

Refugee Crisis or Identity Crisis: Deconstructing the European Refugee Narrative

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*“Because night has fallen and the barbarians haven’t come.
And some of our men just in from the border say
there are no barbarians any longer.
Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?
Those people were a kind of solution.”*

Constantine P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians”

Abstract. Employing discursive and relational style of analysis, this paper situates the refugee issues within the contours of recurrent neoliberal turmoil and challenges the examination of ‘refugee crisis’ in isolation from the shifting identity discourses in the European continent. Instead, it urges for a scientific examination that situates the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in a broader plane where the ‘refugee’ and the European ‘self’ become intrinsically linked, entangled, and inseparable categories in the process of European identity reinvention. The paper elucidates the interplay between the social, economic and cultural factors that are pushing the emergence of new European identity and the construction of the ‘refugee’ as an incompatible ontological category that solidifies the emerging particularistic identities in Europe. In deconstructing narratives that construct the ‘refugee’ as a culturally alien and abject ‘other’, the analysis employs discursive psychology to expose the performativity of the hidden meanings of metaphors and metonymies that pervade the representation of refugees in the European linguistic discourse. It further relies on Agamben contribution on the biopolitics of Western nation state to argue that the refugee’s body represents a site of biopolitical interventions that produce the ‘bare life’, the ‘liminal body’, and the ‘marginal’ through which the European neoliberal ‘polis’ secures its existence.

Keywords: *culturalist discourse, identity, refugee, neo-orientalism, metaphors, biopolitics, ‘bios/zoe’, superfluous bodies*

Introduction

When Cavafy wrote this poem in 1898, he was inspired by the writings on the fall of Ancient Roman Empire, and most probably could not predict that his poem will gain pertinence after more than one hundred years of its initial publication. The

subtext of the poem is quite comprehensible; The Empire secures its existence through an ‘other’, a threatening ‘outsider’ that serves as a solution to the inner problems of the polis, and once the ‘alien’ disappears there is no place for relief or happiness but for anxiety and panic that the Empire is now alone on its own problems, without a ‘barbarian’, its reverse image, its ultimate ‘other’. The beginning of the 21st century found the European Empire in analogous despair, struggling to accommodate its avant-garde identity through the hardships of the recurring crisis of neoliberalism and uncontrollable forces of globalization (Fligstein, 2012). The ideological enmities that for more than forty years forged and strengthened the distinct and sui generis identity of the European Union waned and Europe had to redefine itself in an ever-changing and unpredictable international landscape. The redefinition of European identity has been tangential with other continental and global dramatic developments that have undoubtedly influenced the course of European identity (re)invention.

One of the recent global phenomenon that is particularly effecting the European identity politics is the increasing numbers of forcibly displaced people as a result of bloody conflicts that have provoked the worst humanitarian drama since the end of Second World War. According to the UNHCR (2017) report, there are more than 65 million forcibly displaced people worldwide and 22.5 million refugees are seeking shelter in foreign lands which is the highest number of asylum seekers since the foundation of UNHCR in 1950. The Europe has been at the frontline of managing the flux of refugees exacerbated by the endless Syrian Civil War that have forced many Syrians to seek shelter and protection in the European countries. The old continent, in turn, has found itself in a middle of a ‘crisis’ and images of refugees dying in the shores of Europe or mass of desperate people waiting to pass the borders have become symbols of European indifference toward the human catastrophe orchestrated in the European backyard (Wilson and Mavelli, 2013). In tandem with the refugee ‘crisis’, European political establishment has been shattered by the resurgence of radical right-wing parties that have fueled anti-immigration and racist sentiments, urging for cultural protectionism and defensive mechanisms to stop border ‘hemorrhage’ caused by the uncontrollable flows of refugees and immigrants

This article focuses on this complex interconnectedness of the refugee ‘crisis’ with the European identity politics and elucidates mechanisms that utilize the refugee ‘crisis’ in altering the conventional identities and forging new senses of



belonging in Europe. More specifically, it problematizes the refugee crisis within the contours of European identity formation in the post- ideological era and interrogates the construction of the refugee as a valuable discursive instrument in the process of European reinvention of the 'Self' (Cantat, 2016; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). The aim is to understand the alternations of the European identity in conditions of perpetual global crisis and continental uncertainties and how the refugee 'crisis' fits the exigencies of these European inner dynamics. To put it simply, this article challenges the objectivity of refugee 'crisis' by proving how the 'crisis' is discursively invoked and reproduced in a context where Europe is undergoing a process of redefinition along culturalist and civilizational lines. Speaking in Cavafy's words, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that the refugee is being constructed as the European 'other' and 'barbarian' in order to provide 'solutions' to the European identity anxieties and dilemmas.

The outline of this paper is divided in two main parts and five subsections. The first part sets the context of European shifting identities in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of refugee as an 'intervening' factor in the politics of European identity. In particular, it focuses on the erosion of conventional cosmopolitan/pragmatist identity of Europe as a result of the recent economic crisis and the emergence of culturalist discourse as a new hegemonic paradigm that renders redundant old categories of identification based on class and economic relations and gives primacy to cultural and primordialist understanding of the 'Self' (Yilmaz, 2012; Sasatelli, 2009). At this particular juncture, the construction of the refugee as a 'threat', 'backward' and culturally 'alien other', gains discursive significance as it serves both to reproduce and stabilize European culturalist identity but also to construct itself in a fixed opposition with the culturalist 'other'. In this regard, it focuses on the emergence of 'neo-orientalism' as a discursive shift from the colonialist Orientalism which manifests itself in the so-called 'securitization of Muslims' and politicization of Muslim identity in the European public sphere (Mavelli, 2013; Saimei, 2015; Amin Khan, 2012).

The second part is oriented in deconstructing the totality of discursive machinery that is erected to speak of and produce knowledge over the refugee and his cultural background. In particular, it interrogates linguistic and non-linguistic dispositive that encode the refugee as a threatening and abject 'other'. Specifically, it deconstructs the use language in daily communication about the refugee 'crisis' that pervades media coverage, public speeches and governmental practices. In this

section, the article problematizes the pervasive use of ‘crisis’ as discursive technology to present reality as ‘exceptional’ and ‘abnormal’ which in turn legitimizes certain unconventional governmental actions. The last section relies on Agamben contribution on the biopolitics of Western nation state and employs the concept of ‘zoe’ and ‘bios’ as biopolitical categories applicable in the refugee crisis. It argues that the refugee’s body represents a site of biopolitical interventions that produces the ‘bare life’, the ‘zoe’, the ‘marginal’ through which the European ‘bios’, and neoliberal ‘polis’ secures its existence.

**Putting refugee crisis in context: European shifting identities and the politics of ‘othering’
*The resurgence of culturalist discourse and European identity crisis***

On 8th of May - the day after the decisive French presidential elections-, European establishment felt a sense of relief and self-confidence from what otherwise could be the state of acute uncertainty and fear on Europe’s future following Le Pen’s victory. Headlines and breaking news of some of the most prestigious newspapers and broadcasters (*The Independent, El Pais, Le Monde, The New York Times, La Repubblica*)¹ reflected the same state-of-mind, signifying their audiences of the ‘existential’ importance that Macron’s electoral win has for the reflected the same state-of-mind, signifying their audiences of the ‘existential’ importance that Macron’s electoral win has for the French Republican values but also for the cosmopolitan vision of the European project.² It seemed that Europe is giving signs of resiliency over crude nationalist sentiments embodied in the far- right discourse that just two years before triggered Brexit and enabled Donald Trump to be elected as US commander in chief.

Beyond the optimism and apparent euphoric reactions that have captivated the bureaucrats in Brussels, a lot of questions concerning the rise of populism and anti-immigration sentiment in European continent need to be posed.

¹ The Independent (08May 2017):“French Election: Le Pen crushed by Macron as he becomes President”. El Pais (08 May 2017): “France defeats radicalism”. The New York Times (08 May 2017): “FRANCE ELECTS MACRON PRESIDENT, SHUNNING AN EMERGENT RIGHT”. La Repubblica (08 May 2017): “Macron, the vote for Europe”.

