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TABLE OF CONTENTS

THEMATIC ARTICLES – NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY	3
From National Identity to European Identity, <i>Radu CINPOES</i>	3
Is there a European Identity? National Attitudes and Social Identification toward the European Union, <i>Mathieu PETITHOMME</i>	15
RESEARCH ARTICLES	37
Migrant Integration: Case for a Necessary Shift of Paradigm, <i>Dieu Donné HACK- POLAY</i>	37
Inter-Ethnic Marital Practice of Bangladeshi Diaspora—An Example of Diaspora Adaptation at this Age of Globalization, <i>Nayeem SULTANA and Solvay GERKE</i> ...	57
What is the Tool of Globalization Good for? Supra-National Actors and the Integration of the Jewish Community/Diaspora in Contemporary Germany, <i>Roxana BARBULESCU</i>	82
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS	102

THEMATIC ARTICLES – NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

From National Identity to European Identity

Radu CINPOES

Abstract. Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and especially in the past few years, the European Union has been going through a mixed process of expansion and consolidation. In the last ten years alone there were two new waves of accession, the EU launched the single currency and failed attempts have been made to introduce a constitution. With all these transformations taking place, attention is more and more centred on the question whether a European identity is emerging. This article investigates this issue examining comparatively the patterns of national identity and of European identity formation and focusing on whether the relationship between the two is a zero-sum type. The aim is to show that although national identity is not necessarily an obstacle for the development of European identity, nationalism is.

Key words: *European identity, national identity, nationalism*

Introduction

An important issue of current debate about identity in the European Union centres on whether or not the process of construction of a European identity necessarily requires the 'erosion' of national identity to the extent that European identity would take primacy over it. The aim of this paper is to engage with such debates and to evaluate the relationship between national identity and European identity using an approach based primarily on nationalist theory.

I argue that, for theoretical and heuristic reasons, nationalist theory can provide a framework for the analysis of European identity formation. Comparing the patterns and processes involved in forging European identity with those that

have taken place in the formation of national identity could offer insights into the methods appropriate to European identity formation.

As in the case of the nationalist elites, the political elites of the European Union employ specific myths and values in order to rally support and to create a sense of belonging: there is a process of selection of these elements according to their potential to 'resonate' with people's consciousness. The selection of a European flag, a European anthem and even a European Day are but some examples for the creation of a symbolic discourse that aims to convey a sense of unity within the European Union.

This paper aims to assess whether national identity and European identity are to some degree mutually exclusive.

1. National identity and nationalism

What do we mean by national identity and how is it constructed? Without rehearsing the debates in the field of nationalist studies between various 'camps' (primordialists, perennialists, ethno-symbolists and modernists), I will state that my approach rests on the modernist claims that nations are modern constructs, that nationalism preceded (and indeed led to) the creation of nations, and that nationalism is primarily a political ideology concerned with power and the modern state (Gellner 1965, 168; Hobsbawm, 1992, 10; Breuilly, 1993, 1). National identity is a type of collective identity that gives allegiance to the nation. The concept of nation is an elusive one (Gellner, 1983, 6), which in minimalist terms can be understood as a community – an 'imagined community' as Anderson (1991, 6) argues – of equal individuals who share a set of common values. There is also some degree of agreement among critics that membership in the nation contains an *objective* dimension and a subjective one. The first has to do with aspects such as territory, mass education, and, more importantly, common legal rights and duties and a claim to sovereignty (Gellner, 1983, 7; Smith, 1993, 30). The latter refers to a common culture, which functions as the cement that unites the members of the community. It is important to stress the difference between 'nation' and 'state'. While the nation is the community of people that share a sense of common history and culture, the state is a legal entity that has to do with power and authority and possesses both internal and external sovereignty over its territory and its body of citizens, and is constituted in the form of laws (Habermas, 1998, 107). However,

the two concepts are conflated by the nationalist ideology, whose main tenet is that the nation should be able to fulfill itself politically through state power. This connection is reinforced even at the level of culture: national identity has to make reference to state institutions to the extent that culture – conceived in national terms – is produced, reproduced and transmitted within institutionalised frameworks. What makes a culture ‘national’ is precisely the fact that it is regulated through institutional constraints (standardised language, educational systems, etc.).

As such, the process of nation-building and of national identity formation is a political product: it is directed towards acquiring or maintaining state-power, and it is the product of elites who use materials from group cultures in order to rally mass support (Breuilly, 1993, 2, Brass, 1991, 8). Despite some critics’¹ tendencies to discount its role in the development of nationalism, culture does play a crucial role in the process of identity formation and it can also help to account for the often non-rational character of nationalism. The function of ‘myths, memories, values and symbols’ in nation formation becomes more visible with modernisation and the advent of ‘print capitalism’ (Smith, 1986, 15; Anderson, 1991). They are strengthened by the shift from an oral to a written culture. Their mass availability contributes, as “a crucial instrument in cultural reproduction”, to the creation of “means of allegiance on the basis of social identification” (Schöpflin, 1997, 21). Thus, Smith is correct in assuming that these symbols and myths of communal past are essential in binding communities together. However, construction of the nation should be seen as a top to bottom process, where nationalist elites select, modify, use and often fabricate such myths of common descent – as Breuilly (1996, 150-152) points out – in order to forge a sense of loyalty to national community they claim to represent². Whether these stories of communal past are genuine or fictitious is not particularly relevant for the study of nationalism: as long as the members of groups perceive them as real, and as long they are effective as means

¹ See Breuilly’s statement: “To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernisation is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power” (Breuilly, 1993, 1).

² In *The Sacred and the Profane*, Mircea Eliade offers some good examples of how myths are created on a very loose basis of real events: on the one hand there are the real events (a young man goes into the woods, falls off a cliff and dies) and on the other hand there is the mythologised interpretation of the event (a young man goes into the woods, he is cursed by the witch of the forest, loses his mind, throws himself off a cliff and dies). The role of the myths is to offer models of conduct, which are dictated by supernatural powers.

of rallying support for the nation, they should be considered when examining nationalist discourse.

2. Pattern of European Identity Construction

In the case of European identity, one can notice patterns strikingly similar to those of national identity construction. Of course, as this process is in progress, some aspects are better developed, whereas other are less clearly shaped. Nevertheless, what we have in the case of the European Union – which is recognisable from the framework of the nation-state – is both the *objective* dimension: there is a territory, and there are sets of common legal rights and duties, which are manifest through the agency of institutionalised state-like structures, and the *subjective* one: loyalty to the political community is being constructed through the employment of the same elements for symbolic selection, reinforcement and reproduction (historical myths, symbols, etc.).

Equally importantly, the project of the European Union is fundamentally elite-driven, in the same way the national projects are, which spreads gradually from top to bottom, explaining why identification with and support for the construction of a united European community is higher among political and social elites and lower at the grass-roots level (at least in the initial stages) (Llobera, 2003, 164; Risse, 2005, 296).

At the institutional and legal (objective) level it can be argued that the European Union has already moved far beyond the initial project of an economic community (and a cooperation limited to coal and steel as the 1951 Treaty of Paris established) and has taken – to all intents and purpose – the shape of statehood. Various stages in the development of the European Union reflect the non-linear character of the project. Delanty distinguishes three phases in the evolution of the European venture, each corresponding to an important shift in focus (and to a change in name). In the aftermath of WWII, the European Economic Community (EEC) emphasised close economic ties based on cooperation between sovereign states. In the second phase – in the 1980's – when the adjective 'economic' was dropped (EC), there is a move from cooperation to interdependence, with an enhanced legal and administrative integration, but still maintaining the emphasis on sovereign states. Since the early 1990's, with the new phase emerging, the name was changed to European Union (EU) and the focus shifted to social integration, with increasing law and

regulatory policies and with the new legal concept of European citizenship (Delanty, 2000, 109-110). Moreover, the institutional framework of the European Union – the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Central Bank, etc. are independent from national governments; the members of the representative institutions – the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the European Parliament have the double mission of acting as government and constituency representatives while, at the same time, representing the Union as a whole (Laffan, 2004, 84-85).

In parallel to these supranational institutional developments, deliberate efforts from the Union have been visible, especially in last decades, towards the construction of some sense of European collective identity, at least at the symbolic level. A range of techniques has been employed in this process. Powerful symbols, usually associated with the nation-state have been created: the European Union has a flag, an anthem, a Europe Day and a motto. Perhaps the most significant symbol of European unity is the common currency, the euro, which – besides its obvious value as a unified medium of exchange, “[has] been designed to appeal to a pan-EU audience [...] each of the seven notes bear[ing] the image of a bridge intended to represent different European architectural styles” (Dunkerley et al., 2002, 118).

The EU has also placed significant focus on education, creating programmes fittingly called Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus, Comenius and Tempus encouraging cultural exchange.

The goal of such projects is two-fold. On the one hand they have a formal, subjective value, which is to create a sense of solidarity by appealing (as in the cases of the anthem and of the names of the education) to personalities that have universal, but also European (especially through geographical location) value. On the other hand, there is a deeper level of substance at which they operate. These programmes play the role of exposing the younger generation to patterns of cooperation and cultural exchange between various parts of Europe, and thus, emphasise similarity (in diversity – as the EU strives to achieve) rather than difference.

Finally, the drive towards the forging of a European identity is also visible in the language employed in EU discourse. “Messages [...] based on such values as ‘peace’, ‘unity’, ‘friendship’, ‘harmony’, and the like [...] directly stress the desire

of European institutions to present ‘Europe’ as a human community” (Brutter, 2005, 128).

3. National and European Identities: Conflict or Mutual Recognition?

I have so far focused on showing the similarities between national identity and European identity in terms patterns of construction and articulation. This discussion, however, does not necessarily mean that the two identities are incompatible, that the relationship between them is a zero-sum type or that in order for European identity to develop, national identity needs to be at least eroded.

In examining whether national identity and European identity are mutually exclusive or at least hostile to one another, I will engage with two types of views: on the one hand with those claiming that national and European identities are in competition and that in the foreseeable future national identity is likely to endure (an opinion shared primarily – but not exclusively – by scholars of nationalism who argue for the pre-modern roots of nations, such as Smith). On the other hand, there is the view – defended by Habermas, among others – that the bases of identification with the European community are radically different from those with the national community; national and European identities are, thus, compatible and they can coexist peacefully.

Both these types of arguments rest on the generally agreed claim that people can have multiple identities. There are various models of observing any hierarchical pattern to how these identities are displayed as well as the interaction between them. One can distinguish between *nested* identities (conceived as concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls), *‘marble-cake’* type identities (that cannot be separated on different levels and where components influence each other), *cross-cutting*, or *separate* (Risse, 2005, 295-296; Herrmann and Brewer, 2004, 8). Also, within the multitude of identities and individual has, it is important to recognise the role of choice in shaping the weight given to particular identities (Sen, 2006, 4).

This framework opens the possibility for national and European identities to coexist. Although individuals may have multiple identities, specific contexts and circumstances dictate which identity becomes more important (to the extent that it takes primacy over any other) at a particular time. The nature of the relationship

between different identities is dictated by the categories those identities belong to. One can distinguish between contrasting and non-contrasting identities: the first type accounts for the identification with groups belonging to the same category, while the latter refers to groups belonging to different categories (Sen, 2006, 28). On this basis, as national and European identities compete – as I have shown – over identical types of structures (both objectively and subjectively), it is conceivable that there are conditions that may cause national identity to come into conflict with European identity. Factors such as economic decline, migration, etc., can bring about such re-evaluations of identities.

Smith argues that such situations are important, and that European identity is not attainable at the expense of national identity. His argument is based on the claim that national identity, once established, is impossible to remove (short of genocide), as it reinforces itself on the basis of its links with the older cultural myths, memories, values and symbols of the core ethnies. By contrast, European identity cannot command such emotional commitment because it lacks such deeply rooted rituals and ceremonies of collective identification (Smith, 1992, 73; Smith, 1993, 30, 131-134).

Similarly, Shore points out that European identity formation fails where national identities have succeeded. He argues that Europe's common values such as "Greco-Roman tradition, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, civil right tradition, democracy and the rule of law, etc." are inadequate in providing solidarity; moreover, deeply rooted values such as language, historical myths, memories and symbols emphasise division rather than unity (Shore 1998, in Llobera, 2003, 165).

The other category of arguments suggests that European identity can be constructed and can function alongside national identities, because their markers of cohesiveness are different. Unlike national identities which are based on perceived primordial allegiances and are enforced by shared cultures and history, attachment to the European Union can be based on what Habermas calls 'constitutional patriotism'; this rests on popular sovereignty and human rights and is shaped by the emergence of a European public sphere, of a political culture shared by all citizens of Europe (Llobera, 2003, 166, Habermas, 2001, 16).

The empirical evidence brought forward to contradict the opinion that national identity and European identity operate in zero-sum terms is generally drawn from surveys (such as the Eurobarometer). Quoting Carey (2002) and Citrin

and Sides (2004), Risse suggests that such surveys show that national identification and European identification are not perceived as contradictory: people feel part of both communities (Risse, 2005, 295). Further survey results come to similar conclusions: a higher identification with the EU does not involve a lower level of national identity (Castano, 2004, 50).

I will now turn to these arguments and explore them. Smith is correct in pointing out that culture plays a crucial role in determining the nature of the relationship between national and European identities. He also concedes that if the nation is regarded as a civic construct, based on voluntary association of rational citizens, the conflict is less apparent, whereas when the nation is viewed as an organic, cultural unit, the contradiction becomes sharper (Smith, 1992, 56). The distinction between civic/political and ethnic/cultural nations, however, is not helpful, because it points to ideal-type cases that are not mirrored by real-life equivalents. Nations that are regarded more or less as models of the civic type (such as Britain, the United States or France) limit consistently membership in the nation according to 'ethnic' criteria. One needs to look no further than the immigration laws of such countries where exclusion from citizenship continues to occur on the basis of ancestry, blood, etc (Spencer and Wollman, 2002, 104-105).

Thus, it is difficult to conceive many communities that are – as Habermas argues – solely linked by abstract notions of civic duties and human rights. Underneath all this there has to exist some perceived sense of common culture, which provides an emotional bond to the members of the community. The emotional aspect is crucial in reinforcing identity, even when that identity rests on individual freedom and rights. Even when the latter (rights and duties) remain very important, the discourse of flagging of identity finds it necessary to go beyond them and to appeal to some kind of revered cultural baggage. In his famous Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln does precisely that, invoking the “hallowed ground, “the brave men, living and dead, who struggled here [and who] have consecrated it [so] that this nation, under God³, shall have a new birth of freedom” in order to command loyalty to a nation “conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal” (Lincoln, 1863, online).

³ There is considerable scholarly debate whether the words ‘under God’ were part of the draft Lincoln used to address the Union. The version used here is the one inscribed on the walls at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.

In contrast to Smith's argument, I have suggested that a sense of belonging based on such values has been constructed in the case of the nation-state, and there is no reason why it cannot be replicated – and indeed it *is being* constructed – in the case of the European Union.

In principle, the 'withering away' of national identity is not a prerequisite for the construction of European identity. People can have multiple identities. What makes the relationship between these particular two special is: 1. the fact that they compete on the same type of institutional frameworks; and 2. the fact that they compete on the same type of symbols.

Most importantly, national identity is the basis for the nationalist ideology, and nationalism claims that the nation should take primacy over all other forms of social identification. On that basis, nationalism is able to command allegiance and loyalty against anything that could threaten (or be seen as threatening) the nation (national sovereignty):

The stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics. The growth in the scope of the European Union in the realm of economics, politics and culture, which have previously been under the sole control of the nation-state, impinges on this view of the nation. (Carey, 2002, 391)

The implication is not that *national identity* functions as a barrier for the development of European identity, but that *nationalism* does. National identity is flagged and emphasised on a daily basis through what Billig calls 'banal nationalism' and it is embedded in the daily routines through "words of linguistic 'deixis'" such as 'we', 'this', 'here' etc. (1995, 94). This everyday, yet hardly benign nationalism becomes habitual, yet the mysticism of the 'homeland' can easily invoke the loyalty and sacrifice of the people, when "competing visions of homelands draw different boundaries around the same places" (Billig, 1995, 78). Although survey show – as mentioned earlier – that people feel that they belong to both national and European communities simultaneously, when it comes to the transfer of sovereignty from the nation-state to the EU (i.e. when the two come into potential contrast), nationalism is able to influence choices, through its

emotive powers. It is the emotional force that plays an important role in evaluating identity in such cases rather than civic values or even profit. As Risse (2005, 297) points out, categories of people such as farmers and women should, in theory, be more supportive and loyal to the EU, the first group because the EU spends the largest percent of the budget on its common agricultural policy, and the second because the EU championed gender equality; despite all this, support for the EU is rather low in both cases.

A solution for national and European identity to co-exist is if national identity disengages from the nationalist claim about the necessity to be congruent with the state. The two can share their common grounds as well as recognise differences in a harmonious way only when they stop competing over the same institutional framework. In other words, for European identity to take off it is necessary to separate nationality and citizenship and “to extract the nation from the state and shape it into a more flexible cultural process independent of political institutions” (Prentoulis, 2001, 205). This is not to say with certainty that a European identity will develop; rather, that European identity construction is a long term process, which depends on various context (not least the decrease in nationalist support), but has the potential to realise itself because it contains an ‘objective possibility’, much in the sense Llobera (using Fouillée) talks about the concept of *idée-force* (2003, 156).

Conclusions

This article has examined the relationship between national identity and European identity, focusing on two directions of thought: one that claims that national identity and European identity are conflicting and that European identity is not likely to replace national identity; and the other that argues that European identity is constructed on an entirely different basis than national identity and the two can coexist.

On the one hand, it has been argued that European identity cannot compete with national identity because it does not have deep rooted memories, myths and traditions that can induce a sense of loyalty the same way national identity does. On the other hand it has been argued that national identity and European identity do not clash, because their bases for allegiance are different. Unlike national identity which rests on a common culture to bind people, European

identity is constructed around 'constitutional patriotism' and individual rights and freedoms.

There are reasons to believe that both these views offer a narrow picture of the relationship between the two identities. I have argued that the formation of European identity involves forging symbols, myths and memories in the same way national identity did. Because these myths and memories are not fixed (although they are often perceived to be), there is no reason to believe that these new constructs cannot become as powerful as the national ones and that, indeed, they can override national them. Second, although European identity is to a large degree based on principles of popular sovereignty and civic rights, it still needs a shared 'culture' to connect people at an emotional level. Finally, I have argued that although both European identity and national identity are created following similar patterns they do not necessarily clash. It is nationalism rather than national identity that could hinder the development of the European identity.

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Is there a European Identity? National Attitudes and Social Identification toward the European Union

Mathieu PETITHOMME

Abstract. This paper shows that the variety of national attitudes toward the EU could account for the continuous difficulties in fostering integration. European citizens have competing normative views and do not agree on the nature, the purpose and the priorities of the EU project. Not only do they differ in their attitudes toward enlargement and the opportunity to foster a political union, but the reasons of their divergence are also distinct. While national belonging does matter at the aggregated micro-level, there are also strong attitudinal differences linked with sociological variables within each country. Yet, in identity terms, processes of social identifications remain closely linked with the national level. The EU integration is a process of “*distanciation*” which transfers individuals’ traditional unity of survival from the national to the supranational level. While people keep their affective identifications at the national level, political power is increasingly exercised at the EU level. In turn, it causes a “retarding effect” and could explain a great deal of the social resistances to EU integration.

Keywords: *Public Attitudes, EU support, European Identity*

1. Introduction

The sense of belonging to a given social community and to pertinent political structures can define citizens’ political identity. The emergence of a particular political identity can be considered as the principal source of legitimacy to the self-organization of a given community. Without identity, a robust legitimacy cannot be attached to a specific political entity. Conventionally, political science has primarily focused on measuring citizens’ degree of support for European integration, more than on explaining the reasons of emergence or non-emergence

of a sense of European identity.⁴ Such an identity could be approached in two different ways. It can be considered from a “top-down” standpoint, through the definition of the subjective limits of the European community. This perspective tries to define who can be considered as European? What can define the European culture and what are the boundaries of its political community? Yet, the European identity can also be apprehended from a “bottom-up” outlook, by asking who feel European and who does not? Hence, this paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the process of European identity formation using systematic comparisons of national attitudes toward the EU. While many social scientists have taken for granted the existence of a European identity, studying it as an *object* more than as a *process*, we try to use a somewhat different perspective, asking why, until now, it is empirically doubtful to say that a European identity does exist? To some extent, it is true that citizens do identify themselves with the EU. Yet, in the short term, national identities are highly predominant and will remain so for a long time. Thus, rather than trying to grasp *what* does not yet exist, it seems scientifically more appropriate to focus on *why* a European sense of identity is so weak.

