensities depending on individual life stages (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Somerville 2007). In all these respects, the experiences of children of migrants in school and within the family are “rarely monocultural” (Davidson 2000, 139) and develop out of local, global and ethnic influences.

The notions of dual identification and in-betweenness have also been given positive and negative meaning. Rumbaut and Ima (1988) were the first to use the idea of living in between to talk about the experiences of young South East Asian refugees in the United States. They referred to them as “marginal to both the new and old worlds, for they straddle both worlds and they are in some profound sense fully part of neither of them” (22). Other studies have described these migrants as “partial insiders in two distinct cultural worlds” (Ryer 2010, 74) or have stressed their position of liminality as individuals trapped between two worlds (Roberge 2009) but “not fully belonging to any” (Buster and Baffoe 2015, 16).

Other social scientists, however, have underlined the dynamic and negotiated character of identities (Jaspal and Cinnirella 2012) and stressed the positive aspects of dual identification, such as the flexibility to function in different cultural settings and environments (LaFramboise, Coleman and Gerton 1993; Hutnik and Bhola 1994), and the ability to perform different identities in order to meet different cultural expectations (Ballard 1994; Song 1997; Liu 2015).
In general, the literature on migrant children’s identities has tended to emphasize the dichotomy between host and heritage cultures and societies, local and transnational, here and there. By doing so, it has tended to establish cultural identity as exclusively determined by the interplay between cultural and linguistic aspects. However, as the next section will demonstrate, this approach does not always illuminate the depth and complexity of migrant children’s cultural identities and the importance of engaging with these identities “in relation to the ever-changing situations and contexts where they emerge” (Ehrkamp 2006, 348).

Methodology

The three participants of this case study were drawn from a larger ethnographic investigation aimed at exploring the cultural identities of 12 children of Chinese migrants in Spain. The main reason for their selection was that they were children of Chinese migrants who defined their cultural identities as dual or in-between. The design is a case study largely based on in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted among three children of Chinese migrants living in Spain. The participants were one female and two males, aged 17, 23 and 26. The female participant was born in Spain, while the others arrived in childhood through family reunification. Their families were all from China’s Zhejiang Province, more specifically from the region of Qingtian.

Participants were recruited via casual encounters in Madrid’s Chinatown district of Usera, through the Facebook page Chiñoles, (aimed at sharing information among Chinese children of migrants in Spain), and via previous contacts that I had in the community. Participant consent was obtained before the process of data collection as well as parental consent for the participant under 18.

The interviews were conducted in cafes, restaurants and via WhatsApp between January and October 2017. They followed a life history approach, where participants were asked to freely talk about their life experiences, and lasted between two and three hours. The interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. The analysis involved manual coding and categorization according to themes. Having worked for three years as a community interpreter and cultural mediator for Chinese migrants in Spain, and having conducted interviews and informal conversations with a large number of Chinese living in Spain, I was able to contrast and triangulate the data with previous information I had about the community.
Sara: Fluid Identities

In his essay, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora”, Stuart Hall (1990) challenges the idea of a stable, unchanging and continuous self. Instead of “one experience, one identity” (225), he argues that cultural identities are fluid, never finished or completed, and that their meaning is in a perpetual process of transformation. Cultural identity is thus:

…a matter of “becoming” as well as of “being”. It belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something that already exists, transcending time, place, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything that is historical, they undergo constant transformation (225).

The majority of studies having documented the dual identities of children of migrants have referred to them as a given outcome stemming from these children’s position at the interface of cultures. In general, these studies have asked why their participants feel in between cultures or have adopted dual identities, but few have examined in depth the processes through which these identities came into being. Some studies have signaled that the intensity of individuals’ transnational, dual or in-between identities follow a pattern of ebb and flow and changes according to the particular events and circumstances of one’s life course. However, while acknowledging temporal changes in intensity, these studies have failed to document the changes in the meaning that individuals attribute to these identities.

Hall (1990) stresses not only the temporal evolution of cultural identities but also, borrowing from Derrida’s notion of differance, the constant self-repositioning of meaning that cultural identities undergo as they shift across circumstances and space. This section will draw on these two ideas to argue that the in-between identities of my participants could not be accurately captured by the largely static and one-dimensional category of in-betweenness that has been widely used in the literature. Sara’s life history, in particular, will describe the internal and external processes that shaped her in-between identity and the diversity of overlapping meanings and connotations that in betweenness acquired as these processes unfolded.

Sara (26), worked as a journalist in Madrid. Her parents, rural people with no formal education, migrated from Qingtian to Spain in their early twenties and met at a Chinese restaurant where they both worked. The most determinant aspect of
Sara’s life, and the one that dominated her narrative, was that she had spent the first 11 years of her life with a Spanish family in Alicante and separated from her biological parents:

In the beginning, and for many years, my parents saw the Spanish family as a babysitter, but the truth is they were more like a foster family, because my parents worked a lot, and then they had to leave Alicante because they began touring different cities to sell products in street markets, so the fact is I was raised and totally immersed in the life of this Spanish family for quite a lot of years. I spent my childhood with them, and when my parents’ situation improved, I went back to them... I stayed with the Spanish family because they got attached to me, they saw me as a member of the family and they didn’t mind looking after me just as if I was another sibling in the family.

Sara emphasized the strong emotional connection that she had developed with her Spanish family and insisted on the fact that she had “two families”: “I don’t see them as my foster family, I call them my family, same as my Chinese family, I don’t see it as my Chinese family, but as my family as well”.

Sara stressed the sharp contrasts that existed between her life with her Spanish and Chinese families and the difficult transition she had experienced when she reunited with her Chinese family at the age of 11:

I was totally Spanish until age 11, I mean I hadn’t had any contact with or received any influence from Chinese culture, and then suddenly, at age 11, I moved into a Chinese family, with a way of life, a type of upbringing that had nothing to do with what I had experienced so far... I had a period, I would say a transition period, where I had to come to terms with the fact that all the frames of reference in my environment had changed... It took me a lot of time to feel that I was at home again and to feel that this was my family and that was my reality... I think I reached adolescence with all those identity issues, with that conflict of family belonging, with that sense of vital disorientation...

Sara’s in between identity gradually emerged from her inability to conciliate her two family experiences and the conflicting identities they generated:

I have had this inner conflict for many years, in terms of saying, I am Spanish, but I have a Chinese family, so I am Chinese as well, but I don’t speak Chinese... I have felt very self-conscious and insecure and had huge identity clashes as a result of being in between two families, in between two cultures, and in my case, it was literally in between, it’s not like other Chinese, young people, who have had baby-sitters,
nannies, foster families as well for a while, but not as extreme as my case, because I was with them until age 11.

Besides identity conflicts and adaptation struggles, she was also confronted with more practical communication hurdles because her biological parents only had basic Spanish language skills, while she in turn did not speak Chinese. Despite all these difficulties, at the time we met, Sara spoke positively about her dual identity as both Spanish and Chinese. However, she stressed how this position had been the result of many years of inner conflict and emotional upheavals:

For a very long time I’ve said straight out that I was Spanish, and I’ve said it very convinced, and I’ve said it even with anger at people for even dare doubt that I was Spanish and, I was even offended that people considered me Chinese, because it was sort of, don’t you see that I have grown up here, don’t you see that I speak Spanish, don’t you see that I don’t speak Chinese and I am telling you that I don’t... and this has evolved into thinking that, damn, I do have a Chinese family, and no, it can’t be this way, this is not fair to my parents, my grandparents, regardless of the little contact that I’ve had with my Chinese family... So I’ve shifted my identity to “I am Spanish but I have Chinese parents”.

This passage illustrates the evolution of Sara’s cultural identity. It shows her progression from a denial of her Chinese identity, to a gradual recognition of her Chinese origins, a struggle to conciliate her Spanish and Chinese selves, and finally a positive reaffirmation of her dual identity. Throughout this time evolution, her individual perception of her identity acquired different intensities and meanings as her context and circumstances changed.

Sara’s narrative also suggests how the attitudes and perceptions of Spanish mainstream society were to a large extent responsible for her identity conflict. First, looking at her phenotypical traits, people expected her to “be” Chinese. Second, they assumed that being Chinese, she would also be able to speak Chinese and know about China. Sara’s feelings of inadequacy arose out of being unable to live up to those standards and projections and out of considering herself as not sufficiently or “authentically” Chinese. It was also this situation that triggered her denial of her Chinese identity as a reaction and stance towards people’s expectations. In this sense, she explained:

It turns out that I don’t speak Chinese, and this is the sort of thing that has also made me feel really self-conscious, it’s the typical innocent question that you are asked by people who don’t know your context, but that makes you feel insecure and
uncomfortable. In my case, every time someone asked me “do you speak Chinese?”, and I said no, they would say “what a pity, your parents should have taught you”, and, in the beginning, I would give a generic reply, “oh, yes, we didn’t spend much time together”, and so on, but deep inside, I felt annoyed, in terms of saying, damn, so maybe I am a bad Chinese, after all?

When she began to come to terms with her Chinese origins, Sara made great efforts to substantiate her Chineseness based on the standards imposed by society and to live up to that essentialist idea of being Chinese. Thus, she made several attempts at learning Chinese. She also traveled to China, read Chinese novels in translation, tried to learn about Chinese history from books. She also expressed regret and a sense of loss because her parents, working-class people with little education, lacked the time, competences and resources to pass on to her what she conceived of as “Chinese culture”:

Un fortunately, and I really see this as a misfortune, I have missed a lot, and also my parents have missed a lot, because they come from a village, they don’t have a high cultural profile, they are working-class people and as a result they haven’t been able to pass on to me knowledge about what China is like, about Chinese culture...

Eventually, after many years and a long process of reflexivity, she accepted that her Chinese identity was not and need not be substantiated or legitimized by her ability to speak Chinese or her knowledge about Chinese culture, but rather by a positive embracement of her personal circumstances, a rejection of society’s stereotypes, and a strong belief in the idea that it was possible to be Spanish by simultaneously being Chinese.

This narrative has revealed how Sara’s in between identity was constantly being shaped and reshaped, questioned and contested throughout her childhood and adolescence years. Following this time evolution, in-betweeness emerged as a changing position in a continuous and dialogical process of self-transformation and not as a two-directional back and forth movement between China and Spain, between here and there. Sara’s feelings of in-betweenness were thus present throughout her life, but with different value and significance. In the beginning, she was assertively Spanish, but her Spanishness was dependent on a strong rejection of her Chinese identity, and therefore evidenced a form of in-betweenness. Subsequently, in-betweenness took the form of a dualism between not feeling completely Spanish as a result of experiences with racialization, and developing a sense of guilt towards her “lost” Chinese identity. Later, in-betweenness manifested
as a strong desire to go back to her origins and simultaneously a downplay of her Spanishness (she was proud of having retained her Chinese passport and Chinese nationality, for example). Finally, at the time we met, her in-betweenness had taken the form of a balanced and more harmonious coexistence between what she perceived as her Spanish and Chinese selves. In betweenness for Sara was also not only a matter of being in between cultures and languages, but also in between families, cities, lifestyles, parenting styles, in between guilt and self-acceptance, in between retrieval and loss, and in this sense could be understood as the product of a biographical intersectionality where many aspects of her life besides language and culture came into play. Moreover, her cultural identity at the time we met was only a specific positioning in between past and future with the potential and likelihood to change again. Thus, she spoke of her identity crisis as “more clear and resolved” than in the past but “by no means concluded”. She also acknowledged “the need to know, to reconnect, to keep reconstructing the [identity] puzzle”. In this sense, cultural identity (and in this particular case feelings of in-betweenness) must be understood not as an outcome, but as a web that moves across multiple elements in a non-necessarily linear progression and in an endless process of becoming.

**Yun: New Patterns of In-Betweenness**

The literature has often described the dual or in between identities of children of migrants as a simultaneous identification with two cultures, estrangement from both cultures, or as a blend of “cultural permeability and vulnerability” (Ang 2001, 194) that suggests an ambivalent tension between both. All these descriptions tend to emphasize the relationship between host and heritage cultures and societies, between China and Spain. For Yun, however, who was caught between the incompleteness of his Chinese identity and a longing to be “more Chinese”, an identity in between cultures meant none of the above.

Yun (23) moved from Qingtian to Spain with his mother and younger sister at the age of 10. Yun’s father was waiting for them in Madrid, where he had migrated four years earlier. Overall, Yun had an easy adaptation to school in Spain: there was a positive atmosphere with classmates and teachers, and he did not have much difficulty learning Spanish or adjusting to the academic curriculum. However, his childhood was subordinated to the demands of the family business and marked by constant residential mobility. The family spent one and a half years in Madrid, where
Yun’s parents took up different types of paid employment, two years in Mallorca, where the family tried their luck with several businesses, then four years in Málaga, before finally moving back to Madrid, where Yun began his degree in Engineering.

Yun also described close ties with his family during childhood and adolescence. He helped at the family business from an early age, and regularly acted as translator for his parents who had very limited Spanish language competence. During his time in Málaga, the family opened two grocery stores. Yun would spend most of his free time with his father in one of the shops, while his sister helped his mother at the other. When he moved back to Madrid to start his university degree, his parents sold their two businesses in Málaga and the whole family settled in the capital again. Yun had never traveled back to Qingtian or other parts of China since migrating to Spain.

At the time we met, Yun had just finished his university degree and had recently taken up his first job at a Spanish consulting company, where he was in charge of finances. The idea was to gain a couple of years of experience before looking for a different job.

One of Yun’s first comments after we met was that it was “strange” to be a second-generation Chinese. Later, when we met at a Chinese hot-pot restaurant where he had worked part-time as a university student, Yun explained—in flawless Spanish— that he did not feel Spanish, but that he did not feel completely Chinese either: “it is a complicated balance, because in the end you don’t totally belong to either side”.

Yun possessed strong intercultural competences and was able to comfortably navigate different cultural contexts: he was perfectly fluent in Spanish, he had worked for both Chinese and Spanish employers, he had translated and mediated between his parents and Spanish society on a regular basis. However, this did not translate into an in-between identity, as he made clear from the very beginning of our conversation that he did not feel Spanish.

On the one hand, Yun explained that the specificities of his growing-up experience, in particular his responsibilities towards the family business, conditioned by his family’s socio-economic status, had generated feelings of distance from Spanish peers and Spanish society:

Spanish, no, I don’t feel Spanish, but Chinese, maybe half Chinese, generally, yes...
Spanish, not really, almost never, only perhaps when I watch football and I support Spain, but not really, because in the end, it’s very different. For example, judging
from my own personal experience up to now, teenagers here, high school students and so on, 17, 18 years old, their main entertainment is go out drinking [ir de botellón], and chatting, and so on, and I’ve never had that, because at that age I had to be in the shop, doing things, so it is quite different...

On the other hand, his feelings of non-belonging to Spanish society were also determined by aspects related to his family’s socio-economic status. In particular, it was his residential mobility as a child, driven by the family’s need to look for the best opportunities for the business, that had generated his lack of attachment to any specific place and his general sense of rootlessness within Spanish society. He described these moves as “funny periods, because you end up not really adapting to any place…” . He added:

In the end, in my case, you don’t really have any roots here, right? So you can afford to leave... I don’t have any important relationships... and my parents, they don’t even plan to stay here.

Residential mobility is in fact a common phenomenon among Chinese migrants from low socio-economic backgrounds, especially in the first stages of migration, when families have to endure hardship and enjoy little economic stability (Villarino 2012).

Traditional values acquired during his childhood years in China also accounted for his feelings of difference from Spanish peers:

Yun: In the end, even though I have only spent four years in school in China, but the values you are taught there, it makes a really big difference, for example in terms of effort, the strong value that is placed on effort, here, it’s like, it is not valued that much...

Author: you mean, this is something that has stayed with you?

Yun: yes, yes, a lot, in terms of having to work hard, Spanish people, I would say, they don’t have that, they are more, I would say, spoon-fed...

While failing to identify with Spanish people, Yun also felt “only half Chinese”. His perception of the partiality and incompleteness of his Chinese identity stemmed from the fact that he equated a “real” Chinese identity with conventional identity markers such as Chinese language proficiency and knowledge of culture, which he crucially did not possess.

This was hinted at during our first meeting at the hot-pot restaurant in Madrid. We chose a quiet table at the very end of the restaurant. As I was watching
him write the order on a small piece of paper, I noticed how he paused for a moment and looked at me in hesitation. Then he took out his cell phone and confessed, embarrassed, that he needed to look up some words because there were several characters he was not able to write in Chinese.

Later in our conversation, when comparing himself with other Chinese people born and raised in China and with Chinese children of migrants having arrived in Spain in late adolescence, Yun described himself as lacking some of the competences they possessed:

They [Chinese having migrated to Spain in late adolescence] know more about Chinese celebrities, and you just stare at them, hum... I, for example, am not much into celebrities, but if you ask me about Chinese celebrities, well, maybe I know some, but very few, whereas those who have come out a few years later than me are very interested in those things and follow them a lot... and for example, I don’t know much about Chinese history, and I am very interested in it, but it is a lot to study, and I don’t really have such a good memory...

These examples reveal how Yun regarded language and knowledge about China as core components of a Chinese identity. Chineseness was thus seen by him as a measurable attribute, something that you may have more or less of, that you may possess (Louie 2002). According to Louie (2002), this view is common among Chinese children of migrants, and is often the product of essentialist images and definitions of Chineseness that are spread by the media and popular culture both in and outside China. This phenomenon places Chinese children like Yun in a difficult and ambivalent position. On the one hand, they regard themselves as not having as much Chinese culture and as less authentic than other Chinese having grown up in China or migrated in late adolescence. On the other hand, they would be expected to “have more Spanish culture”, for having migrated earlier, but their Chineseness in the host society complicates their “authenticity” as Spanish and makes them not Spanish enough. They thus see their practices as “diluted and inauthentic versions of ‘real’ traditional Chinese culture” (Louie 2002, 239), yet at the same time they cannot fully identify with Spain and feel inescapably Chinese.

Perhaps as a result of this feeling of incompleteness, Yun yearned for a connection with China. He longed to learn about Chinese history and culture, and to visit his hometown in Qingtian. In fact, the main reason why he had taken up his current job—he had received several offers from other employers—was that the company was setting up an office in China, and that there would most probably be
opportunities for him to travel.

On the other hand, while Yun made a clear distinction between himself and Chinese people born in China or having arrived in Spain in late adolescence, he also established boundaries between himself and Chinese university students living in Spain, because he regarded their lives as totally estranged from his own life experiences:

... a lot of them, they are well off, because if they could afford studying in a Western country, so they’ve been well provided for, when someone calls them names, they make a big deal, they feel harassed, victims of racism, but in our case, we have grown up in the family shop, and we’ve seen these things all our lives, this is a normal thing... but they just don’t understand it.

All this suggests that in-betweenness for Yun was not a simple matter of feeling between Spain and China, but rather an internal struggle to find his personal way of being Chinese. He felt caught between his own imaginative perceptions of Chineseness and the representations of Chineseness circulated by media and society. He felt different from other Chinese communities (Chinese university students in Spain and Chinese born in China), and in this sense also in between. He also experienced a more emotional form of in-betweenness, as he was caught between the insecurity for not being “Chinese enough” and a longing to be “more Chinese”. All this suggests that Yun experienced a very specific form of in-betweenness that did not fit into the conceptualizations of in-betweenness that previous studies have proposed. Although his circumstances, in particular his cultural and linguistic competences and his professional integration in Spanish society, partly indicated a life in between China and Spain that matched the notions of in-betweenness previously documented in the literature, further exploration of his life history and narrative suggest a greater deal of nuance that resists such clear-cut binaries and categorizations.