² See, for example, The Washington Post (7 May 2017): “With Le Pen defeat, Europe’s far-right surge stalls” where prominent Brussels officials and European diplomats comment Macron’s win as a necessity to halt the upsurge of right-wing radicalism and collapse of the European Union.

Specifically, is European populism and rising xenophobia confined to the daily rhetoric of radical right-wing segments and their supporters, or rather is a symptomatic manifestation of a structural and deep identity crisis that prompts Europeans to redefine themselves in the context of major global and continental disruptions? If yes, how does such a crisis on European consciousness manifests itself and what are the explanatory factors that justify these claims? The scholarship has provided extensive scientific inquiries on the topic and there is apparently a wide consensus among scholars that Europe is going through an identity crisis which has provoked the redefinition of Europe both culturally and politically (Wodak et al., 2009; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Cantat, 2015). What is common among scholars is the examination of problematique from an anti-essentialist perspective which rejects the modernist/Cartesian conception of identity as a fixed, self-contained and autonomous property from the social interactivity and contextualities (De Finna, 2006; Van Dijk, 2001). This perspective offers insights on the discursive production and reproduction of European identities and on the crisis and fluctuations of these identities due to major disturbances that trigger alternations in the hegemonic discourses (Wodak, 2015). In this regard, scholars have discerned patterns of hegemonic shifts in the construction of European identity as a result of global and continental traumatic processes that have destabilized the conventional multi-cultural identity of Europe (Cantat, 2015). Specifically, the focus has been oriented in elucidating psychological effects of neoliberal perpetual crisis in forging new senses of belonging and inducing a process of a paradigmatic shift that is replacing the conventional ontological and epistemological order based on class antagonism with a culturalist ontology which entails a displacement of identity formation from the economic realm to the cultural one.

The homogenizing and uncontrollable forces of globalization and the agony of the recent European economic crisis (a continental phenomenon due to the peculiarities of EU's economic and financial system) are the most mentioned factors to explain the European 'identity crisis' and the changing discourses on 'Europeanity'. Delanty et al., (2008) argue that the globalization process where the nation-state refrains the exercise of its sovereign power to restrict, control or (un)authorize the international flows of money, goods or mobility of people "unleashes new kinds of anxieties about securities, social status and identity" (p.12). The global financial crisis that expanded rapidly all around the world has exposed the vulnerability of global capitalism where problems and solutions have been displaced

from national boundaries to chaotic and unmanageable global networks that are not accountable to any legitimate authority (Cetti, 2012). In the European context, the economic crisis and its severity (increased poverty, unemployment and austerity measures) has produced new fears and uncertainties about the future and the distrust in the institutions of European Union has reached unprecedented levels (EURACTIV, 2013). Similarly, Betz (1995) and Koopmans (2005: 5) argue that economic deprivation or seclusion induces identity psychosis and emotional dissatisfaction with the status-quo and existing structures of self-identification, prompting people to embrace nationalism as a “new anchor for collective identities that can renew the sense of control”. To put it simply, psychodynamics of neoliberal subjects in Europe have stimulated the re-nationalization of political discourse and set the terrain for the re-introduction of *essentialized* understanding of the self. In this vein, Delanty et al. (2008) and Checkel and Katzenstein (2009: 1-2) discern patterns of discursive shift of the European identity from the one that sketched a cosmopolitan vision of Europe as epitomized with the motto ‘Unity in Diversity’ to the new narrative that defines Europe in civilizational terms under the banner of ‘Europe for Europeans’. This in turn implies that the pragmatist principles of economic interdependence and mutual prosperity that have underpinned European identity for more than 60 years are being eroded and replaced by the re-actualization of contextualized/particularist identities that is manifested in the daily rhetoric about ‘national decadence’ or ‘Islamization of Europe’.

Roy (2007) and Yilmaz (2012) contextualize the European complex identity formation within contours of what is commonly referred as the revival of culturalist discourse which overshadows conventional economic relations between labour and capital with novel antagonisms based on essentialized cultural differences and cultural belonging. The emerging paradigm makes superfluous old categories of identification (labour/capital, men/women, LGBT/Conservative) by centralizing a primordialist/culturalist understanding of the ‘Self’.

As Yilmaz (2012: 369) points out:

“What we are witnessing is a tectonic movement that has shaken the entire political landscape and realigned social and political movements along a new fault line. This new fault line is interpellated by a discourse of culture, i.e. culture has become central to the questions of belonging and alterity, that is, the ontology of the social has become culturalized.”

The tectonic movement of European political landscape that Yilmaz is

referring to, in practice, alludes to “epistemic collusion between right and left” (p.369) which in public discourse is manifested through a consensual episteme in the political spectrum on how to operationalize the problems and challenges of contemporary Europe. This is not to say that the left and the moderate right are appropriating the xenophobic or segregationist attitudes of the radical-right, nor that the left is abandoning its progressive struggles in favour of nationalist meta-narratives. Rather, it speaks to the same ontological categories (‘us’ versus. ‘alien other’) that the moderate political spectrum shares with the far-right, to problematize and articulate social, economic and cultural struggles (Soysal, 2009). For instance, traditionally progressive projects that promote gender equality, freedom of sexuality or labour rights are being increasingly re-articulated in relation to the *culturalized other*, thus rendering invisible the domestic antagonism that has characterized social and cultural emancipatory movements in European societies (i.e. the left historically has problematized gender oppression from a materialist perspective and framed its struggle within major ontological categories of ‘Labour versus Capital’).

For illustration, Villy Svondal a member of Danish Socialist Party and until recently Foreign Minister of Denmark when asked about his opinion on the increased numbers of immigrants arriving in the country, argued that “...the leftwing has led years of struggle for gender equality. But it is also obvious that when immigrants come here from, for instance, Somalia, then, they haven’t experienced that struggle and all hardships that the struggle brought with it” (as quoted in Nielsen, 2012: 152). Similar claims were made by Joost Lagendik a high-profile member of Dutch Green Left Party who said “So there is this fear...that we are being transported back in a time machine where we have to explain to our immigrants that there is equality between men and women, and gays should be treated properly. Now there is the idea we have to do it again”.³ What is striking in these remarks is the ontological structure that is invoked by the speakers to frame their arguments about gender equality, respectively LGBT rights. In both cases, progressive policies are articulated in opposition to the ‘foreigner’, mostly associated with Muslims that are posing threat to ‘our’ emancipatory achievements. The use of ‘we’ as a denominator of Dutch or Danish gender progress mitigates in-group discordances by addressing the gender issue as taking place “between “us” with gender equality and “them” without

³ See, New York Times (11 October 2006): ‘Across Europe, Worries on Islam Spread to Center’; <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/world/europe/11muslims.html?mcubz=1>

gender equality” (Nielsen, 2012: 152). In essence, this culturalist reading of the ‘Self’ from the moderates or leftists does not differ substantially from extreme pole of the political spectrum. When Le Pen proudly argues that “France isn’t burkinis on the beach. France is Brigitte Bardot” (New York Times, 5 May 2017), she is just transmitting more explicitly the same threat that concerns Svondal and Lagendik. While they may differ in regard to the methods of addressing this threat (Le Pen or Wilders for immediate expulsion and Langendik for ‘educational’ modules to teach the immigrant about the gender equality), they share a common vision that ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’ are incompatible and mutually exclusive ontological categories (Roy, 2007)⁴.

This complex co-dependence of socioeconomic factors with identity dynamics in the European continent sets the context on which the refugee drama is played and new collective identities are being forged and reproduced. As Sassatelli (2009: 4) succinctly articulates it: “Europe really seems to have lost the plot....Today, it appears, Europe is in search of a new story to tell, first and foremost to itself: an identity, that is”. In this process of crafting new narrations for itself, Europe is in search for an opposite ‘Other’ to provide coherence and stability to the newly emerging European ‘Self’. The arbitrariness of geopolitical dynamics have produced the ‘refugee’, the European ‘Other’, who is being utilized as a valuable discursive instrument in the process of European reinvention.