The Existence of Multiple Normative Views on the European Union

To begin with, it seems meaningful to delineate what kind of project do citizens associate with the EU. While the views of political leaders on the aim of the integration project are regularly acknowledged, few works emphasize that the variety of perceptions which national citizens attach to the EU could account for the great difficulties in fostering integration.⁵ It is generally believed that the EU integration will lead to a long-term convergence of national attitudes.

⁴ See for instance Gabel, M. & Whitten, G. D. (1997), “Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions and Public Support for European Integration”, *Political Behavior*, 19(1), pp. 81-96; Gabel, M. (1998), Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories”, *The Journal of Politics*, 60(2), pp. 333-54; Anderson, C. J. (1998), “When in doubt use proxies. Attitudes toward domestic politics and support for European Integration”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 31(5), pp. 569-601.

⁵ On that point, see for instance the work of Eichenberg and Dalton which argue that “national traditions” can explain a great deal of citizens’ attitudes toward the EU: Eichenberg, C. G. & Dalton, R. J. (1993), “Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration”, *International Organization*, 47(2), pp. 507-34. On the growing literature on the sociology of European integration, see Deflem, M. & Pampel, F. C. (1996), “The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European Identification”, *Social Forces*, 75(1), pp. 119-43; Menéndez-Alarcón, A. V. (1995), “National Identities Confronting European Integration”, *International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society*, 8(3), pp. 543-62; Menéndez-Alarcón, A. V. (2002), *The Cultural*

Different countries will gradually become more similar in terms of prosperity and social attitudes. Nevertheless, it seems that national attitudes toward the EU are compound, and they are likely to continuously diverge in the forthcoming future. European citizens do not agree on the purpose of the EU project and on what it should entail for the future. For testing these strong national differences over the meaning of European integration, we compare citizens' attitudes on the two dimensions of (1) *enlargement* and (2) *political union*.

These two features are considered as indicators of the support toward the *widening* and the *deepening* of the EU, which are two main contentious issues of the EU project. For decades now, the European community has witnessed over lasting dissensions between people preferring intergovernmental options, and others privileging federal evolutions.⁶

In autumn 2006, 58% of the Europeans were in favor of a European political union. While 52% of the citizens of the "old Europe" support this idea, the proportion attains 64% in the "new Europe".⁷ While 77% of the population in Slovakia and Slovenia support the promotion of a political union, the proportions are slightly lower in the Netherlands (50%), in France and in Luxembourg (49%). The support is even lower in countries which are traditionally reluctant to EU integration: 42% in Sweden and Denmark, 40% in Austria, 36% in Finland and 31% in the UK. These findings tend to suggest that there is indeed an important attitudinal divide between the "two Europe". While people in the old EU member states are becoming more skeptical, central and Eastern European citizens are much more enthusiastic. While the former fear that the original political project will become less and less feasible, the latter only begin to enjoy the benefits of membership after the imposition of EU conditionality.

Moreover, only 46% of EU citizens agree that the process of enlargement should continue while 42% are opposed and 12% do not know.⁸ Those results can be partly

Realm of European Integration. Social Representations in France, Spain and the United Kingdom, Westport: Praeger, pp. 543-62.


⁶ For the main works on the intergovernmental theory, Cf. Moravcsik, A. (1993), "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(2), pp. 473-524; Moravcsik, A. (1998), *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State from Messina to Maastricht*, New York: Cornell University Press.

⁷ Eurobarometer 66.1, QA11: "Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a European political union?" – For.

⁸ Eurobarometer 66.1., QA 25.4: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it" – Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years – For.

biased and could reflect the divide between Western and Eastern Europe. Considering that old member states are more numerous than the new members, the average attitude of European citizens on the enlargement could over-represent the attitude of Western Europeans. Indeed, while in Poland, the support for EU enlargement reaches 76%, 74% in Slovenia and 68% in Romania, favorable opinions are much more moderate in countries like Italy (47%) or Belgium (46%). Old member states are also the more reluctant to EU enlargement which is only supported by 34% of French citizens, 32% in Luxembourg and 30% in Germany. The figure 1 below presents the findings of a comparison between national attitudes toward the *EU political union* and the *EU enlargement*. It clearly appears that there are various normative views associated with the EU project. The countries which became members in 2004 and 2007 are the most supportive of both the enlargement and the construction of a political union. The first circle is composed of eight of the ten countries which entered the EU in 2004 (Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta) and the last two members (Bulgaria and Romania). Greek citizens are the only relatively old members which are both in favor of the enlargement (71%) and supportive of the achievement of a political union (73%).

Figure 1. National Attitudes towards Enlargement and Political Union - EU 27 (%)



Personal elaboration from (1) Eurobarometer 67.1, QA 27.4: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it", positive answer, for EU enlargement in future years; (2) Eurobarometer 66, QA11: "Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a European Political Union?", positive answer, for EU political union.

The second circle is composed of more moderate countries which are generally in favor of a political union but remain much more divided on the perspective of the enlargement. It includes the recent members of Latvia and Estonia, but in general, all the other countries are from Western Europe (Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Belgium). France, Luxembourg and Germany, all founding fathers of the EU, seem to share a specific position primarily characterised by their strong reluctance toward the enlargement which is supported by less than 35% of their respective populations. Finally, the promotion of a political union is favored by a minority of citizens in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and Finland), in the UK and in Austria. A short majority of Swedish citizens are in favor of EU enlargement (53%), but all the others are quite opposed to this perspective (48% in Denmark, 43% in Finland) or strongly reluctant (36% in the UK and 30% in Austria).

Consequently, it is clear that citizens in the EU 27 are more than ever divided on the future of the EU integration project. There are still strong national and even “regional” divisions between the west, the east and the northern part of the EU. Not only do citizens differ in their general attitudes toward enlargement and the opportunity to foster a political union, but the reasons of their divergences are also distinct.⁹ Scandinavian citizens tend to resist European integration because they perceive that their national institutions would provide higher social standards and more inclusive and participatory political systems than the EU could do.¹⁰ Differently, the new central and Eastern European members are generally associating the EU project with peace and socioeconomic prosperity. EU membership is an indirect way for going beyond a shameful past of Communist occupation and for becoming “mainstream Europeans”.¹¹ In contrast, Western

⁹ A similar argument is made by Breakwell which states that “the EU has poor definition as a superordinate category and that, without an agreed-on “portrait” for this identity element derived from EU categorisation, there will be great diversity in the ways it is characterised by different people in different countries”. Cf. Breakwell, G. M. (2004), “Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union Institutions”, in Herrmann, R. K., Risse, T. & Brewer, M. B. (eds.), *Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 8.

¹⁰ On the differences in terms of redistributive policies and welfare states between Western Europe and Scandinavian political systems, see the insightful book by Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹¹ The expression has been used to describe the paths followed by Portugal and Spain in their accession to the EU. See Royo, S. & Manuel, C. (2003), “Some lessons from the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union”, in Royo, S. & Manuel, C. (eds.), *Spain and Portugal in the European Union. The First Fifteen Years*, London, Franck Cass, p. 19.

Europeans tend to fear a dilution of the original EU project. The moderation of pro-European attitudes in recent years seems to be a side effect of the consecutive enlargements and the consequent losses of powers for themselves. Thus, the difficulties to foster EU integration could thus be explained by the fact that there is no such thing as *an EU integration project*, but in fact, there are *several competing EU integration projects*.

2. A Persistent Social Divide in the Support for EU Integration

When social scientists deal with the support for EU integration, they generally focus exclusively on national attitudes. Even though the national variable appears highly relevant, it would nevertheless be scientifically insufficient to limit our analysis to national determinants. Hence, if one has to consider the support toward European integration, a pertinent model has to follow a two-level explanation. In other words, while at the aggregated micro level, citizens differ in their attitudes toward the EU in function of their national belonging, there are also strong differences between citizens within each country, depending on their level of education, social status or degree of ethnocentrism. A theory explaining the support toward EU integration has to be a social theory because in a given country, the attitudes of citizens from lower social classes can be closer with that of citizens of the same social status in another country than with their fellow nationals from upper classes. To assess more comprehensively this sociological divide, three countries rather different in terms of national attitudes toward the EU have been selected (Great-Britain, France and Belgium). National attitudes have been decomposed in function of several socio-economic variables. The results of this analysis are presented below (Figure 2).

In coherence with our first demonstration, it can be said that for all the independent variables considered, the British have always a less positive perception of the EU, the French have a moderately positive image and the Belgians share a very good image of the EU. The figure 2 shows that for all the independent variables, there is a double effect of the national context and of the considered variable in itself. The factor of cognitive mobilization seems to play an important role in the differentiation of attitudes.¹² Indeed, for the three countries

¹² Ronald Inglehart has argued that the shift from industrial to postindustrial societies would lead individuals to experience higher degrees of social mobility while the general level of life and education would tend to increase. On the political plan, this social change would have

Figure 2. Positive Perception of the EU in Great-Britain, France and Belgium (%)

	Great-Britain	France	Belgium
Country	50	66	76
Level of Education			
<i>Less than 20 years</i>	42	55	68
<i>More than 20 years</i>	73	80	84
	+31	+25	+16
Age			
15-39	64	71	85
<i>more than 40</i>	43	63	72
	-21	-8	-13
Social Class			
<i>Upper Class</i>	59	68	80
<i>Middle Class</i>	48	68	75
<i>Working Class</i>	46	61	73
	-13	-7	-7
Ideological Position			
<i>Left</i>	68	68	85
<i>Centre</i>	45	68	79
<i>Right</i>	36	69	77
	-32	1	-8
Knowledge of the EU			
<i>Good</i>	58	80	89
<i>Bad</i>	47	62	70
	-11	-18	-19
Place of Residence			
<i>Countryside</i>	39	58	79
<i>Big Town</i>	55	78	84
	+16	+20	+17
Subjective Religion			
<i>Christian</i>	45	65	75
<i>Atheist/non believer</i>	63	69	76
	+18	+4	+1
Costs and Benefits			
<i>Fear</i>	33	57	69
<i>No fear</i>	75	93	94
	+42	+36	+25
Cultural Threat			
<i>Fear</i>	31	44	57
<i>No Fear</i>	79	81	83
	+48	+37	+26

Indicator constructed by merging together two variables of the Eurobarometer 63.4: (1) "Can you tell me what image do you have of the EU?" and (2) "In general, do you think your country has benefited from EU membership?".

considered, the positive perception of the EU increases with a higher level of education, a higher knowledge of the EU and it tends to decline with the augmentation of the age. While a positive perception of the EU is shared by 42% of British citizens which have studied less than 20 years, 55% of French and 68% of Belgians, the proportions rise for attaining respectively 73%, 80% and 83% for those which have accomplished more than 20 years of study. In the same way, 64% of the 15-39 years-old in Great-Britain, 71% in France and 85% in Belgium

two major consequences: on the one hand, it would foster citizens' average levels of political competence or "cognitive mobilization", and in the other hand, the progression of "post-materialist" values would influence an evolution of societal priorities, from "materialist" values like economic and physical security to "post-materialist" values like individual liberty, personal autonomy and political participation. Cf. Boy, D. & Mayer, N. (1997), "Les Formes de la Participation", in Boy, D. & Mayer, N. (1997), *L'Electeur a ses Raisons*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 55. See also, Inglehart, R. (1990), *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.

have positive perceptions of the EU, while the proportions only reach 43%, 63% and 72% for those who have more than 40 years-old.

Furthermore, in the three countries considered, the social status seems to determine the perceptions of the EU. Citizens from upper classes are always more positive than those of the middle and working classes. The differentiation between social classes seems relatively more moderate as expected in France (from 61% to 68%) and in Belgium (from 73% to 80%), even though it is more clear-cut in Great-Britain (from 46% to 59%). Even if the effect is quite temperate, it follows the same trend as other existing studies.¹³ When we look at the ideological variable, apart from the French case, it seems that EU support is higher on the left than on the right of the political spectrum. The effect is quite clear in Great-Britain. While 68% of left voters have a good image of the EU, they are only 36% on the right side of the political spectrum. In general, it has been considered that left voters are more in favor of European integration than right sympathisers, and that people from the “classic right” are less homogeneous on the support for the EU than people on the left.¹⁴ However, further empirical research is needed in order to define whether this tendency might apply to all the EU 27. What has been demonstrated in the literature is that people who support political parties situated in the center of the political spectrum have a higher probability to be positive about the EU than people who support peripheral parties. Hence, for Hooghe and Marks, there is a general “inverted U curve” which can be drawn on the support for EU integration.¹⁵

¹³ Certainly, the moderate differentiation results from the difficulty to regroup the original eighteen social classes given by the Eurobarometer survey into three different social classes without losing the substance of the analysis. For the evolution of the social class as an explanatory variable, consult Boy, D. & Mayer, N. (1997), “Que reste-t-il des variables lourdes?”, in Boy, D. & Mayer, N. (ed.), *L'Electeur a ses Raisons*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 101-38. See also Vilchez-Silva, B. (2006), “Les classes populaires et l'Union Européenne”, in Reynié, D. (ed.), *L'Opinion Européenne en 2006*, Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde, pp. 68.

¹⁴ Belot, C. & Cautrès, B. (2004), “L'Europe, Invisible mais Omniprésente”, in Cautrès, B. & Mayer, N. (ed.), *Le Nouveau Désordre Electoral. Les Leçons de 21 Avril 2002*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 131.

¹⁵ Hooghe, L., Marks, G. & Wilson, C. J. (2004), “Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?”, in Marks, G. & Steenbergen, M. R. (ed.), *European Integration and Political Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 235-60.

Various other effects can be observed by looking at other independent variables. To live in a big town rather than in the countryside systematically favor more positive images. On that point, the proportions are situated between 58% and 78% in France, 79% and 84% in Belgium and between 39% and 55% in Great-Britain. In addition, people who fear that the EU project will engender high individual costs for them, or who think that the process of integration represents a cultural threat have always a less positive image of the EU. The differences of attitudes can even bypass 45%. Indeed, it seems that the “subjective vulnerability”, that is to say, the fear of a degradation of life conditions can be understood in parallel with the “objective vulnerability” to pertain to lower social classes.¹⁶ The inequalities of cultural and political competences seem themselves linked with inequalities in the socioeconomic order as the social position or the belonging to the working class.¹⁷

In the end, if we consider the overall independent variables, it is possible to differentiate two types of sub-populations for the three countries considered. On the one hand, the young individuals, with a higher level of education, a good knowledge of the EU and which identify with the left tend to have a good image of the EU. This type of individuals which are usually in favor of the EU are also generally from urban background, open to other cultures and in a favorable socioeconomic situation which led them not to fear a loss of benefits which would result from EU integration. On the other hand, old people, with a low level of education, which tend to identify with the right side of the political spectrum and which have a bad knowledge of the EU have a higher probability to share a negative image of the EU. To live in the countryside, to declare oneself Christian, to fear a loss of national identity or a loss of socioeconomic benefits resulting from EU integration also reinforce the probability to have a negative image of the EU. In the end, the conjunction of the factors of cultural and political competence, social position, partisan preference and degree of ethnocentrism seems to distinguish two-subtypes of populations with diverging attitudes toward the EU within all the countries considered. Alongside national determinants, socio-economic factors play a great role in the differentiation of individual attitudes.

¹⁶ Cf. Gabel, M. J. (1998), *Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and European Union*, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press, pp. 26.

¹⁷ Belot, C. & Cautrès, B. (2004), *op. cit.*, pp. 129.

3. The Illusion of an Effect of Socialization

Since the early beginnings, European policy-makers have argued that EU popular legitimacy would be derived from its capacity to promote future-oriented policies and to solve complex problems at the EU level. The EU system of governance has been presented as a new type of political system which includes features of intergovernmental cooperation and supranational decision-making. Given its “specific” characteristics, many social science theorists have defended that it is useless to compare the EU with other political systems as it is not an international organization, nor is it a state. This tendency to consider the EU apart from theoretical reflections has two major consequences.

First, in terms of popular legitimacy, many have argued that the traditional “bottom-up” popular legitimacy which prevails within nation-states cannot be applied to the EU. At the national level, there is a *government* “of the people, by the people and for the people”. The foundations of national institutions and the legitimacy of political actors are dependent on popular support. If people have to elect representatives, it is only because they cannot exercised directly and constantly their shared sovereignty. Thus, they delegate their powers to elected political representatives which are given a defined mandate for taking decisions. Hence, national democracies are “*input democracies*” in the sense that political decisions cannot be exercised without people’s prior support.

In contrast, many have argued that this type of legitimacy is inapplicable at the EU level. The specific requirements of European policy-making, complex problem-solving mechanisms and negotiations between member states would not permit European MPs or Commissioners to be as accountable as their national counterparts. In fact, even though a given member of the European Parliament could have some commitment with his electorate, the pressures for consensus and the necessary negotiations with other “Euro-parties” would lead the final political outcome to be far from different from the original project. Consequently, European political actors have promoted the idea that the EU is an “*output-oriented democracy*”.¹⁸

Its legitimacy would not have to be assessed in reference with its popular assets, but with its effectiveness in terms of political outcomes.

Secondly, in terms of popular identity, many politicians have believed that if the EU would be judged in relation with its political outcomes, in the long term, its

¹⁸ Schmidt, V. (2005), “Democracy in Europe: The Impact of European Integration”, *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(4), pp. 768-71.

positive actions would necessarily lead to the development of a European sense of identity among EU citizens. While in the short term national identities will remain dominant, it is believed that the concrete benefits enjoyed by EU citizens in terms of peace, security and prosperity would gradually lead them to develop positive views on their European identity. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that it is actually the case. Not only do national identities remain the first objects of popular identification, but it does not seem that an effect of socialisation exists.¹⁹ The following argumentation will address these two aspects in more details.

The social scientists which have defended the existence of a “socialisation effect”, stating that more and more people would “feel” European over time, tend to over-emphasise the agency of European institutions in the process of identity formation.²⁰ In other words, the process of European identity formation is generally considered from a “top-down” perspective. European elites would foster European integration, and in response to it, ordinary citizens would gradually identify themselves with the EU. For instance, Michael Bruter defends that supranational institution building has a strong influence on the development of a sense of European identity for individual citizens. He argues that the continuous exposition to EU symbols and the continual institutionalisation of the EU system of governance would stimulate the process of European identity formation.²¹ He believes that “the emergence of a European identity in a given country is closely linked with the date of EU membership”, an implicit way of saying that national identification with the EU would necessarily progress over time.²²

Nowadays, it is true that a huge majority of European citizens know the emblematic symbol of the European flag. 95% of European citizens in the EU 27 declare that they have already seen it.²³ Moreover, 78% of them declare that the EU flag “stands for something good”, which would seem to show that not only do they know

¹⁹ As Soledad Garcia puts it, “A European identity cannot in any case be constructed exclusively from above. Europe will exist as an unquestionable political community only when European identity permeates people’s lives and daily existence”. Cf. Garcia, S. (1993), “Europe’s fragmented Identities and the frontiers of citizenship”, in Garcia, S. (ed.), *European Identity and the search for legitimacy*, London & New York: Pinter Publishers, pp. 15.

²⁰ For an example of such argument, Cf. Laffan, B. (2004), “The European Union and its Institutions as “Identity Builders”, in Herrmann, R. K., Risse, T. & Brewer, M. B. (eds.), *Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 75-97.


²¹ Bruter, M. (2005), *Citizens of Europe?*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 30-36.

²² Bruter, M. (2005), *Ibid.*, pp. 38.

²³ Eurobarometer 67, QA 42: “Have you ever seen this symbol?” - *The European flag*.

this symbol, but they also attach a positive judgment to it.²⁴ Though, refuting Michael Bruter’s approach, we defend that it is not because people value European symbols that they would ultimately develop a sense of European identity. The question of European identity is primarily linked with how people *feel* attached to the EU, and not only with how they *perceive* it. Moreover, even if one looks at how people perceive the EU, it is far from clear that a “top-down” socialisation effect exists. The deepening of the EU integration does not seem to be correlated with a greater popular consciousness of the EU. Since the 1980s, the proportion of EU citizens which are aware of how the EU works has not really progressed. For instance, in autumn 2006, only a minority of EU citizens (43%) affirmed that they understood “how the EU works”.²⁵ The figure 3 below shows that between 2000 and 2005 there is only 2% of EU citizens who constantly assert that they “know a great deal” about the EU, its institutions, its policies. 22% defend that they “know quite a lot” and 23% declare that they “know almost nothing” while 53% state that they “know a bit”. If a “top-down” process of identity formation from elites to ordinary citizens would exist, it seems that it has not been really effective up to now. The large majority of EU citizens still ignore the way the EU works.