Moreover, contrary to what previous literature has suggested, culture and language were not the only categories that shaped his cultural identity. In this sense, Yun’s in-betweenness must be understood as multi-layered and intersectional. It emerged from an interplay of external and personal elements that crucially included socio-economic background (in particular his family obligations and residential mobility) and conflicting images and representations of Chineseness, all of which further demonstrates the uniqueness of his in-between experience.
Qi (17) was born in Madrid, but was soon sent back to China where he lived with his grandparents before returning to Spain at the age of 5. His family owned a Chinese bazaar and lived in a working-class neighborhood with a fast-growing Chinese population at the outskirts of Madrid. Qi had a difficult adaptation after moving back to Spain with his parents and sisters, two years younger and eight years older than him. He attributed this to his difficulty to learn Spanish and to establish meaningful connections with people. He was the only Chinese student in his class and it took many years for him to begin interacting with peers:

In the beginning, when I first arrived, I couldn’t understand anything. I didn’t speak or hang out with anyone, it was just from home to school and from school back home. Then, in fourth grade, I began to play football, and I could understand a little… but there was still a distance, in the sense that they were all friends and I was on the side. I was almost 10 years old at that time.

It was only at the age of 12-13 that Qi began to gradually engage in interactions with Spanish peers. According to him, his parents were largely responsible for his difficulties to integrate:

I would say that the reason for this difficulty to integrate, besides the language, were my parents... If I had been allowed to go to the park and socialize, I would have been able to make friends more quickly.

In general, Qi reported a strong parental discipline and described his parents as “very traditional”. He was never allowed to go out and was given a lot of housework responsibilities. His parents worked long hours. He was mostly in charge of a Chinese baby-sitter who dropped him at school in the morning and with whom he spent most of his hours after school.

Qi repeatedly stressed his disapproval of the strict parental education he had received. He also, in several occasions, mentioned that he supported a more liberal parental education. Talking about his parents’ attitudes towards her elder sister, for example, who was forced to move out of the house at the age of 18 because her parents forbid her to have a boyfriend, he said: “if I had children, I would say you have to be careful with this, this and that, instead of forbidding”.

He referred to his relationship with his parents as “not good”: 

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We don’t understand each other and I don’t approve of their traditional views. My dad always said, “this is my house and if you want to live in my house you need to do what I say”.

At age 17, due to his family atmosphere, Qi decided not only to leave school (which he found too difficult) but also to leave his parents’ house and earn his own living. At the time we met, Qi rented a small room in the district of Usera, where he also worked 12-hour shifts at a small recently opened café. The café specialized in Taiwanese bubble-milk tea and had a small menu written only in Chinese.

Qi visited his parents twice a month and spent a few hours with them. Since leaving school, and before taking up his job at the café, he had previously worked at a luxury Chinese restaurant, where they had over 100 clients every evening and only four waiters, a situation that had motivated his decision to quit.

Qi felt both Spanish and Chinese. However, this statement seemed to contradict his life circumstances and experiences. Unlike other participants in this section, he had not received a very strong direct influence from Spanish society or developed ties with Spanish peers. At the time we met, and after having lived in Spain for 12 years, he had only established superficial Spanish friendships. Talking about his parents’ prohibitions, he mentioned for example how he was only very occasionally and in special circumstances allowed to sleep at a Chinese friend’s house. “What about Spanish friends?” I asked, to which Qi replied that “there has never been a strong friendship with Spaniards to the degree of being invited to their place”. Moreover, Qi had experienced difficulties learning Spanish, had dropped out of school, and this had limited his contact with Spanish society and his opportunities for insertion in the Spanish labor market. He now lived in Usera with Chinese people and worked for a Chinese employer at a café especially targeted at the Chinese community. His practices and his social relations were dominantly Chinese.

When questioned about his dual identity, Qi did not regard it as the product of any specific circumstance, but simply as the passive result of his cross-border mobility, which had shaped his receptivity towards what he identified as Spanish and Chinese mentalities. “Well, in my case, I feel both Spanish and Chinese, I can be with both… I can understand both sides well”, he said. Later, he added: “I think if I had grown up in China I would not be like this, I would probably have the same mentality as my parents”.

However, his cultural identity could also be read as a response to his individual circumstances. In this sense, Qi’s Spanish identity may be understood not
so much as the passive result of his cross-border mobility, but instead as a reaction to the traditional mentality of his parents, that he greatly opposed, and which he negatively identified as Chinese.

This more nuanced reading of his identity is what his life practices, process of adaptation, and continuous reference in conversation to his negative feelings towards his parents seemed to suggest. This reading is also more able to account for the paradox between his Spanish identity and his general disconnection from Spanish society and provides a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the process through which his dual identity was generated.

To sum up, Yun, Qi and Sara all straddled different worlds. At both material and symbolic levels, their lives unquestionably blended elements from Spain and China, host and heritage cultures. And yet, their narratives have shown a dynamic interaction between different elements of their life histories that suggest a more multilayered and open-ended form of in-betweenness that was the product of an intersection between many different aspects connected to their social environment and their individual biographies. Approaching their dual identities as a form of biographical intersectionality rather than from the perspective of linguistic and cultural binaries provides a richer and much more nuanced understanding of their identities and allows to see the participants as embedded in their personal life situations and relationships with others. This perspective also sheds some light on the intricate processes through which their dual identities were established and negotiated.

Conclusion

This study has examined the narratives of three participants who claimed a dual identity or an identity in between. It has tried to argue, from different perspectives, that existing conceptual frameworks of dual and in-between identities, which have commonly been conceived of in terms of fixed categories, binary oppositions and symbolic or material back and forth movements between host and heritage cultures, fail to capture the depth, complexity and contextual constraints of the participants’ identities and experiences.

As pointed out by Menjivar (2002), in order to “fully assess the analytical power of a concept one must also take into account circumstances where it does not apply fully or the factors that may in some way limit it” (549). In this sense, I have
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tried to raise questions that refine and more clearly describe what is meant by dual and in-between identities in different contexts. These questions have revealed that the dualism and in-betweeness of the participants emerged more as a form of biographical intersectionality where a multiplicity of social, cultural, contextual and individual aspects converged rather than as a cultural and linguistic dichotomy.

In the first section, Sara spoke of her in-betweeness as a shifting, malleable condition that acquired different shapes, meanings and intensities throughout one’s life history and that was in this sense endlessly produced and never resolved in a definitive way. The second section argued that Yun’s identity did play out as feelings of dual belonging, dual exclusion, or as an ambivalent position between belonging and marginality, but rather as a simultaneous desire and inability to be Chinese. Besides, his particular form of in-betweeness encompassed a wide range of elements that reached beyond the cultural and linguistic in-betweeness that previous research has tended to focus on. These elements included residential mobility, socio-economic status and a conflict between external and internal perceptions of what it meant to be Chinese. Finally, through Qi’s narrative, the third section proposed to look at dual identities as physical or symbolic spaces of belonging dynamically constructed and negotiated out of the participants’ need to engage with different aspects of their personal circumstances and environment.

Like any other ethnic community, children of Chinese migrants are a heterogeneous group with different personal and social characteristics (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). There are different stages in their lives, different migration and adaptation processes, different class and socio-economic backgrounds and therefore the potential and possibility for dual and in-between identities to manifest in different ways. The narratives thus suggested the importance of approaching the participants as individuals rather than as children of migrants. In other words, although one cannot dismiss the fact that the participants inhabited dual realities and articulated dual identities, migration was sometimes not the central or most fundamental element of their experiences, or was simply embedded in other aspects of their individual trajectories, hence the need to consider their biographies.

Conventional notions of in-betweenness have also been criticized for their underlying ideological assumptions and power relations. Benesch (2008), in this sense, has insisted that the two polarities that constitute the discourse of in-betweeness (in this case native and non-native, Spanish and Chinese) have been created from a monocultural and monolingual perspective. Positioning individuals as
not belonging (or belonging) to the normative categories of native or non-native, Spanish or Chinese, pathologizes their identities and ignores the creative processes and social interactions through which alternative identities may originate. Similarly, the discourse on dual or transnational identities proposes to embrace the multiplicity and creativity of cultural identities that blend multiple elements. However, it paradoxically does so through an abstract and homogeneous celebration of the liberating character of these dual identities, and by framing this discourse within the categories and dichotomies that it is trying to reject.

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Refugee Crisis or Identity Crisis: Deconstructing the European Refugee Narrative

Valon JUNUZI

“Because night has fallen and the barbarians haven’t come.
And some of our men just in from the border say
there are no barbarians any longer.
Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?
Those people were a kind of solution.”

Constantine P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians”

Abstract. Employing discursive and relational style of analysis, this paper situates the refugee issues within the contours of recurrent neoliberal turmoil and challenges the examination of ‘refugee crisis’ in isolation from the shifting identity discourses in the European continent. Instead, it urges for a scientific examination that situates the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in a broader plane where the ‘refugee’ and the European ‘self’ become intrinsically linked, entangled, and inseparable categories in the process of European identity reinvention. The paper elucidates the interplay between the social, economic and cultural factors that are pushing the emergence of new European identity and the construction of the ‘refugee’ as an incompatible ontological category that solidifies the emerging particularistic identities in Europe. In deconstructing narratives that construct the ‘refugee’ as a culturally alien and abject ‘other’, the analysis employs discursive psychology to expose the performativity of the hidden meanings of metaphors and metonymies that pervade the representation of refugees in the European linguistic discourse. It further relies on Agamben contribution on the biopolitics of Western nation state to argue that the refuge’s body represents a site of biopolitical interventions that produce the ‘bare life’, the ‘liminal body’, and the ‘marginal’ through which the European neoliberal ‘polis’ secures its existence.

Keywords: culturalist discourse, identity, refugee, neo-orientalism, metaphors, biopolitics, ‘bios/zoe’, superfluous bodies

Introduction

When Cavafy wrote this poem in 1898, he was inspired by the writings on the fall of Ancient Roman Empire, and most probably could not predict that his poem will gain pertinence after more than one hundred years of its initial publication. The
The subtext of the poem is quite comprehensible; The Empire secures its existence through an ‘other’, a threatening ‘outsider’ that serves as a solution to the inner problems of the polis, and once the ‘alien’ disappears there is no place for relief or happiness but for anxiety and panic that the Empire is now alone on its own problems, without a ‘barbarian’, its reverse image, its ultimate ‘other’. The beginning of the 21st century found the European Empire in analogous despair, struggling to accommodate its avant-garde identity through the hardships of the recurring crisis of neoliberalism and uncontrollable forces of globalization (Fliigstein, 2012). The ideological enmities that for more than forty years forged and strengthened the distinct and sui generis identity of the European Union waned and Europe had to redefine itself in an ever-changing and unpredictable international landscape. The redefinition of European identity has been tangential with other continental and global dramatic developments that have undoubtedly influenced the course of European identity (re)invention.

One of the recent global phenomenon that is particularly effecting the European identity politics is the increasing numbers of forcibly displaced people as a result of bloody conflicts that have provoked the worst humanitarian drama since the end of Second World War. According to the UNHCR (2017) report, there are more than 65 million forcibly displaced people worldwide and 22.5 million refugees are seeking shelter in foreign lands which is the highest number of asylum seekers since the foundation of UNHCR in 1950. The Europe has been at the frontline of managing the flux of refugees exacerbated by the endless Syrian Civil War that have forced many Syrians to seek shelter and protection in the European countries. The old continent, in turn, has found itself in a middle of a ‘crisis’ and images of refugees dying in the shores of Europe or mass of desperate people waiting to pass the borders have become symbols of European indifference toward the human catastrophe orchestrated in the European backyard (Wilson and Mavelli, 2013). In tandem with the refugee ‘crisis’, European political establishment has been shattered by the resurgence of radical right-wing parties that have fueled anti-immigration and racist sentiments, urging for cultural protectionism and defensive mechanisms to stop border ‘hemorrhage’ caused by the uncontrollable flows of refugees and immigrants.

This article focuses on this complex interconnectedness of the refugee ‘crisis’ with the European identity politics and elucidates mechanisms that utilize the refugee ‘crisis’ in altering the conventional identities and forging new senses of
belonging in Europe. More specifically, it problematizes the refugee crisis within the contours of European identity formation in the post-ideological era and interrogates the construction of the refugee as a valuable discursive instrument in the process of European reinvention of the ‘Self’ (Cantat, 2016; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). The aim is to understand the alternations of the European identity in conditions of perpetual global crisis and continental uncertainties and how the refugee ‘crisis’ fits the exigencies of these European inner dynamics. To put it simply, this article challenges the objectivity of refugee ‘crisis’ by proving how the ‘crisis’ is discursively invoked and reproduced in a context where Europe is undergoing a process of redefinition along culturalist and civilizationals lines. Speaking in Cavafy’s words, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that the refugee is being constructed as the European ‘other’ and ‘barbarian’ in order to provide ‘solutions’ to the European identity anxieties and dilemmas.

The outline of this paper is divided in two main parts and five subsections. The first part sets the context of European shifting identities in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of refugee as an ‘intervening’ factor in the politics of European identity. In particular, it focuses on the erosion of conventional cosmopolitan/pragmatist identity of Europe as a result of the recent economic crisis and the emergence of culturalist discourse as a new hegemonic paradigm that renders redundant old categories of identification based on class and economic relations and gives primacy to cultural and primordialist understanding of the ‘Self’ (Yilmaz, 2012; Sasatelli, 2009). At this particular juncture, the construction of the refugee as a ‘threat’, ‘backward’ and culturally ‘alien other’, gains discursive significance as it serves both to reproduce and stabilize European culturalist identity but also to construct itself in a fixed opposition with the culturalist ‘other’. In this regard, it focuses on the emergence of ‘neo-orientalism’ as a discursive shift from the colonialist Orientalism which manifests itself in the so-called ‘securitization of Muslims’ and politicization of Muslim identity in the European public sphere (Mavelli, 2013; Saimei, 2015; Amin Khan, 2012).

The second part is oriented in deconstructing the totality of discursive machinery that is erected to speak of and produce knowledge over the refugee and his cultural background. In particular, it interrogates linguistic and non-linguistic dispositive that encode the refugee as a threatening and abject ‘other’. Specifically, it deconstructs the use language in daily communication about the refugee ‘crisis’ that pervades media coverage, public speeches and governmental practices. In this
section, the article problematizes the pervasive use of ‘crisis’ as discursive technology to present reality as ‘exceptional’ and ‘abnormal’ which in turn legitimizes certain unconventional governmental actions. The last section relies on Agamben contribution on the biopolitics of Western nation state and employs the concept of ‘zoe’ and ‘bios’ as biopolitical categories applicable in the refugee crisis. It argues that the refuge’s body represents a site of biopolitical interventions that produces the ‘bare life’, the ‘zoe’, the ‘marginal’ through which the European ‘bios’, and neoliberal ‘polis’ secures its existence.

**Putting refugee crisis in context: European shifting identities and the politics of ‘othering’**

*The resurgence of culturalist discourse and European identity crisis*

On 8\textsuperscript{th} of May - the day after the decisive French presidential elections-, European establishment felt a sense of relief and self-confidence from what otherwise could be the state of acute uncertainty and fear on Europe’s future following Le Pen’s victory. Headlines and breaking news of some of the most prestigious newspapers and broadcasters (*The Independent, El Pais, Le Monde, The New York Times, La Republica*)\textsuperscript{1} reflected the same state-of-mind, signifying their audiences of the ‘existential’ importance that Macron’s electoral win has for the reflected the same state-of-mind, signifying their audiences of the ‘existential’ importance that Macron’s electoral win has for the French Republican values but also for the cosmopolitan vision of the European project.\textsuperscript{2} It seemed that Europe is giving signs of resiliency over crude nationalist sentiments embodied in the far-right discourse that just two years before triggered Brexit and enabled Donald Trump to be elected as US commander in chief.

Beyond the optimism and apparent euphoric reactions that have captivated the bureaucrats in Brussels, a lot of questions concerning the rise of populism and anti-immigration sentiment in European continent need to be posed.

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\textsuperscript{2} See, for example, The Washington Post (7 May 2017): “With Le Pen defeat, Europe’s far-right surge stalls” where prominent Brussels officials and European diplomats comment Macron’s win as a necessity to halt the upsurge of right-wing radicalism and collapse of the European Union.
Specifically, is European populism and rising xenophobia confined to the daily rhetoric of radical right-wing segments and their supporters, or rather is a symptomatic manifestation of a structural and deep identity crisis that prompts Europeans to redefine themselves in the context of major global and continental disruptions? If yes, how does such a crisis on European consciousness manifests itself and what are the explanatory factors that justify these claims? The scholarship has provided extensive scientific inquiries on the topic and there is apparently a wide consensus among scholars that Europe is going through an identity crisis which has provoked the redefinition of Europe both culturally and politically (Wodak et al., 2009; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Cantat, 2015). What is common among scholars is the examination of problematique from an anti-essentialist perspective which rejects the modernist/Cartesian conception of identity as a fixed, self-contained and autonomous property from the social interactivity and contextualities (De Finna, 2006; Van Dijk, 2001). This perspective offers insights on the discursive production and reproduction of European identities and on the crisis and fluctuations of these identities due to major disturbances that trigger alternations in the hegemonic discourses (Wodak, 2015). In this regard, scholars have discerned patterns of hegemonic shifts in the construction of European identity as a result of global and continental traumatic processes that have destabilized the conventional multi-cultural identity of Europe (Cantat, 2015). Specifically, the focus has been oriented in elucidating psychological effects of neoliberal perpetual crisis in forging new senses of belonging and inducing a process of a paradigmatic shift that is replacing the conventional ontological and epistemological order based on class antagonism with a culturalist ontology which entails a displacement of identity formation from the economic realm to the cultural one.

The homogenizing and uncontrollable forces of globalization and the agony of the recent European economic crisis (a continental phenomenon due to the peculiarities of EU’s economic and financial system) are the most mentioned factors to explain the European ‘identity crisis’ and the changing discourses on ‘Europeanity’. Delanty et al., (2008) argue that the globalization process where the nation-state refrains the exercise of its sovereign power to restrict, control or (un)authorize the international flows of money, goods or mobility of people “unleashes new kinds of anxieties about securities, social status and identity” (p.12). The global financial crisis that expanded rapidly all around the world has exposed the vulnerability of global capitalism where problems and solutions have been displaced
from national boundaries to chaotic and unmanageable global networks that are not accountable to any legitimate authority (Cetti, 2012). In the European context, the economic crisis and its severity (increased poverty, unemployment and austerity measures) has produced new fears and uncertainties about the future and the distrust in the institutions of European Union has reached unprecedented levels (EURACTIV, 2013). Similarly, Betz (1995) and Koopmans (2005: 5) argue that economic deprivation or seclusion induces identity psychosis and emotional dissatisfaction with the status-quo and existing structures of self-identification, prompting people to embrace nationalism as a “new anchor for collective identities that can renew the sense of control”. To put it simply, psychodynamics of neoliberal subjects in Europe have stimulated the re-nationalization of political discourse and set the terrain for the re-introduction of essentialized understanding of the self. In this vein, Delanty et al. (2008) and Checkel and Katzenstein (2009: 1-2) discern patterns of discursive shift of the European identity from the one that sketched a cosmopolitan vision of Europe as epitomized with the motto ‘Unity in Diversity’ to the new narrative that defines Europe in civilization terms under the banner of ‘Europe for Europeans’. This in turn implies that the pragmatist principles of economic interdependence and mutual prosperity that have underpinned European identity for more than 60 years are being eroded and replaced by the re-actualization of contextualized/particularist identities that is manifested in the daily rhetoric about ‘national decadence’ or ‘Islamization of Europe’.

Roy (2007) and Yilmaz (2012) contextualize the European complex identity formation within contours of what is commonly referred as the revival of culturalist discourse which overshadows conventional economic relations between labour and capital with novel antagonisms based on essentialized cultural differences and cultural belonging. The emerging paradigm makes superfluous old categories of identification (labour/capital, men/women, LGBT/Conservative) by centralizing a primordialist/culturalist understanding of the ‘Self’.

As Yilmaz (2012: 369) points out:

“What we are witnessing is a tectonic movement that has shaken the entire political landscape and realigned social and political movements along a new fault line. This new fault line is interpellated by a discourse of culture, i.e. culture has become central to the questions of belonging and alterity, that is, the ontology of the social has become culturalized.”