In hunt for the ‘enemy’; the ‘refugee’ stabilizing the European ‘Self’

Following the publication of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1994) and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that seemed to validate Huntington’s cataclysmic thesis of civilizational confrontations, there is an increasing interest in Western academia to re-scientize cultural and religious encounters of Islam with the Western world. The scientific scrutiny of Cultural and Religious studies has been focused on the intercultural dynamics in a globalized world, where cultural spatiality are blurred and diminished as a result of massive flows of people moving from one cultural and

⁴ See, for example the binary categorization and ontological incompatibility of ‘Islam’ and ‘Frenchness’ in Emmanuel Macron’s comment: “Our mission...it will be difficult, it will take time, it will be demanding for all men and women...will be to act in such a way that French people of the Muslim faith are always more proud of being French than of being Muslim” (The Economist, 9th May 2017). For Macron, being a proud muslim excludes apriori feelings about France and French values.

religious habitus to another, foreign culture (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). As the gravitation of the global migration indicates patterns of demographic flows from the Islamic geography toward the European ecumene, scientific endeavors have problematized the complex encounter of ‘Muslim immigrant/refugee’ with the European culture. The common feature of these accounts (see, Bowen, 2010; Klausen, 2005; Laurence and Vaisse, 2006) is the explanation of tensions between Muslims and the host cultures as a natural consequence of Kulturkampf between Islamic worldviews of the Muslim immigrant/refugee and European values that fail to cohabite due to their adherence to opposing systems of values and beliefs. The rising anti-immigrant sentiment among Europeans is explicable in terms of ‘demographic shifts’ of the recent decades where people of different cultures and religions create a sense of cultural aggression or invasion in host societies (Papastergiadis, 2006). This essentialist reading of the ‘immigrant’ as a purveyor of his cultural tradition, reifies immigrants’ otherness as being constituted prior to their arrival in the European territory, in absence of any external interfering factor to alter their deep-rooted identity. Thus, the opposing identities of the Muslim immigrant and native European are naturally given and constituted, in the sense that these identities are conceived as being established and formed in one “objective, readily available, non-discursive reality” (Yilmaz, 2012:374).⁵ “Islam” and “Europe” stand in opposition to each other due to their inner and fixed properties (the ‘absolutism’ of the former, and ‘Enlightenment’ of the latter) beyond any spatial or temporal context, and in isolation from any articulatory/discursive practice to provide meanings to these notions.

In contrast to these essentialist narratives on the identity of Europe and the ‘fleeing’ Muslim, a growing number of scholars are scrutinizing identity politics of contemporary Europe not through aprioristic lenses of dispositional analysis, but by examining the diverse discursive apparatuses that are put into the production of the European ‘Self’ in antagonism with the ‘threatening’ Muslim (Kristoglou and Tsimouris, 2015; Cantat, 2015; Connolley, 2002). This approach that Emirbayer (1997) has called ‘*relational/processual style of analysis*’ moves away from the

⁵ Huntington relies upon the same essentialist assumptions in his “Clash of Civilization”. He defines civilizations as primordial categories based on what he calls “objective elements of blood, language, religion, way of life” (p.42-43). Based on these essentialist ontological stances, he makes the controversial claim that “Islam has bloody borders” or that the problem of the West “is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam...” alluding to the hostile, irreconcilable or conflicting interaction of the West with the Islamic World.

reification of 'identities' based on some ahistorical properties, but rather examines them as being constituted discursively (acknowledge their malleability) and in an incessant encounter with the 'Other'. Building on that, Campbell (1992: 2) argues that "...the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside,' a 'self' from an 'other,' a 'domestic' from a 'foreign'". Or, as Connolley (2002: xv) puts it: "What I am is defined in terms of "What I am not". The 'Self' projects itself always in opposition to the 'Other', because people need to invent some 'differences' that make 'us' distinguishable from 'them. In addition, what makes these identities to persist is the construction of a perpetual threat posed by the 'Other', a danger that 'they' possess a risk of alienating and disfiguring 'our' being and values that 'we' represent (Van Dijk: 2001). In the European context, ideas on Europeanity and uniqueness of European values have been historically constructed in opposition to a threatening outsider, corresponding to the particular interests involved in the 'making of Europe'. During the Cold War, Western European unification manifested in the economic platform of European Community was made possible through the 'common enemy' of communism, epitomized by the Soviet Union which represented the totalitarian ideological 'Other' that is ready to invade 'the land of freedoms' once we fail to stay united (Wodak and Boukala, 2015). However, with the collapse of communism in the eastern frontiers and the institutionalization of neoliberalism as a global mode of governance, Europe "had to reinvent its other... [to legitimate] new senses of Europeanity" (Cantat, 2016: 3).

The horrors of war and human catastrophe in the Middle-East has manufactured the 'refugee', a de-territorialized body seeks shelter and protection in a foreign land, representing a site of intensive power interventions where the demarcation lines between the privileged insiders and anomalous outsiders are drawn and discursively reproduced. Nevzat Soguk, one of the most influential deconstructionist scholars in the field of Migration Studies, in his seminal book "State and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecrafts" interrogates the historical junctures which gave rise to the 'refugee' as a tool to stabilize and naturalize state sovereignty and also to forge and consolidate national identities. He traces back the origin of the modern idea of 'refugeeness' in the birth of the centralized nation-state where the population once stratified in different strata (aristocracy, clergy, peasantry) had to be reorganized into a unified body of citizens that have duties and responsibilities solely to a single authority, that of a sovereign



nation state (Soguk, 1999). As the nation-state exercised its authority over a clearly defined territory, citizenship became bounded with territoriality, establishing the well-known 'state-territory-people hierarchy' (Soguk, 1999: 74). Thus, being a member of a nation state or national citizen became the 'normal' mode of belonging, an eligible form to engage in the affairs of the polis, and most importantly a preferred mode of subjectivity chosen by the sovereign power to its constituency. It is at this particular juncture that statecraft invented the displaced 'other', the 'refugee' who represents the inverse image of the citizen, an 'abnormal' other, who has been "ejected from the [established] trinity of state-people-territory" (Buckel and Wissel, 2010). The 'refugee' meets the exigencies of nation-state to produce an 'aberrant other', a de-territorialized "outsider" in relation to whom the identity of the nation and its citizens can be perpetuated" (Haddad 2002: 24). From the expulsion of Huguenots as a result of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes⁶ that committed heresy against the sovereign maxim 'cuius region, eius religio', to the forced displacement of political exponents and supporters of ancient regime during the revolutionary inauguration of French Republic, the 'refugee' has come to symbolize the "pure extraneity", a stateless body that in a privileged sedentary world is in an incessant process of motion "condensing around itself pure outsiderhood" (Brubaker 1992: 47).

In contemporary context where the mass movement of Muslims toward the European gates has regenerated the 'migrant/refugee' issue, the social and functional significance of the modern 'refugee' seems not to have changed substantially from the early modern times. Ideas on citizenship and nation-state as the ultimate instance of representation have persisted and "the modern citizen, occupying a bounded territorial community of citizens, is the proper subject of political life"; subsequently, based on this premise the "refugee is defined negatively as one who lacks... a territorial space and so lacks the effective representation and protection of state" (Soguk, 1999: 171). As Agamben (1995: 84) succinctly points out:

"If refugees represent such a disquieting element in the order of the modern nation-state, this is above all because by breaking the continuity between *man* and *citizen*,

⁶ The Revocation of Edict of Nantes refers to an edict (Edict of Fontainbleu, 1685) enacted by Louis XIV of France to suppress the rights of Protestants (in France known as Huguenots) to freely practice their religion. With the new edict, the state officially initiated the prosecution of Protestants by burning their churches and closing their schools. The pogroms led to massive expulsion of Protestants from France who sought protection in neighboring countries (for further details, see Soguk 1999, and Henry M. Baird 2004).

nativity and *nationality*, they put the original fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis” [emphasis added].