Figure 3. “How much do you know about the European Union, its institutions, its policies?”



Source Eurobarometer 66.1, QA14: “Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?”, p. 147.


²⁴ Eurobarometer 67, QA 43.2: “This symbol is the European flag. I have a list of statements concerning it. I would like to have your opinion on each of these. For each of them, could you please tell me if you tend to agree or tend to disagree”- This flag stand for something good.

²⁵ Eurobarometer 66, QA 12.2: “Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree” – I understand how the EU works – Tend to agree.

In addition, it seems worthless to compare this first indicator with a second one which deals with the effective knowledge of the EU. This second indicator is composed of three correct answers to three statements related to EU institutions.²⁶ The figure 4 presents a comparison of these two indicators. European countries have been grouped together depending on the date of their EU admission. Seven different groups of countries have been delineated: (1) the six founding members (Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), (2) UK, Denmark and Ireland which became members in 1973, (3) Greece in 1981, (4) Spain and Portugal in 1986, (5) Sweden, Austria and Portugal in 1995, (6) Poland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Malta and the Czech Republic in 2004, and finally, (7) Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. If an effect of socialization would exist, we should find that citizens' knowledge of the EU progresses over time. It should be observed that citizens in old EU member states would know better the EU, its institutions and its policies than citizens in new member states.

Nonetheless, the figure shows that in practice, things seem more complicated. If one exclusively compares the attitudes of the countries which have joined the EU in 1995 with those who did it in 2005, the figure tends to suggest the existence of an effect of socialisation. There is a gradual decrease of the effective knowledge of the EU: while 23.66 % of Swedish, Austrian and Finnish people are considered to have an effective knowledge of the EU, the proportions decrease to 21.6 % for eastern European citizens and to 8.5% in Romania and Bulgaria.

Figure 4. Citizens Knowledge of the EU in Function of the Date of Membership - EU 27 (%)



Personal elaboration from Eurobarometer 66.1, QA14 & QA 20.

²⁶ Eurobarometer 66.1, QA 20: "For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false?" (1) The EU currently consists of 15 Member states (false); (2) Members of the EU Parliament are elected directly by EU citizens (true); (3) Every six months a different Member State takes the EU Presidency (true). Those people who give three correct answers are considered to have an effective knowledge of the EU.

Yet, the figure highlights that it is far from being a clear cut dynamic. Indeed, Spain and Portugal are members of the EU since 1986 but only 20% of their respective citizens have a good knowledge of the EU, a similar proportion with that of countries which are only members since 2004. On the understanding of the EU, those southern European countries even show lower percentages than the new 1995, 2004 and 2007 members. The same pattern seems to be true for the founding fathers of the EU: 47.7% of their citizens declare to understand how the EU works while only 21.6% could be considered to have an effective knowledge of the EU. These proportions are quite similar with those countries which became EU members in 1995 and in 2004. The fact that France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have been EU members for fifteen years does not seem to make the difference. Of course, only a broad longitudinal approach could sustain robust results. Yet, our analysis seems to show that it is difficult to defend empirically that an effect of socialisation does exist.

4. Preexisting National Identities and European Identity Formation


If there is no effect of socialisation as it has often been argued, then, how could a European identity emerge? It seems misleading to conceive the European identity as something out there which could be observed and objectified. Rather, there is a crucial need to focus on the *process* of European identity formation and on its main determinants. A European identity will necessarily have to be based on preexisting national identities. Indeed, many social scientists have showed that it is worthless to speak of exclusive identities. In a global world in which processes of social integration at a higher level are widespread, identities are becoming more multiple.²⁷ Contrary to what postmodern or cosmopolitan theorists would say, it seems rather improbable that people would dismiss their national identities to identify with the EU from one day to another. Thus, the development of a European identity could only be possible through a reconstruction, an enrichment of national identities by including a European component.

The figure 5 below presents a comparison between national and European prides. It shows that national pride is always higher than European pride in all countries considered. While the sense of national pride vary from 98% in Cyprus and 70% in Germany, the sense of European pride vary from 80% in Slovakia to 33%

²⁷ Herrman, R. & Brewer, M. B. (2004), "Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU", in Herrmann, R. K., Risse, T. & Brewer, M. B. (eds.), *Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 8.

in the UK. On average, in the EU 27, the national pride attains 86% while the European pride only reaches 59%. In all the countries, a clear majority of citizens feel proud of their nationality. Yet, it does not seem to be the case for the attachment to Europe: 19% do not feel proud to be European and 17% do not feel European at all. As we have previously demonstrated, the probability to feel European and to be proud of it is always higher for people with a high social status, as well as good levels of education and degrees of knowledge of the EU.

Figure 5. Comparison between National and European Prides - EU 27 (%)



Personal elaboration from (1) Eurobarometer 66.1, QA 21: "And what would you say, you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be (nationality)", answer proud (very proud and fairly proud); (2) Eurobarometer 66, QA 32: "And what would you say, you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European", answer proud (very proud and fairly proud).

The sense of European pride is also highly correlated with positive images of the EU and positive assessment of the benefits of EU membership. Among those who have a positive image of the EU, 79% feel proud to be European, while the proportion decreases to 51% for people with a neutral image. It only reaches 26% for people with a negative image. In the same way, for those who consider that their country has benefited from EU membership, 73% feel proud to be European while the percentage decreases to 40% when the benefits of membership are assessed to be negative. Consequently, it seems that even if a sense of attachment to Europe can theoretically progress in the forthcoming years, it would have to be built in complement and not


against preexisting national identities. Otherwise, the promotion of a European identity is doomed to failure.

The figure 6 below seems to reinforce our argumentation. Two different questions have been asked. The first one presents national and European identities as contradictory. People can exclusively choose to declare themselves as “national only” or with “some European element in identity”. The second question is not exclusive and asks if people feel European in addition with their national identity.

For the first question, when we compare the blue (nationality only) and the red lines (some European element in identity), it seems that national and European identities could be understood in terms of a zero-sum game. The comparison between the two lines tends to give the impression that there are countries with high levels of attachment to their own nationality and a very low sense of European identity (Finland, UK, Hungary, Greece...), while others have more mixed attitudes and a third group presents a high sense of European identity and a very low sense of national identity (Italy, Spain, Germany...).

However, those results seem to over-simplify the social reality. This possible misconception could indeed be an artifact of the question itself which presents European and national identities in an “either-or” option. In contrast, the second question (green line) asks people whether they “feel European in addition to national identity. A large majority of European citizens declare that they feel national *and* European as well. Apart for the specific case of the UK (only 32%), for all other EU countries, answers are always situated between 50% and 73%. 72% of the Greeks, 67% of people in Luxembourg and 65% in Poland feel both national and European. In general, 16% of the citizens of the EU27 declare that they often feel “European in addition to their national identity”, 38% that they sometimes do and 44% declare that it is never the case.

Figure 6. Patterns of Identification with National and European Identities (%)



This figure has been constructed with two different question. While the first one gave two exclusionary alternatives (1), the second one asked whether people feel European in addition to their national identity (2). (1) Eurobarometer 61, QA 38: "In the near future, do you see yourself as...?"- Nationality only - or - some European element in identity. One answer only. (2) Eurobarometer 66.1: QA30. Do you think of yourself as only (NATIONALITY), but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?

In fact, if one looks more closely, all the main sociological factors outlined above can be found again. 24% of those which are still studying declare that they "often" think of themselves as European in addition to their national identity, and 46% prefer to say that they only "sometimes" do. At the other extreme, the percentage of people who answer "often" decreases to 12%, and 32% for the "sometimes" option for those who did less than 15 years of studies. While 24% of the managers would "often" feel a sense of multiple identities, only 12% of manual workers would do so (47% and 34% respectively for the answer "sometimes"). Thus, a number of elements can be deduced from our analysis. First, until now, national identities are still the dominant and the overarching elements which give ground for the self-identification of individual EU citizens. Processes of social identifications remains closely linked with the national level. Even if a sense of European pride and of gradual attachment to the EU exists and could theoretically progress, it will have to deal with the resistance of national identities. Secondly, some utopists and elitists would believe that one day, people, might stop to think of themselves as national and directly identify with the European level. Yet, as a

specific European language, public sphere, proper history, culture and way of life have not been “imagined” for the moment, it seems intellectually misleading to think that with higher levels of education, people would progressively dismiss their national cultures. The tendency might even be the contrary.

A national identity is linked with a specific social *habitus* to which individuals have learned to adapt their own structure of personality. If one wants to understand the resistances toward the emergence of a European identity, it is worthless to remember the dual characteristic of a given identity: it has both an outward-looking part as it is inherently linked with the historical and social environment, but it has also an inward-looking stance, as it informs the background of an individual personal identity. National identity has to be differentiated from nationalism. While the former is an elusive link between people and nation, an object of social and personal identification, the latter characterizes the political project to defend and sponsor the interests of a given nation.²⁸ An identity has also a social function, as it enables the individual to imagine his self-embodiment within a given community. It partly explains why identities are constantly evolving, as a given social group can decide to “exit” or “voice” its specific national character within a predefined community.²⁹ National identity is conceived here not as an objective fixed entity but as the subjective representation of allegiance toward one’s country.³⁰ But for this process to succeed, it has to be sufficiently grounded on a distinctive feeling of belonging which remains very weak in the case of the EU. This is why it is essential to understand how members of developed nations consider their *de facto* belonging to a country, and how they juggle that identity with their multiple other allegiances. As Katharine Throssell puts it, identity is increasingly “*just a part of who we are*”, a hazard of chance that made us born like this, socialized like this, with no greater claim on the person than gender, politics or religion.³¹

In order to precise more concretely our perspective, it is worthless to conceptualise the EU project in the light of the theory of Norbert Elias. He has

²⁸ Anderson, B. (2002), *L’imaginaire national. Réflexions sur l’origine et l’essor du nationalisme*, Paris: La Découverte.

²⁹ The concepts of “exit” and “voice” come from the famous book written by Hirschman, A. O. (1970), *Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

³⁰ Macdonald, S. (1993), “Identity Complexes in Western Europe”, in Macdonald, S. (ed.), *Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western Europe*, London: Berg, pp. 1-26.

³¹ Throssell, K. (2007), “Learning to be French: A study of national identity and primary socialization”, paper presented to the *Annual Cronem Conference*, University of Surrey.

defended that we are witnessing a gradual process of social integration to superior levels and that this process entails progressive transfers of powers. Traditionally, individuals have subjectively defined their “unity of survival”, once the tribe, then the community and finally their state and nation. However, in progressively transferring their allegiances to upper levels, they have lost security and capacities of involvement in the short term.³² The most important point here is that for each gradual shift from one unity of survival to another situated at a higher level of integration, the original equilibrium between the individual and its society evolves.³³ While the previous form of social organization could foster a sense of security and of belonging for the individual, the new stage of integration does not in the short term. In that light, we can understand why the EU integration project so often tends to create important resistances: before being fully integrated in the new European society in the making, individuals have to lose the sense of security they have acquired at the national level, even though the EU is not yet able to replace the national level in terms of affective attachment. The main implication for the study of European identity is that as long as we will not invent new ways and materialise in practice a “sense of belonging” with Europe, individuals will have no incentive to identify themselves as Europeans. If we want a European identity to emerge progressively, then, the next generations will have to learn the European history, know better their fellow European and be socialised within a European environment.

For the majority of European citizens, the EU is nothing but an abstract concept. Many people do not feel that the EU system of governance is part of their daily life even though the arenas of interventions and political competences of the EU are constantly increasing. For people to feel European, EU institutions would have to become more meaningful and inclusive for ordinary EU citizens. People cannot sincerely participate in a system in which they do not feel to belong. Following a recent Eurobarometer survey, 59% of Europeans in the 27 member states think their voices do not count in the EU and 75% do not feel involved in the EU.³⁴ The figure 7 below highlights that apart from Luxembourg, Belgium, The


³² Elias, N. (1991), *La Société des Individus*, Paris, Fayard, pp. 219.

³³ Elias, N. (1991), *Ibid.*, pp. 219.

³⁴ Eurobarometer 66.1, QA12.1. *Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree? “My voice counts in the European Union”*. AS it could have been expected, people’s general attitude towards the European Union correlates with how they feel about whether their voice counts in the EU. People with positive views regarding the

Netherlands and France, citizens in all the others EU countries share the feeling that their actions are not decisive within the EU. The high costs of entry for understanding and apprehending how the EU actually works tend to limit the possible feeling of involvement within the system.

Figure 7. National Attitudes towards Involvement and Influence in EU affairs - EU 27 (%)



Eurobarometer 66.1: (1) QA12.1. Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?, "My voice counts in the European Union", tend to agree; (2) QA 12.3. Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?, "I feel involved in EU affairs", tend to agree.

In a European system which they do not understand completely, which does not fully represent them and gives few opportunities of participation, people prefer to "exit". To the national resistances for integration at a higher level evocated by Elias, has to be summed the lack of appealing, of *inclusiveness* of the EU system of governance in itself. In that sense, the major misunderstandings linked with European identity are certainly linked to the fact that most of the existing works dealing with the concept have been concerned with static approaches trying to objectify something which does not yet exist in the real world. Rather, it seems more interesting to approach the European identity from the viewpoint of a theory of social evolution, as a process in the making.³⁵ EU

European Union are significantly more likely to feel that their voice counts than are citizens with a negative stance towards to European Union.

³⁵ Duchesne, S. & Frogner, A. P. (2002), "Sur les dynamiques sociologiques et politiques de l'identification à l'Europe", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 52(4), pp. 355-73. See also Duchesne, S. & Frogner, A-P. (1995), "Is There a European Identity", in Niedermayer,

integration is a “*process of distancing*” which transfers individuals’ traditional unity of survival from their national state to a new supranational level of decision-making. Yet, because the former (national level) still plays a dominant affective role while more and more political power is exercised by the latter (EU level), there is a growing “*retarding effect*” between people’s social *habitus* and the logic of the political system in which they live.³⁶ The major difficulty for the potential emergence of a European identity is thus constituted by the fact that “there are strong differences in the national *habitus*” of Europeans, and those national identities “are associated with a high level of affectivity which cannot be eliminated through compromises”.³⁷

Conclusion

This paper has tried to delineate the main reasons which could explain why it seems so difficult for a European sense of identity to emerge. First, it seems that there are different normative views associated with the EU project. The national context plays a great role in fostering specific representations of the EU and contributes to differentiate political attitudes. With the eastern European enlargements, the diversity of EU member states is becoming more important than ever before. In the forthcoming future, it is likely that Europeans will still diverge on the priorities and the nature of the EU project. Secondly, the attitudinal comparisons between Great-Britain, France and Belgium tend to show that there is a deep social divide within European countries between two types of subpopulations.

While the most educated, the youngest, the less ethnocentric and the most socio-economically favored have a high probability to support EU integration and define themselves as Europeans, it is rather the contrary for all the people in opposed sociological positions. A theory which aims to explain the support for EU integration has necessarily to take into account these two levels of analysis, the national and the sociological dimensions. Finally, we have seen that there is still a long way for a European identity to emerge. Few people do understand how the EU works and share a good knowledge of the EU. National identities are still the dominant “locus” of social identification and they are likely to remain so for a long

O. & Sinnott, R. (ed.), *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 193-226.

³⁶ Elias, N. (1991), *Ibid.*, pp. 238 & p. 263.

³⁷ Elias, N. (1991), *Ibid.*, pp. 285.

time. Norbert Elias' theory of social evolution provides insightful elements for understanding the resistances toward popular identification at the EU level. There is a growing incongruence between the transfer of power to European institutions and the resilience of personal attachments at the national level. Even though things might evolve in the future, up to now, the concept of European identity remains a theoretical construction and not a sociological reality.

RESEARCH ARTICLES

Migrant Integration: Case for a Necessary Shift of Paradigm

Dieu Donné HACK-POLAY

Abstract. This article deals with the antagonism between the need for migrant communities to maintain their native culture and the necessity to integrate in the dominant community in order to achieve social harmony and socio-economic promotion. The article found that cultural isolation could alienate some migrants who may see in the establishment of the community organisation a way of leading a migrant life that requires neither increased contacts with indigenous groups nor specific training. The migrants find themselves locked in menial jobs and do not experience upward social mobility. The situation points to a need to rethink the management of community organisations and support systems.

Keywords: *migrant integration, community organizations, socio-cultural identities, Polish immigrants in UK*

Introduction and background

Attempting to maintain socio-cultural identities in the host country is not a new phenomenon among immigrants and minority ethnic communities. Such attempts are part of the struggle to retain a community's roots. There is evidence that many immigrant communities tend to settle in particular areas of the capital and other UK towns and cities (Bloch, 2002, Hack-Polay, 2006a) in order to strengthen ties between them, keep alive aspects of their culture and fight against acculturation. Migrant and ethnic communities have not been outside this general picture and some, such as the Polish community in the United Kingdom, have long been known for their strong linguistic and cultural survival. For the Poles, for instance, the generations that immigrated to the UK during the First and Second World Wars established foundations on which later generations built to keep Poland, the Polish language and culture alive abroad for decades.

A large number of the immigrants have been very successful citizens in the host countries (Robinson, 2000). In the fulfilment their citizenship responsibilities, Tabori (1972) believes that most feel indebted to the country of settlement and therefore work hard to demonstrate their worthiness as citizens. The Polish communities in the UK can be credited with a large degree of success (British Refugee Council, 2002; Hack-Polay, 2006b). However, some of the immigrants are left behind due to a number of factors which could include language acquisition and the degree and extent of exploitation of social networks available. For the less successful migrants, the lack of competence in the language of the host country often becomes a disabling factor. A number of researchers in the field of sociolinguistics have highlighted some major social and psychological factors impacting on the successful integration of migrants in the host environment. For Mitchell and Myles (2001, p.24), there are cognitive factors, e.g. intelligence, language aptitude and language learning strategies as well as affective factors, e.g. language attitudes, motivation and language anxiety, which have an important effect on the performance of the second language learner. Other authors such as Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1995), Solomos & Back (1996) and Brennan & McGeevor (1990), etc. have found that racism and socio-cultural boundaries could also be important cause.

The paper looks at the issue of the under-performance of groups of migrants from a more social perspective and considers the degree to which the availability of a large community network could have an impact on the socialisation process, particularly through language acquisition and participation in social and economic life in the host country. The article investigates the strategies employed by the Polish migrant community in south London to ensure language and cultural survival and the degree to which cultural and linguistic conservatism impacts on the development of a second language and economic opportunities, particularly among adult members of the community. Social and cultural conservatism or maintenance could be described as the relatively successful retention of particular social and cultural attributes by a minority community within a dominant group.

Migrant organisations are not separable from the life and concentration of people from different cultures who try to settle in an alien society. Migrant organisations represent a way of establishing or maintaining norms and values within a population of newcomers that share similar characteristics. Such organisations are important factors in the integrations of migrants. Omi & Winant

(1986:22) explain in a study of American society that “the key factor in explaining the success that an ethnic group will have in becoming incorporated into a majority society ... is the values or norms it possesses”. The assumption in Omi & Winant’s research is that a group is incorporable only if they have particular values and norms could be disputable. In fact in the context of migration, many migrants may not have the opportunity to be affiliated with a group close to their original culture but through individual struggle integration is possible, alongside the struggle of other migrants with whom they may share little or no cultural ties.

Furthermore, evidence from other research namely Park (1950) suggests that other characteristics such as skin colour, physical appearance, etc., are likely to impact on the level and speed of integration of minorities in a dominant society. Park writes that “where races are distinguished by certain external marks these furnish a permanent stratum upon which and around which the irritations and animosities, incidental to all human intercourse, tend to accumulate and so to gain strength”. Research in the integration of refugees in the United Kingdom has shown varying levels and degrees of integration of groups of refugees, which may have some racial foundations (Brennan & McGeevor, 1990; Clark, 1992). However, a key remark in Omi & Winant’s point is applicable to sizeable groups that have the capability to erect themselves as a distinct category which they want to perpetuate. This is the case of Irish immigrants in the USA whose integration Park (1950) has described as successful and rapid compared to that of black people. It may also apply for instance to the Indian and the Somali communities, etc. in Britain that share both religious and other cultural practices.

In other cases, migrant organisations aim to represent a support group, a self-help initiative in order to support economic prosperity and welfare. These therefore do not necessarily strive to perpetuate or identifiable norms. It can thus, be established that migrant organisations may have two different aims: either to perpetuate particular norms and values or act as a brokerage for economic and social success and integration of its members who may be or may not be from the same cultural origin. Wagner & Obermiller’s (2004:100) found four types of functions fulfilled by migrant ethnic organisations among American immigrants. These four types comprised organisations founded for social purposes, “to affirm their identity, to remain connected to their roots, and preserve their heritage”.