The tectonic movement of European political landscape that Yilmaz is
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referring to, in practice, alludes to “epistemic collusion between right and left” (p.369) which in public discourse is manifested through a consensual episteme in the political spectrum on how to operationalize the problems and challenges of contemporary Europe. This is not to say that the left and the moderate right are appropriating the xenophobic or segregationist attitudes of the radical-right, nor that the left is abandoning its progressive struggles in favour of nationalist meta-narratives. Rather, it speaks to the same ontological categories (‘us’ versus. ‘alien other’) that the moderate political spectrum shares with the far-right, to problematize and articulate social, economic and cultural struggles (Soysal, 2009). For instance, traditionally progressive projects that promote gender equality, freedom of sexuality or labour rights are being increasingly re-articulated in relation to the culturalized other, thus rendering invisible the domestic antagonism that has characterized social and cultural emancipatory movements in European societies (i.e. the left historically has problematized gender oppression from a materialist perspective and framed its struggle within major ontological categories of ‘Labour versus Capital’).

For illustration, Villy Svondal a member of Danish Socialist Party and until recently Foreign Minister of Denmark when asked about his opinion on the increased numbers of immigrants arriving in the country, argued that “…the leftwing has led years of struggle for gender equality. But it is also obvious that when immigrants come here from, for instance, Somalia, then, they haven’t experienced that struggle and all hardships that the struggle brought with it” (as quoted in Nielsen, 2012: 152).

Similar claims were made by Joost Lagendik a high-profile member of Dutch Green Left Party who said “So there is this fear...that we are being transported back in a time machine where we have to explain to our immigrants that there is equality between men and women, and gays should be treated properly. Now there is the idea we have to do it again”.3 What is striking in these remarks is the ontological structure that is invoked by the speakers to frame their arguments about gender equality, respectively LGBT rights. In both cases, progressive policies are articulated in opposition to the ‘foreigner’, mostly associated with Muslims that are posing threat to ‘our’ emancipatory achievements. The use of ‘we’ as a denominator of Dutch or Danish gender progress mitigates in-group discordances by addressing the gender issue as taking place “between “us” with gender equality and “them” without

gender equality” (Nielsen, 2012: 152). In essence, this culturalist reading of the ‘Self’ from the moderates or leftists does not differ substantially from extreme pole of the political spectrum. When Le Pen proudly argues that “France isn’t burkinis on the beach. France is Brigitte Bardot” (New York Times, 5 May 2017), she is just transmitting more explicitly the same threat that concerns Svondal and Lagendik. While they may differ in regard to the methods of addressing this threat (Le Pen or Wilders for immediate expulsion and Langendik for ‘educational’ modules to teach the immigrant about the gender equality), they share a common vision that ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’ are incompatible and mutually exclusive ontological categories (Roy, 2007).

This complex co-dependence of socioeconomic factors with identity dynamics in the European continent sets the context on which the refugee drama is played and new collective identities are being forged and reproduced. As Sassatelli (2009: 4) succinctly articulates it: “Europe really seems to have lost the plot….Today, it appears, Europe is in search of a new story to tell, first and foremost to itself: an identity, that is”. In this process of crafting new narrations for itself, Europe is in search for an opposite ‘Other’ to provide coherence and stability to the newly emerging European ‘Self’. The arbitrariness of geopolitical dynamics have produced the ‘refugee’, the European ‘Other’, who is being utilized as a valuable discursive instrument in the process of European reinvention.

**In hunt for the ‘enemy’; the ‘refugee’ stabilizing the European ‘Self’**

Following the publication of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1994) and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that seemed to validate Huntington’s cataclysmic thesis of civilizational confrontations, there is an increasing interest in Western academia to re-scientize cultural and religious encounters of Islam with the Western world. The scientific scrutiny of Cultural and Religious studies has been focused on the inter-cultural dynamics in a globalized world, where cultural spatiality are blurred and diminished as a result of massive flows of people moving from one cultural and

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4 See, for example the binary categorization and ontological incompatibility of ‘Islam’ and ‘Frenchness’ in Emmanuel Macron’s comment: “Our mission…it will be difficult, it will take time, it will be demanding for all men and women…will be to act in such a way that French people of the Muslim faith are always more proud of being French than of being Muslim” (The Economist, 9th May 2017). For Macron, being a proud muslim excludes apriori feelings about France and French values.

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religious habitus to another, foreign culture (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). As the gravitation of the global migration indicates patterns of demographic flows from the Islamic geography toward the European ecumene, scientific endeavors have problematized the complex encounter of ‘Muslim immigrant/refugee’ with the European culture. The common feature of these accounts (see, Bowen, 2010; Klausen, 2005; Laurence and Vaisse, 2006) is the explanation of tensions between Muslims and the host cultures as a natural consequence of Kulturkampf between Islamic worldviews of the Muslim immigrant/refugee and European values that fail to cohabite due to their adherence to opposing systems of values and beliefs. The rising anti-immigrant sentiment among Europeans is explicable in terms of ‘demographic shifts’ of the recent decades where people of different cultures and religions create a sense of cultural aggression or invasion in host societies (Papastergiadis, 2006). This essentialist reading of the ‘immigrant’ as a purveyor of his cultural tradition, reifies immigrants’ otherness as being constituted prior to their arrival in the European territory, in absence of any external interfering factor to alter their deep-rooted identity. Thus, the opposing identities of the Muslim immigrant and native European are naturally given and constituted, in the sense that these identities are conceived as being established and formed in one “objective, readily available, non-discursive reality” (Yilmaz, 2012:374). “Islam” and “Europe” stand in opposition to each other due to their inner and fixed properties (the ‘absolutism’ of the former, and ‘Enlightenment’ of the latter) beyond any spatial or temporal context, and in isolation from any articulatory/discursive practice to provide meanings to these notions.

In contrast to these essentialist narratives on the identity of Europe and the ‘fleeing’ Muslim, a growing number of scholars are scrutinizing identity politics of contemporary Europe not through aprioristic lenses of dispositional analysis, but by examining the diverse discursive apparatuses that are put into the production of the European ‘Self’ in antagonism with the ‘threatening’ Muslim (Kristoglou and Tsimouris, 2015; Cantat, 2015; Connolley, 2002). This approach that Emirbayer (1997) has called ‘relational/processual style of analysis’ moves away from the

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5 Huntington relies upon the same essentialist assumptions in his “Clash of Civilization”. He defines civilizations as primordial categories based on what he calls “objective elements of blood, language, religion, way of life” (p.42-43). Based on these essentialist ontological stances, he makes the controversial claim that “Islam has bloody borders” or that the problem of the West “is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam…” alluding to the hostile, irreconcilable or conflicting interaction of the West with the Islamic World.
reification of ‘identities’ based on some ahistorical properties, but rather examines them as being constituted discursively (acknowledge their malleability) and in an incessant encounter with the ‘Other’. Building on that, Campbell (1992: 2) argues that “…the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an ‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’”. Or, as Connolley (2002: xv) puts it: “What I am is defined in terms of “What I am not”. The ‘Self’ projects itself always in opposition to the ‘Other’, because people need to invent some ‘differences’ that make ‘us’ distinguishable from ‘them’. In addition, what makes these identities to persist is the construction of a perpetual threat posed by the ‘Other’, a danger that ‘they’ possess a risk of alienating and disfiguring ‘our’ being and values that ‘we’ represent (Van Dijk: 2001). In the European context, ideas on Europeanity and uniqueness of European values have been historically constructed in opposition to a threatening outsider, corresponding to the particular interests involved in the ‘making of Europe’. During the Cold War, Western European unification manifested in the economic platform of European Community was made possible through the ‘common enemy’ of communism, epitomized by the Soviet Union which represented the totalitarian ideological ‘Other’ that is ready to invade ‘the land of freedoms’ once we fail to stay united (Wodak and Boukala, 2015). However, with the collapse of communism in the eastern frontiers and the institutionalization of neoliberalism as a global mode of governance, Europe “had to reinvent its other... [to legitimate] new senses of Europeanity” (Cantat, 2016: 3).

The horrors of war and human catastrophe in the Middle-East has manufactured the ‘refugee’, a de-territorialized body seeks shelter and protection in a foreign land, representing a site of intensive power interventions where the demarcation lines between the privileged insiders and anomalous outsiders are drawn and discursively reproduced. Nevzat Soguk, one of the most influential deconstructionist scholars in the field of Migration Studies, in his seminal book “State and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecrafts” interrogates the historical junctures which gave rise to the ‘refugee’ as a tool to stabilize and naturalize state sovereignty and also to forge and consolidate national identities. He traces back the origin of the modern idea of ‘refugeeness’ in the birth of the centralized nation-state where the population once stratified in different strata (aristocracy, clergy, peasantry) had to be reorganized into a unified body of citizens that have duties and responsibilities solely to a single authority, that of a sovereign
nation state (Soguk, 1999). As the nation-state exercised its authority over a clearly defined territory, citizenship became bounded with territoriality, establishing the well-known ‘state-territory-people hierarchy’ (Soguk, 1999: 74). Thus, being a member of a nation state or national citizen became the ‘normal’ mode of belonging, an eligible form to engage in the affairs of the polis, and most importantly a preferred mode of subjectivity chosen by the sovereign power to its constituency. It is at this particular juncture that statecraft invented the displaced ‘other’, the ‘refugee’ who represents the inverse image of the citizen, an ‘abnormal’ other, who has been “ejected from the [established] trinity of state-people-territory” (Buckel and Wissel, 2010). The ‘refugee’ meets the exigencies of nation-state to produce an ‘aberrant other’, a de-territorialized “outsider” in relation to whom the identity of the nation and its citizens can be perpetuated” (Haddad 2002: 24). From the expulsion of Huguenots as a result of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes\(^6\) that committed heresy against the sovereign maxim ‘cuius region, eius religio’, to the forced displacement of political exponents and supporters of ancient regime during the revolutionary inauguration of French Republic, the ‘refugee’ has come to symbolize the “pure extraneity”, a stateless body that in a privileged sedentary world is in an incessant process of motion “condensing around itself pure outsiderhood” (Brubaker 1992: 47).

In contemporary context where the mass movement of Muslims toward the European gates has regenerated the ‘migrant/refugee’ issue, the social and functional significance of the modern ‘refugee’ seems not to have changed substantially from the early modern times. Ideas on citizenship and nation-state as the ultimate instance of representation have persisted and “the modern citizen, occupying a bounded territorial community of citizens, is the proper subject of political life”; subsequently, based on this premise the “refugee is defined negatively as one who lacks... a territorial space and so lacks the effective representation and protection of state” (Soguk, 1999: 171). As Agamben (1995: 84) succinctly points out:

“If refugees represent such a disquieting element in the order of the modern nation-state, this is above all because by breaking the continuity between man and citizen,  

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\(^6\) The Revocation of Edict of Nantes refers to an edict (Edict of Fontainbleu, 1985) enacted by Louis XIV of France to suppress the rights of Protestants (in France known as Huguenots) to freely practice their religion. With the new edict, the state officially initiated the prosecution of Protestants by burning their churches and closing their schools. The pogroms led to massive expulsion of Protestants from France who sought protection in neighboring countries (for further details, see Soguk 1999, and Henry M. Baird 2004).
nativité and nationality, they put the original fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis” [emphasis added].

In this regard the Muslim refugee plays a double and paradoxical role within the dynamics of European identity engineering: in one hand, the refugee in his/her Muslim role represents the threatening ‘other’, the disruptive agent and the new site of collective anxieties that authorizes defensive mechanisms in protection of European cultural and historical heritage; on the other hand, refugees’ sufferings and non-sedentary status offer psychological balm for host citizens whose permanent insecurities and fears caused by globalization and economic crisis are relativized when confronted with the marginal and defenseless ‘other’. These two discursively reproduced roles of the refugees will be explained in more details in the next section where we examine the emergence of neo-orientalism as a new mode of orientalizing the Muslim, and in the last section where we deconstruct the refugees’ subjectivity through Agamben’s categories of zoe and bios. However, some insights must be provided here inasmuch they contribute to a better understanding of role of the refugees in forging and stabilizing the European ‘Self’.

It is argued that the role of the refugee as a threat to the European values and way of life is premised on the wide-spread stereotypes that Muslims are inassimilable subjects that not only bring their ‘otherness’ to our borders but also their religious dogmatism which is irreconcilable with what ‘we’ stand, posing a danger of collective alienation and cultural invasion (Wodak et al., 2015). In the case of refugees, these sentiments are more vividly manifested compared to economic immigrants, because the refugee fleeing from war represents the forced migrant who unwillingly has left the native country, and as such does not have any incentive to set foot in the European ‘cultural melting pot’. As Haddad (2002: 24) argues the refugee “has no desire to reinvent or re-imagine a new identity, nor even to totally adopt that of her host state; rather she remembers her home with nostalgia and will act to ensure her ties with her native culture and identity survive”. These qualities make the refugee a problem that needs to be addressed, a site where anxieties about security of borders and surveillance of foreign bodies entering into the territory become more important than the sentimentalisms of humanitarian empathy. Tazzioli (2015) talks about the ‘cartographic anxiety’ a psychosocial condition of contemporary Europeans to make everything visible, to map the flows of illegal migration and to identify routes through which the refugee challenges the sanctity of national borders. Similarly, Papastergiadis (2006: 431) analyses what he calls “the invasion complex”, a collective fear that “creates
a global culture of siege” that both physical and cultural boundaries that demarcate “us” from “them” are being violated. This amalgam of fears and anxieties in turn, serve as a ground for exceptional measures to address the apparent problem; from Farage’s or Orban’s statements that urge to defend “Europe’s Judeo-Christian Culture” and “Europe to be preserved for the Europeans”, to Slovakian Prime Minister decision to refuse Muslim refugees entering the country but welcoming persecuted Christians – the problem is the culturalized ‘Other’ that needs to be observed, controlled and very often (preferably) expelled.

This form of engineering the ‘Other’ in the European discourse is not something of a recent times, nor is emerging as a response to the refugee problem, but rather is a traditional technique of Europeans to exercise power over the inferior and barbaric Muslim. However, since the publication of Said’s ‘Orientalism’, tectonic geopolitical shifts have dramatically changed the configuration of power in International Relations resulting in the resurface of neo-orientalism as a new form of ‘othering’ where the refugee performs the assigned roles.

‘Civilizational threat’ replacing ‘Civilizational mission’: New faces of European orientalism

The French weekly magazine L’Express in one of its editorials released in April 2011, informed the public about the unexpected rise of popularity of the Raspail’s racist novel “The Camp of the Saints” (1973, in French: Le Camp des Saints), ranked in top 5 bestsellers of the year and reaching an audience of over 70,000 new readers in four years (L’Express, 06 April 2011). At the risk of oversimplification, the dystopian book provides an apocalyptic vision of the fall of the West by innumerable boats carrying immigrants from the Indian sub-continent, that in biblical proportions disembark on the southern shores of Europe (France) which stuck on its guilt for the misfortunes of other races, succumbs to the invasion of barbarians and their perversities.

The book was cited by Marie Le Pen and Geert Wilders in their inflammatory

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8 Statement of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in 26th Bálinkyos Summer School and Student Camp (see, http://hungarytoday.hu/news/pm-orban-europe-preserved-europeans-47390)
9 Raspail vocabulary in the book is extensively racist and degrading. He writes about “immigrants’ rivers of sperm” “kinky-hair, swarthy-skinned and long-despised Indians” etc. (see, Shikha Dalmia, The Week, 17 March 2016).
speeches against the “migratory submersion” of the political elites in front of the “tidal waves of refugees flooding Europe”.10

In fact, the gaining popularity of such a nativist and racist novel is quite indicative to the major shift in the European discursive machinery in rearranging and adjusting the ‘Self – Other’ axis in a new discursive order, where the conventional roles of the ‘European’ and the ‘Muslim’ are inversed, rearticulated and reproblematized. In specific terms, we are witnessing a rupture from the Said’s colonialist ‘Orientalism’ toward ‘Neo-orientalism’ of Raspail, which in the recent decades has become the hegemonic regime of ‘orientalizing’ the ‘other’ (Samiei, 2010). The proud that echoed ‘White Man Burden’ is being replaced with the alarming decry of the ‘Islamisation of Europe’, and adventurous stories of Napoleon incursions in Egypt are being eclipsed by literature that foresees the ‘Fall of the West’ or the ‘Decadence of Western Civilization’. The conventional role of the Orientals as “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike” others who lack intellectual and biological capacity to govern themselves that justified the ‘civilizational mission’ of the “rational, virtuous, mature” Europeans (Said, 1978: 48) has given place to a neo-orientalist discourse, which ontologizes the other as a danger, destabilizing agent that pose a existential risk for the Western civilization (Mamdani, 2002). From being an object of European universalist ambitions of civilizing the ‘inferior races’, the ‘other’ in neo-orientalist accounts has become the aggressor, a civilizational threat.

This new form of Orientalism (Neo-Orientalism) is blatantly evident in the rise of the so-called ‘Eurabia’ literature, which is attracting progressively conspiracionist scholars on blaming political establishment and leftist elements in Europe for “dhimmitude”11 - a peaceful acceptance of Islamisation of Europe by denying its Judeo-Christian heritage and silently allowing the demographic ‘genocide’ of Europe through pro-immigration policies (BatYe’or, 2005).12 On the other hand, Tariq-Khan (2012: 1599) talks about the “rise of ideologically motivated scholarship in the fields of security studies, terrorism and homeland security” after

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11 The word dhimmitude is a neologism that etymologically derives from the Arab word dhimmī- “the protected people” referring to non-muslim people living in an Islamic country. The word is used mostly by anti-immigration scholars to refer what they call servitude or submission of Europe to Islamic interests. (see, www.dhimmitude.org).

12 Carr (2006) summarizes the key premise underpinning “Eurabia” fantasies: “Eurabia is a school of conservative opinion... which depicts Europe as a doomed continent, on the brink of cultural extinction in the face of relentless and coordinated campaign of Islamisation”.
terrorist attacks of 9/11 that has led to the “securitization of Muslims” both in its technical meaning of the word as a subject that needs to be under “an intensive surveillance matrix”, and also in political sense through interrogation of the Muslims’ traditions and beliefs in public debates about the Islam (in)compatibility with Western norms and culture. But, what explains the shift from the colonialist ‘Orientalism’ to the defensive ‘Neo-orientalism’? There are two major processes taking place in the world politics that explain the emergence of the ‘Other’ as a threat: the first refers to the unique political and social transformations within Islamic world, and the second to the direct encounter of Islam with the West as a result of global mobility that makes cultural borders both physically and virtually invisible.

The rise of Islam as a ‘threat’ to the civilized world order: From the 1980s onwards, the Middle East has gone substantial social and political changes, which effectively have put Islam at the center of world attention and reproblematized relations between the West and the Islamic world. The Islamic Revolution in Iran that ended the secular pro-Western Shah regime in 1979 was a prelude of what later will become interpreted as an “Islamic resurgence” against the Western world order (Samiei, 2010). The failing attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the emergence and terrorist activities of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda and most recently ISIS, in the Western eyes are normal sequences of Islam’s attempts to remake the liberal-secular world order. Mavelli and Petito (2012: 934) argue that the imagined threat of Islam to the Westphalia secular international system stems from the ‘Enlightenment narrative that has invented a dichotomy between the religious and secular and constructed the former as an irrational and dangerous impulse that must give way in public to rational, secular forms of power’. For example, Huntington (1994: 210) who by all means fulfills the criteria of a neo-orientalist scholar sketches his ‘clash of civilization’ as taking place between the ‘anti-modernist’ Islamic culture of “uniting religion and politics” and the “Western Christian concept of a separate realms of God and Ceaser” - providing a monolithic understanding of modernity, and abstracting the role of religion and tradition in establishing multiple modernities.13 Similarly, there is a general tendency to read terrorism, dictatorships and human rights’ abuses through culturalist lenses, in the sense that these phenomena are

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13 See Katzenstein (2009) where he argues against monolithic examination of civilizations. The main point he makes is that we cannot think of civilizations and modernity in singular, but rather in plural as multiple civilization and corresponding modernities.
increasingly linked to Islam prerogatives that are discursively invoked to make essentialist claims on the sociopolitical dynamics of the Middle East. In this vein, Mamdani (2002) argues that the Western discourse tends to avoid history, geopolitical interests and the complex construction of political identities in the Middle East by reducing everything associated with it to the cultural attributes of its inhabitants. This is most obvious in the Western reactions after failed attempts of “Arab Spring” and the aftermath that followed the fall of autocrats in Libya and Egypt. Ventura (2017) provides empirical insights on the representation of Arab Spring saga in the Western media as a collective failure of Muslims to end tyrannical regimes and embrace freedoms of liberal democracy. This failure has re-confirmed and strengthened the old orientalist stereotypes that the Orient is “fixed in time and place” and even the democratization experiments such as the ‘Arab Spring’ ends in fiasco and humanitarian catastrophe (Amin Khan, 2012).