In this regard the Muslim refugee plays a double and paradoxical role within the dynamics of European identity engineering: in one hand, the refugee in his/her Muslim role represents the threatening ‘other’, the disruptive agent and the new site of collective anxieties that authorizes defensive mechanisms in protection of European cultural and historical heritage; on the other hand, refugees’ sufferings and non-sedentary status offer psychological balm for host citizens whose permanent insecurities and fears caused by globalization and economic crisis are relativized when confronted with the marginal and defenseless ‘other’. These two discursively reproduced roles of the refugees will be explained in more details in the next section where we examine the emergence of neo-orientalism as a new mode of orientalizing the Muslim, and in the last section where we deconstruct the refugees’ subjectivity through Agamben’s categories of *zoe* and *bios*. However, some insights must be provided here inasmuch they contribute to a better understanding of role of the refugees in forging and stabilizing the European ‘Self’.

It is argued that the role of the refugee as a threat to the European values and way of life is premised on the wide-spread stereotypes that Muslims are inassimilable subjects that not only bring their ‘otherness’ to our borders but also their religious dogmatism which is irreconcilable with what ‘we’ stand, posing a danger of collective alienation and cultural invasion (Wodak et al., 2015). In the case of refugees, these sentiments are more vividly manifested compared to economic immigrants, because the refugee fleeing from war represents the forced migrant who unwillingly has left the native country, and as such does not have any incentive to set foot in the European ‘cultural melting pot’. As Haddad (2002: 24) argues the refugee “has no desire to reinvent or re-imagine a new identity, nor even to totally adopt that of her host state; rather she remembers her home with nostalgia and will act to ensure her ties with her native culture and identity survive”. These qualities make the refugee a problem that needs to be addressed, a site where anxieties about security of borders and surveillance of foreign bodies entering into the territory become more important than the sentimentalisms of humanitarian empathy. Tazzioli (2015) talks about the ‘cartographic anxiety’ a psychosocial condition of contemporary Europeans to make everything visible, to map the flows of illegal migration and to identify routes through which the refugee challenges the sanctity of national borders. Similarly, Papastergiadis (2006: 431) analyses what he calls “the invasion complex”, a collective fear that “creates



a global culture of siege” that both physical and cultural boundaries that demarcate “us” from “them” are being violated. This amalgam of fears and anxieties in turn, serve as a ground for exceptional measures to address the apparent problem; from Farage’s or Orban’s statements that urge to defend “Europe’s Judeo-Christian Culture”⁷ and “Europe to be preserved for the Europeans”⁸, to Slovakian Prime Minister decision to refuse Muslim refugees entering the country but welcoming persecuted Christians – the problem is the culturalized ‘Other’ that needs to be observed, controlled and very often (preferably) expelled.

This form of engineering the ‘Other’ in the European discourse is not something of a recent times, nor is emerging as a response to the refugee problem, but rather is a traditional technique of Europeans to exercise power over the inferior and barbaric Muslim. However, since the publication of Said’s ‘Orientalism’, tectonic geopolitical shifts have dramatically changed the configuration of power in International Relations resulting in the resurface of neo-orientalism as a new form of ‘othering’ where the refugee performs the assigned roles.

‘Civilizational threat’ replacing ‘Civilizational mission’: New faces of European orientalism

The French weekly magazine L’Express in one of its editorials released in April 2011, informed the public about the unexpected rise of popularity of the Raspail’s racist novel “The Camp of the Saints” (1973, in French: Le Camp des Saints), ranked in top 5 bestsellers of the year and reaching an audience of over 70,000 new readers in four years (L’Express, 06 April 2011). At the risk of oversimplification, the dystopian book provides an apocalyptic vision of the fall of the West by innumerable boats carrying immigrants from the Indian sub-continent, that in biblical proportions disembark on the southern shores of Europe (France) which stuck on its guilt for the misfortunes of other races, succumbs to the invasion of barbarians and their perversities.⁹

The book was cited by Marie Le Pen and Geert Wilders in their inflammatory

⁷ Nigel Farage’s comments after deadly attacks against Charlie Hebdo’s journalists (see, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30776186>)

⁸ Statement of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in 26th Bálványos Summer School and Student Camp(see, <http://hungarytoday.hu/news/pm-orban-europe-preserved-europeans-47390>)

⁹Raspail vocabulary in the book is extensively racist and degrading. He writes about “immigrants’ rivers of sperm” “kinky-hair, swarthy-skinned and long-despised Indians “ etc. (see, Shikha Dalmia, The Week, 17 March 2016).

speeches against the “migratory submersion” of the political elites in front of the “tidal waves of refugees flooding Europe”.¹⁰

In fact, the gaining popularity of such a nativist and racist novel is quite indicative to the major shift in the European discursive machinery in rearranging and adjusting the ‘Self – Other’ axis in a new discursive order, where the conventional roles of the ‘European’ and the ‘Muslim’ are inversed, rearticulated and reproblematised. In specific terms, we are witnessing a rupture from the Said’s colonialist ‘Orientalism’ toward ‘Neo-orientalism’ of Raspail, which in the recent decades has become the hegemonic regime of ‘orientalizing’ the ‘other’ (Samiei, 2010). The proud that echoed ‘White Man Burden’ is being replaced with the alarming decay of the ‘Islamisation of Europe’, and adventurous stories of Napoleon incursions in Egypt are being eclipsed by literature that foresees the ‘Fall of the West’ or the ‘Decadence of Western Civilization’. The conventional role of the Orientals as “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike” others who lack intellectual and biological capacity to govern themselves that justified the ‘civilizational mission’ of the “rational, virtuous, mature” Europeans (Said, 1978: 48) has given place to a neo-oriental discourse, which ontologizes the other as a danger, destabilizing agent that pose a existential risk for the Western civilization (Mamdani, 2002). From being an object of European universalist ambitions of civilizing the ‘inferior races’, the ‘other’ in neo-orientalist accounts has become the aggressor, a civilizational threat.

This new form of Orientalism (Neo-Orientalism) is blatantly evident in the rise of the so- called ‘Eurabia’ literature, which is attracting progressively conspiracionist scholars on blaming political establishment and leftist elements in Europe for “dhimmitude”¹¹- a peaceful acceptance of Islamisation of Europe by denying its Judeo-Christian heritage and silently allowing the demographic ‘genocide’ of Europe through pro-immigration policies (BatYe’or,2005).¹² On the other hand, Tariq-Khan (2012: 1599) talks about the “rise of ideologically motivated scholarship in the fields of security studies, terrorism and homeland security” after

¹⁰See, New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/france-election-marine-le-pen.html?mcubz=0>

¹¹ The word dhimmitude is a neologism that etymologically derives from the Arab word dhimmi- “the protected people” referring to non-muslim people living in an Islamic country. The word is used mostly by anti-immigration scholars to refer what they call *servitude* or *submission* of Europe to Islamic interests. (see, www.dhimmitude.org).

¹² Carr (2006) summarizes the key premise underpinning “Eurabia” fantasies: “*Eurabia is a school of conservative opinion...which depicts Europe as a doomed continent, on the brink of cultural extinction in the face of relentless and coordinated campaign of Islamisation*”.



terrorist attacks of 9/11 that has led to the “securitization of Muslims” both in its *technical* meaning of the word as a subject that needs to be under “an intensive surveillance matrix”, and also in *political* sense through interrogation of the Muslims’ traditions and beliefs in public debates about the Islam (in)compatibility with Western norms and culture. But, what explains the shift from the colonialist ‘Orientalism’ to the defensive ‘Neo-orientalism’? There are two major processes taking place in the world politics that explain the emergence of the ‘Other’ as a threat: the first refers to the unique political and social transformations within Islamic world, and the second to the *direct* encounter of Islam with the West as a result of global mobility that makes cultural borders both physically and virtually invisible.