Hack-Polay (2006a) has developed an interesting typology of migrant community organisations and their functions as presented in the table below.

Table 1: Typology of migrant community organisations

Type of organisation	Key function
<i>Social community organisation</i>	- welfare solidarity – assistance with employment- education guidance- social events (wedding, religious, dancing parties)
<i>Cultural survival community organisation</i>	- affirm identity -retain connection with roots -preserve heritage preserve language and religion
<i>Political community organisation</i>	Political mobilisation- national government in exile – lobbying of foreign powers

Source: Hack-Polay, D D (2006) *Metaphors and narratives in exile: understanding the experiences of forces migrants in the UK*, doctorate thesis, Guildford, University of Surrey, December.

Many migrant groups could fall within these three categories. However, they differ from the degree of involvement in a particular type. The models followed by many migrant communities can be said to fall in the Immigrant-host framework of which Patterson (1965) is a strong advocate. She argues that the process of integration of an immigrant community involves both the host community and the newcomers to adapt to and accommodate a changing social and racial geography, although the immigrant group had more of the adaptation to do.

The support element centres around two broad themes: employment and social life. Members of migrant groups are aware of the difficulties that they face in those areas. Anthias and Yuval Davis (1995:77) stress the fact that migrants face various forms of exclusion and discrimination in employment. This justifies to a certain extent the flow of migrants within those community structures which can provide advice and some practical assistance to newcomers wanting to enter the job market or find some friendship.

Many migrant groups in Britain represent a vital social tool contributing to the healing and the integration processes. Community organisations fulfil many different functions. Such structures represent a focal point for new arrivals, as these are the places or milieus where they encounter the first humanly contacts, the first contacts that are meaningful, reassuring and hopeful. For Pfister-Ammende (1960) and Gordon (1964), the ethnic community reduces the culture shock experienced by immigrants as a result of sudden landing in the new society because it reduces disorientation while enabling a sense of identity. Many migrant community groups serve the interests of individuals from particular nationalities or ethnic origins.

In Greenwich, for example, the Somalis numbering around 9000 people, have set up several community organisations to meet the multiple needs of the multitude who live there. Somali organisations operating in Greenwich include the Somali Community Centre (Woolwich) the Somali Community Education & Employment Support and the Somali Refugee Action Group, which aim to provide welfare, educational, training, employment, health, cultural and religious support to their members.

The importance of community organisations is not arguable as they help migrants re-gain a smile and engage in 'normal' human interactions are socio-psychological dimensions that help refugees to get away from the perceived 'abnormal' nature of their new conditions, i.e. loneliness, isolation, speechlessness, depression, etc. in the early period following migration.

However, the role of the community organisation could be viewed from a different perspective which may not always be in the line of inclusion. In fact, instead of freeing the individual, the community organisation could alienate them, confining them to dealing only with people that look like them, speak their languages and dance their rhythms. Hack-Polay (2006a) found that those respondents who had friends among the indigenous population were able to develop language competence quicker and use their contacts to gain social promotion.

This finding highlights to a large extent the alienation that community or ethnic based groups could place their members in. Stein (1986) sees contradiction in the role of the ethnic organisation; while on the one hand, it smoothens the transition between being a citizen in their homeland and becoming refugees, the community organisation can also be seen as "dysfunctional, as a barrier that keeps

the refugee in an ambivalent position – midway to nowhere between the lost homeland and the new society” (Stein, 1986:17). Such practices help maintain the status of a divided society, which is not always the sole making of the indigenous population but, as Castles & Kosack (1973) found, could be a more complex problem that involves the deliberate subordination of migrant communities in labour, housing, education as well as discrimination against minorities. Usually, the first generations, and maybe the second, would almost be confined to similar micro-social groupings and only later generations could start to see openings through education, work and leisure attendance together with the indigenous young people.

The key finding of the research establishes that the larger the community of migrants from a specific culture is, the abilities they have to develop mechanisms for cultural and linguistic conservatism. These are invaluable ingredients of crucial importance when it comes to healing the social and psychological disruptions caused by migration but at the same time, in the long term, extensively sustained community paternalism could alienate more vulnerable community members and represent rather hindrance to social and economic integration in the new society, thus, necessitating a shift of paradigm from community organisations supporting migrants. The possible impact of social and cultural protectionism on the social and professional promotion among migrant communities in the United Kingdom has not always attracted an amount of literature commensurate with the problem and further research is fundamental for a greater understanding of the phenomenon.

METHODOLOGY

The research was done using participant observation and interviews to get information from 20 members of a Polish community in south London and the priest of community’s Catholic Church. Participant observation in the research was covert and meant that attending the Polish church on Sunday and other cultural, social and religious events, the researcher was able to speak to pre-selected subjects, whose language competence who felt to be minimal but were in some form of employment. Rapport was developed with the target participants and the trust built enabled the subjects to invite the researchers for a number of private events which helped follow their social and professional lives. This meant that the

researcher did was they did, slept where they slept and ate and exchange social jokes with them. The interactions were conducted with the assistance of a Polish interpreter. In addition to data from observation, interviews were held with the Parish Priest and two elders. They provided additional historical and statistical information about the community. The interview with the Priest was crucial in understanding the philosophies behind the Polish community's organisation and support networks.

FINDING AND ANALYSIS

The observees

The observees were aged between 24 and 35 years. The average age was 27 years. This shows that the newcomers from the new European Union (EU) countries may be predominantly the young in search of work and a better life. There were 15 men and five women. Most of the observees (six in ten) came to the UK after the accession of Poland to the European Union in May 2004. They have therefore been in the country for over three years. The remaining respondents (40 per cent) have lived in the UK for well over three years, mostly between four and six years. These old-timers acknowledged that they were illegal immigrants in the UK prior to their country entering the EU.

The observees all had only a moderate knowledge of the English language, with only one having a basic understanding of the language. However, it was difficult to establish the true level of the observees because the language competence in each of the four main language learning areas (reading, writing, speaking & listening) varied for most individuals. For instance while Jarek's spoken English could be estimated to be at intermediate level, his writing was comparable to complete beginners. This meant that the observees did not have sufficient language abilities to converse in English. All were in employment. Ten of the fifteen men were in unskilled or semi-skilled employment, working in various capacities (plasters, plumbers, electricians, cleaners) on building sites around London. The remaining five men worked in catering (3) and delivery (2). One of the women worked in a hotel as a chambermaid, two as cashiers and two were childcare helpers in with private families. The high employment rate among the participants may suggest that the primary reason for coming to the UK was work. Such a choice

possibly made other activities such as studying less of a priority for many migrants. That denotes strong labour market participation among migrants.

Instruments of socio-cultural conservatism: community infrastructures

The Polish community in south London uses several strategies to maintain key social and cultural characteristics that form part of its identity. The most significant of those are provision of a church service, a Saturday school for children, a community centre, classes for adults, play group for babies and toddlers and a community newspaper. The significance of these activities or strategies is explained below.

The community centre

In the absence of reliable historical data about the community in Polish south London, I set out to have informal discussion with some elders and the priest in order to gather additional information to complement documentary sources. According to those informants, the community has existed there for over sixty years during which different generations have worked to maintain various activities geared at promoting Polish language, culture and identity. The elders I spoke to have been part of the community for over thirty years and were able to narrate their experience of the setting. The community centre was set up via collection and donations from the founders. Many of the original members sometimes offered weeks of wages in order to purchase the building that house the community centre today. The community centre is composed of four large buildings: a four storey building where the priest and the care taker have their residence; another four storey building that houses the Polish Saturday school for children and adult classes; a large community hall and a church. The buildings are arranged in a rectangle shape, leaving a reasonable parking and play area in the centre. The complex attests the degree of meticulous organisation by a community striving for survival as a linguistic and cultural entity.

The priest who manages most of the activities was not sure exactly how many members were using the centre. Particularly, after the accession of Poland to the European Union in 2004, which allowed free movement of people from Poland into the EU, a large number of Polish immigrants have entered the UK. The

number frequenting the South London community centre has increased dramatically, with the church and the Saturday school now being largely oversubscribed. As a guide, the priest explained that there used to be about 80-100 people for each of the two Sunday services, but now there are not enough seats for all as an estimates 120-140 attend each service despite the number of Sunday masses being increased to three. The number of pupils on roll at the Saturday school has also nearly tripled, from 100 in 2006 to over 250 in 2007.

So, this is a growing community which continues to strive to maintain a certain identity through various means. The subsection below examines some of the key strategies used by the community for linguistic and cultural survival.

Religious and cultural instrument

The Polish Church is open every day and members can come for service or private prayers. As the priest resides on the premises, he can often be contacted if needed. The main church services (masses) are held on Sundays. Due to the capacity of the church as explained earlier, there are now three services, at 10 a.m., 11.30 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. The services are conducted in native language and following the rites and rituals of the Polish Catholic church as it is practised in the country of origin. Members are not only old-timers but newcomers are now outnumbering more established members of the community at church services. After the mass every Sunday, the community hall is opened for members to congregate there for socialising and tea, biscuits, sweets and lunch are offered.

The significance of the church in culture maintenance is not arguable. It brings alive what Wiley (2001) called “connections to past traditions and the maintenance of ancestral languages”. These connections are so strong that it seems as though they could only be expressed in the mother tongue. It is the expression of literacy as a social capital. In this sense, I would disagree with Carrington & Luke (1997) who suggest that literacy does not provide social success. Certainly in the case of this Polish community, members’ practice demonstrates that literacy can have effects on other cognitive practices. The use of the native language in the context of the church is a tool for social and cultural action.

During the covert observation process, the researcher attended a number of cultural events, a Christmas party, children’s ball as well as private barbeque parties in some of the observees’ homes. In much of these instances the invitees

were predominantly Polish migrants, though a few people from different socio-cultural groups attended but were mostly accompanying spouses. A large national gathering of these immigrants takes place at the POSK, a multi-storey tower which represents the headquarters of the Polish community in the UK. Here many cultural events take place every year, including historical and cultural exhibitions, children's language and culture competitions, balls and World War II remembrance ceremonies. All these attest the power of the culture as an instrument of identity maintenance and self-segregation among migrant communities (Hack-Polay, 2006a; Durkheim, 1961; Malinowski, 1954).

Education instrument

A Saturday school operates within the community centre and is open to all children of Polish origin who live in the area, regardless of whether their parents attend the church or not. The Parish priest explained that the accent is placed on the widening of the community base that will serve as a core in the cultural maintenance initiative. The more pupils there are on roll the more extensive and stronger the community would be, providing more prospect for socio-cultural and linguistic survival and cultural revival. Within the Saturday school, language is therefore "both the medium and the message of education" The school seeks to develop the children's ability to speak the native language as well as know and understand the culture. The curriculum is thus based on the school curriculum in the native country.

Informal sessions offering educational guidance and employment advice are run once a week. This is to offer the support of the community to newcomers to enable to settle smoothly. There is often referral to some members of the community who may be working in places where there may be possible openings for the newcomers. Usually, if an established member helps a newly arrived person to find employment within their workplace, he or she would take responsibility to work closely with the new employee until they are settled and could coach another person into the job.

Some English classes provision is available to ensure community members are linguistically independent and could seek some integration with other communities. But these are not always structured and extensive; it is also believed that their language abilities will naturally increased in the workplace (Norton,

2000), which could, however, be somehow problematic given that newcomers often work with countrymen and women, thus getting minimum opportunities to practice the language. There are also recreational classes with Salsa lessons, yoga, polish traditional dance (Karolinka) and a choir. There is a social club within the community setting where people congregate to seek friendship.

Social networks: the mother and toddlers group

A mother and toddler group also operates within the community centre geared at developing friendship among Polish mothers but also among their children. The researcher visited the group during the research. During tea with the mothers, the researcher enquired with the playgroup leader about the reasons why many of these women were not attending their local playgroups operated for a multicultural audience. The leader joked: “you see, they are happy here; we drink tea together; we sing songs from Poland for our kids and we chat and gossip about some people together; we understand each other”. The women would have benefited from the contacts with women from other migrants and indigenous groups in terms of improving their language skills, meeting new people and developing strategic alliances and network that could help in future life. However, they chose to come to the community centre’s playgroup where they could the sense of feeling foreigners and some embarrassment, in the words of the playgroup leader.

Informational instrument: Community Newspapers

The community newspapers, ‘Cooltura’, ‘Goniec Polski’, ‘Nowy Czas’ and ‘Panorama’ are in Polish language and circulated through the church or in the community hall as means of providing comprehensive news to the community. At the end of each church service, community members get the paper free of charge from the community hall. A monthly bulletin is also produced and distributed free of charge. The papers ensure that vital religious and community information is available to all members of the community with no need for translation. While the newspaper is an essential element to build the community spirit, it could provide members who are not literate in English with an opportunity not to seek to read papers in English language. In fact, many members also purchase newspapers and

magazines in Polish language from a nearby shop, specialising in the sale of Polish products.

Instruments of socio-cultural conservatism: economic infrastructures

The availability of almost all vital services and a supportive community and social networks may not necessarily encourage individuals within the community to learn and mix with the host culture, and the observees in this research exemplify this situation. The acquisition of a second language usually represents a tool for social action. Mercer (2000), for example, argues that second language acquisition helps people to use the language to deal with many situations, to solve problems and to get things done successfully. However, in the case of the observees, it seems that learning the language (English) of the host society in which they have come to live would be an unnecessary activity particularly because they can complete the social action Mercer refers to without having recourse to English. In fact as one of the observees, Wojtek, explained:

I can have most of the things I want within the Polish community here or in other parts of London. The church service is in Polish. It's really good. So I don't really need English. I need to work hard.

This attitude towards learning the host culture and language was not isolated among the observees. The existence of a strong Polish community with a church, shops, newspapers and community centre, play group school for kids, and even doctors and dentists could all be the adverse ingredients of second language learning. Aneta, a female respondent who worked as a childcare assistant for a Polish family espoused that view. She pointed out that

There is a lot of work you can find without English. I work for a Polish family and that suits me because I can communicate with the lady and the kids and laugh together. They also come to the same church as me. It's a community thing.

Although Aneta, like many others, acknowledged feeling bad because she was not as competent in English language as she would have liked, she thought the possibility of making money quickly to take home was more tempting. Usually, spending months and or years learning English to be proficient was perceived by some as "a waste of time", in Jan's words.

Migrant financial services

Most of the areas in social life where one could need English, for the observees, the native language would suffice to deal with those situations. The existence of the Polish Bank PKAO in London is not there to help language acquisition. Community members can go to the Central London branch and open accounts without speaking English. Given the large numbers of Eastern European migrants who have come to the UK since 2004, some major British Banks such as Barclays and NatWest offer bank account in Polish language. Some estates agents have followed this trend. In addition, a number of money transfer agencies have emerged, which provide services exclusively to the migrants in their native language and transfer funds mostly to designated countries generating large numbers of migrants. At the same time, migrant communities have set mortgage lending services to assist those wanting to purchase properties, estate agents for those looking for rented accommodation and Polish law practitioners to assist with legal issues.

Migrant shops and supermarkets

There are numerous shops, supermarkets, beauty salons, etc., specifically set up for the Polish community. These are often operated by members of the community. However, with more migrants arriving in the UK (government estimates the number of Poles in the UK at about 1 million), business in this economic area has been booming and more actors have penetrated the markets. Traditional Asian and other corner shops around London offer a wide range of Polish products. At the peak of the research, the researcher attended a community cultural event at the Polish community centre in south London. As the researcher waved goodbye to friends, including three of the observees, they were heading to the local 'Polish shop' to get the usual supply of sausages, beers, sweets, etc., from Poland. It would seem to be a fact of newcomers using these economic entities due to language barriers, but for many in the community it becomes a way of life.

These sophisticated social and economic infrastructures built around the community leads to a certain self sufficiency. Members of the Polish community are able to operate in the new society with little knowledge of the language and the dominant culture. These, from the perspective of mutual and psychological

support, are significant in addition to enabling the community to safeguard their cultural roots. However, community self-sufficiency and cultural conservatism has a number of less positive consequences for individual members, the migrant community and the host society at large.

Consequences of migrant socio-cultural conservatism

Social and labour market participation: Parallel labour markets

The possibility of finding work without competence in English language has some repercussions on the types of employment the migrants could aspire to and obtain. The evidence from the research reveals that many migrants who do not develop competence in the host language, culture and social networks are likely to end up in unskilled employment or low paid menial jobs (Hack-Polay, 2008). Andrej, a helper on a building site said:

As long as I can find some work to do, I'll prioritise work over other things. My primary reason for coming to England was to work and make money. Where I work, I am with many Polish people and I feel very comfortable with them.

As it can be seen, as long as the migrants can find work and fulfil the purpose for migrating, the need to learn and acquire the host language and culture is not felt. However, even for those like Iwona, a female respondent, who might feel "ashamed" (as she puts it) at not speaking English, there are other barriers to the motivation to learn English. She explained that

I work long hours, from six in the morning to six o'clock in the evening over six days a week. When I come home I am exhausted and I can only eat and sleep. On Sunday, I need to go to church, I can't miss it.

The observees were unanimous that the long working hours and the labour-intensive jobs they do were also to blame in their not turning up to learn the language of the host country. Some of the observees, such as Agnieszka, have dropped out of language courses they enrolled on for this very reason coupled with the childcare issues they face due to the absence of the extended family network. Norton (2000), studying the case of language learning of immigrant women in Canada, found that confidence and anxiety as well as class and ethnicity were socially constructed and impacted on second language acquisition. However, while

the women studied by Norton thought against marginalization, the Polish observees did not feel a sense of marginalization given the size of their community through which they could lead 'normal social life'.

Self-sufficiency or self-imposed social exclusion?

All the observees reported that they mostly socialise with people from their community in South London or with members of Polish communities in other parts of London. Polish church services, Christmas parties, wedding, etc. were examples of social activities that the observees attended predominantly. This makes their living in the UK look like 'living in another country' within England, a world on its own. As Pawel, an observee explained:

It's like in Poland. We play our music; we dance our dances; we drink our beer. It's really good. It really makes you feel at home.

Iwona explained it more profoundly when she talked about the Polish Christmas in South London. She said

I can't miss it. And I can't go to English church because I need to understand everything. So even if the church wasn't here I would go to Willesden (West London).

It almost seems as though the respondents were not only happy but determined to live a life outside the dominant English language and cultural framework. This may not be conducive to second language learning because as Norton (2000) argues access to native social networks are crucial to second language acquisition but this was lacking crucially in the case of my observees. The observees fit in Mitchell & Myles' (2000) observation when they argue that "Few adult learners ever come to blend indistinguishably with the community of target 'native speakers'; most remain noticeably deviant in their pronunciation, and many continue to make grammar mistakes and to search for words, even when well motivated to learn".

Social shame (multi-cultural cultural avoidance)

Bogdan has no friend in the wider British community. When stopped by someone wanting he avoids them and does not respond. He says that's the best way when you live in a foreign country. When he needs crucial services that require

him to speak English, he has recourse to friends. But many admit, this make them feel uncomfortable but it is difficult to do something about it because going to college regularly will divert them from the priory purpose for migrating, which is to make money quickly and return home. However, many migrants eventually stay in the host country; many of those spend years preparing and planning for a future back home that they would no be part of. Many of the participants acknowledge the fears of have to remain in the host country and having to live with what could be described as perpetual social shame and multiculturalism avoidance (Hack-Polay, 2006a).

CASE FOR A SHIFT OF PARADIGM

Centrality of migrant organisations

Cultural and language maintenance are important and could represent a great cultural and economic asset. Not only can people engage in social actions and maintain their identity as a community, but there is much evidence that in the current globalising world, speaking more than one language could help in economic promotion. If identity is defined as “the way one sees one’s own position and meaning in the world and also how one is identified by others”, then the migrant community would face a dilemma. On the one hand they would see themselves as a strong community with a cultural identity but the outside world would continue to perceive them as foreigners and lacking literacy. They would then perhaps continue to be given “the low status, solitary jobs which no one else wants to do and this marginalization will limit their opportunity to practise English and also reduce their confidence and heighten their anxiety” (Norton, 2000).

For Rasool (2000) identity, in general and language identity specifically, is closely connected with broader social structures and historical processes. This, for the migrant observees in South London, has meant that their purpose of coming to the UK which was predominantly economic could not also be reconcilable with the ‘wasting’ of time on other ‘secondary’ things such as second language learning, particularly if they could still marginally participate in society and the labour market.