The “backward” Muslim meets the “civilized” Westerner: In tandem with the emergence of Islam as a threat to the liberal and secular international order, there has been another important encounter of Islam with the West, where the old geographical and cultural boundaries have been blurred and trivialized (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). Specifically, the Muslim that in medieval times was encountered in the adventurous and exotic stories of European travelers, is not anymore a character of storytellers or a distant ‘stranger’ whose bizarre habits or behaviours are objects of European entertainment and narcissism. Now, the Muslim who embodies a multilayered dimension of ‘otherness’ (as a refugee, immigrant, Muslim, socio-economic disprivileged) displays his/her ‘otherness’ in a foreign land, threatening the hierarchy of values and order of the host country (Casanova, 2004). And as such, the Muslim body, beliefs, habits and in general the totality of values that constitutes him/her as a ‘Muslim’ are objects of security interrogations, thorough examination and exhaustive debates in the European public sphere.

Mavelli (2013) talks about the ‘visual securitization of Islam’ in France, that manifests itself through debates on the burqa and hijab, where the image and appearance of Muslim women is ‘securitized’, in the sense that it becomes a symbol of aggression against French laicite. The image of veiled women is ambivalently constructed: at one level she becomes the vivid expression of the Islamic expansion in France; at another level she represents the visible victim of Islamic patriarchy and gender oppression; a marginal object that has to “be rescued from herself and her faith” (Amin Khan 2012: 1601). The Muslim women is rarely given a voice to tell her
preferences, experiences and motives behind her decisions, because as Ventura (2017: 285) concludes the “West is the subject, the one who studies and speaks, and the East is the object, the one who is studied and spoken about”. Similar patterns of ‘orientalizing’ Muslim refugees are discernable especially after sexual assaults in Germany that were used by the German radical right-wing to attack Merkel’s pro-immigration policies. The German government responded swiftly by opening a website for ‘sexual education for immigrants and refugees’ teaching the refugees about “the right way to have sex” (Faiola and Krichner, 2016). The website (www.zanzu.de) uses highly illustrative graphics and images that educate the refugee about the sexual pleasure, different ways of sexual intercourse, the importance of family planning and sexual transmitting diseases. The premise that underpins such governmental measure is that the refugee is sexually uneducated and unaware about the civilized norms that govern sexuality and as such his naiveté and uncivilized sexual behaviors justify the ‘disciplining’ techniques of the state.

However, the negative representation of the Muslim refugee is just the outer expression of an inner discursive structure that makes ‘meaningful’ and ‘commonsensical’ neo-orientalist stereotypes. Mavelli (2013: 165) refers to an ‘already-existing consolidated discursive realm’ to denote to the totality of discursive mechanisms that constructs the refugee as a threatening and aversive ‘other’. Therefore, in the next sections the focus falls on the examination and deconstruction of linguistic and non-linguistic apparatuses that underpin European response toward the refugee ‘crisis.

On the semiotics, representation and biopolitics of refugees

Deconstructing the daily lexicon and media coverage of the refugee ‘crisis’

The post-structuralist approach on its deconstructionist mission relies upon myriad techniques of discursive analysis (signs, symbols, texts, communication) de-essentialize social reality and categories through which this reality is operationalized (Van Dijk, 2001). The most recent development within post-structuralist scholarship has been the emergence of the discursive psychology – a new form of discursive analysis oriented especially on the use of spoken and written language as a discursive mechanism to fabricate a ‘reality’ or make something appear factual through the use of rhetorical devices (Wodak, 2011). One of the main contributions of this novel technique consist on its departure from the conventional psychological cognitive approaches that examine the spoken and written language of the speaker/writer as
“a reflection of their inner thoughts and beliefs”, and instead it proposes the examination of language as a device that tends to inaugurate a reality and/or to reify certain categories (Goodman and Burke, 2010: 2). In other words, discursive psychology is not interested if the act of speech reflects the inner thoughts and beliefs of the speaker/writer, but rather on the performativity that the act of speech has for the social reality and others’ perceptions of it.\footnote{For example, when Geert Wilders claims that “Immigration is the most dangerous thing against the West”, discursive psychology is not interested if this claim comes from the inner beliefs of Wilder about immigration. Rather, it focuses on the intentions behind this speech and finding what kind of ‘action’ Wilders is calling for with such a claim (see, Wodak and Boukala, 2015).} To achieve this objective, discursive psychology exclusively interrogates the syntax of the sentences used to assert a fact or a reality (topos) and elucidates the hidden meanings of metaphors, metonymies, causalities between variables and categorical reasoning produced by the use of language (Goodman et al., 2017). Discursive psychology is mostly applied in the deconstruction of racist language and exclusionary speeches and on the linguistic strategies that legitimize the exclusion/inclusion of a particular group. Therefore, in what follows, this section will focus on the daily vocabulary, figures of speech and categorical reasoning that pervades the representation of the refugees in the European linguistic discourse.

\textit{Deconstructing the “crisis”:} The European citizen is being continuously told to live along the ‘crisis’ in conditions of perpetual emergency and exceptionalism. In Agamben\footnote{Agamben gave this response in an interview for Verso (2013), (for more, see, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1318-the-endless-crisis-as-an-instrument-of-power-in-conversation-with-giorgio-agamben)} words: “The concept of ‘crisis’ has indeed become a motto of modern politics, and for a long time it has been part of normality in any segment of social life”. The ubiquity of ‘crisis’ that pervaded the daily discourse of financial and economic downturn of 2008, is being superimposed by another emergency, traumatic event and untypical situation, that of handling the mass arrival of refugees in the shores and gates of Europe. From media’s headlines to the public speeches of governmental officials or far-right exponents, the word ‘crisis’ always follows after the word ‘refugee’, which for Papastergiadis (2006) represents a discursive technology to signify the recipient of the information about the abnormality of situation and the lack of conventional mechanisms to address the ‘obvious’ problem. Roitman (2013: 4) argues that “once we call a problem a crisis we begin to engage in
a series of logically interconnected steps that unleashes a characteristic pattern of reasoning...[pushing the observer to think] that they are witnessing a fictitious, erroneous or illogical departure from reality'. To put it differently, ‘crisis’ is a discursive device that demarcates the boundaries between the notion of ‘normalcy’ and ‘abnormalcy’, juxtaposing the present (abnormality) with “an alternative and more normal situation” (Roitman, 2013: 4). The ‘abnormality’ of refugees approaching Europe remains intact by the continuous and uninterrupted process of producing ‘facts’ that confirm the seriousness and exceptionalism of the situation. A totality of discursive machinery is erected to serve this function: newspapers’ front pages, journalistic articles, public speeches and institutional communications write about and speak of ‘massive flows of refugees’ arriving in European borders, ‘illegal’ routes that refugees use to bypass borders, escalation and tensions between the refugees and the border police or the anarchy and lack of order in the refugees encampments (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti, 2016).

Other mechanisms such as government bodies specialized in migration and demography engage in statistical analysis to compare the numbers of refugees from one year to another, contrast it with the previous trends, and detect patterns of ‘sudden’ and ‘unexpected’ upcoming ‘waves of refugees’ (Wilson and Mavelli, 2016). All of these multiple discourses tend to sketch the refugee problem as a ‘broken space, a gap that emerges in the [imagined and discursively constructed] harmonious continuity of the social’ (Yilmaz, 2009: 375), and make permissible the use of unconventional measures to neutralize and avoid the evident ‘abnormalcy’. Brassett and Vaughan-Williams (2012) talk about the ‘traumatized subjectivities’ during the times of chaotic and uncontrollable ‘crisis’, that allow the sovereign power to find recourse on exceptional responses or therapeutical interventions to address the causes of ‘trauma’ and restore order and stability. The therapeutic governance of the refugee crisis manifests itself in various ways: The construction of fences in the highly ‘contested’ borderlines as in the case of Hungary, the total ban of refugees based on their religiosity as practiced in Slovakia, or letting the refugees live ‘between the borders’ and bureaucratic limbo as shown in the Greek and Macedonian cases.

*The refugee as a metaphorical figure:* The use of figures of speech in the exclusionary language represents another valuable site of examination for discursive analysis, representing another linguistic device that give *meanings* and shape *cognition* of the social reality (Wodak, 2008). Lakoff and Johnson (1989) on their
seemantic linguistic book ‘Metaphors We Live By’, suggest that the use of metaphors in
communication is not only a matter of how we talk about things or what kind of words
we choose to depict things around us, but rather it represents a linguistic technique
which influences and structures the way we think and make judgments about these
things. In our context, the representation of refugees in metaphorical phrases enframes
what can be said and thought about the refugee, and informs implicitly the social
cognition with the attributes of the subject (refugee) which constitutes the target of the
metaphor. There is a growing interest among linguistics and post-structuralist scholars
to identify metaphors about the refugees found in newspapers, public speeches and
scholarship articles (Musolff, 2012; Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011; Wodak, 2008; Törmä,
2017).

Törmä (2017) identifies two major metaphors used in reporting, talking or
writing about the current refugee ‘crises in Europe. The Water metaphor expressed in
the use of liquid words such as ‘floods, tidal waves, tsunami, floodgates’, and Animal
metaphor that finds expression in the representation of refugees in terms of ‘flocks,
swarms, jungle, parasites’. For example, Bill Cash a British conservative
MP, in one of his
speeches in the House of Commons said: “Germany... [should do more] to help stop the
tsunami of millions of people who could well come over here and swamp Europe” (The
Indepedent, 16 September 2015). The use of ‘tsunami’ and ‘swamp’ as metaphors to
describe the arrival of refugees, evoke emergency and exceptionalism same as in
conditions of ‘natural disasters’ that destroy everything in their path. Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orban made similar associations when claimed that “The wave [of refugees] has reached us now” and that Europe has to stop “migrants to flood us” (as quoted in Cioban, 2016: 33). The repertoire of water metaphors with the refugees on
the target is further exaggerated in media reports and newspapers articles. Daily Mail
(26 June 2015) writes about how the “tidal wave of migrants could be the biggest threat
to Europe since the war”; Herald Sun (26 July 2015) warns that “Labour Party could open
the floodgates on refugees” or BBC (20 June 2015) alarming headlines such as “Migrants
flood trains in desperate bid to leave Italy”. For Parker (2015) the association of
migrants/refugees with the liquidity o
Similar discursive patterns of metaphorical representation of the refugees are found in the use of animalistic words as lexical substitutions for the refugees’ behaviours, living conditions or way of life. While the use of water metaphors forges the image of the refugee as a ‘threat’ that is difficult to contain, the animal metaphors dehumanize refugees and highlight their otherness compared to the non-refugee or the privileged citizen. To use the religious inspired concept of ‘The Great Chain of Being’, the refugee is placed in hierarchical order below the ‘normal’ human because language constructs them as less-than human, lacking “refinement, civility, morality, self-control and cognitive sophistication” (Esses et al., 2013: 522). The most obvious and vivid case is the ‘Calais camp’ most commonly known as the ‘Jungle’ that for two years served as a shelter for more than six thousand refugees and immigrants on their attempt to reach United Kingdom. As Crawley (2016) points out “The name [Jungle] that this place has been given is a symbol of otherness, suggesting a wild, untamed lawless environment in which people roam freely and uncontrolled”. In Agambenian terms, the ‘Jungle’ represents a zone where ‘the state of exception’ unfolds and people living in it establish the zoe, the bare and naked life stripped from any right or privilege of the bios (see next section). Furthermore, as Törmä (2017) argues the ‘Jungle’ becomes a notion not only to refer a particular territory where “anarchy and chaos reign”, but also a metonymy for its inhabitants, that automatically renders them as dangerous, uncivilized - as Residents of the ‘Jungle’. Other dehumanizing metaphors such as Mirror’s attention-grabbing headline “Stunning interactive map shows thousands of migrants flocking to Europe every month...”17, or David Cameron’s controversial remarks that “swarms of refugees are crossing the Mediterranean” further reinforce the pejorative image of the refugee as an abject ‘other’ that lacks individuality and agency but succumbs to the instinctual forces of the masses (‘flock’ or ‘swarm’) to reach the desired destination (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011).

On the categorization of refugees: Edward Said in his seminal book ‘Orientalism’ argues that one the main features of the classical orientalist discourse

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17 This is related to the ‘cartographic anxiety’ that we described in the second section. This anxiety manifests itself in continuous preoccupation to map everything, visualize and identify zones or routes of demographic motion.
is the construction and reification of antagonist categories based on Manichean worldviews of ‘civilized’ versus ‘uncivilized’, or ‘The West’ versus ‘The Orient’. In our contemporary world, especially after the terrorists attacks of 9/11 and the commencement of ‘war on terror’, binary categories of ‘us’ against ‘them’ have regained significance and new patterns of categorization have emerged and consolidated (Salter, 2007). Mamdani (2002) discerns that the increasing association of Islam with terrorism has given place to another discursive differentiation of Muslims in ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’. ‘Good’ Muslims represents the peaceful and law-abiding persons that distance themselves from the violent acts of radical Islam (see, Tony Blair, 2005). On the other hand, ‘bad’ Muslim a are the hijackers of the real Islam, an indoctrinated believer who commits acts of violence and horror in the name of Allah, against the proper interpretation of religious texts (see, George Bush, 2001). Wilson and Mavelli (2016: 6) argue that this narrative of Good/Bad Muslims “has contributed to constructing good Muslims as devoid of agency, as potential victims of...radicalized and politicized views of Islam”. This narrative is being reproduced in the Western approach toward the refugees; the good/genuine/real refugees mostly associated with women, children, or men that have experienced torture or rape, and bad/queue jumpers/bogus asylum seekers that migrate to Europe not to seek protection but to benefit from the welfare payments of European countries (Fiddaín-Qasmiyeh, 2016). For Mamdani (2002: 767) the decisive criteria that governs this categorization is premised on the gendered construction of the ‘genuine’ refugee as a powerless ‘other’ who lacks agency to change her predatory culture and whose “salvation lies as always, in philanthropy, in being saved from the outside”.

Conversely, the bogus refugee challenges his victimhood by exercising agency in the form of ‘illegal’ border passing or actively seeking survival strategies that put into question the axiom that reduces him ontologically to a mere victim (Wilson and Mavelli, 2016).

The same categorization is evident in the media coverage of the ‘crisis’, where the blurred lines that define the differences between the ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ are utilized in framing the refugee ‘crisis’ in a particular direction. For example, Goodman et al., (2017) argue that the use of term ‘refugee’ in media is invoked to describe the deserving category of asylum-seekers that are fleeing their homes because of persecution or extreme warfare conditions. On the other hand, the term ‘migrant’ labels the undeserving category of people that come to Europe
‘voluntarily’ for economic reasons, jeopardizing the welfare and prosperity of the host country. In this regard, the use of these terms is intentional, depending on the image that the media tend to push forward for these people. Greussing et al. (2017), examined the mediatic frames (lenses through which the refugee crisis is interpreted) of different newspapers in Europe and concluded that the media uses different frames to cover the refugee ‘crisis’ (i.e. victimization, criminality, or economization frame). For instance, during the Calais turmoil or sexual assaults in Germany, media relied on criminality frame that associates the refugees with “illegality, terrorism, and crime” (p.3). On other occasions, such as the death of young Aylan in the shores of Turkey, the media ‘activates’ the victimization frame that calls for a humanitarian treatment of the refugees as a moral obligation to the others’ sufferings.

Taken together, the demeaning language of ‘othering’ and media neo-orientalist representation of the refugees constitutes that segment of discursive realm responsible for the ‘normalization’ of differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and provides ‘lenses’ through which the refugee ‘crisis’ has to be conducted (Hurd, 2016). Once the ‘crisis’ is constructed and the figure of the refugee is delineated, the intervention of sovereign power comes into expression. The biopolitics and the entire institutional, administrative and physical mechanisms intervene in the ‘refugee’ problematique aiming to govern and organize the refugee’s life and body.

The Refugee between ‘ZOE’ and ‘BIOS’: The biopolitics and governmentality of the refugee crisis

Agamben’s opus magnum ‘Homo Sacer’ (1994) represents one of the most influential post-modernist contributions in the post-Foucault deconstructionist scholarship. Despite the undisputed influence of Foucault’s concepts (especially biopolitics and governmentality) that are central to Agamben’s political theory, ‘Homo Sacer’ makes an important breakthrough in the re-conceptualization of the relations between bio-power and sovereignty, introducing a rupture from the

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18 The study covers 10,606 newspaper articles in the period from January 2015 to January 2016. Some of the newspapers included in the study were Der Standard, Kronenzeitung, Die Presse, Salzburger Nachrichten etc
19 Economization frame refers to the representation of refugee crisis in economic terms such as ‘refugees are burden to the economy’ or media reporting about ‘welfare frauds by asylum-seekers (see, Greussing et al., 2017

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Foucauldian decentralized conception of power relations. The decisive schism between the two lies in the different readings of how bio-power operates; while Foucault offers a contextualized and contingent interpretation of the biopolitics as emerging at the dawn of Modern Age with the rise of bio-power (understood as a multiplicity of power relations that permeates every level of social interaction) and the decline of sovereign power, Agamben re-introduces a top-down or legal-juridical notion of power, arguing that the sovereign and bio-power are not mutually exclusive, but in contrary, the latter has been historically an instrument of the former (Neal 2004, Erlenbusch 2013). As Agamben (1995: 7) points out: “It can ... be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power”. In other words, for Agamben, the biopolitics does not substitute sovereign power, nor the birth of bio-power is a by-product of modernity as Foucault suggests, but rather these two have ‘originary bond’ that can be traced back to the ancient Greece and Roman times (Agamben, 1995: 15).

Based on these theoretical grounds, Agamben digs in the history of ancient times to elucidate the earliest forms of biopolitics in the Western political tradition and the production of ‘docile bodies’ vulnerable to sovereign intervention. Agamben’s point of departure is that the Western biopolitics operates through exclusion/inclusion of bodies from the political and juridical realm which constitutes “the fundamental categorical pair of Western politics” (1995: 8). A historical archetype of the Western biopolitical activity is found in the Ancient Greece, in the etymological distinction between ‘zoe’ and ‘bios’ - two Greek words that refer to our single word of ‘life’ but which are semantically very different from each other. ‘Zoe’ in the ancient Greece referred to the mere fact of living, a biological existence common to all living beings which Agamben calls “the pure fact of birth”; ‘Bios’ on the other hand, indicated the proper or ‘the qualified life’ of living in polis and participating in the community life of the city which makes human beings distinguishable from animals (Agamben,1995:4).20 This distinction is crucial to understand the inner workings of Western biopolitics because as Agamben argues

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20 It is interesting how Agamben makes an analogy between ‘zoe/bios’ and ‘voice/language’. He argues that ‘voice’ in the Ancient Greece was considered to be a feature of all living beings to express pain and pleasure, but ‘language’ was a unique ability of humans to express what is ‘bad’ and ‘good’, also to make the distinction between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’. The point that Agamben tries to make by using this analogy is to show that same as ‘language’ that needs ‘voice’ to articulate words, the ‘bios’ too needs ‘zoe’ to establish itself as the opposite image of ‘bare life’ (see, Agamben, 1995, p.7-8).
the “Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/ political existence, zoe/bios, exclusion/inclusion” (p.8). Put it differently, the bio-power of the sovereign is exercised through perpetual production of ‘zoe’ or bare life, of those who are excluded from the political realm (bios) and stripped of any political or juridical rights and who can be killed or tortured with impunity (Brasset et al., 2012). The existence of ‘zoe’- unworthy form of life- is both outside the ‘bios’ because of its exclusion, but also inside the ‘bios’ because it is the sovereign power which perpetually problematizes the exclusion, the ‘bare life’, the ‘zoe’ (Agamben, 1995: 11).