The rise of Islam as a ‘threat’ to the civilized world order: From the 1980s onwards, the Middle East has gone substantial social and political changes, which effectively have put Islam at the center of world attention and reproblemated relations between the West and the Islamic world. The Islamic Revolution in Iran that ended the secular pro-Western Shah regime in 1979 was a prelude of what later will become interpreted as an “Islamic resurgence” against the Western world order (Samiei, 2010). The failing attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the emergence and terrorist activities of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda and most recently ISIS, in the Western eyes are normal sequences of Islam’s attempts to remake the liberal-secular world order. Mavelli and Petito (2012: 934) argue that the imagined threat of Islam to the Westphalia secular international system stems from the ‘Enlightenment narrative that has invented a dichotomy between the religious and secular and constructed the former as an irrational and dangerous impulse that must give way in public to rational, secular forms of power’. For example, Huntington (1994: 210) who by all means fulfills the criteria of a neo-orientalist scholar sketches his ‘clash of civilization’ as taking place between the ‘anti-modernist’ Islamic culture of “uniting religion and politics” and the “Western Christian concept of a separate realms of God and Ceaser” - providing a monolithic understanding of modernity, and abstracting the role of religion and tradition in establishing multiple modernities.¹³ Similarly, there is a general tendency to read terrorism, dictatorships and human rights’ abuses through culturalist lenses, in the sense that these phenomena are

¹³ See Katzenstein (2009) where he argues against monolithic examination of civilizations. The main point he makes is that we cannot think of civilizations and modernity in singular, but rather in plural as multiple civilization and corresponding modernities.

increasingly linked to Islam prerogatives that are discursively invoked to make essentialist claims on the sociopolitical dynamics of the Middle East. In this vein, Mamdani (2002) argues that the Western discourse tends to avoid history, geopolitical interests and the complex construction of political identities in the Middle East by reducing everything associated with it to the cultural attributes of its inhabitants. This is most obvious in the Western reactions after failed attempts of “Arab Spring” and the aftermath that followed the fall of autocrats in Libya and Egypt. Ventura (2017) provides empirical insights on the representation of Arab Spring saga in the Western media as a collective failure of Muslims to end tyrannical regimes and embrace freedoms of liberal democracy. This failure has re-confirmed and strengthened the old orientalist stereotypes that the Orient is “fixed in time and place” and even the democratization experiments such as the ‘Arab Spring’ ends in fiasco and humanitarian catastrophe (Amin Khan, 2012).

The “backward” Muslim meets the “civilized” Westerner: In tandem with the emergence of Islam as a threat to the liberal and secular international order, there has been another important encounter of Islam with the West, where the old geographical and cultural boundaries have been blurred and trivialized (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). Specifically, the Muslim that in medieval times was encountered in the adventurous and exotic stories of European travelers, is not anymore a character of storytellers or a distant ‘stranger’ whose bizarre habits or behaviours are objects of European entertainment and narcissism. Now, the Muslim who embodies a multilayered dimension of ‘otherness’ (as a refugee, immigrant, Muslim, socio-economic disprivileged) displays his/her ‘otherness’ in a foreign land, threatening the hierarchy of values and order of the host country (Casanova, 2004). And as such, the Muslim body, beliefs, habits and in general the totality of values that constitutes him/her as a ‘Muslim’ are objects of security interrogations, thorough examination and exhaustive debates in the European public sphere.

Mavelli (2013) talks about the ‘visual securitization of Islam’ in France, that manifests itself through debates on the burqa and hijab, where the image and appearance of Muslim women is ‘securitized’, in the sense that it becomes a symbol of aggression against French *laïcité*. The image of veiled women is ambivalently constructed: at one level she becomes the vivid expression of the Islamic expansion in France; at another level she represents the visible victim of Islamic patriarchy and gender oppression; a marginal object that has to “be rescued from herself and her faith” (Amin Khan 2012: 1601). The Muslim women is rarely given a voice to tell her

preferences, experiences and motives behind her decisions, because as Ventura (2017: 285) concludes the “West is the subject, the one who studies and speaks, and the East is the object, the one who is studied and spoken about”. Similar patterns of ‘orientalizing’ Muslim refugees are discernable especially after sexual assaults in Germany that were used by the German radical right-wing to attack Merkel’s pro-immigration policies. The German government responded swiftly by opening a website for ‘sexual education for immigrants and refugees’ teaching the refugees about “the right way to have sex” (Faiola and Krichner, 2016). The website (www.zanzu.de) uses highly illustrative graphics and images that educate the refugee about the sexual pleasure, different ways of sexual intercourse, the importance of family planning and sexual transmitting diseases. The premise that underpins such governmental measure is that the refugee is sexually uneducated and unaware about the civilized norms that govern sexuality and as such his naïveté and uncivilized sexual behaviors justify the ‘disciplining’ techniques of the state.

However, the negative representation of the Muslim refugee is just the outer expression of an inner discursive structure that makes ‘meaningful’ and ‘commonsensical’ neo-orientalist stereotypes. Mavelli (2013: 165) refers to an ‘already-existing consolidated discursive realm’ to denote to the totality of discursive mechanisms that constructs the refugee as a threatening and aversive ‘other’. Therefore, in the next sections the focus falls on the examination and deconstruction of linguistic and non-linguistic apparatuses that underpin European response toward the refugee ‘crisis’.

On the semiotics, representation and biopolitics of refugees

Deconstructing the daily lexicon and media coverage of the refugee ‘crisis’

The post-structuralist approach on its deconstructionist mission relies upon myriad techniques of discursive analysis (signs, symbols, texts, communication) de-essentialize social reality and categories through which this reality is operationalized (Van Dijk, 2001). The most recent development within post-structuralist scholarship has been the emergence of the discursive psychology – a new form of discursive analysis oriented especially on the use of spoken and written language as a discursive mechanism to fabricate a ‘reality’ or make something appear factual through the use of rhetorical devices (Wodak, 2011). One of the main contributions of this novel technique consist on its departure from the conventional psychological cognitive approaches that examine the spoken and written language of the speaker/writer as

“a reflection of their inner thoughts and beliefs”, and instead it proposes the examination of language as a device that tends to inaugurate a reality and/or to reify certain categories (Goodman and Burke, 2010: 2). In other words, discursive psychology is not interested if the act of speech reflects the inner thoughts and beliefs of the speaker/writer, but rather on the performativity that the act of speech has for the social reality and others’ perceptions of it.¹⁴ To achieve this objective, discursive psychology exclusively interrogates the syntax of the sentences used to assert a fact or a reality (topos) and elucidates the hidden meanings of metaphors, metonymies, causalities between variables and categorical reasoning produced by the use of language (Goodman et al., 2017). Discursive psychology is mostly applied in the deconstruction of racist language and exclusionary speeches and on the linguistic strategies that legitimize the exclusion/inclusion of a particular group. Therefore, in what follows, this section will focus on the daily vocabulary, figures of speech and categorical reasoning that pervades the representation of the refugees in the European linguistic discourse.

Deconstructing the “crisis”: The European citizen is being continuously told to live along the ‘crisis’ in conditions of perpetual emergency and exceptionalism. In Agamben¹⁵ words: “The concept of ‘crisis’ has indeed become a motto of modern politics, and for a long time it has been part of normality in any segment of social life”. The ubiquity of ‘crisis’ that pervaded the daily discourse of financial and economic downturn of 2008, is being superimposed by another emergency, traumatic event and untypical situation, that of handling the mass arrival of refugees in the shores and gates of Europe. From media’s headlines to the public speeches of governmental officials or far-right exponents, the word ‘crisis’ always follows after the word ‘refugee’, which for Papastergiadis (2006) represents a discursive technology to signify the recipient of the information about the abnormality of situation and the lack of conventional mechanisms to address the ‘obvious’ problem. Roitman (2013: 4) argues that “once we call a problem a crisis we begin to engage in

¹⁴ For example, when Geert Wilders claims that “Immigration is the most dangerous thing against the West”, discursive psychology is not interested if this claim comes from the inner beliefs of Wilder about immigration. Rather, it focuses on the intentions behind this speech and finding what kind of ‘action’ Wilders is calling for with such a claim (see, Wodak and Boukala, 2015).