The use of ethnic languages as “vernacular literacy” (Martin-Jones & Bhatt, 1998) is empowering at a local level, but it is disabling for the community beyond

the locality. It is an acknowledgement that within a social or geographical space, there are several communities and parallel labour markets which operate alongside each other for various reasons. However, the observees in the research seem to be drifting into stronger conservatism as the community becomes more and more complacent in developing mechanisms for its members to acquire the English language and host culture which prevail outside of migrant networks. Persisting in such social isolation, the community runs the risk of depriving its members of intellectual, professional and multicultural developments on its doorstep. Norton (2000) has argued that in such cases, the community of immigrants could face economic disadvantage as its members are handed mostly the unskilled work, thus confining them to lower social classes. Bucholz (2003), in her study of 'nerd girls', coined the concepts of negative identity practice and positive identity practice. The former refers to situations where individuals attempt to distance themselves from a rejected identity; the latter refers to situations where individuals seek to construct a chosen identity. The observees in South London seem to be involved in negative identity practice, which is about rejecting the British identity.

However, the involvement in negative identity practice may not necessarily be to the advantage of the individuals and the community as earlier asserted. Sometimes hybridity could be a viable alternative which could provide more opportunities (Gutierrez, Baquedano-Lopez & Tejeda, 2003). They argue that the meeting of cultures, hybridity, gives rise to a third space "in which alternative and competing discourses and positioning transform conflict and difference into rich zones of collaboration and learning because it increases the possibility of dialogue. Migrant communities could well benefit from a strategic positioning into this intersection space.

Partnership between government and migrant community organisations

If the government is serious about preparing migrants for citizenship then a necessary shift in strategy should occur. An indispensable part of such a shift is the search for partnership with community organisations, e.g. provide/fund English language and culture provision within the community organisation. The priest of the Polish community church explained that "we don't have enough money to do all this; we tried". The UK government is pushing to make speaking English a condition for gaining citizenship. But people cannot be forced to learn. Evidence

suggests that many are prepared to remain mere permanent residents if the conditions are enforced. This confirms that the way to get people to learn the host country language and explore the multiple benefits of multiculturalism is through dialogue between host government and migrant community organisations; through the release of adequate funding to finance integration activities within specific migrant groups but also encourage linkages and dialogues between different migrant communities. Partnership goes far beyond the mere concept of involvement. Partnership was one of the foundations of the Sure Start initiative. For Wolfendale (2000:8), partnership is about “consulting and including them (people) from the earliest planning stages, from service delivery to evaluation”. This understanding of partnership implies working together to achieve a common goal, that of building a harmonious society. This means migrant community leaders should have a say in defining objectives and targets as well as establishing whether outcomes have been met. This will create a true and necessary cultural exchange that educates newcomers to be part of the tolerance and multicultural societal project.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This investigation has revealed that the migrant community uses a variety of strategies to ensure social and cultural conservatism, which in turn, is an aspect of the community’s attempts to preserve its identity. The social infrastructure built around the community is so strong that it can be isolating, perhaps, alienating some community members. In a multicultural space such as London, members are increasingly being confined – or rather locked - into their small space, which denies opportunities to more vulnerable community members because of the little ability to engage in a dialogue with other communities and negotiate a strategic positioning. Social, cultural and linguistic isolation has had a negative impact on the degree to which the observees could achieve social promotion.

There is a learning point for all other migrant and ethnic communities, in the sense that they need to engage in a reflective exercise in order to establish whether their interests are better served as an isolated community or as a community that opens up, dialogues, and competes with others. Perhaps a more proactive role in trying to establish mechanisms that promote independence for all members outside of the community setting could be the way forward for migrant

groups in an era of massive immigration to Britain. While many migrants have done extremely well in the UK and demonstrated strong labour market participation (Hack-Polay, 2006b), those who have found it difficult to adjust to social and economic life in the foreign country deserve much help both from the host authorities and their community organisations. The UK Home Office's plans to force migrants to learn English before they could qualify for citizenship may work only if migrant organisations are placed at the centre of the strategy and are sensitised to work with their individual members.

The research therefore points to the necessity of a shift of paradigm in the way ethnic and migrant groups and community organisations manage themselves in the host country.

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Inter-Ethnic Marital Practice of Bangladeshi Diaspora— An Example of Diaspora Adaptation at this Age of Globalization

Nayem SULTANA and Solvay GERKE

Abstract. During this period of globalization, international labor migration is a common reality. Attaining economic solvency and better future are the major causes among many that motivate people for migration at this moment. Current paper is an initiative to explore the rights, realities and survival strategies of Bangladeshi migrants working in Peninsular Malaysia from the perspectives of social networking. In this context Bangladeshi Diaspora formation and settlement practices in the multi-cultural social setting of the host country will be explored, where migrants' integration and assimilation is strictly prohibited by the anti-integration migration policies. For this, sojourns' complex coping mechanisms and survival strategies will be presented here that were scrutinized through an intensive fieldwork among the Bangladeshi migrants of Peninsular Malaysia. How inter and intra-ethnic networking enabled migrant Bangladeshis to find a way of settlement and survive as well and the likelihood of the existence of a hybrid trans-national identity within the migrants and their newly developed inter-ethnic strong ties, will be presented in this paper.

Keywords: *Embedded realities, survival strategies, inter-ethnic ties, hybridism*

Introduction

The proliferation of literatures on the organizational pattern of the Diaspora generally conceptualizes immigrants, their social networks and survival strategies by the closed socio-cultural models of "structural functionalism"³⁸. The idea that the migrants live in the receiving society, still remain primordial both in the sense of organizational structure and cultural behavior is found imperfect in the current study conducted among the returned and current Bangladeshi migrants. Instead, we have found and therefore would like to emphasize on the inter-ethnic (plurinational) marital practices of Bangladeshi migrants that create hybrid culture, business and identities in the *Bangla Bazaar*³⁹ of Kuala Lumpur.

³⁸ Radcliffe Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*. London: Cohen, 1952.

³⁹ *Bangla Bazaar* is one of the hotspots of Bangladeshi migrants.

As a matter of fact, Floya Anthias in her seminal article entitled “Evaluating Diaspora: Beyond Ethnicity”⁴⁰ proposed alternative ideas about Diaspora. Evaluating the existing writings, she identified some drawbacks and criticized (these) as essentialized. Concerning transnational migration and ethnic relations, she noticed that most of the writings emphasize on the conceptions of “deterritorialized ethnicity”, where primordial networks with home based ties (bonds) get the priority. She intends to focus on the arguments of globalization, non-nation based solidarities and intersectionality of different aspects, especially class, gender and “trans-ethnic” solidarities, while she is arguing for a less essentialized concept of Diaspora. To authenticate her arguments she proceeds discussing on major literatures (on Diaspora), for example, Hall⁴¹ (1990), Gilroy⁴² (1993), Cohen⁴³ (1997), Clifford⁴⁴ (1994) etc. Regarding these she finds some dissimilarity with the real world situation (empirical realities) and hence proposes guide lines for further research. She thinks that in the conventional understanding of Diaspora, race and ethnic relations are the main focuses, where historical and analytically informed vocabularies are not concentrated properly.

In fact, if we take into account her arguments for a less essentialized concept of Diaspora what she pretends very much related with the modern styles of transnational migration and refer to the ethnographic examples of this study we may notice that the instances of inter-ethnic marriage and the other forms of inter-ethnic ties become one of the significant coping strategies of Bangladeshi migrants. Hence like some other researches, the issue of assimilation and integration through inter-ethnic marriages as well as religious, cultural and ethnic pluralism of Malaysia converts into a significant part of this study.

In continuing this, experts are often found exploring the state of religious and ethnic pluralism in Malaysia referring to the Article 153 of the Constitution. For example, Yeoh⁴⁵ quoted this article when he was explaining religious pluralism of Malaysia. Mentioning from the Article 153 he stated that people who “profess the religion of Islam, habitually speak the Malay language, and conform to Malay

⁴⁰ Floya Anthias, “Evaluating Diaspora: Beyond Ethnicity”, *Sociology*, v32 n3 p557, August 1998.

⁴¹ Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora”, *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, ed. J. Rutherford. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990.

⁴² Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic*. London. Verso, 1993.

⁴³ Robin Cohen, *Global Diaspora: An Introduction*. London: UCL Press, 1997.

⁴⁴ James Clifford, “Diasporas”, *Cultural Anthropology* (9: 1994), 302-38.

⁴⁵ Christopher Rodney Yeoh, *Malaysia, Truly Asia? Religious Pluralism in Malaysia* (2006), p-2-5 [database on-line]; available at

<http://www.pluralism.org/research/profiles/display.php?profile=74415> .

customs” are permitted “for special reservation of quotas in three specific areas: public services, education, and business licenses, without harming the rights of other ethnic groups”.

Like him, other studies also consider this article as part of an “ethnic bargain”. It is described that the motivation for “mutual tolerance and respect” can be ascertained by this. Eventually, he thinks it will protect violence and keep intact of the ethnic and racial diversity of Malaysia. For understanding the advent of Islam in Malaysia as well as “mutual tolerance and respect”, manifested among different ethnic groups, he emphasizes on historical perspectives and scrutinizes pre and post-colonial history of Malaysia. Besides, he also focuses on the hybrid identities. Since this pre and post-colonial history provides a good insight for understanding the status of integration and assimilation of Bangladeshi migrants into the receiving society, especially within the Muslim communities, in the next section we will proceed on it.

The discussion will show how Islam became a dominant religion of this region. Along with it, we will see the causes of peoples’ immigration into the country from different parts of the world that may help us to notice the voluntary forms of assimilation and integration, practiced by different ethnic communities and religious groups. Additionally, it will explain on what context people prefer to change their previous religious identities and convert to Islam. Therefore, we will continue our discussion under the following sub-headings:

1. Advent of Islam in Malaysia, the state of Malaysians’ culture and identities and the potential factors for generating inter-ethnic networking between Bangladeshis and other communities
2. Inter-ethnic marriage and the Malay customs
3. Inter-ethnic marriage and the rise of hybrid culture and identities

However, before entering into the discussion it should be mentioned that the secondary and primary data of this research have been collected from June 2005 until July 2006 through intensive field work and an interview survey among the returned and current (Bangladeshi) migrants in Bangladesh and Peninsular Malaysia. Based on qualitative research, semi-structured interviews, group discussion, observation and case study methods were followed to gather in-depth information. Sources of secondary data are literature reviews, newspapers, magazines, web pages, published and unpublished journals, reports and conference papers of several institutions and organizations.

Advent of Islam in Malaysia, the State of Malaysians' Culture and Identities and the Potential Factors for Generating Inter-ethnic Networking between Bangladeshis and Other communities

Malaysia was a centre for trade and commerce during the tenth century AD⁴⁶. At that time, Buddhist and Hindu regulated (ancient) Malay kingdoms were discovered in the northern peninsular region of Malaysia. Due to its unique geographical location, which was in between Chinese and Indian civilizations, it turned into a busy area. Islam was not a native religion of Malaysia until 14th century. Rather, it was brought (into Malaysia) by the Arab traders from the Middle East. After the establishment of Sultanate of Malacca in the 15th century, Islam became a dominant religion over the Southeast Asian region. At this time, businessmen from Europe used to visit Malacca for buying Asian spices as they could not get it in their home country. Asian traders on the other hand, mushroomed in this trading zone in order to obtain foreign goods from the European merchants after selling their own products, including spices. However, sometimes, European traders needed to wait in Malacca for couple of months for a good condition of weather, suitable for their sail. It was mentioned in the study⁴⁷ that in time of strong severe monsoon winds Malacca helped traveling merchants to survive. Its strategic position was next to Sumatran land that contributed in this regard. Thus Malacca converted into a busy cosmopolitan city.

When the first ruler of Malacca, Parameswara, converted into a Muslim through getting married with the Muslim princess Malik Ul Salih of Pasai, Islam turned into a dominant religion. At that time, Islam entered into all the territories of the sultanate, Sumatra in Indonesia and northern Thailand. Local populace and traders changed their previous religious identities for Islam in order to be benefited through the affiliation with the ruler's religion. Nevertheless, there are the followers of other religious ideologies in Malaysia. According to Yeoh, Islam was not imposed on them; rather they practiced on their own, what is identified as an instance of "ethnic and religious pluralism in Malaysia".

Besides, there are many cases, where foreign traders such as Europeans and Chinese integrate themselves into the local Malay culture. They tried to accustom into the Malay customs and learned Bahasa Melayu. Along with it, these merchants settled down in Malaysia through inter-ethnic marriages with the local people of Malacca. Showing the example of *Peranakan* culture, where a hybrid or

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

“syncretic blend” of Malay and Chinese culture is practiced (until now) by their descendents, Yeoh provided an instance of cross-cultural marriage, solemnized between the sixth ruler of Malacca, Sultan Mansur Syah and a Chinese princess, Hang Li Po. As a result of it, until then (August 2006), there remains a group of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, who speak in Malay language and maintain the Buddhist tradition at a time, is depicted by him.

In this context, it is noteworthy to state that the cases of Bangladeshi migrants’ integration and assimilation in the receiving country can be identified as another example of hybrid culture, what will be analyzed in the next section referring to the case of Kalim Miah⁴⁸. However, before that let us find the following table where the potential factors for generating inter-ethnic or cross-cultural ties between Bangladeshis and other ethnic communities are presented briefly.

Table: Potential Factors for generating inter-ethnic networking between Bangladeshis and other ethnic communities

Embeddedness	Everyday realities and experiences	Types of ties	Actors of the ties	Survival strategies
Neighborhood	Relatedness through living space, common niche	1-Strong ties among the same economic and status groups (friendship)	Nepalese, Tamil Indian, Indonesians and Malays	1-To combat inter-ethnic conflict 2-Being afraid of sudden attacking or stealing of goods by non-ethnic members
		2- Weak ties with well-off people (business partnership)	Malay, Indian Muslim, Tamil Indians	1-To expedite their sources of earning 2- To cope with the existing institutional framework of the host society (for immigrant entrepreneurship) 3-To find a way of integration for upward mobility

⁴⁸ Kalim Miah is a respondent of this study.

Co-workers	Common working environment, experience and principles	Strong ties (1-marital or affair relations, 2-working as a group of small scale vendors and 3-business partnership)	Malay, Indian Muslim, Indonesians	<p>1-To combat inter-ethnic conflict</p> <p>2-Being afraid of sudden attacking or stealing of goods by non-ethnic members</p> <p>3- To expedite their sources of earning</p> <p>4- To cope with the existing institutional framework of the host society for immigrant entrepreneurship</p> <p>5-To find a way of assimilation for upward mobility</p> <p>6-To by-pass law about short-term recruitment of migrant workers</p>
Common religious ideology (construction of 'Muslim brotherhood')	Similar notions of "halal and haram" (sacred/legal and impure/forbidden according to Muslim rites) and moral obligations to other Muslims, more or less common rituals of	1-Strong ties (marital and affair relations)	Malay, Indonesians, Indian Muslims	<p>1-To combat inter-ethnic conflict</p> <p>2-Being afraid of sudden attacking or stealing of goods by non-ethnic members</p>

	prayer, food, attire, festivals, duties etc.			3-To find a way of integration or assimilation for upward mobility 4- To by-pass law about short-term recruitment of migrant workers
		2- Weak ties (business relations)	Malay, Indian Muslims	1-To expedite their sources of earning 2- To cope with the existing institutional framework of the host society (concerning immigrant entrepreneurship)

Source: Semi-structured interviews, group discussion and observation

The table indicates that Bangladeshi migrants meet their inter-ethnic (both local and other migrant communities) counterparts and develop ties on the basis of neighborhood, working niche as well as common religious identities, where both (inter and intra-ethnic actors) are embedded in. They (respondents) develop these ties as strategies for survival in a foreign society, where they need to compete with co-ethnic members, other migrant workers and local people as well. They compete with each other for the scarce resources like job, increases of salary, housing etc. They also need to develop networks as they can protect themselves from their rivals. To ease their settlement in the host country, they attempt to strengthen their bargaining power and maneuver the existing institutions (norms, values on the code of conduct, dress, food, drinks, social interactions etc., policies about their permanent resident status, inter-ethnic marriage, ethnic enterprises etc.) that are imposed on them as foreign workers.

In fact, if we concentrate on the everyday discourses of the host country about its multi-ethnic communities, we may notice that the society bears some common perceptions regarding Bangladeshi migrants. These common notions appeared in daily newspapers as well as literatures on migrant workers. Besides, through their talks and behavioral attitudes, both experts (immigration authorities, some officials of Bank Negara, N.G.O officials, officials from Bangladesh High Commission, representatives from MTUC⁴⁹ etc.) and administrators (factory managers, supervisors) expressed their cognitions regarding Bangladeshi migrants, especially referring to the instances of un-skilled and semi-skilled workers. Bangladeshis on the other hand, assisted to know the common proverbs and morals about them, while they were interviewed. Exploring these discursive practices it is found that the provided space for this community (Bangladeshis) is very limited and they are disgraced in the society. Most of them (un-skilled and semi-skilled workers) are allowed to stay there only as workers.

Identifying them (un-skilled and semi-skilled workers) as the “social problem makers” their marriage with locals was prohibited (by the Immigration Act). For example, it is mentioned that there are so many cases where Bangladeshi workers get married with the local ladies, though they are already married in Bangladesh. Later on, they leave their host wife and children when they determine to depart from the country. They also provide instances of the numbers of single mothers in Malaysia, who are left alone by their Bangladeshi husbands. Bangladeshis on the other hand, argued that there left no choice for them to stay with their Malaysian wife and children. They are deported by the authorities as soon as their work permits are expired. Highlighting cultural differences between Malaysia and Bangladesh, some of them stated that their Malaysian wife disagreed to join with them for Bangladesh, if they were requested in time of deportation. For example, when we asked Yunus Miah⁵⁰ whether he would bring his Malay wife to Bangladesh, he said,

No. Nurmala does not want. She is afraid of Bangladeshi family life. She thinks that my parents and other relatives will torture her. She will not be permitted to work. Besides, she has nobody there. Rather, I am trying to settle down here. She is assisting me via her local relatives and friends. My daughter is a Bumeputera; managing PR will not be a big deal for me.

⁴⁹ Malaysian Trade Union Congress.

⁵⁰ One of the respondents of this study.

The case of Yunus is not a unique one; rather assimilation into the local culture is a common practice of Bangladeshis in the study areas, where inter-ethnic marriages are solemnized (between Bangladeshis and other communities). For example, Kalim Miah, one of the central Bangladeshi entrepreneurs of *Bangla Bazaar*, preferred to assimilate into the local culture. For his adaptation and upward mobility, he emphasized on local (Malay) custom (*adat*), instead of nurturing Bangladeshi cultural patterns (we will find more discussion in the next section). In fact, it is seen that Bangladeshis need to follow their inter-ethnic wife's custom, if they prefer to settle down on spouse visa, because the alternative one is not possible. Their Malaysian wives disagree to accustom into Bangladeshi culture considering it exploitative for them. As a result, when the system does not work properly, Bangladeshis need to go back bearing the criticism, like "social problem makers".

Moreover, the home ministry and immigration authorities continuously suggested to "flush out"⁵¹ undocumented migrant workers. "Ops against illegals soon"⁵² is quoted in several times in the daily newspapers of Malaysia, where referring to the instances of Indonesians and Bangladeshis, the huge presence of undocumented workers are criticized. In fact, we notice in these texts that migrants are seen not as human beings, rather as the instruments for production. For example, instead of mentioning deportation or expatriation of undocumented workers, they are quoting the terms "flush out" of "illegals" as if they are "rubbish" (!) that needs to be cleaned. The term "illegal" is also inhuman on the ground that migrants are treated as criminals (!).

As a matter of fact, if we analyze the Immigration Acts of Malaysia, we find that the undocumented workers are considered as criminals in the host society. The Immigration Act⁵³ (especially Section 6) provides tough penalties including whipping and imprisonment for the migrants, who do not have valid work permit (*Jalan card*) and other important travel documents, like passport. Thus, undocumented migrants are criminalized for an administrative problem. It also barred the migrants from working for different employers except one that was mentioned in their work permit. Consequently, there always remains a risk for

⁵¹ The Sun, 14th August 2004. "... Flush out workers without permits."

⁵² N12: Nation, 4th February 2006.

⁵³ Immigration Act (1959/63, amended 2002). According to the amended Immigration Act, undocumented workers will be punished imposing a (maximum) fine of RM 10000 or five years (not higher than five years) jail or both. Mandatory whipping (not more than six strokes) is also fixed as a penalty for the undocumented workers.

converting into undocumented workers (for all of the migrant workers) if they are sacked or lose the job due to bankruptcy of the company. Besides, it ruins workers' freedom of job selection. As a result, they convert into "bonded laborers" that increase the risks of harassment and exploitation. The following statement of the Home Affairs Minister (Malaysia) as well as common morals and talks will depict how Bangladeshis are perceived in the host society.