Agamben’s unique analysis on the functioning of Western biopolitics has been at the center of post-structuralist scholars who rely on Agamben’s categories of ‘zoe/bios’ to illuminate the inclusionary/exclusionary practices of contemporary Western bio-power but also to interrogate the production of subaltern forms of life and spatialization of violence in the modern nation-state (Papastergiadis, 2006). Specifically, a particular interest has been given to the production of refugees as biopolitical bodies through which the ‘zoe/bios’ dichotomies are reproduced and the “normal liberal citizen-subject is performed into existence” (Brasset et al., 2012: 22). Even Agamben himself considered that the refugees’ body is the most vivid expression of ‘bare life’ who “had lost all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still human” (Agamben, 1995: 81). In our globalized world, the production of ‘zoe’ and ‘bios’ is reflected on the selectivity and contradictions of globalization, in the sense that this phenomenon has produced different global subjects; the globalized subjects who enjoy the privileges of global mobility (capitalists, tourists, bureaucrats, academics) embodying neoliberal values of innovation, consumption, entrepreneurship, and the liminal subjects who represent the the refugee, the sans papiers that being deprived from the privileges of the ‘borderless world’, they inhabit the ‘zoe’- the deportation camp or fall victim of Kafkaesque bureaucratic procedures that construct them as precarious, deportable and temporal bodies (Fassin, 2005). As such, the refugee becomes a site of biopolitical intervention, a marginal and trivialized body that ‘fluctuates’ in illegality without a defined and permanent status and whose life is in permanent state of uncertainty, anxiety and ‘legal limbo’. Speaking in Hobbesian terms, the refugee is not a contractual party of the ‘social contract’ with any sovereign state that would constitute him/her as a citizen with duties and rights, but rather it is a ‘matter out of state’ or a biological being that is denied to participate in the matters of the polis.
(Papastergiadis, 2006). In the actual socioeconomic context that is pervaded by major economic and financial crisis, the precarity and radical alterity of the refugee stabilizes the anxieties and insecurities of inhabitants of the neoliberal polis. As Kristoglou and Tsimouris (2015: 7) argue: “In a climate of insecurity exacerbated by the international financial crisis, and state and non-state terrorism, one person’s perceived security is experienced relative to another person’s precarity”, suggesting that the marginality and the insecure status of the refugees enables the reproduction of neoliberalism and neoliberal subjectivities. The superfluous body of the refugee represents the ‘abjected’ and in the same time the ideal ‘other’ upon which the neoliberal ‘bios’ secures existence throughout its inherent and chronic crisis. But, what are the biopolitical mechanisms used in the production of the refugee as the ‘zoe’ of the contemporary Europe? And, what are the personal experiences of those who encounter such mechanisms?

The ‘biopolitics of otherness’ and the production of ‘bare life’ requires a synchronic operation of multiple policing technologies and administrative apparatuses that materialize in practice the subjugation and containment of the outsiders’ body. Abstractly speaking, the technologies employed in the subjectivation of the refugee can be divided in two major categories: the spatial technologies oriented in the capture, surveillance and ‘quarantining’ of bodies out of the bios in the physical sense, and procedural biopolitical mechanisms that interrogate, scientize and manage the legal status of the ‘foreigners’ through labyrinths of detailed and rigorous bureaucratic procedures (Fassin, 2011; Jeffers, 2012). The former consists on the techniques that aim to spatialise the refugee through mechanisms of surveillance of the borders, sophistication of border checks, routine patrols to capture the san papiers, waiting zones in the airports and most importantly the establishment of detention camps as a site where the refugee is physically secluded from the polis, and is ontologically and practically reduced to a mere biological being. On the other hand, procedural technologies function through daily bureaucracies, interviews, physical and psychological examination of the asylum seekers to (dis)prove the credibility of the refugees’ claims that they fled from prosecution and sufferings (Bendixsen et al., 2016). As Jeffers (2012) argues: refugees become “enmeshed in a bureaucratic performance” where they have to persuade authorities of their persecution and imminent threat in the native country if the asylum application is rejected. Therefore, the refugee has to narrate his/her own story, provide details of the assumed victimhood and show ‘traces’ of physical...
or psychic persecution. In narrating the story the refugees have to speak confidently and without nervousness about their distant past, otherwise a ‘weak performance’ is translated in immediate deportation without any right for appeal (Cabot, 2014). These forms of intimate physical and psychological examinations through the never-ending bureaucracies represent the most sophisticated form of technological intervention that perpetually produces and governs ambiguous, precarious and transitory biopolitical bodies.

Conclusions

The end of Cold War and the beginning of the 21st century has found Europe in crossroad. The cosmopolitan vision of European Union as epitomized by its emblematic motto ‘Unity in Diversity’ is giving place to the ‘revisionist’ decries that urge for ‘Fortress of Europe’. European identity that for more than fifty years embodied values of solidarity and multi-culturalism is being overshadowed by a new specter that urges isolationism, cultural segregation and national purity (Wodak et al., 2015). In fact, the process of redefinition of Europe is neither confined to a marginal segment of political spectrum that calls explicitly for ‘Europe for Europeans’, nor it takes place in a normal economic and political landscape (Wodak et al., 2015). Rather, the reinvention of Europe is indicative for a major paradigmatic shift in European consciousness that surpass the rigidities of political affiliations. Furthermore, Europe is seeking a new identity for itself in an ever-changing and unpredictable international constellation, superimposed by major economic and financial crises that have unleashed new fear, anxieties and traumas (Sassatelli, 2009). This is the context of the European inner dynamics upon which the current refugee drama is orchestrated.

Disciples of Huntingtonian paradigm (i.e. Bowen 2010, Lauraence and Vaisse 2006) that rely on crude essentialism and ahistoricism to interpret current identity dynamics provide a simplistic and reductionist explanations on the identity shifts in the post-Cold War era. According to these accounts, the redefinition of Europe along cultural lines and skepticism toward the cultural ‘Other’ is a normal consequence of the revival of civilizational identities and reconfiguration of international politics along primordialist categories of identification (Yilmaz 2012). Applied in refugee crisis, this approach explains (if not naturalize) the European reluctance to accept refugees in their countries based on the essentialist understanding that European identity and Islamic identity are irreconcilable and stand in perpetual opposition with
each other due to some fixed and transhistorical dispositions or properties that make Islam and the West dichotomous and mutually exclusive ontological categories (Hall, 2007). Instead, this paper calls for a relational/ processual style of analysis that does not conceive identities as ‘sealed’ and static entities with some dispositional characteristics, but rather examines them as discursive practices that are dynamic and in an incessant process of construction and discursive reproduction (Emirbayer, 1997). In our particular case, the refugee problematique has to be contextualized within the dynamic of European identity formation and that the discourse over the refugee ‘crisis’ must be examined as taking place in the “interplay between national fears and anxieties over global processes” (Papastergiadis, 2006:431).

Therefore, this article aimed to argue that the refugee ‘crisis’ has emerged as a decisive event in conditions where Europe was seeking an ‘enemy’ to forge its own culturalist identity. The refugee meets the exigencies of European ‘other’ as the reverse image through which the European ‘Self’ is constructed and reproduced (Kristoglou and Tsimouris, 2015). The refugee as a de-territorialized body becomes a valuable discursive instrument to forge new senses of belonging for Europeans but also it represents the marginal ‘other’ whose suffering relativize the insecurities and anxieties of the European citizen after traumas of economic and financial crisis. The refugee who is synonymous with ‘Muslim’ takes a central position in the discursive exercises of European ‘neo-orientalism’ that replaces expansionist orientalisms of Medieval times with defensive orientalism that constructs the Muslim not as an object that needs to be governed but as a ‘threat’, a ‘danger’ that possess the risk of alienating the Western civilization (Saimei, 2015). These novel forms of ‘orientalizing’ the Muslims manifest themselves in myriad discursive practices, from the daily lexicon used to speak of and write about the refugee, to the categorization of refugees on ‘good and bad refugees’ and ‘bogus and genuine refugees’. The representation of the refugees through demeaning metaphors and metonymies in media reporting but also in public speeches portrays the refugee as ‘natural catastrophe’ or inhumane being that is more instinctual than rational (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011). Ultimately, the refugee becomes a ‘docile body’, a venue of biopolitical interventions where different technologies (bureaucracies, camps of detention, permanent surveillance and control) produce the refugee as inhabitant of ‘zoe’ of bare and naked life, who is expelled from the matters of polis and is ontologically reduced to a mere living being that fluctuates in a permanent state of ambiguity, precariousness and unpredictability.
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FOCUS: HUMANITARIANISM AND BORDERS

A Critique of the Humanitarian (B)order of Things

Antonio De LAURI

Abstract. The reification of humanitarian borders generates a politics of crisis that weakens the capacity to produce structural political changes and legitimizes exceptionalism and the reproduction of hierarchized borders. In this article, I argue that a critique of crisis implies the possibility of thinking about migration beyond the limits of humanitarian borders, therefore locating debates about political action and change within the realm of ordinary politics rather than that of emergency and exceptionalism. In contemporary Europe, a critique of crisis is a critique of power. It is thus a way to develop a political vision of borders and mobility beyond the humanitarian order of things.

Keywords: humanitarianism, borders, critique, crisis, political change, exceptionalism, ordinary politics, rescue

What is a crisis of borders? What forces does it enhance? And what is the role of a critique of crisis? Informed by these questions, this article discusses the notion of humanitarian borders as a dominant discourse used to read contemporary mass mobility through the language of emergency. In contrast to such a discourse, I maintain that a critique of crisis should argue for a political disconnection of mobility from hegemonic narratives of crisis and emergency. Indeed, the connection of migration and mobility with humanitarianism shows historical continuities with the hierarchization of borders and populations on the move. The rise of modern humanitarianism is closely linked to the abolitionist consciousness developed in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries (Abruzzo 2011; Ribi Forclaz 2015), which partly consisted of delegitimizing the slave trade (Bass 1989 [2009]; Stamatov 2013). Today that humanitarianism is largely implemented on and between borders, its raison d’etre remains consistent with modern (anti)slavery discourses. Although humanitarian interventions in refugee camps, rescue practices along the coasts, and the management of migrant “waiting zones” are distinct from the nineteenth-
century claims for the rights of slaves, the focus of humanitarian action remains tied to a victim-centered approach as the core of a complex infrastructure of professionalized and institutionalized practices of aid. We know that humanitarian actions cannot be reduced to the relationship between giver and receiver, but we also know that there is a structural and inevitable correspondence between the figures of helpless victims and their humanitarian counterparts. When combined with border control, it happens in many parts of the world today, the victim-centered approach, instead of enhancing comprehensive political and juridical instruments for legal protection and freedom of movement, inspires and legitimizes a hierarchical stratification of mobility, according to which a small number of “deserving victims” (such as trafficked persons or refugees) are strategically separated from the masses who remain undeserving in their claims for rights and freedom (O’Connell Davidson 2010). One further step in the management of mobility sees the politics of selection and distinction applying, for example, to groups of refugees themselves wherein only certain categories (sick children, women, those who have suffered torture, etc.) are eligible for asylum (Mavelli 2017).

Borders represent a major concern for humanitarian action, whether concerning the disputes and conflicts they generate or simply the mobility of vulnerable people who have to cross them. Yet humanitarian and border studies have traditionally represented distinct fields of inquiry. The literature that directly focuses on and emphasizes the growing overlap of humanitarian intervention with the management of borders is relatively recent, although it is also lively and cross-disciplinary (see, for example, De Genova 2017a; Campesi 2015; Walters 2010; Williams 2015).

This expanding field of research is predominantly marked by a critical approach, at times based on ethnographic methodology that focuses on securitarian regimes, the business of bordering, the temporary extension of crisis, the merging of humanitarian action and policing, and states’ politics of confinement, conservation, and rejection. This article aims to discuss the role that such critiques can play in the context of humanitarian borders. The core of the discussion in not new per se, as humanitarianism has always been characterized by the tension between criticism and the need “to do something.” However, I believe that, given the current scenario where humanitarian crises are proliferating globally, critique can contribute to overcoming the “humanitarian approach” in the management of borders as well as supporting ordinary politics to promote the emergence of different political
subjectivities. Humanitarianism creates new geographies with their specific limits, and through its “humanitarization” of borders—that is, the process through which borders are redefined as spaces of humanitarian crisis and emergency—it has the consequence of obscuring crucial issues of ordinary politics and political action. From this perspective, I envision critique not merely as a counter-discourse but as a form of creative action that can inform our imagination with a different order of things. To support the necessity of a nonhumanitarian understanding of mobility and borders, I build on the notions of ordinary politics, political action, and political change. Invoking ordinary politics here recalls the Gramscian idea of actualizing the possibility for all people to fully express their political personality (Gramsci 1975).

Although I have argued elsewhere (De Lauri 2016) that normalization rather than exceptionalism is the main feature of humanitarian military operations, the current humanitarian management of borders in Europe is protracting situations of exceptionality and thus inhibiting the possibility of political action through the practice of “ordinary politics.” The effect of this protraction is to normalize border crises, usually accentuated by a politics of urgency. Suffocated by the imperatives of crisis, emergency, and declared neutrality, the very idea of political change is anesthetized in favor of humanitarian goals. This provides the opportunity for right-wing, xenophobic, and populist political parties (such as those in Italy and Hungary) to merge their rejectionist policies with ideas of risk, danger, and protection, as defined by the grammar of emergency. I maintain that a shift from humanitarian goals to political change is essential if we want to address the structural causes that produce and exacerbate human suffering for people on the move. Following Antonio Gramsci’s (1967, 1975) emphasis on politics as the expression of a distinctive political will, I see “ordinary politics” as the sphere of action in which different political subjectivities mobilize and advance their demands for change (even radical change). In contrast to ordinary politics, the humanitarian order of things enables contingent forces to be mobilized by political actors who are hidden behind the veil of emergency and crisis.

Borders in crisis

Borders are social institutions (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) and legal constructions characterized by contested instances of producing and policing territorial integrity (Reeves 2014). As noted by Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan
borders have become a master narrative in public cultures. Borders have canalized the imagination of populations across the world and function as a grand motif in everyday life, everywhere. Critical events and ongoing challenges brought on by increasing regional conflicts, the war on terror, and the new security, environmental, health, and economic problems of world populations on the move all indicate that the related notion of “violent borders” (Jones 2016) remains a major concern for both scholars and policy makers.

Throughout global history, ideologies of protection (of cities, empires, nations) have often translated into the factual construction of border walls and fences, a phenomenon of particular relevance nowadays. At least seventy countries, up from fifteen in 1989, now have border walls or barriers, and these obstructions are springing up at an unprecedented rate. Over 60,000 people have died and far more have been detained while attempting to cross a border in the past two decades (Jones et al. 2017). This is a direct consequence of states expanding the reach of their security and detention practices and attempting to intercept or capture border crossers or intentionally make their journeys more perilous. The global multiplication of border barriers and the intense activity of policing borders (Fassin 2011) are responses to both security claims and humanitarian emergencies. Contemporary walls and fences, notwithstanding the political, geographical, and cultural diversity in which they are inscribed, reproduce a transversal historical feature, that of substantializing political power and, at the same time, protecting its territorial domain. Yet these barriers also stage political performances in a new theater in sovereignty struggles.

Migration, organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, political movements—all subject to the materiality of walls—are today inscribed in a post-Westphalian world in which forms of sovereignty and governance are contested by state and nonstate political, economic, and humanitarian actors. In their declared political intentions and purposes, walls are the factual, material response to the quest for collective protection in a world perceived as destabilized and “under threat.” Through a chemical metaphor, we could argue that the wall is the solidification of the liquid idea of protection, which ranges from geopolitics to biopolitics. Indeed, spatial and territorial control is not the only task ascribed to border barriers, since they also function to discipline populations and extend biopolitical governance to the everyday lives of citizens. The wall is thus a technique of power aimed at governing borders that are differently performed by a plurality of social actors. Of course,
nation-states’ exercise of force over the legitimate means of movement does not target all people on the move (Sharma 2017), only those groups categorized according to certain dominant ideas of national identity, religion, gender, and class.

A world without borders has represented the mantra of globalization proponents, whether they be large corporations or humanitarian organizations. And yet the proliferation of walls and fences is not in conflict with borderless discourses and globalized flows. Rather, they demarcate the “fault lines of globalization” (Ritaine 2009), being built both against and along these discourses and flows. Walls and fences exacerbate inequality and symbolize the affirmation of a privileged few who actually live the promise of globalization and defend its privileges through teichopolitics, the politics of building barriers (Rosiere and Jones 2012). At the same time, as objects that reveal contested instances of power and sovereignty, border walls are shaped by domopolitics (Walters 2004): they are physical limits through which notions of home and protection materialize. In the framework of crisis, not only engineered but also natural physical borders (such as a desert or sea) become instruments of “dissuasion and patrol” (Albahari 2006) that allow for instances of separation and privilege (between those who can and those who cannot cross a border).

The crisis of borders in the so-called Western democracies has exploded into the public domain due to their inability to control the flows of migrants and refugees or to stop terrorists. In addition to exacerbating security policies, the crisis has ideologically and politically justified the affirmation of humanitarian borders as zones where practices of aid and rescue have merged with policing and rejection. The 2015 “migration reception crisis,” for example, did not simply made explicit the dysfunctionality of Europe’s asylum system and its broader architecture (Hampshire 2015); it also made evident how, through the narrative of “rescue,” interdiction was laundered into an ethically sustainable strategy of border governance (Moreno‐Lax 2018) by combining the securitization and humanitarization of borders. On the ground, migrant safety continues to be undermined by policies that further securitize and militarize borders (Williams 2016).

We owe the convincing definition of the humanitarian border to William Walters (2010), who explained that the idea of a humanitarian border might at first sound oxymoronic. Contemporary humanitarianism is often described as a force that, in the name of an endangered humanity, transcends the walled space of both national and international systems. However, it would be misleading, Walters suggests, to draw any simple equation between humanitarian projects and the logic of
deterritorialization. While humanitarian interventions might stress certain norms of statehood, the exercise of humanitarian power is intrinsically connected to the production of new spaces. By redefining certain territories as “humanitarian zones,” humanitarianism actualizes a new geography of spaces, which materializes in various situations—in conflict areas, in regions affected by famine, in the context of failed or fragile states, or in situations where the actual borders of states and gateways to national territories become zones of humanitarian government (Walters 2010: 139). This is the case with many borders today in Europe, the United States, the Middle East, Australia, and Africa. In Europe, for instance, the multiplication of border barriers, detention centers, and shelters, on the one hand, and, on the other, the intensification of border patrols, maritime control, and deportations signal a new step in European border history: the humanitarization of European borders as zones affected by severe crisis.

Traditionally, border control has been implemented with the mandate of maintaining state sovereignty over exclusive territorial spaces through the regulation of who and what can move across state borders, that is, into and out of exclusive state territory. To this aim, border control has authorized practices that range from violence embodied in the restriction and denial of movement to physical force embodied in the work of the border police (Pallister-Wilkins 2017). With the rise of humanitarian borders, the politics of bordering have increasingly overlapped with practices of confinement (helping refugees and migrants in their “home countries”). As a consequence, the externalization of European borders and policies of rejection have been framed as actions of compassionate control and as a response to crisis and insecurity. Patrolling coasts, expanding the reach of immigrant reception centers, or fencing territories have thus become humanitarian reactions to migrant and refugee emergencies and, by extension, to border crises. Today, the reciprocal relationship between humanitarian search-and-rescue operations and state-sovereign performances on European borders reproduces, on European territory, a dynamic that humanitarian militarism around the world has best embodied for decades: the overlapping of rescue and global policing (De Lauri 2019). Despite the diversity of geographical, historical, and cultural contexts characterizing today’s humanitarian borders globally, it is possible to discern the emergence of a transnational discourse of compassionate border security that fuses the humanitarian impetus with policing and militarization, reshaping traditional territorially based understandings of borders (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017).
The power of crisis

One thing that is often inadequately discussed in public discourses about the control of mobility and the humanitarization of borders is that crisis is good business for the governmental, international, and private actors that provide security infrastructures and personnel. The technological, bureaucratic, and policing apparatuses mobilized by security regimes have produced a major growth industry today. While the enforcement and supply of security measures have always been understood as one of the exclusive functions of the nation-state, a more recent security turn has triggered a process of internationalizing and privatizing security (Deitelhoff 2009). Rather than marginalizing the state, however, this process has accompanied the re-emergence of nation-state ideologies as an integral part of the globalizing effects of securitization (De Lauri 2019).