¹⁵ Agamben gave this response in an interview for Verso (2013), (for more, see, <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1318-the-endless-crisis-as-an-instrument-of-power-in-conversation-with-georgio-agamben>)

a series of logically interconnected steps that unleashes a characteristic pattern of reasoning...[pushing the observer to think] that they are witnessing a fictitious, erroneous or illogical departure from reality'. To put it differently, 'crisis' is a discursive device that demarcates the boundaries between the notion of 'normalcy' and 'abnormalcy', juxtaposing *the present* (abnormality) with "an alternative and more normal situation" (Roitman, 2013: 4). The 'abnormality' of refugees approaching Europe remains intact by the continuous and uninterrupted process of producing 'facts' that confirm the seriousness and exceptionalism of the situation. A totality of discursive machinery is erected to serve this function: newspapers' front pages, journalistic articles, public speeches and institutional communications write about and speak of 'massive flows of refugees' arriving in European borders, 'illegal' routes that refugees use to bypass borders, escalation and tensions between the refugees and the border police or the anarchy and lack of order in the refugees encampments (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti, 2016).

Other mechanisms such as government bodies specialized in migration and demography engage in statistical analysis to compare the numbers of refugees from one year to another, contrast it with the previous trends, and detect patterns of 'sudden' and 'unexpected' upcoming 'waves of refugees' (Wilson and Mavelli, 2016). All of these multiple discourses tend to sketch the refugee problem as a 'broken space, a gap that emerges in the [imagined and discursively constructed] harmonious continuity of the social' (Yilmaz, 2009: 375), and make permissible the use of unconventional measures to neutralize and avoid the evident 'abnormalcy'. Brassett and Vaughan-Williams (2012) talk about the 'traumatized subjectivities' during the times of chaotic and uncontrollable 'crisis', that allow the sovereign power to find recourse on exceptional responses or therapeutical interventions to address the causes of 'trauma' and restore order and stability. The therapeutic governance of the refugee crisis manifests itself in various ways: The construction of fences in the highly 'contested' borderlines as in the case of Hungary, the total ban of refugees based on their religiosity as practiced in Slovakia, or letting the refugees live 'between the borders' and bureaucratic limbo as shown in the Greek and Macedonian cases.

The refugee as a metaphorical figure: The use of figures of speech in the exclusionary language represents another valuable site of examination for discursive analysis, representing another linguistic device that give *meanings* and shape *cognition* of the social reality (Wodak, 2008). Lakoff and Johnson (1989) on their

seminal linguistic book *'Metaphors We Live By'*, suggest that the use of metaphors in communication is not only a matter of how we talk about things or what kind of words we choose to depict things around us, but rather it represents a linguistic technique which influences and structures the way we think and make judgments about these things. In our context, the representation of refugees in metaphorical phrases enframes what can be said and thought about the refugee, and informs implicitly the social cognition with the attributes of the subject (refugee) which constitutes the target of the metaphor. There is a growing interest among linguistics and post-structuralist scholars to identify metaphors about the refugees found in newspapers, public speeches and scholarship articles (Musolff, 2012; Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011; Wodak, 2008; Törmä, 2017).

Törmä (2017) identifies two major metaphors used in reporting, talking or writing about the current refugee 'crises in Europe. The *Water* metaphor expressed in the use of liquid words such as 'floods, tidal waves, tsunami, floodgates', and *Animal* metaphor that finds expression in the representation of refugees in terms of 'flocks, swarms, jungle, parasites'. For example, Bill Cash a British conservative MP, in one of his speeches in the House of Commons said: "Germany... [should do more] to help stop the *tsunami* of millions of people who could well come over here and swamp Europe" (The Independent, 16 September 2015). The use of 'tsunami' and 'swamp' as metaphors to describe the arrival of refugees, evoke emergency and exceptionalism same as in conditions of 'natural disasters' that destroy everything in their path. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban made similar associations when claimed that "The wave [of refugees] has reached us now" and that Europe has to stop "migrants to flood us" (as quoted in Cioban, 2016: 33). The repertoire of water metaphors with the refugees on the target is further exaggerated in media reports and newspapers articles. Daily Mail (26 June 2015) writes about how the "*tidal wave* of migrants could be the biggest threat to Europe since the war"; Herald Sun (26 July 2015) warns that "Labour Party could open the *floodgates* on refugees" or BBC (20 June 2015) alarming headlines such as "Migrants *flood* trains in desperate bid to leave Italy". For Parker (2015) the association of migrants/refugees with the liquidity of water tends to portray the refugees as an entity in motion that permeate easily and inevitably any physical constrains and that arrive in a 'sudden', 'dramatic' and 'threatening' way. Furthermore, Haddad (2002: 33) argues that the use of liquid metaphors for the refugees is in "contrast with the territorializing metaphors of identity- such as roots, soils, trees, seeds" that are mostly invoked to refer to the sedentary identity and status of the native people.

Similar discursive patterns of metaphorical representation of the refugees are found in the use of animalistic words as lexical substitutions for the refugees' behaviours, living conditions or way of life. While the use of water metaphors forges the image of the refugee as a 'threat' that is difficult to contain, the animal metaphors dehumanize refugees and highlight their otherness compared to the non-refugee or the privileged citizen. To use the religious inspired concept of 'The Great Chain of Being', the refugee is placed in hierarchical order below the 'normal' human because language constructs them as less-than human, lacking "refinement, civility, morality, self-control and cognitive sophistication" (Esses et al., 2013: 522). The most obvious and vivid case is the 'Calais camp' most commonly known as the 'Jungle' that for two years served as a shelter for more than six thousand refugees and immigrants on their attempt to reach United Kingdom. As Crawley (2016) points out "The name [Jungle] that this place has been given is a symbol of otherness, suggesting a wild, untamed lawless environment in which people roam freely and uncontrolled". In Agambenian terms, the 'Jungle' represents a zone where 'the state of exception' unfolds and people living in it establish the *zoe*, the bare and naked life stripped from any right or privilege of the *bios* (see next section). Furthermore, as Törmä (2017) argues the 'Jungle' becomes a notion not only to refer a particular territory where "anarchy and chaos reign", but also a metonymy for its inhabitants, that automatically renders them as dangerous, uncivilized - as Residents of the 'Jungle'.¹⁶ Other dehumanizing metaphors such as Mirror's attention-grabbing headline "Stunning interactive map shows thousands of migrants flocking to Europe every month..."¹⁷, or David Cameron's controversial remarks that "swarms of refugees are crossing the Mediterranean" further reinforce the pejorative image of the refugee as an abject 'other' that lacks individuality and agency but succumbs to the instinctual forces of the masses ('flock' or 'swarm') to reach the desired destination (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011).