Statement of Home Affairs Minister:

"The abuse is glaring because Bangladeshis are not allowed to work here...They have blue eyes. They look like Hindi film actors and they create social problems here."⁵⁴

Common Morals, Proverbs and Talks:

1-Tamil Indians: "We don't know any Bangladeshi in Port Klang area".

2-Bangladeshi Workers of Port Klang: "Tamils are jealous; they don't want to see us here. They lost their bargaining power for us."

3- Malay business partner: "Real Muslims can stay here and will be respected."

The above statements and parts of talks may remind us Foucault's arguments in one of his classical works, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In order to provide a "pure description of discursive events" he proposed a guideline. He wanted not only a concrete description of discursive events, but also the underlying causes of that. According to him,

The description of the events of discourse poses a quite different question: how it is that one particular statement appeared rather than another? It is also clear that this description of discourses is in opposition to the history of thought. There too a system of thought can be reconstituted only on the basis of a definite discursive totality. But this totality is treated in such a way that one tries to rediscover beyond the statements themselves the intension of the speaking subject, his conscious activity, what he meant, or again, the unconscious activity that took place, despite himself, in what he said or in the almost imperceptible fracture of his actual words; in any case, we must reconstitute another discourse, rediscover the silent murmuring, the inexhaustible speech that animates from

⁵⁴ It was mentioned by the Home Affairs Minister Datuk Seri Radzi Sheikh Ahmed, which was quoted in *New Straits Times*, 13th March, 2006.

within the voice that one hears, re-establish the tiny, invisible text that runs between and sometimes collides with them.⁵⁵

Let us summarize the main arguments from the above citation. Through the analysis of discourses he wanted to explore (1) the social context (2) embedded realities, (3) tacit and explicit consciousness of the actor (speaker) and the surroundings, (4) the hidden or intrinsic meaning of the speech, (5) institutions, conditions and socio-cultural boundaries that regulate the contents of speech, types of cognition and knowledge on a specific issue, (6) power relations among the subject (knowledge on a specific topic), speaker and the networks etc.

Applying the above points (for discourse analysis) if we explain the statement of Home Affairs Minister, we may identify anti-integration migration policies (of the host country) as the realities where Bangladeshis are embedded in. Though institutionally Bangladeshis are not welcomed for integration, but socially these migrants possess the chances for assimilation into the society. We may presume that local people (natives) prefer Bangladeshis as their “strong and weak ties”⁵⁶ that create a social context for inter-ethnic marriage and business relationship, if we consider the comment of a Malay business partner (of a Bangladeshi businessmen), “Real Muslims can stay here and will be respected”.

Common religious ideology, for example, fortifies the consciousness of ‘Muslim brotherhood’ within different ethnic groups. Though they belong to different ethnic groups⁵⁷ (in the sense of primordial attachments, history and culture), but all the Muslims have common beliefs and perceptions regarding *Allah* (as the only one creator), *Quran Sharif* (holy Quran), *Makka Madina* (pilgrimage to sacred places) and Islamic rituals in their everyday life. In fact, while Cohen⁵⁸ was describing how religion might provide an “additional cement” for the rise of “diasporic consciousness” even within the members of different ethnic groups, Metcalf⁵⁹ focused on “Muslim space” created through rituals and “sanctioned practice” (s). Her conceptions of “Muslim space” does not demand any sovereign land (“juridically claimed territory”); rather she has described the concept adding

⁵⁵ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. (Tavistock Publications Limited, 1972), p27.

⁵⁶ Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties”, *AJS volume 78*, 2 Number 4, 1973.

⁵⁷ Alan Barnard and Jonathon Spencer eds., *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (Routledge, 1998), p-190-191.

⁵⁸ Robin Cohen, “Global Diasporas: An Introduction” in *Religion and Diaspora*, Steven Vertovec (WPTC-01-01), P-10.

⁵⁹ Barbara Metcalf, “Introduction: Sacred words, sanctioned practice, new communities” in *Religion and Diaspora*, Steven Vertovec (WPTC-01-01, 1996), P-19.

three more ideas, like (1) “social space”, (2) “cultural space” and (3) “physical space”.

It was found that the religion of Islam not only worked as a platform for the rise of consciousness within Bangladeshis, Indonesians and Tamil Muslim Diasporas, but also it united Bangladeshis with Malay *bumiputeras*. Along with the faith in (only one) “Allah almighty” and his prophet Muhammad, the most obligatory duties (*salat*/five times ritual prayer in a day, *zakat*/giving alms to the poor, *sawm*/fasting during Ramadan and *hazz*/pilgrimage to Mecca), the common Islamic rites and ceremonies (relating to pregnancy, child birth, naming, schooling, initiation, sacrifice, marriage, death etc.), common festivals (like *Eid*) as well as the conceptions and practices of sacred (*halal*) and profane (*haram*) are the arenas of social, cultural and ideological engagement for the Muslims of the study areas. The respondents meet Malays, Tamil Muslims or Indonesians not only as their workmates, housemates or neighbors, but also interact with them in the local *surau* and mosque, because all of them are Muslims.

Consequently, owing to same religious background as well as regular correspondences through common living and working atmosphere, these groups get the chances for network building. Or in other words, their “every day forms of engagement”⁶⁰ provide them the opportunities for network building. While Bangladeshis develop networks with them as survival strategies and for upward mobility, the other ethnic communities are motivated by the religious ideology as well as business interest.

However, exploring the hidden or intrinsic meaning of the speech of Home Affairs Minister, “they have blue eyes; they look like Hindi film actors” we may demonstrate the tacit and explicit consciousness of the speaker (Minister) and the respective authorities of host country. Through his statements he wanted to regulate integration of Bangladeshis in Malaysia that consequently would reconstitute a new discourse emphasizing intra-ethnic mixing, instead of inter-ethnic one. However, though they imposed social and legal boundaries, but failed to control the cognition of local people and the social context associated with inter-ethnic ties (between Bangladeshis and local people).

Therefore, authorities of the receiving country try to warn the local people establishing a new discourse, where they highlight the negative impact of assimilation. At the same time, they also refer to the institutions (migration policy) of the country. They highlight that a ban is imposed on the immigration of

⁶⁰ Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society. India and Beyond* (World Politics 53, April 2001), p- 362-398.

Bangladeshi migrants and speak on behalf of it considering them (Bangladeshi migrants) as the social problem makers. Thus, the authorities of the host country utilize their institutional power to deport Bangladeshis from the study areas and on the other hand, through discursive practices they are manipulating people's world view (knowledge) regarding the consequences of assimilation. Both these institutional and social dimensions of discursive practices demonstrate the hierarchical power relationships among the authorities of the receiving country (Home Affairs Minister, for example), local people and migrant Bangladeshis, where respondents of this study are embedded in.

Moreover, the statement is regulated by the dominant discourse of anti-integration migration policy that determines the contents of speech. This discourse of discourse may create a necessity for making reference from Foucault's work, where he tries to figure out power relationship with "discursive formations"⁶¹ in society that controls the flow and types of knowledge. He proposes to see statements in the context ("field") of discourse and the related networks ("relations") that make hay for these (statements) to come out. Now, if we refer to the statement of Home Affairs Minister, we may postulate that he is representing the outlook (discourse) of the receiving country regarding its migrant workers (mostly un-skilled and semi-skilled workers). They want the existence of migrant workers only as the cheaper means of production (and nothing more), since the locals are reluctant to do these job.

As a matter of fact, Mentioning Azizah's⁶² arguments Abubakar⁶³ wrote that migrants are not allowed to stay in the host society for more than ten (10) years. Among other points it was mentioned that the high presence of un-skilled and semi-skilled laborers created job competition between migrant workers and local poor, especially after the 1997 financial crisis. Based on the above arguments and also evaluating the quoted statements of Bangladeshi migrants ("Tamils are jealous; they don't want to see us here. They lost their bargaining power for us")

⁶¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, (Tavistock Publications Limited., 1972), p-31.

⁶² Azizah Kassim, "Profile of Foreign Migrant Workers in Malaysia: Towards Compiling Reliable Statistics". Paper read at a Conference on 'Migrant Workers and the Malaysian Economy' organized by the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 1998.

⁶³ Syarisa Yanti Abubakar, "Migrant Labour in Malaysia: Impact and Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis", (EADN Regional Project on the Social Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, 2002), p. 16.

and Tamil Indians (“We don’t know any Bangladeshi in Port Klang area”), we can presume the conflicting situation between Bangladeshis and Tamil Indians.

Under these circumstances, instead of avoidance, Bangladeshis try to develop strong (friendship) and weak ties (business partnership) with Tamil Indians as they can convince their ethnic members on behalf of them. They depend on other Tamil Indian friends and business partners in order to combat conflict with Tamil Indian rivals, since they are incapable to manage it depending only on intra-ethnic networks. Concerning this Varshney’s conceptualizations on how to minimize ethnic conflicts is noteworthy. Identifying inter-ethnic networks as “agents of peace”⁶⁴, he has stated that if communities only remain within themselves and are not interconnected with other ethnic communities except their own, it may create more ethnic tensions and violence. Consequently, Bangladeshi migrants’ networking with Tamil Indians can be identified as a positive step to minimize ethnic conflict between Tamil Indians and Bangladeshi Diaspora.

In fact, on the one hand, they perceive their well-off intra-ethnic weak ties as exploitative, while on the other, their strong ties are not so well-off. It is also less connected with the macro level authorities and hence does not possess enough power and information for upward mobility. Moreover, their embeddedness in the discriminatory immigration rules and anti-integration policies of the host country influence them to develop inter-ethnic ties mostly with other Muslim communities and partly, with Tamil Indians. Thus, they try to combat risks and by-pass laws for finding a way of settlement and upward mobility as well. Therefore, the dominant perception on primordial networking⁶⁵, where it is shown that migrants become organized solely within them because of the harsh realities in the host society, cannot be conceptualized as a general fact for all Diasporas. On the contrary, we need to focus empirical and embedded realities as well as historical aspects (if there is any) that regulate the types of networking.

And here we find the reflection of Anthias’s arguments, where she intends to focus on globalization, non-nation based solidarities and also for a less essentialized concept of Diaspora. In fact, through this study we have found that

⁶⁴ Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society. India and Beyond* (World Politics 53, April 2001), P- 363.

⁶⁵ Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fournon, *Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home*. Duke University Press, 2001. See also Min Zhou and Rebecca Kim, “Formation, Consolidation and Diversification of the Ethnic Elite: The Case of the Chinese Immigrant Community in the United State”, *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 2, 2001.

Bangladeshi migrants possess non-notation based ties that open a scope for the development of hybrid Bangladeshi-Malay identities and (hybrid) culture in the receiving country. In the next section we will proceed on this issue.

Inter-ethnic Marriage and the Malay Customs

Gerke in her article on inter-ethnic marriage in East Kalimantan, Indonesia states the following:

As soon as Aneu was brought to her husbands place in Kota Bangun she became a Muslim and married him according to Muslim custom. She is quite amused about the fact that after undergoing the religious ceremony, which had probably no deeper sense for her, she was accepted as a Kutai. This process of 'masuk Melayu' is a standard practice of assimilating other ethnic groups. Wee (1984) has described this process of assimilating sea nomads (orang laut) to Malay society in the Riau Archipelago.⁶⁶

Referring to Nagata, she continues: "There are three aspects of this process, namely accepting Islam, Malay custom and Malay language"⁶⁷

In fact, Kalim Miah of *Bangla Bazaar* is now staying in Malaysia after having married a Malay lady. In order to assimilate and integrate himself into Malay society, Kalim Miah had to only look at two aspects: Malay language and custom. Religion was not a topic, seeing that he already was a Muslim. Their wedding ceremony took place in Malaysia maintaining Malay custom. Due to both being Muslims and sharing the same religious faith, though there were similarities regarding marriage customs, still, there were differences between Bangladeshi and Malaysian marital patterns.

For example, in Bangladesh there is no system for the obligatory marriage certificate what we have seen in the cases of Malaysia. Through these mandatory courses groom and the would-be bride can learn about their respective duties to each other. After successful completion of the classes both the bride and groom achieve certificates for marriage that is totally an unknown issue in Bangladesh. On the other side, in Bangladesh providing dowry to husband and his family is very common among the less privileged classes of migrants, what we cannot see in

⁶⁶ Solvay Gerke, "Ethnic Relations and Cultural Dynamics in East Kalimantan: The Case of the Dayak Lady", *Indonesia and the Malay World*, (Oxford University Press, No.72, 1997), 176-187.

⁶⁷ Nagata 1974, quoted in Gerke1997, 176-187.

Malaysia. Though illegal⁶⁸ in Bangladesh, but practicing and asking for dowry in time of matrimonial ceremony, prevails in many sections of the society.

The idea that unemployment and underemployment of young males, especially in rural Bangladesh play key roles for practicing dowry⁶⁹ is found true concerning migrant Bangladeshis, who are married with other Bangladeshis. Since the required items and amount of cash for dowry payment are fixed depending on the grooms' family's demand, it helps to reduce the costs of the (groom's) family needed to purchase these amounts. Moreover, through the interview survey it is found that among different ways of earning the required amount of money for migrating to Malaysia, dowry (2.7%) from wife's part was one of the sources⁷⁰. Besides, it also works as a symbol of economic solvency for the bride's family, where on the other hand, for the groom and his family, dowry acts as a proof of their higher social status and qualifications. Or in other words, it helps groom and his family to accumulate cultural capital (honor/prestige) within the networks of neighbors, friends and relatives. This argument is substantiated on the ground that it supports one of the social values which is, the higher the qualifications and social status of groom will be, the higher the payment for dowry will be demanded from the bride.

Referring to the rise of dowry practice in Bangladesh over the last 20-30 years Kabeer⁷¹ depicted two major causes, such as, (1) males' (from all classes) integration into the "wider cash economy" and (2) devaluation of women's productive roles within the household. As a matter of fact, Kabeer's argument reminds us the field situation where Sanda, one of the female respondents of this study was divorced on this ground. Like her, there are other cases where bride's parents cannot contribute to the whole amount of dowry at once and consequently this opens a scope for husband's part to give divorce to the wife. In fact, since Sanda's parents failed to pay the full amount of dowry immediately after her marriage, she was reminded by her husband and parents in-law several times. Being failed to pay the due she had to accept divorce. Later on, in order to protect

⁶⁸ According to The Dowry Prohibition Act 1980, a husband and his family will face death penalty or life imprisonment if his wife is murdered (or they attempt to murder her) for dowry.

⁶⁹ Md. Awal Hossain Mollah, *Combating Violence against Women in South Asia. An Overview of Bangladesh*, (<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN020004.pdf>, retrieved 2nd August 2007).

⁷⁰ The other sources were, (a) selling arable land (37.3%), (b) friends and relatives (40%), (c) father's provident fund (18.7%) and respondent's provident fund (1.3%).

⁷¹ Naila Kabeer, *Subordination and Struggle: women in Bangladesh* (*New Left Review*, No.168. March 1988), p. 106.

herself from the neighbors' criticism (because of divorce) she decided to migrate to Malaysia, where she was supported by her parents. As a result, it is not surprising that female migrants' parents try to save remittance in order to buy "gifts" (dowry) for their daughters' marriage, what is found in time of field research.

Now if we compare the above situation with the Malaysian marital system for Muslims, we will find that husband needs to pay *mahr* to the wife, instead of the opposite one. Moreover, economic solvency is one among other capabilities that helps the groom to obtain permission for marriage. Otherwise, he will be unable to get registration for his marriage and hence the events of staying together of the couple will be considered as *illegal* from the point of view of *Shari' ah*.⁷² However, though there are so many constraints regarding wedding practices in Malaysia, especially in the case of inter-ethnic marriage, still some⁷³ male respondents conducted inter-ethnic marriage. They developed inter-ethnic strong ties in order to find a way of upward mobility and for settling down permanently, what is already discussed in the previous sections. Regarding this let us consider Kalim Miah's following statement, where he emphasized dissimilarities between Bangladeshi and Malay marital customs. According to him,

Still a few dissimilarities existed. We could not get married before obtaining a certificate of marriage course. I had to provide her full part of *mahr* immediately when the marriage was solemnised. Still I feel relief hoping and expecting for a better future. I know my children will be *bumiputera*, as they contain the blood of a *bumiputera*. Yah--sister, my wife is a *bumiputera*.

Actually, according to Muslim customs wife deserve *mahr*, what we may see in Malaysia. Since through marriage she will be subjugated totally under the authority of her husband, *mahr* is considered as her right. It is also explained as a symbol of respect shown by the husband to his wife. The property or money provided as *mahr* remained bride's property and hence it is not comparable to

⁷² The Shari' ah is the holy law of Islam based on Quran and Sunnah. In Malaysia Muslims are administered by Islamic law. Though Islamic laws are governed both by Shari' ah and Civil Courts, but the Article 121 (1A) of the Constitution of Malaysia sanctioned special power and authority to the Shari' ah Courts for the management of Islamic laws. The Shari' ah law is confined only for Muslims. For more information please find Zaitoon Dato Othman. Islam in Malaysia Today and its Impact. "The Practice of Shari' ah Laws in Malaysia" available at <http://www.muslim-lawyers.net/news/datoothman.html/> retrieved 3rd August 2007.

⁷³ Amongst the married respondents 9% migrants are married with locals. The others were already married before their migration to Malaysia.

bride's price. Kabeer argued that the provision of *mahr* was also common in Bangladesh in the past. Identifying it as bride's property she continued that bride and sometimes her family used to receive gifts, such as jewellery and clothes, from the groom's family. Moreover, instead of full payment, part of the *mahr* was kept as unpaid. They used to do it as if the wife could claim the rest amount in cash, if she was divorced without any reason. Thus, according to Kabeer, earlier *mahr* acted as a restraint to divorce.

However, through this study it is found that though an amount was fixed as *mahr* (for Sanda) in the *kabin nama* (marital contract), but it was not a handsome amount in comparison to the sum of dowry that she supposed to pay to her husband. Moreover, it was mentioned (by Sanda) that her *mahr* was totally unpaid and it failed to protect divorce. Rather, on being failed to pay the dowry she had to accept divorce. Consequently, it can be stated that Sanda's (intra-ethnic marriage) case is not similar to Kalim Miah's (inter-ethnic marriage) case. On the contrary, it is found that in Bangladesh amongst these systems of payments, demand for dowry (wife needs to pay to her husband) is obligatory, where *mahr* (husband is supposed to pay to his wife) stands for a marker of symbolic payment. Consequently, the roles of dowry are stronger than *mahr* in Bangladesh, though most of its citizens are Muslims. While in the case of Malaysia payment of *mahr* to the bride is not only obligatory for the Muslim groom, but also he is not allowed to ask for dowry to his wife.

Since Kalim Miah was trying to assimilate him into Malay community in order to be benefited as the husband and father of *bumiputeras* (the right of Malay *bumiputera* is protected under Article 153 of the Constitution of Malaysia), he followed Malay customs in his nuptial ceremony with a Malay lady. In fact, Malay wedding ceremony is a combination of Islamic rites and traditional Malay rituals. For example, Kalim Miah's marriage ceremony lasted for seven days that was an instance of Malay custom. Among Malay community grand ceremony was welcomed for wedding and hence Kalim needed to follow that ritual. Kalim, therefore, spent "a lot of money" for the entertainment of guests in his wedding ceremony. In the feast, he continued that one cow, two goats and one hundred twenty two chickens were slaughtered, where not only Malays, but also some of his Bangladeshi friends were invited. Besides, he needed to follow different Malay rituals in several phases of his wedding ceremony. In Kalim Miah's following words,

Before marriage, representatives from my side, my village mates and brothers went to her parents with 'hantaran' (odd number of gift boxes are taken to the bride's house during the proposal ceremony). A local 'Qadi' (religious

marriage celebrant) conducted the ceremony. We are bringing them (children) up according to Malay customs. My son speaks in Malay and when Ayesha will be grown up, we will give her a *hejab* (a piece of cloth to cover the head).

The statement indicates that Kalim Miah tries his best to adopt Malay custom in order to find a way of integration and assimilation in the Malay community. He emphasized Malay customs not only in marital rituals, but also in his post marital life through parenting his children according to Malay rituals. In this context it is noteworthy to mention that though Kalim adopted Malay custom, but he had no clear-cut idea about the internal meaning of any custom. He pursued that in order to find a way of integration in the receiving country that might enable him to be a rich man. Kalim's integration process, therefore, makes a room for making references from Gerke's work, where she was explaining how Aneu converted into a Kutai without having any deeper understanding of the standard practices of *masuk Melayu*.