The more crises we are exposed to, the more complex securitarian architectures are provided by state, international, and private actors. What Tine Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) call the “emergency trap” refers to the capacity of international organizations to use emergency powers that feed the securitization–exceptionalism nexus. The emergency trap continuously expands the space for security needs and plays a crucial role in shaping the way insecurity is collectively perceived.

Crisis, on the other hand, constitutes the lifeblood of the humanitarian system itself. Arguably, there is no humanitarianism without crisis. Studies of illegality have shown that when border barriers are used as infrastructures to combat criminal organizations, they do not reduce illegal trafficking. On the contrary, illegal flows are connected to the business of bordering (Van Schendel and Abraham 2005). Anthropological research on the US-Mexico border, for example, has largely addressed the political economy of borders and the link between global capitalism and states’ production of borders (Alvarez 1995; De León 2015; Lugo 2008). The explosion of crises, therefore, always corresponds to the fortification of some forms of power.

To explore the meaning, legitimization, and power entailed in representing the refugee crisis in Europe, anthropologists Seth Holmes and Heide Castañeda (2016) suggest returning to Antonio Gramsci’s notion of a “war of position.” As both a continuation and a contrast with the concept of a “war of manoeuvre,” the war of
position is defined by the struggle over symbols that legitimize and shape political-economic structures. Boats of refugees in the sea, human flows across borders, and refugee centers in collapse are all framed and experienced as part of a humanitarian crisis. These are moments in “the war of position and war of manoeuver when hegemony and the architecture of a social world are at stake,” with upcoming “structural and symbolic realities unknown” (2016: 13). Holmes and Castañeda argue that Gramsci himself consistently conceived of crisis “as a moment of openness in which ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born’” (2016: 13).

For Gramsci (1967, 1975), the future is a political product, the effect of an actualized political will that is able to transform the social environment. To accelerate and shape the future, there are two different possibilities. The first one corresponds to the capacity to extend such a political will to the number of people needed to make that political will productive, a quantitative form of progress. The second possibility is qualitative progress, which refers to the capacity to intensify the political will within an existing minority until it reaches the equation $1 = 1,000,000$ (Gramsci 1967: 55).

In the current European context, characterized by multiple discourses over immigration, hospitality, hostility, and rejection, humanitarianism manages to produce both quantitative and qualitative progress. That is to say, it is able to accelerate and shape the future through a progressive humanitarization of a world to come. This process concretely translates into the bureaucratization of aid (Dunn 2012), the professionalization of solidarity (Olesen 2008), the stratification and hierarchization of victimhood and, in this specific case, the reproduction of the crisis of borders. Clearly, border crises in the European context did not begin with and are not limited to recent migration and refugee flows. Tensions between nation-states in the eastern part of Europe (for instance, between Ukraine and Russia) and ongoing territorial disputes (for example, over Gibraltar) indicate that the stability of the nation-state notwithstanding, “the issue of bordering, of ordering territory, is still fraught with fragility and contention” (Hess and Kasparek 2017: 58). However, the humanitarian crisis of borders transcends the realm of territorial control to enhance a mode of governance that extends to the entire life trajectory of multitudes of people. Consistent with European Union migration policies, the humanitarization of borders reiterates the vision of the “irregular” migrant as both a life that needs

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1 The book is a collection of Gramsci’s political writings that appeared mostly during the period 1914–1921 in Avanti, La città futura, Il grido del popolo, L’ordine nuovo.
protection and a security threat to protect from (Vaughan-Williams 2015). Transformed into a humanitarian crisis, the violence on borders does not appear as an instrument of exclusion but, rather, as a response to emergency. The exacerbation of security and control therefore becomes acceptable and legitimate in the public discourse through its humanitarian reconfiguration. The multilevel humanitarian response to crisis does not implement or support violent means of control per se. However, by enabling forces of contingency, humanitarizing borders turns violence into a “zone of protection.” The violent control at borders becomes acceptable because of the emergency that needs humanitarian responses. In the Mediterranean “hotspots,” we see today two apparently different narratives and forms of action: state policing, control, and rejection, on the one hand, and rescue and assistance provided by humanitarian organizations, on the other. What has been recently called the “Black Mediterranean” to describe the history of racial subordination in the Mediterranean region pushes us to situate the contemporary migrant and refugee crisis in the context of Europe’s history of empire, colonialism, and transatlantic slavery (Danewid 2017: 1679), thus reconnecting historical forms of humanitarian assistance with the construction of a specifically European form of border governance.

Of course, even if today’s humanitarian goals at the border contribute to inequality, we might be inclined to distinguish between actors and activism—not least to avoid blaming all humanitarians for contributing to exclusion and death. However, although this distinction is worthwhile and evokes a different ethos embodied by state actors and humanitarian organizations, border policing and humanitarian rescue belong to the same episteme to the extent that they take place within a humanitarian space governed by exceptionalism and emergency. It is in the framework of this contingent geography of crisis that we can understand how regimes of protection are affirmed and how the freedom of movement is dismantled. In short, Europe is currently being walled up. One of the most notorious examples is Hungary, where, in July 2015, its president announced the construction of a four-meter-high fence along its border with Serbia to prevent refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan from “trespassing” across Hungarian national borders. Consistent with this approach, the Hungarian parliament approved a controversial law enabling all asylum seekers in the country to be detained in “transit areas” (camps) and forced back into neighboring Serbia. As of June 2016, nearly 146 kilometers of the planned 166 kilometers of the barrier had been constructed on the border between Bulgaria
and Turkey as a response to increased migrant flows (De Lauri 2018). Elsewhere, regimes of border control in various countries are displacing migrants caught between different borders. As a result of the large number of migrants and asylum seekers traveling across its land borders in the past few years, Greece has increasingly fortified and militarized its border with Turkey—including the areas affected by landmines hidden from earlier conflicts. This process has led to the displacement of thousands of migrants between the Turkish-Greek and the Bulgarian-Turkish borders. The new politics of fencing today finds its legal and political justification in the framework of FRONTEX, the agency tasked with border control for the European Union.

In our globalized world, freedom of movement is still a mirage, especially for migrants left with no more than their labor force to sell in the capitalist transnational market. Paradoxically (although not surprisingly), the entire architecture of border control in Europe has been rationalized and justified as an effort to “protect” migrants and refugees. In the process, much was gleaned from earlier humanitarian efforts to fight human trafficking and regulate human mobility. Within the new geography of emergency and crisis, a powerful regime has been put in place, one that legitimizes a wide array of actions to keep mobility under control (Sharma 2017). The criminalization of migrants and the consequent reproduction of a vulnerable labor force to be used in host countries (De Giorgi 2010) are relevant in this picture. As much as humanitarian interventions across the globe have been often accompanied by neoliberal projects of economic and political expansion (De Lauri 2016), the humanitarization of the border crisis coherently responds to and shapes new economic and political challenges in Europe.

To describe something as a humanitarian crisis implies facilitating specific forms of action but disallowing others, enabling the public to think about a specific issue in one way but not in another (Scott-Smith 2016). Moreover, once a crisis is qualified in specific terms (that is, as a humanitarian crisis), it directly calls for a specific power to manage and administer it. In opposition to a historical narration that is “disrupted and episodic” (Gramsci 1975), the humanitarization of borders in crisis is a universal salvific narrative that creates a constant nexus between human suffering and the need for humanitarian exceptionalism. This exceptionalism in managing borders translates into exaggerated security practices and consolidates the hierarchization of borders as something “natural”—thus normalizing the political and social scrutiny of those who can and those who cannot cross a border. At the
same time, the humanitarian border transforms the social and legal status of border crossers by enhancing mechanisms that reproduce victimhood and perpetuate categories of people eternally in need of help. Since 2015, the invocation of tragedy, and thus the question of crisis, has served as an ordering principle to reinforce the fortification of various forms of border policing (De Genova 2017a). One main feature of such a humanitarian strategy at the mercy of state political actors is the polarization between “irregular migrants” and innocent victims. In this context, policing (to reject “irregular migrants”) and piety (to help victims), violence (deportation, confinement), and promise (help “them” at “home” and welcome those “who are really in need”) become components of a humanitarian framework that is founded in crisis itself.

A critique of crisis

Due to its propensity to feed and reproduce power, crisis should be constantly subject to critique. Didier Fassin (2017) has recently emphasized that critique is under attack both in academic circles and public fora. By drafting a genealogy of critique, Dario Gentili (2016) has noted that to be questioned and challenged today is not critique as a modality of judgment. On the contrary, what we see today is a diffused criticism, enhanced by new media and new technologies and conditioned by the neoliberal market. It is the figure of the intellectual and the act of political critique that are increasingly marginalized. The proliferation of crises should solicit a reinvigorated critique as both a political act and a “process of social ferment” (Koselleck 1988).

Elsewhere, I have pointed out the distinction between criticism and critique (De Lauri 2016). Wendy Brown (2009) has reminded us that critique has been distinguished from criticism for much of modernity, especially for Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, who distanced themselves from “criticasters,” and “critical critics,” respectively. Even though the fact remains that critique seems to intrinsically

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2 Many political leaders use such a categorization to distinguish between deserving migrants and undeserving others. For instance, Tomáš Zdechovský, a member of the Czech center-right European People’s Party, said, “I was surprised these people were not refugees. It was revealed during the special procedure when they gave their true purposes away. We should help people who really need it, like those escaping from Syria, and let the other ones know the EU has the right to choose.” See https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/refugees-or-migrants-the-eu-grapples-with-definitions/.

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replicate a tacit presumption of reason’s capacity to unveil errors (Brown 2009), I would argue that the distinction between criticism and critique is based on a further difference: criticism is a way of simply reiterating a counterdiscourse, while critique is stimulated by a generative force. For the same reason, critique should not be confused with skepticism, which “involves suspension of belief in something,” or with radical epistemological skepticism, which “involves an attempted—or affected—suspension of belief in everything” (Sayer 2009: 770). With its inclination to remain bonded to the order produced by the subject being criticized, criticism serves to reproduce power, insofar as a certain level of criticism is what makes a hierarchical order legitimate. If criticism were not allowed, this order would appear to be totalitarian as a matter of course. Critique, in contrast, produces new ways of reimagining the world. This generative force makes critique, rather than metaphistorical, fully immersed in the time to which it belongs. I understand this form of critique as the result of the intellectual engagement of a critical mass of people with specific public concerns, for example, mobility and borders. Here, critique is a modality of imagining the world in other ways. Critique itself seems to carry a utopian quality—and thus a certain level of dependence on ideology and an intrinsic impossibility of being “disinterested” (Wallerstein 2006). By extending the reflections of João Biehl and Ramah McKay (2012), it is possible to argue that critique is a means of repopulating the public imagination. Hence, it is linked to public consciousness and is required for animating any moral and political dialectic.

Although today we see growing criticism targeting the management of borders and the treatment accorded to border crossers, such criticism remains tied to the discursive domain of humanitarian borders. An example is the discourse that we should protect migrants but also control them; we should help them, but only at their “home.” Criticism solicits contrasting feelings of pity and fear and reproduces the dominant refrain of humanitarian crisis. Arguments of innocence (e.g., the innocence of those who die at sea) and compassion (generated by agonizing images of border crossers) are thus used to legitimize humanitarian exceptionalism and a contingent politics of suffering. By contrast, critique points to the legal and political structural changes required to create the conditions to ensure the rights and freedom of populations on the move and identifies them beyond humanitarian borders. As Miriam Ticktin (2016) has put it, to argue against humanitarian borders is not to claim that there is no place for emotion in the face of suffering and death. Rather, it is to create space for an “affective politics” (2016: 268) that supports
different projects of equality and fits with different political visions. A critique of crisis is an invitation to move beyond humanitarian borders, to move beyond emergency.

Freedom of movement and the protection of border crossers are not actually humanitarian problems: they are political imperatives, issues that belong to the realm of politics rather than humanitarian emergency. The capacity of crisis to push freedom and protection outside the sphere of ordinary politics into the realm of humanitarian exceptionalism generates conditions that suspend the political democratic project and neutralize durable political efforts. The scope of a critique of crisis thus substantially overlaps with a “critique of power” (Saar 2010) as an endeavor opposed to both “neutral control” and hierarchical categorization. Such a critique presupposes an idea of mobility as a political project of equality. Although this final intention might be shared by many humanitarian actors engaged in rescue and assistance operations across borders, the way humanitarian emergency frames the issue of mobility and migration produces opposite effects (e.g., processes that frame some border crossers as victims and others as criminals).

From humanitarianism to political change

In 1914, Antonio Gramsci recognized the gravity of the political and military situation in Europe, noting that the consequences of that historical moment would be severe and dramatic for the future of humanity. A proper political response, he emphasized, could not take the “comfortable position of absolute neutrality” (Gramsci 1967: 9). Europe has changed since then, and it would be misleading to construe that historical narrative as a mirror of today’s challenges. What is still meaningful, though, is Gramsci’s concerns over neutrality.

Given the relevance of hidden “power agendas,” the politics of humanitarian negotiation, and the broader sphere of humanitarian diplomacy to provide access to certain forms of aid and assistance, humanitarian neutrality has long been questioned. Yet it continues to be a key principle of the contemporary public humanitarian domain—despite a certain degree of difference in terms of how it is interpreted and practiced by different humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It has been argued that, in the context of contemporary migration flows, aid organizations find themselves at a crossroads: they can “hold onto neutrality and impartiality, or they can question these principles entirely”
(Scott-Smith 2016: 17). But overall, neutrality, along with humanity, impartiality, and independence, still provides the foundations for humanitarian action. Such a “presumed neutrality” obfuscates the very notion of political will or political intention. An increasing number of NGOs and humanitarian practitioners consider neutrality to be marginal (at times, even counterproductive) when compared to the main challenge to “leave no one behind” and guarantee access to aid, but there is still a gap between public policy and concrete strategies of humanitarian practice. As a result of this tacit political attitude, humanitarianism provides some political actors (e.g., right-wing political parties in Italy) with fertile ground to implement emergency politics and avoid debates over structural political changes—thus perpetrating the conditions for the longue durée of nondurable solutions. Indeed, the action required to address issues such as the rights of migrants and freedom of movement is not a (presumed) neutral humanitarian action but an explicitly political kind. In a democratic context, political action is part of the ordinary democratic process. Humanitarian action, on the contrary, is not intrinsically democratic: it is intended to solve an immediate emergency and, by its own nature, is extraordinary and contingent. The expansion of contingency to the realm of ordinary politics is what normalizes emergency and the use of force.

The contemporary humanitarian machinery constitutes a coherent strategic framework (Duffield 2001) that integrates different elements such as aid apparatuses, diplomacy, private investment, and military force into a single functional role. Humanitarianism is not merely a substitute for explicit political action and political projects; it is also the expression of the historical persistence of a salvation philosophy that “becomes an industry pretending to be free of political self-interest” (Nader and Savinar 2016: 53). A critique of crisis and humanitarian borders, I believe, corresponds to the effort of thinking politically beyond the appearance of the humanitarian order of things. It is a way to relocate ordinary politics—rather than exceptionalism—at the core of our understanding of political action and change.

Against this background, I envision ordinary politics as an avenue to counter the humanitarization of borders and all that accompanies it. Invoking ordinary politics should not be taken as a suggestion to imagine the realm of politics as an apologetic space in which doing good is the rule and the political dialectic goes smoothly. Nor do ordinary politics exclusively refer to state politics. Rather, I summon the concept of ordinary politics to refer to the democratic exercise and
ongoing confrontation of hegemonic political power, which is, by definition, subject to critique. In fact, the notion of ordinary politics covers a rich spectrum of political activities, ranging from demonstrations to political party initiatives, from grassroots activities to local governance, from institutional action to spontaneous forms of public engagement. I contrast this idea of ordinary politics with humanitarianism as the politics of protracted emergency in which political change is substituted with a neutral administration of contingency.

Political change is notoriously not univocal (Werlin and Eckstein 1990). My focus on political change stresses the need to imagine an alternative to humanitarization by creating the space for different political subjectivities to emerge in the realm of ordinary politics. It is also worth clarifying that political change does not necessarily result into a more just and equal world. Indeed, it would not necessarily lead to open borders. Nevertheless, it is in the realm of politics that different actors can claim their rights—beyond their temporary humanitarian protection. Asylum seekers and migrants “embody a quest for liberty, rather than for help. They demand rights, rather than permissions” (Albahari 2015: 2). It is in the arena of political struggle that migrants and refugees can claim freedom of movement and their social and political rights, not in the limbo of their exceptional and protracted humanitarian victimhood. Following a critique of crisis, the space of political change is revealed to be the space of “conscious action” (Gramsci 1967), of declared political projects.

For Gramsci (1975), the possibility of political action arises from critical awareness and historical consciousness. This is an aspect of crucial relevance to the current European context. The historical narrative produced by discourses of humanitarian crises transforms migrants’ political subjectivity into the mere expression of their basic needs. When not considered as social threats (e.g. “irregular migrants”), border crossers are depicted as voiceless victims, therefore reinforcing the “individualizing effects” (Kallius 2016) of the current governance of mobility. At the same time, the narrative of crisis fosters the image of the migrant as a radical Other. As Holmes and Castañeda (2016) have noted, Europe has been caught between two simultaneous responses: hospitality versus xenophobia, compassionate pragmatism versus fear of (cultural and religious) difference. Although mostly neglected in mainstream media and humanitarian propaganda, a racial mechanism of repulsion still underlies attitudes in today’s Europe (De Genova 2017b).
Humanitarian borders reflect the political and conceptual shift away from legal borders and portray policing operations as articulations of a politics of compassion and repatriation. The merging of humanitarian search-and-rescue operations with state-sovereign performances on European borders is the counterpoint to the complex architecture of confinement in the Middle East and Africa (“helping migrants where they are”). Rejection and restraint, in this perspective, mutually serve the main function of keeping migrants and refugees in their “home countries” while reframing the geographical substance and the political extension of borders. The critique of humanitarian borders informs a political history of the present that aims to detach mobility from the hegemonic narration of crisis, perpetual victimhood, and radical otherness. It is against the backdrop of critique, I argue, that the space for political participation and political change emerges.

Conclusion

The humanitarization of borders has introduced new dichotomies into the domain of mobility and borders management, such as rescue/policing, crisis/need, victim/criminal, and emergency/control. These dichotomies, however, do not simply function as a politics of the oxymoron. Rather, they structure a governance of borders in which radicalized security regimes and hierarchies of mobility are both nourished by compassionate humanitarian goals. I have suggested that to open the space for political action and change, we need to move beyond the constraints of humanitarian crisis. This implies the possibility of recognizing multiple political subjectivities in the realm of ordinary politics rather than humanitarian exceptionalism.

Historically, borders have reflected the state’s order of things. In contemporary Europe, frontiers between national territories also reflect a humanitarian (b)order of things governed by imperatives of crisis and contingency. The role of the state is not diminishing, as some would argue, but is reinforced in the framework of humanitarian crisis. The force and violence that the state is able to exercise on its borders are increasing as a legitimatized reaction to crisis. In response, the critique of crisis represents an instance of political action that aims to rethink borders outside of the humanitarian domain—thus delegitimizing violent borders. The critique of humanitarian borders does not translate into the absence of an empathetic vision of human suffering. Quite the contrary: critique questions a vision
of suffering that justifies the reproduction of victimhood, and it echoes the emergence of the diverse political subjectivities that borders crossers experience and strive to express.