On the categorization of refugees: Edward Said in his seminal book 'Orientalism' argues that one the main features of the classical orientalist discourse

¹⁶ See, Human Rights Watch recent report 'Like Living in Hell' (26.07.2017) about the French Police abuses of immigrants and refugees during the evacuation of the 'Jungle camp'. (<https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/26/living-hell/police-abuses-against-child-and-adult-migrants-calais#page>)

¹⁷ This is related to the 'cartographic anxiety' that we described in the second section. This anxiety manifests itself in continuous preoccupation to map everything, visualize and identify zones or routes of demographic motion.

is the construction and reification of antagonist categories based on Manichean worldviews of ‘civilized’ versus ‘uncivilized’, or ‘The West’ versus ‘The Orient’. In our contemporary world, especially after the terrorists attacks of 9/11 and the commencement of ‘war on terror’, binary categories of ‘us’ against ‘them’ have regained significance and new patterns of categorization have emerged and consolidated (Salter, 2007). Mamdani (2002) discerns that the increasing association of Islam with terrorism has given place to another discursive differentiation of Muslims in ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’. ‘Good’ Muslims represents the peaceful and law-abiding persons that distance themselves from the violent acts of radical Islam (see, Tony Blair, 2005). On the other hand, ‘bad’ Muslim are the hijackers of the real Islam, an indoctrinated believer who commits acts of violence and horror in the name of Allah, against the proper interpretation of religious texts (see, George Bush, 2001). Wilson and Mavelli (2016: 6) argue that this narrative of Good/Bad Muslims “has contributed to constructing good Muslims as devoid of agency, as potential victims of...radicalized and politicized views of Islam”. This narrative is being reproduced in the Western approach toward the refugees; the *good/genuine/real* refugees mostly associated with women, children, or men that have experienced torture or rape, and *bad/ queue jumpers/ bogus asylum seekers* that migrate to Europe not to seek protection but to benefit from the welfare payments of European countries (Fiddain-Qasmiyeh, 2016). For Mamdani (2002: 767) the decisive criteria that governs this categorization is premised on the gendered construction of the ‘genuine’ refugee as a powerless ‘other’ who lacks agency to change her predatory culture and whose “salvation lies as always, in philanthropy, in being saved from the outside”.

Conversely, the *bogus* refugee challenges his victimhood by exercising agency in the form of ‘illegal’ border passing or actively seeking survival strategies that put into question the axiom that reduces him ontologically to a mere victim (Wilson and Mavelli, 2016).

The same categorization is evident in the media coverage of the ‘crisis’, where the blurred lines that define the differences between the ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ are utilized in framing the refugee ‘crisis’ in a particular direction. For example, Goodman et al., (2017) argue that the use of term ‘refugee’ in media is invoked to describe the deserving category of asylum-seekers that are fleeing their homes because of persecution or extreme warfare conditions. On the other hand, the term ‘migrant’ labels the undeserving category of people that come to Europe

‘voluntarily’ for economic reasons, jeopardizing the welfare and prosperity of the host country. In this regard, the use of these terms is intentional, depending on the image that the media tend to push forward for these people. Greussing et al. (2017), examined the mediatic frames (lenses through which the refugee crisis is interpreted) of different newspapers in Europe¹⁸ and concluded that the media uses different frames to cover the refugee ‘crisis (i.e victimization, criminality, or economization frame).¹⁹ For instance, during the Calais turmoil or sexual assaults in Germany, media relied on criminality frame that associates the refugees with “illegality, terrorism, and crime” (p.3). On other occasions, such as the death of young Aylan in the shores of Turkey, the media ‘activates’ the victimization frame that calls for a humanitarian treatment of the refugees as a moral obligation to the others’ sufferings.

Taken together, the demeaning language of ‘othering’ and media neo-orientalist representation of the refugees constitutes that segment of discursive realm responsible for the ‘normalization’ of differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and provides ‘lenses’ through which the refugee ‘crisis’ has to be conducted (Hurd, 2016). Once the ‘crisis’ is constructed and the figure of the refugee is delineated, the intervention of sovereign power comes into expression. The biopolitics and the entire institutional, administrative and physical mechanisms intervene in the ‘refugee’ problematique aiming to govern and organize the refugee’s life and body.

The Refugee between ‘ZOE’ and ‘BIOS’: The biopolitics and governmentality of the refugee crisis

Agamben’s opus magnum ‘*Homo Sacer*’ (1994) represents one of the most influential post- modernist contributions in the post-Foucault deconstructionist scholarship. Despite the undisputed influence of Foucault’s concepts (especially biopolitics and governmentality) that are central to Agamben’s political theory, ‘*Homo Sacer*’ makes an important breakthrough in the re- conceptualization of the relations between bio-power and sovereignty, introducing a rupture from the

¹⁸ The study covers 10,606 newspaper articles in the period from January 2015 to January 2016. Some of the newspapers included in the study were *Der Standard*, *Kronenzeitung*, *Die Presse*, *Salzburger Nachrichten* etc

¹⁹ Economization frame refers to the representation of refugee crisis in economic terms such as ‘refugees are burden to the economy’ or media reporting about ‘welfare frauds by asylum-seekers (see, Greussing et al., 2017

Foucauldian decentralized conception of power relations. The decisive schism between the two lies in the different readings of how bio-power operates; while Foucault offers a contextualized and contingent interpretation of the *biopolitics* as emerging at the dawn of Modern Age with the rise of bio-power (understood as a multiplicity of power relations that permeates every level of social interaction) and the decline of sovereign power, Agamben re-introduces a top-down or legal-judicial notion of power, arguing that the sovereign and bio-power are not mutually exclusive, but in contrary, the latter has been historically an instrument of the former (Neal 2004, Erlenbusch 2013). As Agamben (1995: 7) points out: “It can ... be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power”. In other words, for Agamben, the biopolitics does not substitute sovereign power, nor the birth of bio-power is a by-product of modernity as Foucault suggests, but rather these two have ‘originary bond’ that can be traced back to the ancient Greece and Roman times (Agamben, 1995: 15).

Based on these theoretical grounds, Agamben digs in the history of ancient times to elucidate the earliest forms of biopolitics in the Western political tradition and the production of ‘docile bodies’ vulnerable to sovereign intervention. Agamben’s point of departure is that the Western biopolitics operates through exclusion/inclusion of bodies from the political and juridical realm which constitutes “the fundamental categorical pair of Western politics” (1995: 8). A historical archetype of the Western biopolitical activity is found in the Ancient Greece, in the etymological distinction between ‘*zoe*’ and ‘*bios*’ - two Greek words that refer to our single word of ‘life’ but which are semantically very different from each other. ‘*Zoe*’ in the ancient Greece referred to the mere fact of living, a biological existence common to all living beings which Agamben calls “the pure fact of birth”; ‘*Bios*’ on the other hand, indicated the proper or ‘the qualified life’ of living in *polis* and participating in the community life of the city which makes human beings distinguishable from animals (Agamben, 1995: 4).²⁰ This distinction is crucial to understand the inner workings of Western biopolitics because as Agamben argues

²⁰ It is interesting how Agamben makes an analogy between ‘*zoe/bios*’ and ‘voice/language’. He argues that ‘voice’ in the Ancient Greece was considered to be a feature of all living beings to express pain and pleasure, but ‘language’ was a unique ability of humans to express what is ‘bad’ and ‘good’, also to make the distinction between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’. The point that Agamben tries to make by using this analogy is to show that same as ‘language’ that needs ‘voice’ to articulate words, the ‘*bios*’ too needs ‘*zoe*’ to establish itself as the opposite image of ‘bare life’ (see, Agamben, 1995, p.7-8).

the “Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of *bare life/ political existence, zoe/bios, exclusion/inclusion*” (p.8). Put it differently, the bio-power of the sovereign is exercised through perpetual production of ‘zoe’ or bare life, of those who are excluded from the political realm (*bios*) and stripped of any political or juridical rights and who can be killed or tortured with impunity (Brassett et al., 2012). The existence of ‘zoe’- unworthy form of life- is both outside the ‘*bios*’ because of its exclusion, but also inside the ‘*bios*’ because it is the sovereign power which perpetually problematizes the exclusion, the ‘*bare life*’, the ‘*zoe*’ (Agamben, 1995: 11).