However, to have a concrete account of Kalim's assimilation into Malay community, happened through the persuasion of Malay customs in his marriage with a Malay *bumiputera* lady, let us see the following aspects. These were narrated by this respondent while he was interviewed on the question of his marital ceremony. The key practices of his marital ceremony are,

- Marriage course
- Proposal ceremony
- Engagement ceremony
- Wedding ceremony
- State ceremony

In the next part we will see a description of these aspects as presented by Kalim.

Marriage Course

Before marriage Kalim Miah and his would-be wife attended two months course, which is called 'Course on marriages'. This course provided them insights into the responsibilities of man as a husband and woman as a wife. Government wants this course to be completed before marriage, because many of its citizen and immigrants marry, but they forget their responsibilities. But, however, he had to obtain permission from the Government for his inter-ethnic marriage, even earlier than their completion of marriage course. In that context, it was necessary to show

his economic solvency. He justified that he could maintain his family. Besides, one of the rules for inter-ethnic marriage is to give a proof of his unmarried or single status. Even, if the groom has previous wife he will have to divorce her. The divorce letter first to be certified by local administration of Bangladesh, and later it has to be endorsed by the Bangladesh High Commission. Thus, they come out to get married.

Proposal Ceremony

According to Malay custom proposal must go from the groom's side to bride's side, consequently, he is represented by some of his friends and relatives. They visited bride's house with gifts. They took seven gift boxes for the bride and her family. One of the gift items was holy Quran and another one was *tikar sembahyang* (prayer mat). Besides, chocolates, flowers, ring and dresses were the other gift items. Then, groom's relatives and friends were treated with a special meal. Before getting proposal wife's part used to know that a proposal was coming, so they were prepared for that with gifts. Since Kalim's representatives brought seven gift boxes, bride's part had to provide eight boxes. That bride's part needs to reimburse it adding one more box is a local ritual. Then proposal was accepted and they discussed about the engagement date. In the same day they also fixed the date of wedding. How the ceremony will be arranged and the sources of probable expenses were the topics of discussion. Kalim Miah had to provide dowry to the bride's part for the expenses of ceremony, what is uncommon in Bangladesh. They decided to have a combined grand party at bride's house and Kalim Miah also arranged a separate programme in *Bangla Bazaar*, where not only Malays, but also Bangladeshis were invited.

Engagement Ceremony

Since Kalim Miah had no female relatives in Malaysia, his friend's (a Bangladeshi businessman of *Bangla Bazaar* and also a member of the Noakhali group) wife presented engagement ring to the bride on behalf of him. In fact, according to the Malay custom, engagement ring is supposed to be provided by a senior female relative to the bride. Besides, showing respect to the Malay custom his friends arranged a tray with clothes, cosmetics, food, fruits etc. as a gift for the bride and her family, when they visited them at the engagement ceremony. However, this ritual is not uncommon among the well off people in Bangladesh, where bride and groom's relatives visit each other with engagement ring and gift items.

Wedding Ceremony

In fact, in wedding ceremony Kalim Miah needed to follow both Malay customs and Islamic rites. For example, along with the provision of *mahr* the ceremony was under the charge of a *Qadi* (a religious priest, schooled in Islamic laws). The *Qadi* also reminded them about the Islamic law concerning marriage. Their respective duties to each other as well as the importance of trust in family relationship were spelled out (by the religious marriage celebrant).

In the wedding ceremony Kalim Miah provided full part of *mahr* to his wife. It was a written contract. There was no system of forgiveness or half payment of *mahr*, what we usually find in Bangladeshi marital systems. Kalim Miah was taught earlier that he should agree boldly that he accepted the bride and would pay the agreed upon *mahr*. Otherwise, the *Qadi* would have to solemnize the declaration ceremony again if Kalim Miah did not accept all the conditions firmly. Or in other words, he was warned not to fumble as it might create suspicion regarding his wishes to marry the bride. Consequently, in order to be welcomed in the Malay community Kalim Miah followed that ritual.

State Ceremony

After the wedding ceremony, Malays prefer to arrange another ritual what is called sitting in the state. In that context, he and his wife were considered king and queen of that day. Though Kalim was a Bangladeshi, still he dressed himself in traditional *baju kurung* (traditional Malay dress) like his Malay wife. Carrying a traditional dagger Kalim accompanied his Malay wife who wore gold made jewellery. They tried to appear as a king and queen and then sat on a decorated dais what is called *pelamin* in Bahasa. This stage resembled as the king and queen were sitting in the state.

Thus, Kalim Miah tried utmost to incorporate himself into Malay community through inter-ethnic marriage. In that context, without raising any questions he followed Malay customs. Even, after his marriage he tried to maintain Malay custom while he was with his wife and children. Their (Kalim and his wife) similar religious background and his persuasion of Malay customs were the means that created a “social space of networks (inter-ethnic strong and weak ties) and identities”⁷⁴ (hybrid) outside of his (Kalim) home country. His religious background

⁷⁴ Barbara Metcalf, “Introduction: Sacred words, sanctioned practice, new communities” in *Religion and Diaspora*, Steven Vertovec (WPTC-01-01, 1996), P-19.

as a Muslim and the acceptance of Islamic rites and Malay customs as well as Bahasa opened a “cultural space”⁷⁵ in the host country, where he interacts and nurtures his inter-ethnic strong and weak ties for finding a way of permanent settlement and consequent upward mobility in the receiving country.

For the interaction within his inter-ethnic networks and to determine the native language of his son, though he prefers Bahasa, but however, for his own case, he could not protect the mixture of Bengali and Bahasa. In the same way, his attempts of assimilation into the Malay community have resulted into hybrid identities and (hybrid) culture. This hybridism can be seen at his newly created “physical space”⁷⁶ surrounded by inter-ethnic strong and weak ties and also at his business enterprise of the *Bangla Bazaar* area, among the Bangladeshi migrants. Therefore, unlike fully echoing Metcalf’s ideas of “imagined maps of Diaspora Muslims”⁷⁷, the situation of Kalim’s integration rather remind us Vertovec’s following accounts on Diasporas,

Diaspora has arisen as part of the post modern project of resisting the nation-state, which is perceived as hegemonic, discriminatory and culturally homogenizing. The alternative agenda—now often associated with the notion of Diaspora—advocates the recognition of hybridity, multiple identities and affiliations with people, causes and traditions outside the nation-state of residence.⁷⁸

We will discuss on the issue of hybridism in the next section.

Inter-ethnic Marriage and the Rise of Hybrid Culture and Identities

Example One:

Through his staying and working in a factory of Kuala Lumpur, Kalim Miah managed to learn Bahasa Melayu even before his marriage. As his wife was a native Melayu speaker, he adopted this language as well. His children are native Melayu speakers and with his wife he also speaks Melayu. Hence, at home, he is totally a Melayu speaker and follower of Malay custom. Thus he was trying to assimilate into Malay community at the expense of his own mother-language, Bengali.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid. By the term “physical space”, the author intends to mean the dwelling and community houses founded in the new settings, away from homeland.

⁷⁷ Ibid. By the term “imagined maps of Diaspora Muslims” Metcalf indicated those spaces of Muslims that are created in a new setting through the combinations of social, cultural and physical spaces (of Muslims).

⁷⁸ Steven Vertovec, *Religion and Diaspora* (WPTC-01-01), P-5.

However, outside the home, in Bangla Bazaar, among the Bangladeshi friends and brothers he speaks Bengali. His restaurant's name is in Bengali and Melayu language –Prabashi Kedai Makanan (foreign restaurant) – and the place where they go for prayer is also named as Bangla Surau. A type of hybrid language can be found among these titles. His attempt was to use Bengali vocabulary, but Melayu words were added. For instance, the words Kedai Makanan and surau are collected from Bahasa Melayu (Malay language). The word Kedai Makanan means restaurant and surau means Muslim prayer house. Even, when he was delivering a speech in front of his Bangladeshi brothers, besides Bengali he mentioned Melayu words, such as, makan, minum, daging lembu etc.

Example Two:

Kalim Miah and his wife have two children, one son (5 years old) and one daughter (3 years of age). Although in Bangladesh, there is no system of affixing father's name and title with the offspring's name, two words have been added to his children's names. His son's name is Foysal bin Md. Kalim Miah and the daughter's name is Ayesha bint Md. Kalim Miah. Here bin means son and bint means daughter. Attaching these two words it is stated that they are the son and daughter of Kalim Miah. This Malay style of naming is the outcome of Kalim Miah's inter-ethnic marriage with a Malay lady.

He feels proud to parent his children following Malay custom, while at the same time, he has contact with his relatives in the country of origin and he tries to proof his "distant nationalism"⁷⁹ through a meeting for the country mates on a national day of Bangladesh. However, the instance of spending money for the get together can also be explained as business strategy to find customers for his manpower business. This argument can be made based on the fact that he is not bringing workers in without taking a fee.

Rather, 'weak ties' are developed here based on commercial networking or in other words, by monetary exchange. Besides, not all Bangladeshis can get assistance, only his followers who support him in his competition with the members of the other group, even though they are Bangladeshis too. In the case of Kalim Miah moreover, the term 'long distant nationalism' can be ignored as well, since in his family life he follows Malay custom. In fact, for his integration into the host society he is trying to assimilate,

⁷⁹ Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fouron, *Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home* (Duke University Press, 2001).

while for business purpose he nurtures Bangladeshi nationalism. In other words, a kind of 'hybridism' is being formulated following his adaptation process.

Conclusion

As a matter of fact, Kalim Miah is one of the representatives of Bangladeshi migrant businessmen of Bangla Bazaar in Malaysia, who has managed to receive the status of permanent residency. He came as a temporary worker looking for economic wealth. Later, through inter-ethnic marriage with a *bumiputera* lady he started business. Within a short time span he reached his vantage points and became successful to upgrade his fortune. Instead of cutting the contacts with the homeland, he converted into a manpower agent and brought his fellow village mates, family members and relatives to Malaysia. In other words, for upward social mobility, he is nurturing nationalist and multi-ethnic networking ceaselessly that paves the way for a hybrid Malay-Bangladeshi culture in the receiving society.

However, it is noteworthy to mention that the arenas of engagement among Muslims, both Diasporas and *bumiputera* Malays, not only create peaceful co-existence, but also in some contexts, it generates tensions between powerful locals and the migrant Bangladeshis. In fact, apart from successful integration, there are also other stories that represent migrants' unequal capabilities, intra and inter- ethnic exploitations as well as the anti-integration migration policies of the receiving country.

Consequently, we have tried to analyze the micro and macro level socio-economic, cultural, political, institutional and ideological frameworks and realities, where migrants are embedded in and try to cope with. These are explored in order to evaluate the nature of Bangladeshi Diaspora organizational structure. Reviewing (1) the nature of migrants' embedded realities, (2) examining the roles (as survival strategies and for upward mobility) of inter and intra-ethnic networks and (3) assimilation processes of Kalim Miah, we may come up with the conclusion that Bangladeshi migrants do not come across a homogeneous reality in the receiving society. Rather, we have seen multi-dimensional embedded realities of migrants that are dealt with the formation of hybrid identities and culture in the receiving country.

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What is the Tool of Globalization Good for? Supra-National Actors and the Integration of the Jewish Community/Diaspora in Contemporary Germany

Roxana BARBULESCU

Abstract. This paper examines a local phenomenon, the integration of the Jewish Diaspora/community in contemporary Germany, and tests the usefulness of globalization theory *as a tool*. The study seeks to provide with an answer to the following research questions: Does globalization theory have any explanatory power for this particular case? What I argue is that, in regards to this particular problem, along the traditional factors - with an active role in the integration of the German-Jewish Diaspora/community - addressed by the traditional and nation-bound methods, factors highlighted by the globalization studies approach should also be taken into account. Taken together, they might lead to joint useful findings that, once corroborated by the investigator, help construct a comprehensive picture of the integration of the GJ Diaspora/community. Despite its failure to explain micro-processes, globalization proved to be useful as a tool because it highlighted important factors which other approaches overlooked. This paper proves the engagement of supra-national actors with the Jewish community in contemporary Germany by showing the impact of two international non-governmental organizations (The Jewish Agency and American Jewish Committee) on their integration.

Keywords: *globalization, Jewish Diaspora, Germany*

1. Starting point

In both social sciences and cultural studies, areas of investigation such as changes of identities of social actors, the relationships between minority and majority groups, ethnic conflict management, terrorist networks, social exclusion, and global poverty to name just a few, are frequent topics found in publications are placed in a globalization-context and presented as concrete manifestations and by-products of an ongoing historical process. The newly emerging challenge is to see if *globalization* is more than a buzz word, i.e. to see if it is fruitful when dealing with the aforementioned problems.



The present paper addresses a particular problem, the integration of the Jewish Diaspora/community in contemporary Germany, and tests the usefulness of globalization theory *as a tool*. The paper seeks to find an answer to the following research questions: Does globalization theory have any explanatory power for this particular case? What does globalization and what does assimilation theory make visible or ignore concerning the Jewish Diaspora? Which of the two tools gives us a more accurate account of the integration of Jewish Diaspora/community in contemporary Germany?

What I argue is that, in regards to this particular problem, along the traditional factors with an active role in the integration of the German-Jewish Diaspora/community addressed by the traditional methods, factors that are highlighted by the globalization studies approach should also be taken into account. The main drawback of the classical theories lies in its focus on the close interactions happening at local level (German-Jewish Diaspora - gentile German society) while forgetting the importance of wider social interactions. On the other hand, globalization theory does not suit well to explain micro-processes. However, taken together, they might lead to joint useful findings that, once corroborated by the investigator, help construct a comprehensive picture of the integration of the GJ Diaspora/community.

In order to support my argument, I will first outline the two theories to which I will refer throughout the text, namely, assimilation and globalization. In the second section, I will continue by showing the main processes that assimilation and globalization theories refer to. The third part will focus on the findings made visible by the globalization theory. To conclude, in the light of the previous discussion I will illustrate them by bringing in the cases of two international non-governmental organizations (The Jewish Agency and American Jewish Committee). In the end, I will explain or return to the advantages and disadvantages offered by the globalization theory as it relates to the integration of Jewish Diaspora in today's Germany.

2. Describing the tools: theoretical accounts of “assimilation” and “globalization”

2.1 Globalization

Since the 1960s, when “globalization” entered the sociological discourse, numerous definitions have appeared, attempting to clarify this controversial term.

In order to define my analytical framework I will make use of several accounts of globalization.

Anthony Giddens understands globalization as the “connections between *local* and *global* (...) processes which are intensifying world-wide relations and interdependence⁸⁰. He further elaborates the concept by claiming that globalization involves four types of change: (1) It stretches social, political and economic activities *across political frontiers, regions and continents*; (2) it *intensifies* our *dependence* on each other, as flows of trade, investment, finance, migration and culture increase; (3) it speeds up the world. New systems of communications mean that ideas, goods, information, capital, and people move quickly; (4) it means that distant events have a deeper impact on our lives. Even the most local developments may come to have enormous global consequences⁸¹.

Similarly geographer David Harvey refers to the specificity of globalization as a “time-space compression”, places emphasis on the close relations that form between otherwise, remote elements⁸².

In addition, Mazlish and Iriye highlight to the historical dimension of globalization, which attempts to follow the emergence and evolution of these interconnections. They argue that “[globalization is] the enhancement of *worldwide interdependence* and the general growth of awareness of deepening global connections as gradual processes with deep historical roots”⁸³. These definitions emphasize close dependency and interconnections between different extremities of a global network i.e. sustainable and consistent transnational links. Thus, I argue that globalization, as a tool, will require *addressing all (even the local) problems in the wider, transnational framework of interdependences beyond the local or regional context*.

For some phenomena such as terrorism or poverty, globalization theory can from the start appear more suitable because of the prominence of their trans-local dependencies. However, the aim of this paper is to show the validity of this analytical tool for a particular local phenomenon.

⁸⁰ My italics, Anthony Giddens, *Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 51.

⁸¹ My italics, Anthony Giddens, (ed.) *Sociology. Introductory Readings*, (Cambridge: Polity 2001), 44.

⁸² Qtd. In Jürgen Osterhammel, Niels P. Peterson, *Globalization: A Short History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 8.

⁸³ My italics, Bruce Mazlish, Akira Iriye, eds. *The Global History Reader*, (NY: Routledge, 2005), 17-8.

2.2 Models of ethnic integration to nation bound frameworks (assimilation and alternative theories)

As mentioned earlier, the second analytical tool which I will make use of is assimilation theory. Its classical version is present in Gordon's study⁸⁴ who define assimilation as a one-sided process that assumes that the minority group would change its characteristics in order to assimilate. Nowadays an uncomfortable concept, assimilation is paralleled by alternative and more liberal models of ethnic incorporation such as "melting pot" and cultural pluralism according to Giddens⁸⁵. One could say that the three models stand for different degrees of assimilation where the first refers to fully *integrated* societies, the second to looser forms of assimilation and the third to non assimilated but cohabitated parallel communities. "It [assimilation] means being or seeking to be similar to the majority society in dress, language, education, culture. Contrary to much tendentious usage, assimilation does not mean an end of (...) identity"⁸⁶. In addition to this there are scholars who argue for a theory of "segmented assimilation", that is to say that assimilation is still a valid model of incorporation but that there are several parallel segments to which the individuals assimilate⁸⁷.

What is interesting is that no matter which of these models we choose, the current models of ethnic integration focus on the (non-)assimilation of a particular ethnic group to a national framework. In regards to the purpose of this study, their emphasis rests on integration *to a nation-bound context* and assumes the actors

⁸⁴ Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1964).

⁸⁵ Giddens, *Sociology*, 256. For a recent review of concepts of assimilation see Harold Abramson, "Assimilation and Pluralism" in Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov, and Oscar Handlin (eds.), *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 150-160; Philip Gleason "American Identity and Americanization" in Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov, and Oscar Handlin (eds.), *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1980), 31-58; Charles Hirshman, "America's Melting Pot Reconsidered", *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983) 397-423; Richard Alba and Victor Nee *Remaking of the American Mainstream. Assimilation and Contemporary Migration* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), For a general discussion of assimilation see Robert Ezra Park, "Assimilation, Social" in Edwin Seligman and Alvin Johnson, eds., *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1930)

⁸⁶ Lloyd P. Gartner "Emancipation in Western Europe, 1815-1870" in *History of the Jews in Modern Times* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 130.

⁸⁷ See Kathryn Neckerman, Prudence Carter, and Jennifer Lee, "Segmented Assimilation and Minority Cultures of Mobility" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (June 1999), 945-965.

within this context as being the active factors that determine integration. To summarize, *such a paradigm looks at the factors, relations and transformations taking place between the two (natives and minority) ethnic groups involved.*


3. Investigations

3.1. First Approach: Assimilation theory

3.1.1 Structure of the analysis

The purpose of a study on the integration of the Jewish community in today's Germany is to derive the description of the factors that are shaping it i.e. *the factors, the specificity* of the bilateral determination between the host country and the minority group and, based on this *to asses the degree of integration* of GJ community as shown in Figure 1. I want to stress that, since we investigate a phenomenon which takes place within a national, geographical and, cultural perimeter, in our case Germany, attention will be given only to factors within Germany.

Figure 1. The classic model investigating the integration of Jewish community in Germany: the relationships between the two actors involved



3.1.2 Historical perspective on Jewish community in Germany

Since the phenomenon we are interested in is a result of historically rooted processes, the assimilation approach has to look at the history of the Jewish community in Germany. In other words, the degree of assimilation of the GJ community in contemporary Germany arises from a historical development of interwoven relations between the Jews who settled in Germany and the German natives.

As Webber argues, “assimilation (...) consisted of whole series of cultural adaptations and adjustments, each of which left its mark on today’s realities”⁸⁸.

Jewish settlement in Germany began in the 4th century with the migration of the Ashkenazi in “barbarian” (not yet Christian) land and continued throughout successive centuries, resulting in thriving communities with an active and intellectual life. Already by the 8th century, Jewish communities were flourishing along the Rhine River living harmoniously with their Christian neighbors. They rapidly came to acquire a special reputation as merchants.

[T]he emerging Jewish merchant class created a vast international network that traversed the Ashkenazi world. Jews would meet at regional fairs to learn about the fates of other communities, to network, and, of course, to trade. The economic and social connections that the Jews formed throughout the continent made them much more valuable than non-Jewish merchants, whose influence seldom reached beyond their immediate surroundings.⁸⁹

In the medieval period, outstanding centers of Jewish of life and learning were found in the Rhineland communities. However, the Golden Age ended with the Crusades when Jews suffered massacres and expulsions. Many immigrated eastward Germany. In the 19th century Jews were granted emancipation, which found official expression in the 1871 constitution. In fact, much of modern Jewish thinking originated in Germany. The Reform movement initiated by the emancipation was founded in Germany during the early 19th century and spread from there to other parts of the Diaspora.