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ESSAY

National Identity and Transylvanian Cultural Interferences in the 19th Century

Carmen BODIU

Abstract. Lucian Drimba, acknowledged as a literary historian and critic through his research on the Transylvanian cultural phenomenon, in the second half of the 19th century and the beginnings of the Romanian theater, remains a landmark for making known Iosif Vulcan’s works. His impressive activity, conducted by the editor of “Familia” newspaper, recognized by his exegetes by its complexity and diversity, is presented by literary historian and critic Lucian Drimba both during the volumes of both his works and in the scientific papers published in the annals of the University of Oradea, as well as articles published in various periodicals and specialty journals. In the context of the Transylvanian scholar’s concerns, the activity of the Kisfaludy Organization is appreciated by the literary historian and critic as a particularly important one by recognizing Iosif Vulcan’s merits on the field of culture as a defender of the national cultural identity and the initiator of the cultural interferences between the Romanians and Hungarians, mediated by his activity as a translator. Lucian Drimba’s research, as a literary historian and critic, has the value not only to evoke the complex personality of the cultured person, Iosif Vulcan, but also to restore a complete, faithful and concrete picture of the Transylvanian cultural phenomenon in the second half of the 19th century.

Keywords: literary historian, national identity, culture, activity, people, works

Lucian Drimba, acknowledged as a literary historian and critic through his research on the Transylvanian cultural phenomenon, in the second half of the 19th century and the beginnings of the Romanian theater, remains a landmark for making known Iosif Vulcan’s works. Four-volume edition of Iosif Vulcan's work (Poems Narration Theater, 1987, Published articles, 1989, Travel Notes (I), 1994, Travel Notes (II), Correspondence, 2002), Eminescu at “Familia” (1974), as well and the monograph of Iosif Vulcan (1974), constitute a unitary, faithful, unique image so far, through its complex form of presentation of the activity and work of the Transylvanian representative, a marked personality of the cultural life of the second half of the 19th century.
The impressive activity carried out by the editor of the “Familia" newspaper on the Romanian culture, acknowledged in its complexity and diversity by all his exegetes, is presented by the historian and literary critic Lucian Drimba, both during the volumes within the work, as well as in the scientific works published in the University of Oradea in articles published in different periodicals and specialized magazines: "Familia", “Limba și literatura" etc.

In the monograph of Iosif Vulcan, (1974), Lucian Drimba fixes his place in the time, making reference to the famous statement of Octavian Goga in Precursors: "It is, perhaps, our most representative cultural figure from the second half of the past century"\(^1\) (in Transylvania). These words, representative of the outstanding personality of Iosif Vulcan, are complemented by the author: "A laborious personality, never tired, with beautiful aspirations that ennobled him, with remarkable initiatives and achievements, with a fruitful activity and a positive role in cultural, social and national life of his time, one of those hardworking and modest precursors of the great achievements"\(^2\). During the monographic study, the literary historian presents in-depth information about the descent of Iosif Vulcan’s family, originating from Muntenia, scholars with a solid religious tradition, in the paternal line, and with cultural-scientific openness, from the mother line, as well as the biographical course of the man of culture. Originating from Muntenia, Vulcan's family settled in the "endearing Transylvania", as lyrical Iosif Vulcan calls it several times, first in the Blaj "oppidum"; from there the great-grandfather Petru Vulcan moved to the township of Şinca-Veche in 1762, joining a regiment of guards. One member of the family was Samuil Vulcan, the bishop of Oradia, brother or cousin with another Peter Vulcan and uncle of Iosif Vulcan's father\(^3\).

About Iosif Vulcan’s biography and activity, the literary historian presents in-depth information, which is able to correct the errors made or to supplement with the less known aspects the information of the exegetes until then. Iosif Vulcan was born on March 31st, 1841 in the township of Holod, being the only surviving child, among the six born of the Greek Catholic priest Nicolae Vulcan of Holod (Bihor) and Victoria Irinyi. About Holod of those times, we learn that it was a significant area of the Greek-Catholic Episcopacy of Oradea, a rich township "with hardworking and wealthy people"\(^4\).

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\(^2\) Ibidem, p. 8.
\(^3\) Ibidem p. 15.
\(^4\) Ibidem, p.20.
In 1844, the priest Nicolae Vulcan was transferred to Leta-Mare, a larger and richer parish, when Iosif Vulcan was three years old. Thus, Leta Mare became, according to the literary critic, both the place of childhood and adolescence, as well as the place of refuge of an intellectual breakthrough youth, but also a place of eternal rest of the mother and grandparents. “Finishing the primary school at Leta-Mare”\textsuperscript{5}, he is enrolled at the Roman-Catholic High School of the Premonstratensians from Oradea (nowadays, “Mihai Eminescu” High School), which he attended between 1851-1859, having as his teacher Alexandru Roman.

About the presence and influence of Professor Al. Roman on Iosif Vulcan, the literary historian describes the social and political climate of the time, mentioning the intervention of the Greek-Catholic bishop Vasile Baron de Erdely, because of which the Romanian language and literature department for many Romanian students was established at this high school, although at that time, in Transylvania, the languages taught in secondary schools were German and Hungarian. The first teacher appointed to the new department was Alexandru Roman, who was brought from the high school in Beiuș. Regarding Iosif Vulcan's claim that "he was his disciple"\textsuperscript{6}, Lucian Drimba explains this statement and expresses the conditions under which Iosif Vulcan could have him as a teacher. Due to the fact that the Romanian language was the object of study only in 4th-8th grades, Al. Roman taught classes of Romanian language younger students, too, except for the duties of the chair.

"Vulcan could not have a teacher in this official status only on his successor in the schools in Beiuș and Oradea, i.e. Dionisie Pășcuțiu."\textsuperscript{7} In the footnotes, the literary historian reproduces the statements of Iosif Vulcan from Familia newspaper", regarding professor Alexandru Roman’s influence and merits in completing his studies, but also presents the scientific activity of D. Pășcuțiu, recognized as a defender of the national identity through his researches in the linguistic field, demonstrating that both Romanian teachers contributed to Iosif Vulcan’s spiritual and moral formation.

Since the high school years, the beginning period, the vocation of the adolescent is affirmed in directions that would last the whole life: for literature, original creations and translations from universal literature, and another well-defined vocation, for journalism. The high school studies are continued, at his

\textsuperscript{5} Ibidem, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{7} Op. cit., p. 23.
father’s request, with the "Faculty of Law" of the University of Budapest. However, the literary and cultural concerns are the dominant ones. He would publish an article and a few original poems in George Barîtiu's "Sheet for the mind, heart and literature" („Foae pentru minte, inimă și literatură”) in Brasov, but his name would appear mainly in “Concordia" magazine, which had Alexandru Roman as an editor, appointed professor at the Department of Romanian Language and Literature of the Hungarian University of Budapest.

During these study years, Iosif Vulcan had overcome the uncertainty of any beginning, he is one of the founding members of the "Petru Maior" Society in Budapest, created for Romanian students in the Hungarian capital. At the same time, he was also remarked in publishing, when he had already "betrays the presence of a journalist". The interest in literary and cultural issues is also acknowledged through the collaboration through articles, poems and prose in different periodicals in Transylvania and Budapest and Vienna as well.

This stage is appreciated as one of the preparations for the publication of the most important magazine by I. Vulcan in Budapest, "Familia", an encyclopedic journal of culture and literature, whose first issue dates back to June 5/17, 1865 and which he tirelessly edited and published it, during the nearly 42 years, until December 1906. Its platform presents him as a defender of the national core and identity, illuminator of the villages and the nation, without launching himself into political debates, considering that it was a Romanian magazine in a Hungarian or Austro-Hungarian dualist state, characterized by a severe attitude in the politics of minorities.

In chapter IV of the monograph, entitled Initiative and cultural action, Lucian Drimba presents, in chronological order, the most important cultural and social actions of the Transylvanian scholar, which he initiated ("Petru Maior" Literary Society, STR, Bihoreana) or in which he participated actively (the Society of Reading in Oradea, Astra, the Kisfaludy Society, the Romanian Academy, the Society of Archeologists and Historians in Oradea). The author mentions the enthusiasm and responsible involvement of Iosif Vulcan in all these actions, which, together with the rich advertising activity, collaborator and editor of several periodicals and editor of three magazines, make up an overall, unitary and coherent image of his entire activity. At the same time, they contribute to outline of the moral portrait of the

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cultured person, animated by the highest ideals in the spirit of the unity of all Romanians.

The research on the activity of Iosif Vulcan within the Kisfaludy Society is valorized, as an independent part, in the chapter IV of the monograph in 1974, and it is one of the topics addressed in the *I. Vulcan, member of Astra and Kisfaludy Society* scientific paper, published in the volume of *Scientific papers*, from the annals of the Pedagogical Institute Oradea, in 1971.

The abstract of the research highlights the multiple responsibilities of the Transylvanian scholar, the author specifying the interval of only three years, which passed from the date of the election of Iosif Vulcanca as a member of the Astra Society and until his investment, as an external member, in the Kisfaludy Society, the Hungarian writers' society in Pesta. The literary historian appreciates ab initio that the election of I. Vulcan in this society constitutes an important event, with a special charge, but also a recognition of his merits as a cultural entertainer of the Romanians in these parts and of his sincere contribution to the development of the bonds between the two nations, based on the mutual knowledge of the specific cultural values. In appreciating this new activity of I. Vulcan, of great importance in the context of his many concerns, the author specifies: "to this action, the devoted Romanian cultural entertainer will not give up any moment, until the end of his life.”

The literary historian also pointed out that, up to 1871, when he was 12 years old in Pesta, in the capital of Hungary, Iosif Vulcan was recognized in the circle of Hungarian writers and cultural people, both through publicity and literary activity, as an activist for emancipation, a fighter for his nation culture, defending national identity and promoting the spiritual values heritage. Another aspect noted by the author is that I. Vulcan’s writing and attitude registered "not the slightest trace of manifestation of chauvinistic nationalism which, he was convinced, would not have provided real services neither to Romanians nor to other peoples from monarchy, but, on the contrary, an intensification of the dissensions between them.”

Registering the activity of Romanian translator of the works of some Hungarian writers, together with German and French poets, the author signals the year 1862 when I. Vulcan published in the pages of the newspaper "Concordia" the translation of the novel by Jokai Mor, “Capul lui Iordachi”. In 1870 another successful translation appeared signed by the same author, the short story, “Ce este sub

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10 Ibidem
pământ”. The activity of translating some Hungarian writers is continued and used later through publications and in the pages of the “Familia” magazine, an interval in which he would translate into Hungarian language lyric creations belonging to V. Alecsandri, D. Bolintineanu and creations belonging to the Romanian folklore. In writing these aspects, the author confesses the intention of Iosif Vulcan to facilitate the proximity of these people and cultivate the friendship between them, having the conviction: "that mutual respect must be born from the exchange of cultural values."

Within that context, Lucian Drimba presents the circumstances in which the society was founded, its beginnings dating back to 1830, with the death of the poet and playwright Kisfaludy Karoly, at the initiative of a group of ten friends, whose purpose was to raise funds for building a memorial statue. Over time it transformed, and since 1836 it has become a literary society, taking the name of the missing writer. Of the multiple concerns of the society, the author mentions the most important ones: stimulating the development of Hungarian literature, by awarding, annually, the most outstanding literary works, as well as translating into Hungarian the literature and folklore of the peoples under Austro-Hungarian rule, with the purpose of making them worldwide known.

The literary historian emphasizes the merits of the "Familia" editor, appreciated by the society, "by translating Romanian literature into Hungarian" and because "he made Hungarian poetry known in Romanian", facts by virtue of which, at its meeting on January 25th, 1871, the members of the Kisfaludy Society unanimously elect I. Vulcan as its external member, the internal member being able to hold it only the Hungarian writers. In the footnotes, which supplement or gloss over the information presented, the author mentions that the Hungarian newspaper "Patria noastra și străinătatea" published, on this occasion, Iosif Vulcan portrait and biography. The Transylvanian scholar occupies, soon after, his place within the society, the first participation being mentioned on February 12th, 1871, on the occasion of its annual meeting. The literary historian introduces, in the multitude of information, passages, notes, mentions that produce delight. Participating in the annual meeting of the company, during the banquet attended by the usual toasts, Iosif Vulcan was greeted by the poet Szasz Karoly, as the first Romanian among the

12 Ibidem
13 Ibidem
Hungarian writers. His answer, written by the literary historian, represents a commitment to the cultural closeness between Romanians and Hungarians and expresses, in the alternative, the deep understanding of I. Vulcan in the face of a human act: "Responding to the greeting, Joseph Vulcan committed to work in this way that the links between Romanians and Hungarians should be as intimate as possible and emphasized that by his choice, in fact, a friendly hand extended to the Romanian nation; therefore, he shook the outstretched hand."\textsuperscript{14}

In the footnotes, the author fully reproduces the text of Iosif Vulcan's toast, eloquent for illustrating the atmosphere of enthusiasm and spiritual, cultural openness, but also for highlighting the attributes of Iosif Vulcan, of which patriotism and modesty are the most important. "Gentlemen! If I take a look at the two most outstanding Hungarian institutes of culture, if I examine the list of the members of the Scientific Academy and the Kisfaludyane Society, I see that I am the first Romanian who has the honor to have been elected to one of these societies, namely the second. I am not so ambitious, gentlemen, to seek the reason for this distinction in the value of my insignificant individuality, but I consider it only as a spiritual handshake, which the Hungarian nation offers through this society to the Romanian nation, of which I am a son. Thus, I receive the honor dedicated to me, and, shaking the warmly outstretched hand, I promise to work with my weak powers on this ground, so that our connections become as intimate as possible. I worship my cup in honor of that literary society that comes to give a helping hand to my nation and which through its translations of the folk poetry of the various nations of the homeland strengthens this connection even more! Long live the Kisfaludyane Society!"\textsuperscript{15}

Another moment highlighted by the author, in the chronological presentation of the events, is the speech of I. Vulcan as of May 31st, 1971, entitled "Romanian Folk Poetry", with which he solemnly entered the society, among the personalities of Hungarian culture, being the first non-Hungarian member of the society that delivered a reception speech. In this regard, Lucian Drimba emphasizes the enthusiasm of the progressive spirits of the Society, that not having the opportunity to know the values of the Romanian culture until then, came to meet I. Vulcan's speech with an undisguised appreciation: "Our esteemed member, on this very moment, with its interesting data (about the Romanian folk poetry) also

\textsuperscript{14} Ibidem, p. 147.

contributes to the knowledge of the people, it will outline the poetry of that people with whom we have not yet had the opportunity to get to know more closely. Let's get acquainted with the poetry of this people, get to know the people themselves.\textsuperscript{16}

The author highlights the elaborate research of Iosif Vulcan, who was careful to bring to light both the artistic valences of our folk poetry and those of preserving the national specific, using numerous fragments taken from the collection of V. Alecsandri and At. M. Marienescu, translated into Hungarian. Throughout the monographic study, the literary historian notes that Iosif Vulcan, great admirer and treasurer of popular poetry, has dealt extensively with folkloric creation, always talking about it with delight, either in words and dissertations, or in articles. For him, “folk poetry has at least a double value: artistic – as it contains the true unmatched of the anonymous creative genius, which presumably proves the solidity of Alecsandri’s claim that «the Romanian is born a poet!» – and documentary – because it is reflected in it history, living conditions, characteristic moral-psychological traits and aspirations of the Romanian nation. For these particular qualities, he recommends not once to the writers as a source of inspiration, believing that popular literature is "the source meant to nourish national literature", able to confer "the charm of characteristic originality", to ensure its durability and to defend it from "the heat of foreign literature."\textsuperscript{17} According to the mention of the literary historian, from the footnotes, Iosif Vulcan’s speech was first published in the "A Kisfaludy tarsasag Evlapjai" yearbook, vol. VII, Pesta, 1872.

The record of the literary historian on the impact of that moment is a thoroughly one, recording both the concrete aims, as well as the enthusiasm and appreciation of the members of the society and the Romanians attending the meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, I. Vulcan’s translations “will soon be included in a collection of Romanian folklore, edited by the Kisfaludy Society”\textsuperscript{18}, and Iustin Popfiu appreciates “the new triumph that brings back the Romanian genius to the world.”\textsuperscript{19} The event is recorded in praiseworthy terms both by the "Familia" magazine, as well as by other Romanian and foreign publications, and the

\textsuperscript{19} Ibidem.
proposals regarding the volume, to be preceded by the speech of I. Vulcan, as an introductory study, along with other translations of the Romanian folk poetry, illustrates the appreciation enjoyed by the Transylvanian scholar.

In the footnotes, Lucian Drimba presents the tiles of the publications that recorded the event, reproducing, in the descriptive passage of that moment, the special appreciation of “Ziarul din Pesta” newspaper: “Many of the newer Hungarian poets would like to handle it original prowess, characteristic of the Hungarian language that we observed in this Romanian compatriot of ours.” The satisfaction of the cultured person is reproduced by the literary historian through the word of thanks regarding the received assessments, but also by highlighting the value of the national cultural heritage: “We feel happy that we could contribute on a new ground to the glorification of the genius of our people.”

The reverberations of the appreciation of Iosif Vulcan among the members of the Kisfaludy Society are recorded by Lucian Drimba and in 1872, when he was invested, as a result of the unanimous trust of the Hungarian colleagues, with the quality of critical reference on two collections of translations from our folk poetry, belonging to Ember Gyorgy and Iulian Grozescu, which the company intended to publish, in its own publishing house, under the title of “Romanian folk songs”.

The author presents the responsible and assumed implication of Iosif Vulcan, characteristic of his way of working, available in all fields of activity: relevant observations of the report submitted to the company, on January 31st, 1872, regarding the fidelity of the original text and the reproduction of the musicality of the original expression in translations submitted for selection. Mentioning the quality of Joseph Vulcan as a good speaker of Hungarian and a skillful translator thus becomes fully justified.

According to its notifications, appreciated by other members, Kisfaludy Society will publish, just over five years, in 1877, the volume entitled “Roman neptalok” (“Romanian folk songs”), which included, besides the translations of the two mentioned authors, indicated by Iosif Vulcan, also other poems translated by the "Famila" editor, preceded by his speech, as an introductory study. In the footnotes, Lucian Drimba points out that the report, kept in the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, was published by Samuel Domokos under the title, twice incorrectly, “Contributions to the knowledge of the Hungarian-Romanian

20 Ibidem, p. 149.
folkloric links” in the "Revista de Folclor", VIII (1963), and that the author was also wrong in claiming that Iosif Vulcan was elected a member of the Kisfaludy Society in 1872.

The volume, totaling 164 pages and 123 pieces of the most inspired of our folk creation, contains 17 doina and 13 ballads translated by Iosif Vulcan, some of which are known to members of the Society, being read during the sessions. In the footnotes, Lucian Drimba, highlights the contribution of I. Vulcan to this volume editing, according to an information from "Familia", XIII, 1877. Thus, he specifies the quantitative proportion of the summed translations, according to which Gh. Ember has 9 ballads and 22 doina, and I. Grozescu, 9 ballads and 35 doina, "which does not add enough to Vulcan's translations to give the total of 123."22

The literary historian notes that Iosif Vulcan has also translated other poems, published in different Hungarian newspapers or in the Kisfaludy Society yearbook. The 1880 album contains, together with works signed by 39 members of the society, and the translation of Iosif Vulcan of “Ștefan cel mare și mama sa”, poem by D. Bolintineanu, after two years before he had read “Cântecul gintei latine” poem. Regarding the translations made by Iosif Vulcan, the author completes, in the footnotes, with information taken from „Familia”, indicating titles of some popular creations consecrated: “Argeș Monastery”, whose reading in the meeting of 1873, aroused the request of the president of the company to publish it in anal, as well as the translation of the “Inelul și corbul”, “Jicman crai”, “Bărbatul urât”, “Craiul și soră-sa”, “Bradul și teiul” ballads from the collections of V. Alecsandri and Simion Fl. Marian, read in the 1875 meeting.

The complex and precise information, presented by the literary historian Lucian Drimba, restores and completes an anthological page of our local and national culture, casting light on lesser-known moments and episodes, but eloquent in the context of the evolution of the Transylvanian cultural phenomenon. Finally, the appreciations and conclusions of Lucian Drimba illustrate the importance of the activity for 10 years (1871-1880) of the cultured person Iosif Vulcan within the Kisfaludy Society, by which he had a major contribution to the knowledge of the folk poetry by the Hungarian people and to the development of the bonds between the two nations, based on the cultural closeness between them. During the research, features of the less well-known moral portrait, Iosif Vulcan, appearing by conception,

attitudes and facts as a humanist, open, cosmopolitan, visionary spirit, guided in all his actions of high respect for the cultural values of the people.