Agamben’s unique analysis on the functioning of Western biopolitics has been at the center of post-structuralist scholars who rely on Agamben’s categories of ‘*zoe/bios*’ to illuminate the inclusionary/exclusionary practices of contemporary Western bio-power but also to interrogate the production of subaltern forms of life and spatialization of violence in the modern nation-state (Papastergiadis, 2006). Specifically, a particular interest has been given to the production of refugees as *biopolitical bodies* through which the ‘*zoe/bios*’ dichotomies are reproduced and the “normal liberal citizen-subject is performed into existence” (Brasset et al., 2012: 22). Even Agamben himself considered that the refugees’ body is the most vivid expression of ‘bare life’ who “had lost all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still human” (Agamben, 1995: 81). In our globalized world, the production of ‘zoe’ and ‘bios’ is reflected on the selectivity and contradictions of globalization, in the sense that this phenomenon has produced different global subjects; the globalized subjects who enjoy the privileges of global mobility (capitalists, tourists, bureaucrats, academics) embodying neoliberal values of innovation, consumption, entrepreneurship, and the *liminal* subjects who represent the the refugee, the sans papiers that being deprived from the privileges of the ‘borderless world”, they inhabit the ‘zoe’- the deportation camp or fall victim of Kafkaesque bureaucratic procedures that construct them as precarious, deportable and temporal bodies (Fassin, 2005). As such, the refugee becomes a site of biopolitical intervention, a marginal and trivialized body that ‘fluctuates’ in illegality without a defined and permanent status and whose life is in permanent state of uncertainty, anxiety and ‘legal limbo’. Speaking in Hobbesian terms, the refugee is not a contractual party of the ‘social contract’ with any sovereign state that would constitute him/her as a citizen with duties and rights, but rather it is a ‘matter out of state’ or a biological being that is denied to participate in the matters of the *polis*

(Papastergiadis, 2006). In the actual socioeconomic context that is pervaded by major economic and financial crisis, the precarity and radical alterity of the refugee stabilizes the anxieties and insecurities of inhabitants of the neoliberal polis. As Kristoglou and Tsimouris (2015: 7) argue: “In a climate of insecurity exacerbated by the international financial crisis, and state and non-state terrorism, one person’s perceived security is experienced relative to another person’s precarity”, suggesting that the marginality and the insecure status of the refugees enables the reproduction of neoliberalism and neoliberal subjectivities. The superfluous body of the refugee represents the ‘abjected’ and in the same time the ideal ‘other’ upon which the neoliberal ‘bios’ secures existence throughout its inherent and chronic crisis. But, what are the biopolitical mechanisms used in the production of the refugee as the ‘zoe’ of the contemporary Europe? And, what are the personal experiences of those who encounter such mechanisms?

The ‘biopolitics of otherness’ and the production of ‘bare life’ requires a synchronic operation of multiple policing technologies and administrative apparatuses that materialize in practice the subjugation and containment of the outsiders’ body. Abstractly speaking, the technologies employed in the subjectivation of the refugee can be divided in two major categories: the *spatial* technologies oriented in the capture, surveillance and ‘quarantining’ of bodies out of the bios in the physical sense, and *procedural* biopolitical mechanisms that interrogate, scientize and manage the legal status of the ‘foreigners’ through labyrinths of detailed and rigorous bureaucratic procedures (Fassin, 2011; Jeffers, 2012). The former consists on the techniques that aim to *spatialise* the refugee through mechanisms of surveillance of the borders, sophistication of border checks, routine patrols to capture the *san papiers*, waiting zones in the airports and most importantly the establishment of detention camps as a site where the refugee is physically secluded from the polis, and is ontologically and practically reduced to a mere biological being. On the other hand, procedural technologies function through daily bureaucracies, interviews, physical and psychological examination of the asylum seekers to (dis)prove the credibility of the refugees’ claims that they fled from prosecution and sufferings (Bendixsen et al., 2016). As Jeffers (2012) argues: refugees become “enmeshed in a bureaucratic performance” where they have to persuade authorities of their persecution and imminent threat in the native country if the asylum application is rejected. Therefore, the refugee has to narrate his/her own story, provide details of the assumed victimhood and show ‘traces’ of physical



or psychic persecution. In narrating the story the refugees have to speak confidently and without nervousness about their distant past, otherwise a 'weak performance' is translated in immediate deportation without any right for appeal (Cabot, 2014). These forms of intimate physical and psychological examinations through the never-ending bureaucracies represent the most sophisticated form of technological intervention that perpetually produces and governs ambiguous, precarious and transitory biopolitical bodies.

Conclusions

The end of Cold War and the beginning of the 21st century has found Europe in crossroad. The cosmopolitan vision of European Union as epitomized by its emblematic motto 'Unity in Diversity' is giving place to the 'revisionist' decries that urge for 'Fortress of Europe'. European identity that for more than fifty years embodied values of solidarity and multi-culturalism is being overshadowed by a new specter that urges isolationism, cultural segregation and national purity (Wodak et al., 2015). In fact, the process of redefinition of Europe is neither confined to a marginal segment of political spectrum that calls explicitly for 'Europe for Europeans', nor it takes place in a normal economic and political landscape (Wodak et al., 2015). Rather, the reinvention of Europe is indicative for a major paradigmatic shift in European consciousness that surpass the rigidities of political affiliations. Furthermore, Europe is seeking a new identity for itself in an ever-changing and unpredictable international constellation, superimposed by major economic and financial crises that have unleashed new fear, anxieties and traumas (Sassatelli, 2009). This is the context of the European inner dynamics upon which the current refugee drama is orchestrated.

Disciples of Huntingtonian paradigm (i.e. Bowen 2010, Lauraence and Vaisse 2006) that rely on crude essentialism and ahistoricism to interpret current identity dynamics provide a simplistic and reductionist explanations on the identity shifts in the post-Cold War era. According to these accounts, the redefinition of Europe along cultural lines and skepticism toward the cultural 'Other' is a normal consequence of the revival of civilizational identities and reconfiguration of international politics along primordialist categories of identification (Yilmaz 2012) . Applied in refugee crisis, this approach explains (if not naturalize) the European reluctance to accept refugees in their countries based on the essentialist understanding that European identity and Islamic identity are irreconcilable and stand in perpetual opposition with

each other due to some fixed and transhistorical dispositions or properties that make Islam and the West dichotomous and mutually exclusive ontological categories (Hall, 2007) Instead, this paper calls for a *relational/ processual style of analysis* that does not conceive identities as ‘sealed’ and static entities with some dispositional characteristics, but rather examines them as discursive practices that are dynamic and in an incessant process of construction and discursive reproduction (Emirbayer, 1997). In our particular case, the refugee problematique has to be contextualized within the dynamic of European identity formation and that the discourse over the refugee ‘crisis’ must be examined as taking place in the “interplay between national fears and anxieties over global processes” (Papastergiadis, 2006:431).

Therefore, this article aimed to argue that the refugee ‘crisis’ has emerged as a decisive event in conditions where Europe was seeking an ‘enemy’ to forge its own culturalist identity. The refugee meets the exigencies of European ‘other’ as the reverse image through which the European ‘Self’ is constructed and reproduced (Kristoglou and Tsimouris, 2015). The refugee as a de-territorialized body becomes a valuable discursive instrument to forge new senses of belonging for Europeans but also it represents the marginal ‘other’ whose suffering relativize the insecurities and anxieties of the European citizen after traumas of economic and financial crisis. The refugee who is synonymous with ‘Muslim’ takes a central position in the discursive exercises of European ‘neo-orientalism’ that replaces expansionist orientalisms of Medieval times with defensive orientalisms that constructs the Muslim not as an object that needs to be governed but as a ‘threat’, a ‘danger’ that possess the risk of alienating the Western civilization (Saimej, 2015). These novel forms of ‘orientalizing’ the Muslims manifest themselves in myriad discursive practices, from the daily lexicon used to speak of and write about the refugee, to the categorization of refugees on ‘good and bad refugees’ and ‘bogus and genuine refugees’. The representation of the refugees through demeaning metaphors and metonymies in media reporting but also in public speeches portrays the refugee as ‘natural catastrophe’ or inhumane being that is more instinctual than rational (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011). Ultimately, the refugee becomes a ‘docile body’, a venue of biopolitical interventions where different technologies (bureaucracies, camps of detention, permanent surveillance and control) produce the refugee as inhabitant of ‘zoe’ of bare and naked life, who is expelled from the matters of polis and is ontologically reduced to a mere living being that fluctuates in a permanent state of ambiguity, precariousness and unpredictability.

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