If prior to the 1933 German Jewish Diaspora (with an estimated population of 503, 000) the Jews in Germany had been successful in commerce, industry, arts and science, the emergence and dominance of National Socialism changed this completely. In 1935, the Nuremberg Laws were enacted, prohibiting marital or extramarital relations between Jews and German Gentiles. In October 1941, the deportations to the death camps began. After the war, the Jewish community was reconstituted, but displaced persons (DPs) from various countries in Eastern Europe accounted for the majority of its members.

⁸⁸ Jonathan Webber, “Modern Jewish Identities” in *Jewish Identities in the New Europe*, Jonathan Webber, ed., (London: Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, 1994), 78.

⁸⁹ David Shyovitz „The Virtual Jewish History Tour Germany“, 2006, database on-line. Available at <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/germany.html>

Currently, according to the Central Council of Jews in Germany (*Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland*) the Jewish Diaspora has 105,000 individual members⁹⁰. There are an additional 40,000 to 80,000 non registered members of the community. Berlin has the largest community, with more than 11,000 members. The second largest communities with nearly 10,000 members each are found in Frankfurt am Main and Munich.⁹¹

3.1.3 Terms of concrete analysis

The literature dealing with the Jewish experience in Germany is rather vast but concentrated mainly in two directions: the *historical Jewish experience* that is, one that gives historical accounts of the Jewish presence on the territory⁹² and, second, the Jewish experience in postwar Germany. If the former is concerned with describing the settlement, the latter highlights the threefold peculiarity of the modern Jewish experience: (1) the *problematic* nature of the relations between members of the Jewish community and the Gentile population in a post Second World War Germany; (2) the absence of a clear criterion for identifying members of the Jewish community since Jewishness itself is a constructed and historicized concept; and (3) the choice for remaining in exile as part of the Diaspora after the consolidation of the State of Israel.

In their studies, Webber, Liebman and Goldschneider⁹³ are particularly concerned with what they call “modern Jewish identity”, which they describe as the result of two simultaneous processes: on the one hand assimilation into a wider society and, on the other hand, the preservation of identity (the counter-

⁹⁰ Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, „Integration“ 2006.Database on-line.

Available at <http://www.zentralratjuden.de/en/topic/106.html> in 27.11.2006.

⁹¹ OSCE “Education on the Holocaust and Anti-Semitism: An Overview and Analysis of Educational” approaches”,119. Database on-line. Available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odhr/2005/06/14897_en.pdf in 21.11.2006.

⁹²Gartner, *History*. Ruth Gay, *The Jews in Germany: A Historical Perspective*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992),

⁹³ Jonathan, Webber “Notes Towards the Definition of ‘Jewish Culture’ in Contemporary Europe” in *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond*, Gitelman, Z., Kosmin, B., Kovacs, A. eds.,(Budapest: CEU 2003), 317-340., Liebman, Charles S. “Jewish Identity in Transition: Transformation or Attenuation” in *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond*, Gitelman, Z., Kosmin, B., Kovacs, A. eds.,(Budapest: CEU 2003), 341-49., Goldscheider, Calvin. “Modernization, Ethnicity and the Post-War Jewish World” in *Terms of Survival. The Jewish World Since 1945*, R. Wistrich ed., (London :Rutledge, 1995), 130-143.

assimilation movement). “(B)eing Jewish today means, most of all, the identification with Jewish culture. Jewish culture has replaced the synagogue, Israel, and philanthropy to become the major Jewish concern. This...is a major shift in Jewish identity (...)”⁹⁴. But the result of this emphasis on the transformation of Jewish identity is that “(...) the whole process of negotiating and renegotiating the details of Jewish cultural distinctiveness in its non-Jewish Diaspora setting is something we know very little about (...)”⁹⁵.

3.2 Second Approach: Globalization Theory

3.2.1 Structure of the analysis

From a perspective of *globalization*, we would have to include into our analysis an enhanced network of relations. Only speaking of the German- Jewish *Diaspora* instead of a *GJ community* gives our research a new spectrum. By placing *Diaspora* in a globalization context and by identifying it as a “transnational social form”⁹⁶ our previous two-factor diagram becomes multi-factored including a series of supra- and transnational actors. In addition to this, Soysal argues for a reconsideration of the transnational connections and questions the use of the concept of “Diaspora” as an analytic category in contemporary scholarship because of its concentration on polarizing the analysis on the ethnical dimension (natives and members of the *Diaspora* as belonging to different ethnic groups), therefore neglecting the transgression of the national and overshadowing the new dynamics and topographies of adhesion⁹⁷.

In this vein, Robert Cohen defines *Diasporas* in a globalization context, suggesting the following criteria

(...) (1) a forced or voluntary movement from an original homeland to a new region or regions; (2) a shared memory about the original homeland, a commitment to its preservation and belief in the possibility of eventual return; (3) a strong ethnic identity sustained over time and distance; (4) *a sense of solidarity with members of*

⁹⁴ Webber, *Jewish Culture*, 317.

⁹⁵ Webber, *Jewish Culture*, 322.


⁹⁶ Donald M. Nonini “Diasporas and Globalization” in *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*, vol.1, Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember and, Ian Skoggard eds., (NY: Springer, 2005), 563.

⁹⁷ Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal “Citizenship and identity: living in *Diasporas* in postwar Europe” in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23 (January 2000), 1.


*the same ethnic group also living in areas of Diaspora; (5) a degree of tension in relation to the host societies; (6) the potential for valuable and creative contributions to pluralistic host societies.*⁹⁸

Therefore, a comprehensive inquiry should consider a series of supranational actors by including in the analysis the relationship between the GJ Diaspora and the State of Israel, the GJ Diaspora and other Jewish Diasporas in the world and, the relationship between INGOs and the GJ Diaspora (Figure 2)

Table 2. Networks that influence the relations German Jewish Diaspora- Germany (Host country)



⁹⁸ My italics, qtd in Giddens, *Sociology*, 263.



In addition to the interconnections mentioned above, the figure indicates the state-to-state relations (blue arrows), the financial flows between members of the Jewish Diasporas world wide and the INGOs (red arrows) and the interdependence between the INGOs' policies and those of local Diasporas. Furthermore, there is an extra network between the Jewish Diasporas world-wide, although such relations often are as well mediated by INGOs. The treatment of the Jewry as a Diaspora introduced these changes however they have not always deemed themselves as a Diasporic group.

3.2.2 Historical perspective on Jewish community *as Diaspora*

Since coming to Europe, Jews have been members of a large network having had trade connections with other communities settled in different countries. However, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution at the end of 18th century in Europe brought internal reforms and changes and among the Jews grew a common desire to better integrate into the communities where they had been living for centuries. Their efforts to integrate failed since the legal rights granted at the beginning of the twentieth century were slowly taken back. In addition, the Jewish communities in Europe began to regard themselves as "communities in exile" i.e. as Diasporas when anti-Semitism and racist theories became more widespread. Therefore, we could pinpoint the moment of birth of the Jewry Diaspora with the birth and consolidation of the modern Zionist movement at the end of nineteenth century.

Defined as “Diaspora nationalism”⁹⁹, Zionism was founded as a response to anti-Semitism in Western Europe and to the violent persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe¹⁰⁰. While Zionism is based heavily upon Jewish religious tradition linking the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, the modern movement was mainly secular because it began largely as a response to anti-Semitism during the late 19th century. “The Political Zionists conceived Zionism as the Jewish response to anti-Semitism. They believed that Jews must have an independent state as soon as possible, in order to have a place of refuge for endangered Jewish communities”¹⁰¹.

Although early Zionist groups were already active¹⁰², the event that led to the spread of Zionism was the Dreyfus Affair. Theodor Herzl, who published the pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* (1896), witnessed the proceedings and eventually founded the World Zionist Organization in 1897. The organization set an example for many others¹⁰³.

3.2.3 Terms of concrete analysis

In order to better understand the dependences between the international actors and the GJ Diaspora I will concentrate on the roles and impact of two INGOs on the integration of this community in Germany. A series of INGOs operate in, or concern with Germany: The Jewish Agency (founded in

⁹⁹ Ernest Geller, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 107-8.

¹⁰⁰ Zionism as a form of diasporic nationalism is part of a larger discussion on the existence of a long-distance nationalism. See Arjun Appadurai *Modernity at large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) and, Nina Glick Schiller “Long-distance Nationalism” in *Encyclopedia of Diasporas* vol.1, M. Ember, C. Ember and I. Skoggard eds., (NY: Springer, 2005), 570-583.

¹⁰¹ Stephen M. Wylen, *Settings of Silver: An Introduction to Judaism*, (NY: Paulist Press, 2000), 392.

¹⁰² Such as Hibbat Zion (1880), Society for the Support of Jewish Farmers and Artisans in Syria and Eretz Israel (1890) in Eastern Europe.

¹⁰³ Usually associated with Herzl’s *Der Judenstaat*, Zionism in its modern understanding made was conceptualized as early as 1861 in Moses Hess’ *Rome and Jerusalem* and 1881 in Leo Pinsker’s *Auto-Emancipation*. More than a decade after “ Herzl, completely unaware of Hess and Pinsker and their books, found out for himself what they had discovered before him.” qtd. In Lucy Dawidowicz, *The Jewish Presence. Essays on Identity and History*, (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 25.

1923 but recognized in 1929), The Keren Hayesod (The Foundation Fund) (founded in 1920), Jewish Health Care International (1999), the World Zionist Organization (1897) and the American Jewish Committee (1906). I will now take a detailed look at The Jewish Agency and American Jewish Committee, two of the organizations with a historical commitment to the interests of Jews world wide.

Example 1: The Jewish Agency (JA)

First founded under the name “Jewish Agency for Palestine” in 1929, this INGO plays a key role in the history of the State of Israel. When the declaration of independence of the State of Israel was proclaimed (1947), the Jewish Agency became the provisional legislature and government and David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, became Prime Minister. In May 1948, the Jewish Agency separated from the government but kept responsibility for immigration, land settlement, youth work, and relations with the world Jewry.

Today, in addition to programs in Israel, the Jewish Agency operates in close to 80 countries on five continents through a network of over 450 emissaries, including hundreds of formal and informal educators. The mission carried out by all these actors is to enact the Agency’s agenda at all levels of the society. “The Jewish agency is committed to the process of integration as an inseparable part of *aliyah*¹⁰⁴. Successful absorption is crucial for strengthening the immigrants and Israeli society – and for promoting continued *aliyah*”¹⁰⁵. In their 2004 Activity Report, The Jewish Agency summarizes its activities conducted in Germany:

Germany: 2004 saw a marked rise in immigration from Germany. The Jewish Agency works extensively with Jews who emigrated from FSU [Former Soviet

¹⁰⁴ *Aliyah*, Hebrew word meaning „ascent“, referring to the act of spirituality „ascending“ to the Holy Land. Nowadays it stands for immigration to Israel.

¹⁰⁵ The Jewish Agency „2004 Activity Report“, 2004. Database on-line. Available at <http://www.jewishagency.org/NR/rdonlyres/9F5A29E0-C445-49B8-978B-3F121B8DF9B5/14132/AR2005.pdf>, in 21.11.2006.

Union] to Germany to ease the considerable difficulties they face in integration as well as to promote their *aliyah* to Israel.¹⁰⁶

This proves that the Agency directly influences *quantitatively the size of GJ Diaspora* because of its commitment and support for immigration to the State of Israel. Moreover, the Agency is actively involved in integrating the new members and, simultaneously works towards their *aliyah* to Israel.

In 2004, two *aliyah* employment-focused fairs were held in Germany. Participants received information on job opportunities and heard personal success stories of recent immigrants from Germany who made *aliyah* to Israel.¹⁰⁷

Secondly, the Agency has a direct and pragmatic involvement in the integration of the Jewish Diaspora in Germany by trying to offer them better chances on the job market. Having a job will increase their quality of life and ease their assimilation into German society. While assimilation theory might look at the level of integration of German-Jews on the job market and through this evaluate the effects of state policies and state run projects, globalization theory makes visible the role of the Jewish Agency, a supranational actor in integrating members of the Jewish community on the German labour market.

The Jewish Agency is leading diplomatic efforts for Germany to change its designation of Jews from the former Soviet Union as refugees. We are preparing a 2005 action plan in anticipation of Germany's change in its immigration laws.¹⁰⁸

Thirdly, the Agency is lobbying to change the legal status of a significant portion of the GJ Diaspora's members, seeking to lead to an adjustment of the policies regarding them and, consequently, of their rights.

If until now we have looked at how the Agency influences the GJ Diaspora, let us now see the wider network of interdependencies in which this INGO is located. Table 1 allows us to track these dependencies by following the capital flows that constitute the Jewish Agency's budget.

¹⁰⁶ JA, Report 2004.

¹⁰⁷ JA, Report, 2004.

¹⁰⁸ JA, Report, 2004.

Table 1. International Donors of the Jewish Agency Revenues (capital global flows)

	Consolidated		Jewish Agency	
	2004	2003	2004	2003
U.S. dollars in thousands				
REVENUES:				
<i>Donations and contributions:</i>				
Unrestricted donations and contributions:				
United Israel Appeal, Inc.	143,224	145,681	143,224	145,681
Keren Hayesod - United Israel Appeal	40,674	37,625	40,674	37,625
International Fellowship	3,000	6,000	3,000	6,000
Direct donations & Spirit of Israel	1,246	709	1,246	709
Net assets released from restrictions:				
United Israel Appeal, Inc.	79,643	110,260	79,643	110,260
U.S. government grant	49,869	57,484	49,869	57,484
Keren Hayesod - United Israel Appeal	54,222	41,073	54,222	41,073
International Fellowship	10,222	8,147	10,222	8,147
Direct donations & Spirit of Israel	11,961	8,415	11,961	8,415
Other income	72,543	78,687	43,210	50,817
Financial income	1,596	1,373	1,596	1,373
	468,200	495,454	438,867	467,584


Source: The Jewish Agency 2004 Activity Report

As one can observe, the financial resources of the Agency come from either private individual donations (donations raised also by INGOs) or from governmental grants such as the U.S. Government Grant. However, the Agency notes in its 2004 Activity Report:

Revenues: the Jewish Agency revenues decreased 6%, totaling \$439 million in comparison with \$468 million in 2003. The main reason for this decrease was a \$7.5 million decrease in the grant allocated to the Jewish Agency by the US government and a reduction in the scope of designed (designated?) budget activity¹⁰⁹.

This shows how a change in the grant amount offered by the US government directly influences the Agency’s budget and, therefore, decreases the number of missions they are able to carry out.

Figure 3. The Jewish Agency and GJ Diaspora in a global network



¹⁰⁹ JA, Report, 2004.

To put it in other words, a decrease in the grant amount offered by the US (*local change*) in the network *affects* the integration of the GJ Diaspora (*the extremities of the network*) as shown in Figure 3.

Example 2: American Jewish Committee (AJC)

Immediately following World War II, the AJC became the first Jewish organization with programs in Germany and, in 1997 they opened a permanent office in Berlin. Today, the office also coordinates the work of the Lawrence and Lee Ramer Center for German-Jewish Relations.

As stated, by the AJC, „The Berlin office brings the organization’s weight and influence to bear on matters of importance, such as *anti-Semitism, democratization, tolerance, Jewish security, including that of Israel, and the quality of Jewish life throughout the world*“ (my italics, AJC Germany).

Since opening its Berlin office, the „AJC has developed relationships and programs with all key government leaders and political foundations in Germany, and this has afforded the AJC the opportunity to address difficult questions such as antiforeigner violence in Germany, and to convince the German government together with German industries and German insurance *companies to complete the process of restitution*“¹¹⁰. However, the AJC’s main activities concern education and more specifically political education in Germany. In the last few years, the INGO had run three programs of political education (Bildungsprogramme) in different schools across Germany.

- **Taskforce Education on Anti-Semitism** (2001): investigates current manifestations of Anti-Semitism and develops educational courses of action.
- **AJC Tolerance Education Network** (2001) :
purpose: to increase and to strengthen knowledge about democracy, human rights and pluralism; A forum for experts in the fields of NGOs and governmental agencies.

¹¹⁰ American Jewish Committee “International Activities: Europe”, Database on-line. Available at <http://www.ajc.org/site/c.ijIT12PHKoG/b.835975/k.D5ED/Europe.htm>, in 19.11.2006.

- ***Hands Across the Campus*** (2003/2004): mirrors a program conducted in USA in 1981; *purpose: political formation of the pupils*, i.e. development of democratic thinking (Demokratieerziehungsprogramms)¹¹¹.

The programs conducted by the AJC seek to change *the perception and the attitudes* of both Jews and Germans about one another and, consequently ease the integration of the GJ Diaspora. Furthermore, the AJC's influence spans so widely since it is the institution that provided OSCE with data and evaluations concerning how education on Holocaust and Anti-Semitism is conducted.¹¹²

The examples of the two Jewish INGOs bring to the foreground a number of elements which affect the integration of the GJ Diaspora in contemporary Germany. Let us examine our findings.

4. Using globalization as a tool

4.1. Disadvantages

Using globalization theory as a tool appears to have some deficiencies. The first criticism, the so called "holes in the net" argument, comes from the fact that the local does not always get to the other point of the network, i.e. it does not always have an impact on all the extremities of the network.

Secondly, the globalization perspective fails to address the specificity of the integration of the GJ Diaspora in contemporary Germany. This happens because this tool puts more *importance on the trans-national relations and trans-national factors* than on the particularities of this Diaspora. What it does is traces the supra-national actors that have an important impact on the integration of this

¹¹¹American Jewish Committee Germany „Bildungsprogramme" (Educational programs). Database on-line. Available at

<http://www.ajcgermany.org/site/c.fkLSJcMUKtH/b.1722115/k.AC56/Bildungsprogramme.htm>, in 23.11.2006.

¹¹² OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) report on „Education on the Holocaust and Anti-Semitism: An Overview and Analysis of Educational Approaches" 2005. Database on-line. Available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/06/14897_en.pdf, in 12.11.2006 notes in a footnote "the information in this country overviews was provided by the Task Force on anti-Semitism and Education, American Jewish Committee Berlin office, in cooperation with national experts (...)"

community. It does not follow up its consequences by investigating the effects of this impact and showing how they actually shape the interactions between Germans and German Jews.

4.2 Advantages

From the perspective of globalization studies, the traditional model of analysis leaves out important factors at a supra-national level. Conversely, an investigation exclusively focused on from the assimilation perspective would consider only the local state of affairs.

Thus, globalization makes visible the connections that lead to key actors, which an assimilation approach would have overlooked. For our case, these are the interconnections that exist between the GJ Diaspora and the two supra-national actors represented here by the Jewish Agency and the American Jewish Committee.

5. Conclusions

This paper examines the benefits of using globalization as a tool for the investigation of a local phenomenon, the integration of the Jewish Diaspora/community in contemporary Germany. The aim is to show whether an enquiry from the perspective offered by globalization studies would be in anyway enriching or more fruitful than the existing methods of ethnic integration. I presented the processes that the two instruments would presuppose, pointed to the differences between the two of them and, in the end, identified the advantages and disadvantages of using globalization as a tool.

Despite its deficiencies, globalization proves to be useful as a tool for the investigation of the integration of the GJ Diaspora in Germany because it highlights important facts which other approaches overlook. Moreover, this paper argues that the active involvement of supranational actors such as INGOs with Diasporas is one of the dimensions that needs to be taken into consideration in research dealing with all Diasporas. However, in “Diasporas and International Agencies” using

Cohen's taxonomy of Diasporas¹¹³, Leopold claims that "(there are) more powerful relations between *victim Diasporas* and international agencies than between *labour Diasporas* and international agencies"¹¹⁴. Thus, the INGOs involvement with the Jewish Diaspora might be higher than with other Diasporas.

However, the findings should be **corroborated** with the results of other theoretical tools in order to gain a more complete picture of this relevant social phenomenon. As Giddens put it, "each of these various methods of research has its limitations. For this reason, researchers will often combine two or more methods in their work, each being used to check or supplement the material obtained by others"¹¹⁵. Applying globalization as a tool did not confirm the findings of the assimilation approach, rather it *supplemented them*.

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¹¹³ In *Global Diasporas*, Robin Cohen introduces a five-type taxonomy: victim (where he nominates the Jewish, African and Armenian), imperial (British), labour (Indian), trade (Chinese) and cultural (Caribbean).

¹¹⁴ Mark Leopold "Diasporas and International Agencies" in "Diasporas and Globalization" in *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*, vol.1, Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember and, Ian Skoggard eds., (NY: Springer, 2005), 422.

¹¹⁵ Giddens, *Sociology*, 660.

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