This collaboration between peoples, based on the respect and appreciation of the values of specific cultures, represents an example of multiculturality and demonstrates Transylvanian cultural interference from the second half of the 19th century. It is part of a tradition illustrated by other prominent personalities of Romanian and Hungarian culture, a representative example, in this sense, being the sincere friendship relationship between the poets Octavian Goga and Ady Endre, which became a symbol of Transylvanian multiculturalism of that period.

The researches carried out by the historian and literary critic Lucian Drimba have the merit not only of evoking the complex personality of the cultured person Iosif Vulcan, activist for the unification of all Romanians and defender of the national identity, but also to restore an overall image, faithful and concrete about the Transylvanian cultural phenomenon of the second half of the 19th century.

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Review by Piotr TEODOROWSKI

The 2016 Brexit referendum can be described as a political earthquake in Britain and created an uncertain future for over three million European Union (EU) citizens living in the United Kingdom (UK). To contribute to the understanding of the consequences of Brexit and its impact on EU citizens in the UK, Eva Duda-Mikulin captures the experiences of Polish migrant women at a specific time of the process in her recent book titled ‘EU Migrant Workers, Brexit and Precarity: Polish Women’s Perspectives from Inside the UK’. This book’s publication is undoubtedly timely as the full picture of experiences and views of EU citizens are not yet known. The book is based on qualitative repeated interviews with Polish women which took place before and after Brexit. These research methods make this work unique as there is a limited comparative data available to explore experiences of the same migrants before and after the referendum (e.g. Rzepnikowska (2018)).

Duda-Mikulin is a Lecturer in Inclusion and Diversity at the University of Bradford. In the past, she was involved in the third sector and worked with marginalised communities such as migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. This extensive experience is visible as she smoothly moves between discussion of her research findings and the implications for the policymakers. As a Polish migrant herself, the author assumes both the role of a researcher (outsider) and Polish migrant woman living in the UK (insider). Her background was utilised to build rapport with participants as she shared details from her personal life during interviews.
‘(M)y researching Polish migrant women as ‘one of them’ proved to be challenging at times. Unsurprisingly, I found myself emotionally involved in the research. Thus, I cared about the end results not only because I wished to carry out rigorous research but because I was concerned about how Polish women are portrayed since I am one of them.’ (p. 14)

In migration studies, a ‘migrant’ is seen as a ‘male pioneer’ who can be later followed by their partners and families. Throughout her research, Duda-Mukulin aims to add gendered experiences to migration theories. Thus, this book is based on a qualitative study of 40 interviews with migrant Polish women. Some of these interviewees were spoken to twice: before and after the referendum. Polish are the largest post-2004 migration group in the UK. Thus, the author claims that it is a ‘distinctive case of large-scale economic migration to the UK’ (p. 25).

The book consists of six chapters — each devoted to one aspect of Brexit or migration: the history of Polish migration to the UK (chapter 2), the labour force and its characteristics in the UK (chapter 3), the process of Brexit (chapter 4), the theoretical debate on the notion of precarity (chapter 5) and finally all findings are brought together to discuss broader implications of Brexit (chapter 6). Statistical data and discussions are supported by qualitative accounts from Polish women who live in the UK.

The initial chapters set up a scene for discussion. Firstly, Polish migration to the UK is discussed from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Polish have migrated to the UK since the Second World War. However, the large migration wave took place after the 2004 Poland’s accession to the EU when Polish nationals started to enjoy the freedom of movement and could migrate to other EU states without visa permits. The EU migration is set in contrast with ongoing political discourse in Britain in which migration became one of the most contentious issues – impacting the results of the Brexit vote. Secondly, demographic and statistical data around migration was presented. Focus is on the economy and workforce to show the types of employment EU citizens are engaged in these are mostly jobs which the British workforce are unwilling to perform. Duda-Mukulin argues that the UK needs migration to fill gaps in its ageing workforce. One of the consequences of Brexit could be labour shortages in the UK. Later, she adds that in the case of an ageing society, losing migrant women could lead to lower birth and fertility rates, as migrants are usually younger than indigenous population. Reasons for initial migration to the UK are shown based on data from the interviews and statistics. The latter showed high
unemployment levels in Poland in the 2000s. However, in the UK, many of participants work in jobs for which they are overqualified. One of the Polish participants says that she keeps hearing of her friends returning to Poland. Nowadays, the unemployment levels in the UK and Poland are both around 4.5 % which as Duda-Mikulin points out may encourage more Polish to return.

The fourth chapter explores the process of Brexit, referendum results and voters’ preferences. Migrants experiences and what the outcome of the referendum means to them are presented here. Readers should be aware that this chapter could be outdated as the Brexit process was still ongoing at the time of writing the book as well as this review. The women’s views were genuinely diverse, as some are well informed of the Brexit process and follow it. Others are worried about their future but expect no real changes. The last group was not even aware that their legal status is under threat. In the context of launching a new compulsory registration scheme (called the settled status) for EU citizens, Duda-Mikulin could consider revisiting her interviewees again to investigate awareness of and willingness to apply for the new status.

The findings are assessed within the notion of ‘precarity’. This book contributes to theory by discussing whether ‘the process of migration always brings some elements of uncertainty and thus, whether precarity and migration are synonymous’ (p. 77). Here, one of the most significant contributions of this book to the academic debate is presented – that is, the comparison of participants experiences before and after the 2016 referendum to outline how their lives were affected by Brexit. Participants spoke about the lack of certainty and guarantees regarding the future right of EU citizens in the UK. Some of the participants felt ‘betrayed and angry with the British government for the lack of protection, assurance, or care about the future of EU citizens’ (p. 86). Some of the media already announced Brexodus (the return of EU citizens to their countries of origin). Duda-Mikulin picks up this discussion and looks at what could be potential barriers for some migrant subgroups to prove their residence and obtain legal status. She notes that this may be especially challenging to achieve for staying at home partners who may lack necessary documentation. She concludes this chapter with the argument that Brexit causes uncertainty, which is a new form of precarity.

The political situation in the UK changes almost every day, and some of the information presented in the book has aged quickly. The author merely mentions the UK government plans to introduce the settled status scheme and discussed with
participants only the permanent residence application. The latter is still available, but the former is obligatory to apply for to ensure that one has a right to remain in the post-Brexit UK. Despite these drawbacks, this book provides a comprehensive introduction to the reader on how the Polish community in the UK perceives and is impacted by Brexit. It is worth a read not only by social science students but also by policymakers. Duda-Mikulin presents why and how Brexit as a political situation impacted the lives of EU citizens, so it is of relevance to stakeholders both in the UK (as the British population ages and requires the young workforce to remain) and migrants’ countries of origin (whose well-educated young people emigrate). The book finishes with a call to the British policymakers to ‘recognise the vital roles migrants, and women migrants in particular play in the British economy’ (p. 97). At the same time, the Polish government is encouraged to challenge the perception of Poland as ‘a comparatively less attractive country’ (ibid) with limited and underdeveloped family support.

‘EU Migrant Workers, Brexit and Precarity: Polish Women’s Perspectives from Inside the UK’ remains a significant contribution to the debate on the impact of Brexit and experiences of women’s migrants. It is hard to read this book and not ponder what the political discourse in the UK will bring next to its migrant population in the years to come.

References

Madison Grant (1916): The Passing Race, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons

Review by Irina POP

Why about an old racist and xenophobic book?

I struggled whether I should do a review of such a book, offensive to the European Values; and to the history of sufferance’s here. I struggled if a racist book should be in the attention of the pro-European journal as JIMS. Finally, I decided to submit the presentation as an alert against the racism and xenophobia’s revival in EU certain circles.

The subject of the book, The Passing of the Great Race: Or, The Racial Basis of European History represents today a real manifesto of the racism, reinforced by the messages of the other old racist books or by new books written by the xenophobic extremist parties’ ideologues. To decipher the dangers behind such messages, their force of multiplication – visible in the book availability (free to be downloaded on the internet archive, free on the kindle, easy to be purchased via Amazon etc.) together with its popularity in 2019 – I think it could be presented as a book which raises significant concerns about the future.

It proposed the major themes that confronted our time: 1. Immigration and Identity; 2. Demographic declines of the White Europe; 3. Questioning Equality and Democracy, 4. Discussing the Justice in terms of the Corruption of the Others.

In some circles, the mentioned above topics simply obscured the main European ideals: 1’ “United in diversity!”, Multiculturalism, Inclusion; 2’ Overcrossing the ageing, stimulating the Young generations; 3.’ Promoting Equality and Democracy, fighting xenophobia; 4’ Promoting equal access to Justice and eliminating Corruption, whatever their sources will be.

The book The Passing of the Great Race is confronting the readers with a long story – starting from the biological bases – where only the Nordic race are valuable for human civilization.

It is – as the history reveals – a major part in preparing 1924, US Law of
Immigration – of selective immigration which bared the access in the US of the Poor Eastern Europeans. Unfortunately, it was also known as “Hitler’s Bible”, as the Führer named it in a letter addressed to Grant.

The historical experience with such literature effects on the public policies – xenophobia directed towards the Jews, Roma people; the racial hygiene and finally, the holocaust – alerted on what the similar trends could cause in our Europe.

**The Passing Race book’s structure**

The book in the final reviewed edition, the 1921’ one, comprises a Preface (of Osborn), the proper text (written by Grant) an Appendix with Maps, a Documentary Supplement added by Henry Fairfield Osborn.

The main text is structured in an Introduction – important as a methodological guide in understanding the concepts and the position of the book towards the issues covered; and into two sections.

The Part I is devoted to clarify the notions RACE, LANGUAGES AND NATIONALITY and to answer questions related to them as: *I. Race and Democracy; II. The Physical Basis or Race; III. Race and Habitat Race Languages and Nationality, VI. Race and Language 69 The European Race in Colonies.*

The main message is that the European (Caucasian) Races, are grouped as Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean.

The Part II, entitled EUROPEAN RACES IN HISTORY, is about a composed history of humanity. The sub-divisions (14) in the text are *I. Eolithic Man, II. Paleolithic Man, III. The Neolithic and Bronze Ages, IV. The Alpine Race, V. Mediterranean Race, VI. The Nordic Race, VII. Teutonic Europe, VIII. The Expansion of the Nordics, IX. The Nordic Fatherland, X. The Nordic Race Outside of Europe, XI. Racial Aptitudes, XII Arya, XIII Origins of the AryanLanguages, XIV. The Aryan Languages in Asia.*

The three main races European races - conserved themselves, from Eolithic to nowadays, biologically and as aptitudes. The Nordic race - Teutonic being included - “proved” to be the creator of the great civilizations, the American one inclusively. In its core is the race of Aryans. Biased assumptions are mainly those in the chapters: The Expansion of the Nordics; Racial Aptitudes.

*The main text assumed as its major topics* the immigration danger, racial hygiene, white superiority, social costs with the poor or dis-genic people. It also supports the correspondent policies: selective immigration; conservation of the
white people qualities – claimed monopoly on the morality, right religion, responsibility - associated with physical features (high stature, blue eyes, blond hair); the reducing the social costs with the non-creative people.

The methods to make the book’s claims acceptable for the scholars’ requirements are of three types. Firstly, the book appeals to the measurements, rigorously done and to an impressive bibliography. The measurements seem to be borrowed from the police arsenal - the facial index, e.g. and they are serving racial purposes. That is they promote the racial pattern. Secondly, the Bibliography – in the final reviewed edition, the 1921 one – is composed by 388 books + 13 others. Reported to a text of 242 pages it represents a highly documented text. The sources are many times large books authored by scientific authorities in their fields. The highest authorities are listed with 4 or 5 titles. The general works as encyclopedias (13 titles), histories, reports or administrative documents (as census e.g.) are also quoted. As ratio between the no. of the sources on the page, we estimate that he used an average of 7 sources on the page. Qualitatively, it is easy to note that the literature used is largely accredited in the scientific circles who explain the social life using biological patterns only. The critical points of views – as those formulated by Franz Boas - are not ignores (to not affects the book credibility among the scholars), but they are simply mentioned, not discussed). That is highly qualified technically literature is biased, is racially and xenophobically oriented. Thirdly, the book appeals to an Appendix, composed by colored maps, illustrating the races distributions. The measurements, the references and the images (maps) are the tools of an inexpugnable scientific citadel difficult to be immediately denounced. On brief, the book rejects the political correctness the multiculturalism and diversity as EU values, and it pronounced against the equal rights, against the human rights, against the democracy.

In the defense of the EU values

In the year (2019) when, there are celebrated 10 years, from the entering into force the EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Liberties, to unveils the underneath tide of the racism and xenophobia promoted in the literature, it is to stand for the EU values. It is to say no to idolatry, no matter how perfectly it imitates the serious scholarly works; to call to the promotion of the Values embraced in the EU Treaties.

*Review by Marius Ioan TĂTAR*

Ronald F. Inglehart is one of the most influential contemporary proponents of modernization theory, which sees economic, cultural and political factors as intertwined in multifaceted processes of social change that tend to propel societies in coherent and roughly predictable directions. In his previous work, Inglehart has found systematic correlations between changes in economic development and shifts in public attitudes on religion, gender equality, different lifestyles and democratic values, more generally. These findings, based on empirical analyses of data coming from the Eurobarometer and Values Surveys, reveal an evolution from materialist to post-materialist orientations and more broadly, from survival to self-expression values. The dynamics of cultural orientations during the last decades are revisited in the *Cultural Evolution*, in which Inglehart develops a new version of the theory of modernization.

The *Evolutionary Modernization* theory, as Inglehart calls it, highlights the central role played by people’s sense of economic and physical security in shaping their motivations and life strategies. First, “socioeconomic development directly affects people’s sense of existential security, determining whether physical survival seems uncertain or can be taken for granted” (p. 14). Second, people prioritize certain values and beliefs that reflect their perceptions of how safe is the environment in which they live. As Inglehart argues, “for most of history, survival was insecure, with population rising to meet the food supply and then

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being held constant by starvation, disease and violence” (p. 8). This leads to what Inglehart names *The Authoritarian Reflex*, a survival strategy that prompts societies to emphasize solidarity with fellow members, conformity to group norms, xenophobia and obedience to strong leaders (pp. 8-9). On the other hand, Inglehart, shows that in the second half of the twentieth century, industrialization, urbanization and mass literacy in the West, promoted the civic and political mobilization of the working class. This has led to increasing electoral support for Left-wing governments implementing redistributive policies which, along with the absence of war, substantially increased the existential security of vast numbers of people, eventually making societies more open, tolerant and democratic. Under these conditions, young generations growing up in the rich world took economic and physical security for granted in the decades following the World War II, and this has changed their motivations, individual objectives and value orientations.

In this book, Inglehart identifies three mechanisms of cultural change. First, he convincingly demonstrates that changes in how young people perceived existential security in the post-war world has brought an intergenerational value shift from giving top priority to economic and physical security (materialist and survival orientations), toward greater emphasis on free choice, environmental protection, gender equality and tolerance of gays (post-materialist and self-expression orientations). Once the new generations, socialized under conditions of high existential security, replace older and more materialistic cohorts, self-expression value orientations seem to become dominant in society and could also diffuse relatively quickly to other segments of the population through social conformity pressures. Second, Inglehart shows that “intergenerational value change is shaped by short-term period effects such as economic booms or recessions, in addition to population replacement”, but the effects of such economic shocks and growth might cancel out, on the long term (p. 23). Third, cultural change is path-dependent: while levels of existential security shape a society’s values, its historical legacies influence the level at which such cultural shifts take place.

However, cultural changes reflecting perceptions of existential security do not occur in only one direction. In the last two chapters of this book, Inglehart discusses what he calls *the Silent Revolution in reverse*, that is a return of insecurities that open the door to “xenophobic populist authoritarian
movements in many countries, from France’s National Front, to the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, to the rise of Donald Trump in the USA” (p. 5). According to Inglehart, these advanced industrial countries are entering the Artificial Intelligence society, a new phase of technological development that makes possible for “computer programs to replace not just industrial workers but also highly educated people, including lawyers, doctors, professors, scientists and even computer programmers” (p. 5). As secure and well-paid jobs are disappearing not only for the working class, but also for the middle class, “declining existential security triggers an Authoritarian Reflex that brings support for strong leaders, strong in-group solidarity, rigid conformity to group norms and rejection of outsiders” (p. 5). While authoritarian populist leaders blame massive immigration for the economic problems of these societies, Inglehart argues that in western countries “insecurity today results from growing inequality” and not from the scarcity of resources (p. 5). Since inequality is essentially a political issue, Inglehart asserts the need for a new political coalition to represent the interests of both the working and middle classes. This new coalition could increase existential security for the vast majority of people through governmental interventions.

While the theoretical and analytical framework developed by Inglehart in this book brings substantial contributions to the literature explaining cultural and political change in contemporary societies, it has in my view two main limitations. First, the increased intra-generational inequality, which is particularly salient among today’s youth, hinders the explanatory power of the main mechanism identified by Inglehart as leading to cultural change, namely the intergenerational shift from values shaped by scarcity, toward increased emphasis put on Postmaterialist and Self-expression values. Several decades ago, cultural shifts from materialist to postmaterialist values was brought about by younger generations. With the dissolution of social safety nets in recent decades, today’s youth is a highly heterogeneous group living in different socio-economic conditions and experimenting divergent levels of existential (in)security. For instance, vulnerable young people living in the European Union face the risk of multiple exclusions that mutually reinforce each other: from the labor market, from education and from the democratic life of their societies (Tătar and Apăteanu, 2019). These young persons have a precarious status on the labor market (Tătar and Apăteanu, 2019) and the economic insecurities linked with this
situation may hinder the development of orientations toward tolerance and openness to new ideas. These developments seem to be at odds with the experiences of the young generations growing up in the post-World War II era, described by Inglehart in this book.

The second potential shortcoming of the analytical framework developed in *Cultural Evolution* stems from the mismatch between the conceptualization and measurement of the main explanatory variable of the Evolutionary Modernization theory, namely “existential security”. When Inglehart discusses the causes and consequences of “existential security” in the theoretical part of the book (see particularly Chapter 1), he makes several assertions that seem to qualify “existential security” mainly as a socio-psychological and subjective variable that should be measured at the individual level: “A society’s culture is shaped by the extent to which its people grow up feeling that survival is secure or insecure” (p. 8, emphasis mine); “Socioeconomic development directly affects people’s sense of existential security, determining whether physical survival seems uncertain or can be taken for granted” (p. 14, emphasis mine); “Cultural change is not simply determined by cognitive factors. To an even greater extent, it is shaped by people’s first-hand experience with existential security or insecurity” (p. 19, emphasis mine). Inglehart’s insistence on people’s feeling, sense or experience with existential (in)security seems to suggest that people’s subjective perceptions and evaluations on whether survival is secure or not is more important for understanding changes in their values, motivations and behavior, than objective degrees of existential security, measured at country level. However, Inglehart uses an index having 3 components to measure existential security in empirical analyses. The Existential Security index is based on each country’s life expectancy, infant mortality and GDP/capita in a given year (pp. 90-93; see also note 21 on p. 239). Thus, the country level operationalization of existential security through objective indicators tends to depart from Inglehart’s theoretical arguments which appear to define existential security as a key psychological (subjective) variable that shapes value orientations. Similarly, the hypotheses regarding the link between changes in existential security and cultural shifts are formulated and tested at country level. Perhaps, a future clarification of the concept of “existential security” would allow for more robust empirical tests of the propositions derived from the evolutionary modernization theory with various types of empirical data and at different levels of analysis.
To sum up, *Cultural Evolution* brings a welcome contribution to the study of economic, cultural and political change, opening new directions for research on these topics. In this book, Inglehart presents a new version of modernization theory that focuses on the causes and consequences of existential (in)security. Based on empirical evidence from more than 100 societies, this book examines how changes in the extent to which people take survival for granted shapes their motivations and behavior, leading to a plethora of long-term phenomena such as secularization, environmental protection, gender equality, same sex marriage, democratization, but also to more recent developments such as the rise of xenophobia and populist authoritarian parties and leaders.

**References**

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